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CHAPTER CXXIII.

THE BATTLE OF VERDUN (I).

Motives of the German Offensive at Verdun—The Winter Preparations—Position of the Crown Prince—Description of the French Salient—The Preliminary Bombardment—The Infantry Attack on February 21—Analysis of the German Gains—How the French Checked the Advance—Result of the Operations, February 21 to February 24—The French Motor Transport and what it Achieved—The Bombardment of the Town of Verdun—The German Strength and Order of Battle—General Pétain takes over the Verdun Command—His Career and Personality—The Attack on Fort Douaumont—German Official Reports and Fictitious Claims—Lord Northcliffe's Dispatch to *The Times*—French Confidence.

AN enthusiastic German survey of the war, at the beginning of 1916, would have shown that German arms had nearly everywhere dealt the enemy "heavy blows." Hindenburg and Maekensen had marched from province to province, from victory to victory, overwhelming the badly equipped but stubborn Russians. In the West the "steel barrier" had held firm against the shrewd thrusts made at it in Artois and in Champagne. The Italians were held along Austria's mountain frontier. The belated efforts of the Allies to come to the assistance of Serbia had proved unavailing, and another small people lay crushed.

But, viewed through less partial speetaeles, there were disquieting elements. Just as the little nations of the war had refused to bow to Germany and had continued the struggle, so the big nations had ever denied complete achievement to the Central Powers. As they had failed at the gates of Paris, and along the Calais road, so had they failed in Russia and in south-eastern Europe to push success to its final conclusion.

Sueeess but no deeision sums up German achievements in the first eighteen months of war. And on the horizon the storm still gathered. The smoke of war factories grew thieker and thieker over the lands of Germany's enemies. The khaki pateh over the fields of Northern Franee was spreading steadily. The equipment of the Russian armies was proeeeding. In every country of the allianee the spirit of the first few months of war remained unshakable.

Failure had attended all efforts to sow diseord between them. Co-ordination was taking the plaee of isolated thought and action. German foreign trade lay dead, and the great Hansa ports were idle. Throughout the world the exehange value of the mark was falling. If internal troubles were rare and unimportant, the tinder for a eonflagration lay plentifully to hand in the inereasing eost of food, the extension of the rationing system, and in the lengthening casualty lists.

Deeision was beeoming more and more urgently neeessary. Limited sueeess eould no longer suffiee, and vietory to be eomplete had to be won over the ehief land opponent and upon the deeisive Western front.

The first preparations for a big German offensive in the West appear to have been begun immediately after the eheek of the great French attaek in Champagne in September and October, 1915. The choiee of Verdun as an objective was dietated in the main by



GENERAL HENRI PHILIPPE PETAIN,
Who took over the command at Verdun after the first German assault.

military considerations. Verdun, it was true, constituted a position of great strength. But German strategy had a forceful logic which drove it to seek out the enemy's strength and to strike at it with the maximum of vigour. The maximum of effort had to produce the maximum of result. The Germans were within ten miles of their objective. The position to be attacked formed a salient, the defenders of which had to fight with their backs to the Meuse and with their main line of railway communication cut by the German heavy artillery.

In addition to the maximum of military result, the German General Staff also sought the maximum of moral effect both in Germany and throughout the rest of the world. The old glamour of the word "fortress" hung about the Meuse town. It was the key to Paris. It was known throughout Europe as the Eastern Gate of France, and by other names which under the new conditions of war had lost their appropriateness. The Germans might have selected Soissons or Arras for attack, but there victory would have failed to create the same effect as would have been caused by the fall of "the *Festung* Verdun" upon the spirits of the German and French peoples, and upon the general atmosphere of the Allied Conferences which were expected to assemble in Paris to discuss plans for a co-ordinated summer campaign. There was a further reason which may well have contributed to the decision of the German General Staff. Warlike success or military reputation was ever a necessity to the Hohenzollerns. Never was this more so than in this war—the "great adventure" of the German military spirit. Examination of the German commands show to how great an extent dynastic considerations were taken into account. On the outbreak of war the future ruler of Imperial Germany had received a command commensurate with his rank if superior to his military record and experience. But even with the counsel and support of the veteran Field-Marshal von Haeseler, and a staff comprising the best military brains of the empire, fortune had not unduly favoured his arms. Checked during the rush to Paris by the

stubborn defence of Longwy, checked again in his furious endeavour to batter through the Fort de Troyon in the closing days of the battle of the Marne, held by many to be responsible for the puzzling features of German strategy before the battle of the Marne, the German Crown Prince had led his men from one disappointment to another. In the Allied camp there was, however, a tendency to attach too much importance to this series of set-backs. It was readily overlooked that while the Crown Prince had nowhere triumphed, he had also nowhere been routed. It was generally forgotten, moreover, by the public in France and in Great Britain, that he was surrounded by advisers who made up for his deficiency in knowledge of the art of war. It was not sufficiently realized that the military and dynastic interest which had allotted to the Prince his chance of glory had also seen to it that his chance should be as great as possible. In consequence his army, in addition to being the best staffed, was in many respects the best disciplined and the best equipped of the forces operating on the Western front.

The preparations for the smashing of French military power occupied the opening months of the year. The task before the enemy was arduous. The Crown Prince surveyed a battlefield presenting uncommon difficulties as well as uncommon advantages.

In the Verdun area, as elsewhere in the West, the front had solidified through chance and the small profits of trench war into an irregular line such as would be seldom selected or imposed by tactics or strategy. General Sarrail, who first commanded the army operating around Verdun, was the first General to whom the fortune of the fighting had given time to learn and profit by the fate which had overtaken the great fortresses of Liége, Namur, and Antwerp. In November, 1914, General Sarrail, speaking to the Paris corre-

GENERAL PETAIN (centre) WALKING WITH GENERAL JOFFRE (on left).



VERDUN AND ITS DEFENCES.

spondent of *The Times*, who was then visiting the Meuse front, said, "Fortresses are built to be taken and 'ville assiégée, ville prise' is an old military maxim which events have brought thoroughly up to date."

The General determined to give the Germans as little chance as possible of besieging Verdun in the old strict sense of the word. Little by little, without any great offensive, he gradually pushed the German lines farther and farther away from the fortification system of the city. The result was that when the German offensive was launched at the beginning of 1916 the line of the French salient on the east bank of the Meuse was based upon Brabant, Consenvoye, Haumont, Bois des Caures, Bois de Wavrille, Herbebois, Ornes, Maucourt, Mogeville, Braux

FRENCH TROOPS WORKING A SMALL BOMB-THROWING MORTAR.

Lake, Haute Charrière Wood, Fresnes en Woevre, Les Eparges and the neighbourhood of St. Mihiel. In this large salient the French had turned to account the first lessons of the war, and armies of men had toiled for months remodelling the system of defence of Verdun, the whole region of which had become an exhibition of every kind of fortification, from the moats and battlements of the town itself to the latest erections in the way of earth and trench work.

The front upon which the first fury of the German offensive broke was the northern sector of the line in the Hauts de Meuse, a region of rolling hills and tortuous valleys, which offered great difficulties to both sides. There were numerous positions from which the rival artilleries were able to enfilade any movements of troops. Countless were the opportunities of surprise, of encircling, and of cutting expeditions. The splendid observation posts to be found at other places along the line—on the Aisne for instance—whence Generals were able to survey the whole of the front of their Army at a glance, were here entirely lacking. The barriers of wooded hillside which cut up the country, impeding any large survey of the operations as a whole, served as the real fortifications of the city, and the forts themselves ceased to possess the special significance of forts and became but specially strong points in the extended network of trench defence.

The German preparations for their onslaught upon this very strong position were on a very large scale. The magnitude of preparation, indeed, quite defeated any possibility of surprise. The German Emperor arrived at Mezières to watch the progress of the work. The appearance of at least thirteen new divisions upon the Western front, the removal from the front line of German army corps for rest and refitting, the bringing up of the 1916 class of conscripts to the Western front, the completion of units along the line, were definite shadows of coming events. In December, 1915, the Germans brought up the greater portion of their heavy artillery from Serbia as well as some of the large guns which had been used with such effect upon the Russian front. Traction material, Austrian 12-inch howitzers, and several 17-inch howitzers came in to strengthen the weight of the German gunfire. The final preparations were carried out under cover of great offensive activity along the whole of the Western front. There were "feeling" attacks in Champagne, along the coast, in Flanders, in Artois, on the Somme, the Aisne, the Moselle, and in Alsace. These attacks deceived no one on the allied side. They revealed no great strategic intention. They remained local and were met with local forces, the main reserves of the French remaining at the free disposal of the Higher Command ready to be moved when the exact spot upon which the great effort of the enemy was to be made became clear.

Points of resemblance between the Champagne offensive of the French and the great German onslaught on Verdun are many. The first similarity between these two great battles was, however, due entirely to the normal development of the modern battle in which aerial fighting precedes intense cannonade. The aerial offensive of the Germans was announced on

BEFORE VERDUN.

The French repelling the unceasing German attacks.

February 21 and its results were of good omen for the future. All around the Verdun salient the enemy air services were active in attempting to interfere with the Verdun communications by heavy aerial bombardment of important railway and supply centres. The most persistent of these attacks was directed against the station of Révigny, one of the many towns in the eastern Marne which bore traces of the Crown Prince's passage after the battle of the Marne. In the neighbourhood of Révigny a squadron of 15 enemy machines was brought to a fight by the French and considerable damage was done to the raiders before they had had much opportunity of effecting their purpose. Here later in the day the French scored their first success in what was about to become the battle of Verdun when a motor gun crew brought down a Zeppelin in flames near Brabant le Roi and forced a sister ship to turn tail and return to harbour.

After the preliminary air skirmishing, as in the battle of the Champagne, the artillery got to work. Along the whole line of the threatened front—at 7.15 on the morning of February 21—the storm burst with unexampled fury. The enemy had scientifically considered the results of the French attack in Champagne. They had seen that, with the expenditure of so many million shells on a front so many miles long with such and such density of attacking troops, the French had failed to pierce through the whole of their defensive system. They, therefore, decided to increase all the factors of success. By employing a still larger number of guns and men upon a smaller front the intensity of the attack was increased enormously. It became possible to reduce the period of preparatory bombardment, and thus deprive the enemy of the chance of bringing up reserves. The concentration of German artillery of every possible calibre upon the Verdun front was such that the French aerial observers abandoned the task of noting the exact position of each battery upon their maps, whole districts, such as the Forest of Spincourt and the Gremilly Wood, having been converted into emplacements of artillery in action. The front to be attacked was systematically flooded with high explosive, tear and suffocating gas shells. One zone in the neighbourhood of the Herbebois Wood, about three-quarters of a square mile in extent, was so scientifically treated by the German artillery that at the end of a bombardment of some hours the whole region resembled a field the soil of which had been turned by some new kind of agricultural machine. A veil of smoke and dust floated over the battlefield. After an hour's bombardment the first line of the French was practically isolated. All telephone communications had been cut, and *liaison* had to be attempted by means of runners. An eye-witness describing the Verdun bombardments wrote:

> Without ceasing shells of every calibre are bursting around us with tremendous hubbub, and the air is torn with incessant explosions. Thousands of projectiles are flying in every direction, some whistling, others howling, others moaning low, and all this whistling, howling, and moaning unites in one infernal roar. From time to time an aerial torpedo passes making a noise like that of a gigantic rattling motor car. All these missiles of destruction flying over a fairly wide area burst one upon the other, so dense is the fire. Shell fragments fly on every side from the cloud of smoke and earth which soon becomes so persistent that it finally covers the earth like a thick fog. With a tremendous thud a giant shell bursts quite close to our observation post, breaking the telephone wires and interrupting all communication with our batteries. A man gets out at once for repairs, crawling along on his belly through all this place of bursting mines and shells. It seems quite impossible that he should escape from the rain of shell which is falling with disquieting rapidity. The enemy's shell expenditure exceeds anything imaginable. There has never been such a bombardment in war before. Our man seems to be enveloped in explosives and shelters himself from time to time in the shell craters which lie thick upon the ground one upon the other. He finally reaches a less stormy spot, mends up his wires, and, as it would be madness to try to return to cover, he settles down into a big shell crater, and waits for the storm to pass.

Under this tremendous fire the first line and large portions of the supporting lines of French trench disappeared, and a mass of tumbled earth took their places. The woods in the first line of the French defences were splintered and shattered as though some wild tornado had swept down upon them. Great trees were uprooted and rent and the woods became filled with an undergrowth of splinters and *débris*. The French in their defensive organization of the woods had availed themselves to the full of the barbed wire protection to be obtained by stringing wire from tree to tree and from bush to bush. As the bombardment continued even this defence was destroyed. The *moral* of the men never weakened, and using the material provided for them by the rain of destruction around them, they were busied through even the worst of the bombardment in reorganizing their positions, making *chevaux de frises* out of the broken timber, turning the large shell craters into entrenchments, and getting ready for the waves of men which they knew were to follow.

The bombardment right along the line reached its culminating point between two and four o'clock in the afternoon, when floating over the German lines to regulate the fire of their guns were no less than six captive balloons. Meanwhile the French artillery was busy in reply, directing most of its fire upon the Forest of Spincourt, where the bulk of the German guns were massed, and endeavouring by barrage fire to impede the launching of the German infantry attack. At five o'clock the German guns lengthened their fire, and along the line the infantry advanced in small detachments to what had once been the French first defence trenches. They had been prepared for great events. Under the eye of the great War Lord they had rehearsed their victories. They had been told by their Generals in Army Orders that the battle upon which they were entering was "the last offensive against the French." On both sides hopes were high that at last the decisive moment had come.

The front attacked in this first day of the battle is sufficiently indicated by the three woods which stretch north of Verdun from Brabant to Ornes—the Haumont Wood, Bois des Caures and Herbebois. These were the three great centres of French resistance. Upon these woods all the fury of the German artillery fire had been directed. The German tactics in this opening stage of the battle consisted in overwhelming these centres of resistance with heavy calibre high-explosive shell, destroying dug-outs and machine-gun positions, and at the same time surrounding them with such heavy barrier fire as to make it impossible for supports either of men or of munitions to be sent up to their assistance. Once the work of destruction had been effected the infantry advance began. The idea of the enemy was that the artillery could obliterate the defence, and the infantry could then advance after reconnaissance to occupy the position. Each wave of infantry was preceded by a reconnoitring detachment, composed of 15 men, behind which came grenadiers and sappers. Advancing in accordance with this plan, the enemy soon got a footing at many points in the French line and gradually sought to flood out the defenders.

Everywhere they met with a defence weakened by the ravages of the bombardment, but nevertheless determined to delay and worry the enemy as long and as much as possible. By nightfall the results of the first day's offensive were unimportant. The Germans

A SINGLE-BARRELLED REVOLVER-CANNON.
Employed by the French at Verdun for trench work.

EFFECT OF FRENCH GRENADES.
Bursting in front of a German trench.

had got into the first line and had at several points got as far as the French support trenches.

The course of events can best be described by following the episodes of the battle section by section.

In the Bois D'Haumont, which constituted the left of the French position, the defence put up was particularly vigorous. The check administered by a few determined men to the German advance was of inestimable advantage to the defence of the rest of the line, enabling as it did the French to bring up their reserves.

The Germans had quickly realized that in Bois D'Haumont they had to meet particularly strong resistance, and the position received special attention at the hands of the German gunners, who covered every passage, every ravine, every clearing in the wood through which reinforcements and supplies might be moving. Under the violence of this bombardment the French lines gradually crumbled away, and towards six in the evening the enemy was creeping into the wood. In spite of a desperate resistance, in spite of many isolated fights in which the defenders gained a momentary advantage, the Germans then "filtered" into the wood in ever growing numbers, and by eight o'clock they had reached the southern fringe of the position. The French in the course of the night endeavoured, following their classic tactics, to deliver a counter-attack. The spring was broken, however, and under the constant hail of shell which was maintained throughout the night any offensive operations on the part of the defenders were quite out of the question.

At dawn on February 22 the French, who had decided to make a last stand in the village of Haumont, could find no comfort in their situation. No supplies were able to reach them through the shell-swept communications. They were without news either from the rear or from the troops on their flanks. The artillery posted in the woods and on the crest around was in the same position. The history of one battery engaged in this region is typical of the adventures of the artillery right along the front in these first few days of the German drive at Verdun.

"Our group of guns," said an officer, in relating his share in the fighting, "was south-east of Haumont wood when the fight began. One battery had scattered its guns east of Haumont and south and north of Samogneux. The two other batteries were farther south, supported by a battery of 90's. We naturally replied to German infantry attack by barrage

fire in order to prevent the enemy from reaching our lines. One of our sections went forward to an advanced position in the Ravine des Caures, and opened fire at almost point-blank range. But the Germans, in spite of tremendous sacrifices, began to flow in everywhere. They got into the Bois des Caures along the crests between the Bois d'Haumont and the Bois des Caures and carried our positions one after the other. This section shortened its fire as the enemy advanced, mowing the Germans down in their ranks. It was all no good. A fresh wave at once took the place of that destroyed and the advance continued. This section of

A FRENCH SAPPER WORKING IN A MINE GALLERY.

guns was blazing away when detachments of the enemy which had managed to get into the Bois d'Haumont made their appearance in the rear of our men. The gunners, having fired away all their shells, blew up their guns and retired. A battery of heavy guns on the Haumont crest did its duty under the most terrific fire. The battery had been found out with terrible accuracy by a group of the enemy's 305 mm. guns, which in less than a minute put 13 'coalboxes' into the position. The battery was compelled to cease fire for a while. At that moment a sergeant of artillery reported to the commanding major that his own battery had been destroyed, and was told off to serve the silenced heavy guns. Gathering other detached artillerymen, he got the battery going again and kept it at work for 48 hours. He remained at his post until the enemy infantry were close upon him, and then, having exhausted all his shells and blown up his guns, the heroic sergeant endeavoured to get through to the French lines, but without success."

Great interest attaches to the following account of the first four days of the German attack upon Verdun, as related by a French military doctor to one of his friends:

On the eve of the attack the positions of the batteries in the Caures wood had been changed. At the beginning of the attack his battery was bombarded at first by the German 5-inch and 8-inch guns, which, in other parts of the French front, had been considered heavy artillery. Then, when the whole position had been thoroughly "treated" with these shells, the Germans began quick fire with 12-inch and 15-inch guns. It was terrific. Behind the French batteries there were two or three zones of German curtain fire, through which the supplies of ammunition had to be brought up and the wounded removed. This was done, it seems, with astounding calm and unanimous heroism.

One gun of his battery was damaged by a shell and had to be removed to the rear. There remained three "75's," which fired ceaselessly. As soon as he had finished binding up the wounded and superintending their removal, he lent a hand in passing on the shells. An 8-inch shell passed between the legs of one of the men serving the battery, but it failed to explode. A little later a 12-inch shell caught this same man as it rebounded, threw him over the gun, and landed him head foremost in a dug-out. The man scrambled out again, saying, "Doctor, I really believe I am invulnerable."

Meanwhile the guns grew hot and tired. The man had gone back to his piece, while the doctor attended to the wounded 20 yards to the rear. Suddenly the gun burst. Raising his eyes, the doctor saw two of the gun's crew headless, and the poor "invulnerable" laid low with both legs cut off. Three minutes later he expired. The burst gun was removed. There remained two, of which one had a hole in its rifling as big as a five-franc piece, while the brake of the other was totally smashed —but still they fired. The gunners, who were splendid, stuck to their work as though nothing had happened.

When the Germans had so "watered" the ground with 12-inch and 15-inch shells that it was completely cut up, they began "watering" with the Austrian 4·1-inch guns, which are the most redoubtable enemy weapon, for they are the nearest thing they have got to our "75.

It was then really hell. But it was nothing compared with the moment when the German machine-guns got on to them. It seems that no cannon is as awful as the machine-gun. The men were dead tired—stretcher-bearers, fatigue parties, and gunners. The severely wounded were tied on to the empty ammunition wagons, and back they went, plunging in and out of the enormous craters which the German heavy shells had made.

That lasted until the moment when the German infantry advanced from the woods in rhythmic trot. Our fellows fired until the enemy was within 300 or 400 yards. Then, not wishing to be caught, they retired.

That was the worst moment of all. The men retreated foot by foot. It made one's heart bleed. They lay flat on the earth, enraged, but compelled to retire before the enemy's masses—and that lasted twenty-four hours!

Then came a moment of mad delight. Our attacking Corps appeared. On they came with indescribable rapidity and uncanny power. The poor fellows, worn

FRENCH HEROES AT THE BATTLE OF VERDUN.

During one of the fiercest assaults the commander of a 75 battery fired 800 shells in succession. The men cooled their guns incessantly with drinking-water from their bottles.

out, lying flat, watched the outpouring of that tremendous torrent of men, guns, ammunition, and all kinds of *matériel*. On it went, rushing forward, never stopping, unchecked, at a bewildering pace, with fantastic dash and "go."

The doctor said, "Never have I felt such joy. From that moment we all knew that the Huns were done for and that their advance was stayed."

Everywhere it was the same story; the guns were unable to get their shells up from the rear, every road, every communication trench, every supply column being exposed to murderous and fatal fire. The regiment which held Haumont had little doubt as to what its duty and its end were to be. It was completely cut off from supplies from the rear

and the enemy had enveloped its flanks. The bombardment towards eight o'clock became even more violent, and so thick was the screen of fire before the village of Haumont, where the gallant regiment lay, that it had to watch in inaction the advance of the German flame throwers to the trenches in the Consenvoye woods and their steady progress down the Ravine of Haumont towards the western edge of Haumont wood. At 10 o'clock heavy shells were falling on the village and neighbourhood of Haumont at the rate of 10 a minute. South of Haumont the bombardment cut the force off entirely. Towards two o'clock shells were falling on the village at the rate of 20 a minute, and the village of Haumont was nothing but a rubbish heap. Even the big armoured cement redoubt, upon which the French had at one time relied, collapsed under the repeated blows of the heavy guns, burying 80 men and several machine guns, and destroying the French ammunition depôt. At five o'clock the enemy advanced to the attack of the ruins of Haumont. They moved out a battalion strong in three columns from north, north-west, and east. The French, dazed and stunned by the tremendous bombardment to which they had been subjected, weakened by their losses in men, machine guns, and ammunition, spurred themselves on to defend. The enemy's left got held up on some wire which in spite of all the shell expenditure of the Germans had managed somehow or other to escape destruction. Here the French got usefully to work with their machine guns, but it was a vain effort. The enemy had pushed forward on his right and centre, and working through the village had crept up to the house where the Colonel and his staff were preparing to make a last stand. The German flame fighters thrust fire into the cellars, and their machine guns swept the exit from the house. The Colonel and his staff had two alternatives. Death by burning or the running of the mitrailleuse gauntlet. They chose the latter, and the Colonel walked through the machine-gun fire unscathed, organized the withdrawal of his regiment, and prepared to bar the road farther down south of Samogneux and Haumont.

The tactics which were employed at this section of the line were applied with equal success on the next portion of the French front, which must be considered as having been formed by the series of woods Consenvoye, Haumont, Caures, and Herbebois. These woods

A FRENCH HEAVY GUN IN ACTION.

NEAR THE GERMAN TRENCHES.
French troops cutting the barbed-wire.

were linked up by trench and organized very thoroughly for defence. The connecting trench defence, however, was the weak spot right along the line, and the enemy, while covering the main position in the woods with shell and plastering all approaches to the wood was able to break the connecting links and carry out a series of enveloping movements.

What happened at the Bois d'Haumont was repeated in circumstances of greater tragedy in the adjoining wood to the east—the Bois des Caures, which was held by two battalions of the famous French Chasseurs under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Driant, a member of the Chamber of Deputies. The first day of the offensive the German artillery bore with most of its weight upon Haumont. On February 21 their guns were, nevertheless, extraordinarily active, and carried out a bombardment of terrible violence along the Bois des Caures front, crushing in every dug-out and leaving the position bruised and shattered at five in the evening. The next day, the envelopment of the Haumont position having begun, all the weight of metal available was concentrated on the first trenches of the Bois des Caures, and the whole line became a dust heap. Under cover of this terrific fire the enemy now advanced from Haumont upon the western flank of the Bois des Caures position, and at noon on February 22 began to try to force a passage through the French support trenches from the west and to push down on the east of the wood from the direction of Ville. The French were considerably outnumbered. Their two battalions had suffered heavily from the bombardment, and the Germans were attacking with a complete and fresh brigade.

Nevertheless the French fought with great determination against the encircling movement. The fighting was very largely with grenades, and the bayonet came into play constantly throughout the day. In spite of all their efforts, however, the German hold on the position became stronger and stronger, and by 5.30 that evening the position of Colonel Driant's Chasseurs became extremely critical. The Germans had managed with great effort to get a gun into position along the Ville road, with which they were able to enfilade the chief point of the defence. Then it was that Colonel Driant held a final consultation with his staff, to whom he stated, without concealment, "In a few minutes we shall have to meet death or become prisoners." He paused for a moment, and added, "Perhaps we might manage to save some of these brave fellows."

FIELD-MARSHAL VON HAESELER.
The veteran who accompanied the German Crown Prince.

After making certain that nothing of value had been left in the dug-out, that all the ammunition which could not be carried away had been destroyed, the survivors of the two battalions split up into five columns and began their retreat from an already impossible position. Colonel Driant insisted on being the last man to leave the wood. The columns, as they debouched from the wood, were met by withering machine-gun fire, which took a heavy toll. Colonel Driant himself never left the wood. He was last seen alive taking refuge from a storm of projectiles in a shell crater. He met the end which, as a nationalist, and deputy for the proud city of Nancy, he most desired. The defence which the men under his command put up cost the enemy over 2,000 in killed and wounded, and delayed and weakened the German attack upon the main line of French resistance.

The most successful opposition to the German advance was made in the Bois d'Herbebois, to the east of the Bois des Caures. On the first day of the offensive all the enemy managed to achieve here was to gain a footing in the first line and to capture one of the defensive works of the supporting trench. Here the reaction was more prompt and more effective than it had been elsewhere along the line, and at midnight on February 21 the French launched a counter-attack which went on until half-past four in the morning. It did not, however, do much more than pin the Germans down to their positions. Throughout the 22nd grenade fighting continued without ceasing, and in night attack the enemy renewed his offensive after a heavy bombardment. His lack of success in no way diminished the ardour of his troops, and on the 23rd an enemy battalion advanced in serried formation upon the French position. Individual firing at 50 yards was the order of the day, and enormously did the French infantryman delight in such close range fighting. The French artillery here got to work with splendid results, and of the battalion which attacked but few were able to get through the curtain fire of the 75's and regain their own line. Undeterred by this massacre the German staff launched four more attacks upon the position with no more result. At a quarter past four on the 23rd the gallant defenders of Herbebois received an order to evacuate. They were informed that, the Wavrille wood having been taken, the whole position of Herbebois was endangered, and the staff was instructed to carry out the withdrawal with the very greatest discretion. The news of this order caused great grumbling among the men. They had fought as soldiers even in this war had seldom fought. Four of their grenadiers had remained for 20 hours at a point where the Germans and French met in a communication trench, hurling grenades at the enemy. The men had performed countless deeds of personal and collective heroism. They had fought like wild cats against greatly superior numbers, and with complete success. It required a rapid explanation of the requirements of strategy to make these men realize that they had to abandon a field of battle littered with hundreds of German corpses; a field of battle upon which they had fought not only the Germans, but the intense cold, snow, lack of food, and almost overwhelming bodily weariness. When they fell back upon the Chaumes wood, and got

FRENCH OFFICER'S FAREWELL TO HIS COMRADES.

Colonel Driant, Deputy for the Meuse, leading his men to the front-line in the Bois des Caures. The soldier-politician stood on the parapet of the trench and delivered a short inspiring address to his men, concluding with the words, "Charge, my children! Long live France!" These were Colonel Driant's last words.

MASSED GERMAN INFANTRY

into touch with the troops on either flank, they had, however, done more than their share, and contributed more than their part to the total of sacrifice which had stayed the German advance along the whole front, and which had given the General Staff time to rush up reserves and meet the growing danger which threatened Verdun.

The situation on the morning of February 23 was serious. The Germans had driven the French almost entirely from the northerly woods which formed the first line. The French had been forced to evacuate Brabant, Haumont, the Bois des Caures, and Herbebois, and had fallen back upon positions based upon Samogneux, Beaumont, the northern edge of the Bois des Fosses, and the little wood of Chaumes. The French effort to wrest the initiative from German hands on the morning of the 23rd was rendered hopeless by the storm of shell which burst over Samogneux, the starting-point of the counter-attack. By the evening of the 23rd all was lost at Samogneux. The village was only nominally in the possession of the French, and the French were forced to take into immediate consideration the necessity of withdrawing farther south, and of making a stand on the Talou and Pepper ridges. So far all activity had been confined to the eastern bank of the Meuse, and the extent of the German advance now exposed them to enfilading fire from the French artillery position on the west bank. As these guns came into action Samogneux was evacuated, and a regiment of infantry was thrown across the Vacherauville-Samogneux road for the protection of the important Height 344. Throughout the whole of the night of the 23rd and the following day the Germans concentrated their effort upon this height. Time after time their attacks, when debouching from Samogneux, reeled and scattered under the fire of the French artillery and mitrailleuses. Their losses here first began to assume the magnitude which subsequently gave to the whole battle its peculiar character of horror. Time after time they charged upon Hill 344, and it was not till the night of the 24th that they succeeded in getting a bare footing on its slopes. Farther east their progress was equally slow, the special difficulties of the country delaying their advance.

In the centre their attack was carried out with greater dash and quicker results. After pouring gas and tear-shells upon the Bois des Fosses, they gathered a large force east of that wood and north of Wavrille, in preparation for an assault upon Beaumont and the Fosse woods. This gathering of troops was reported to the French artillery, which got to work upon it with

MOWN DOWN BY FRENCH GUNS.

deadly effect. At the same time the French infantry determined to forestall the enemy, and two battalions were sent forward with the north-western corner of Wavrille wood as their objective. They got as far as the south-western edge of the wood, where they were held up by concentrated machine gun-fire. The Germans, in view of the vigour revealed by the French, and following their plan of destroying the defensive positions by artillery and leaving them to be occupied by the infantry, delayed their infantry attack, and resumed the bombardment of Beaumont and the Fosses woods. At one in the afternoon they got their infantry going, turned the Zouaves and sharpshooters out of the Wavrille wood, and, pushing forward, turned Beaumont on the west and the Bois des Fosses on the east. In half an hour, in spite of very heavy losses, the enemy had captured the whole of the Fosses woods, and had got into the streets of Beaumont. Beaumont was fought house by house, but the French were unable to stay the forces of the enemy. La Chaume was the next to fall completely into the hands of the Germans, and at 20 minutes past two large bodies of the enemy were marching between Louvemont and Hill 346 straight on to the main fortified line defending the Meuse capital. Ornes, surrounded on three sides, had to be given up.

The position was every hour becoming more dangerous. A great effort had to be attempted. Every available man was hurried into the line in a final supreme effort to stay the advance before it reached some vital spot of the Verdun defences.

The troops upon both sides had been fighting with the very greatest sacrifice. The French forces were still those which had borne the brunt of the artillery preparation and the first days' assaults. They were worn out with lack of sleep and lack of food, but were called upon to stave off defeat for yet a little longer, and to give time for the reserves and reliefs to reach them and take over their burden. Throughout the night they held out, and with their relief in the morning began a fresh and more cheerful chapter in the history of the battle of Verdun. Up till that moment the Germans could look upon their offensive with satisfaction and with pride. They had not, it was true, given the French a sledge-hammer blow such as the French gave the Germans in one day in the Champagne, but they had carried a large and important section of the front, driven the French back in confusion, and profited by some of the weaknesses which showed themselves in the French command. In appearance, if not in circumstance, the French retreat from the Brabant line to the

THE STRICKEN FIELD OF VERDUN.

The scene of the violent German assaults on March 8 and 10, 1916, which were repelled with great slaughter.

Douaumont line resembled the retreat from Charleroi to the Marne. The achievement of the enemy in forcing the necessity and advisability of that retreat upon the French was by no means to be despised. It was but the prelude to action upon an even vaster scale—the prelude to one of those periods when the fortune of a day makes the history of an age.

The French then stood with their backs to the wall at bay. The whole nation from the Pyrenees to the North Sea, from the Atlantic to the Eastern Front, knew that the fate of France trembled in the balance. The tremendous forces brought into action by the enemy clearly showed that he was seeking to inflict one of those crushing blows from which even the most elastic and buoyant of peoples do not recover. The losses which the enemy had suffered without blenching shewed as clearly that regard for human life was not likely to stay his efforts. Blood and steel were to batter and crush the defenders of the Eastern Marches of France. The people of France were to be ruthlessly brought to realize that nothing could stand against the organized might and iron determination of their enemies.

The population of France had followed the course of events calmly but nevertheless with anxiety. They had watched the gradual withdrawal of their troops from position after position, knowing full well that until their armies fell back upon the main natural fortifications on the east of the Meuse, the full resisting power of France could not be exerted. Never has a people shown a finer confidence in its army and its star than that displayed by the French in those trying opening days of the battles for Verdun. Never was confidence in the end more clearly deserved. Knowing nothing of the steps taken to ensure the triumph of their final resistance, with their faith attacked by enemy rumour and by enemy lie they maintained a cheerful front and awaited calmly the news that the Verdun armies had turned upon their opponents as Joffre had turned on the Germans in September, 1914.

The first phase of the Verdun battle came to an end on February 24. On that date the whole of the first French line and a large stretch of country had fallen into German hands, together with several thousand prisoners and many guns. The progress of events is summarily indicated in the following diary:

A FRENCH "EYE" ON VERDUN.
Captive balloon ascending near the battle zone.

February 21.—*Front from Brabant sur Meuse to Herbebois.*—Haumont wood and Beaumont salient captured by the enemy. Attacks against Brabant and Herbebois repulsed.

February 22.—*Front from Brabant to Ornes.*—Haumont village evacuated. Part of the Beaumont salient recaptured. Strong attack on Herbebois stopped. Artillery bombardment from Malancourt to Etain.

February 23.—*Front from Brabant to south of Ornes.*—Brabant evacuated. Attack against Samogneux repulsed. Part of the recaptured Beaumont salient lost. French withdrawal from Samogneux and Ornes.

February 24.—No German attacks during the night. French established on the line of heights stretching from the east of Champneuville to south of Ornes.

Broadly speaking, what had happened was that the salient which the Germans attacked had been driven in and the French line of defence had moved from the arc to the chord. The position, more closely described, was the following. On the French left the Talou Ridge, enclosed on three sides by the Meuse, was too dangerous a spot for either side to wish to occupy in force, but both sides desired to prevent the enemy from occupying it. The loop of the Meuse was therefore neutralized, and from

GERMAN DUG-OUTS AND HUTS BEHIND THE FIRING-LINE.

Small picture: Enemy reinforcements going to the trenches.

the artillery of the opposing armies a stream of shell rendered it untenable for either. The elimination of this region from the fighting very considerably reduced the front of active operations. The French, when the critical moment of the fighting began, found themselves upon a dominating plateau, well knit and affording excellent positions for artillery.

The objective of the enemy had now become the capture of Douaumont and Pepper Ridges.

Before entering upon any description of the series of bloody battles which covered this country with agony and horror it is necessary to refer in some detail to the forces which had been engaged by both armies in the fighting, and to events farther away from the actual front of battle.

The great achievement of the resistance by the comparatively small numbers of the French on the first positions they occupied gave to their General Staff time to bring up their men, and to organize even more thoroughly than they had done the main lines of defence. The Germans in their offensive had, without question, reckoned among the difficulties of the French the question of transport. Verdun was dependent for all its communications with the interior of France upon two railways. The first, the main line from Verdun to Paris, was entirely under the fire of the German artillery, and the second was but a small line running up the Meuse Valley from Bar-le-Duc. The French had done nothing visible to remedy this defect, and without doubt the Germans had imagined that the very greatest difficulty would be experienced in moving reserves into the threatened sector and in keeping them supplied with munitions and food. But the possibility of a great attack upon Verdun had long been considered by the French General

Staff, and the paucity of Verdun's communications had been taken into account.

The General Staff in the first few days of the offensive was somewhat harshly criticized for its failure to build supplementary lines of communication between the Verdun salient and the rest of France. As a matter of fact, the arrangements made for the re-victualling of the defenders of Verdun worked admirably. It was quite clear that any attack upon Verdun would be accompanied by a very violent bombardment of the Verdun-Paris main line, which would, if it did not interrupt communication completely, make it at any rate extremely difficult. There remained only the small railway from Bar-le-Duc, which was plainly inadequate to meet the requirements of a large force during a period of intense activity. The General Staff decided that the best way of supplementing the yield of the Bar-le-Duc railway was to organize an "intensive" system of road transports. At the beginning of February a special committee was appointed to take charge of the whole problem of transport in this region. Under its orders were placed 200 motor-lorry sections—that is to say, about 4,000 lorries—with 300 officers and 8,500 men. The size of such an organization may be gauged from the fact that on an average journey of 70 kilometres a day 2,000 hectolitres of motor spirit, 200 hectolitres of oil, and 2,000 kilogrammes of grease were necessary. This supply of transport was entirely supplementary to the existing motor forces of the fortified region of Verdun and the army of the Argonne. The committee got to work before the battle began, and after close examination of the situation it was decided in principle that the Bar-le-Duc railway should be used only for food supplies, and that the motors should be reserved as far as possible for the transport of troops, munitions and engineering material. It was further decided that the whole network of roads around Verdun should be entirely closed to all wheeled traffic save that of the army motor-cars. The transport columns, it was determined, should

BOMBARDING THE GERMAN TRENCHES.

not, as was eustomary when sueh units reach the zone of fire, unload into horse vehicles, but should unload at onee into speeial depots of munitions and material.

The question of traffie eontrol and of road repair was also important, and a regular road police was organized. There were about 75 kilometres to be covered by car. This distanee was split up into seetions, eaeh plaeed under the control of an offieer, and the day and night duty of this nature required the serviees of 300 officers and men.

This organization was ordered to begin operations at noon on the seeond day of the German offensive. In less than four hours the great circuit had been cleared of all extraneous traffie; the road had beeome a railway. Lord Northeliffe, in his telegram to *The Times* of Mareh 6, thus deseribed this service at work:

> As night falls we come across our first convoy of the great hooded motor lorries, which my companion counted by the thousand while we were on our way between Paris and the Meuse. The war has reduced motor transport to a science, and in no way is French efficiency better demonstrated than in the manner in which they have added to the carrying capacity of their railways and great canals. They have utilized thousands of miles of poplar and lime lined roads for mechanical transport at 15 miles an hour. On one road alone we counted 20 motor convoys, each composed of about a hundred wagons, and each group indicated by some simple mark, such as a four-leaved shamrock, an ace of hearts, or a comet.

When a car failed no time was lost in lengthy repair; it was just tumbled straight off the road into a ditch and left there until the army had time to look after it. When the road showed signs of giving way under this eonstant grinding of heavy traffie, a squad of military road-menders was there at onee making rough and ready repairs to the surfaee. Day and night this servicc of motor-cars, whieh had converted the Verdun road into a kind of moving platform, bore up to the front its load of shells, its burden of cheerful, resolute *poilus*, its cargo of eager 75's. Some idea of the eapaeity of this rather hastily organized service can be gained from the figures of traffic handled in the first fortnight of activity, when 22,500 tons of munitions were carried and unloaded at the various supply spots. The kilometrie tonnage amounted to about 3,000,000, or an average of about 200,000 kilometrie tons per day. The average daily journey of each car was 155 kilometres, and in a fortnight the cars specially told off for munitions transport alone had covered 1,200,000 kilometres. In the same period 190 motor car groups, specially affected to the transport of men, had earried into the threatened salient some 250 battalions, or close upon 200,000 men. In addition to all this specialized transport, the service also aeted as a general Carter Paterson for the army, medical stores, slightly wounded, and the eivilian population being evaeuated, and carried to the extent of 200,000 tons of material and 10,000 men. To put these results into railway figures, the traffic handled in that one fortnight represented the capaeity of 15 trains a day in each direction. Seventeen

FRENCH CAVALRY ON THE WAY TO VERDUN.

At a shell depot: Watching an Aeroplane in flight.

A supply of shells ready for transport to the batteries. Centre picture: Dispatching shells to the batteries.

SHELLS FOR THE FRENCH GUNS AT VERDUN.

BEFORE THE BATTLE: A VIEW OF VERDUN.
Showing the Cathedral and the River Meuse.

hundred lorries covered the road each day in each direction, so that the average intensity of traffic was one lorry every 25 seconds. This result was achieved in spite of excessively bad weather conditions, in spite of snow and heavy frosts. It was but fitting that General Joffre should have recognized the devoted service of the motor-car sections in a special Order of the Day, for it was largely due to their efforts that the French were able to build up along the Pepper and Douaumont Ridges the barrier against which the German assaulting wave beat in vain.

The Germans, from the very outset of the offensive, indeed before the actual preparatory bombardment had begun, endeavoured by every means in their power to interfere with French communications. The great Zeppelin excursion, which ended in the destruction of one of Germany's most modern airships at Révigny, was the beginning of this attack upon the rail centres of the French, and when the German heavy and field artillery opened fire upon the first-line trenches of the French, their long-range guns began a systematic bombardment of the whole of the country to the south, Verdun, the Meuse bridges, and the Paris-Verdun railway receiving special attention.

The town of Verdun itself had for many months lain at the mercy of the German artilleryman, who, whatever one may think of the German madness of destruction, usually has method when he sets to work, and, no useful military object being attainable by an isolated bombardment of the town unconnected with active military operations in the field, the Germans had contented themselves, before the attack, with sending a few long shots into the town. Verdun paid the price of its proud position as a sentinel on the eastern frontier. It shared the fate of Ypres, of Arras, and of Reims. Mr. Warner Allen, the representative of the British Press with the French Army, describing the bombardment of the town and its approaches, wrote:

> The air was trembling with the noise of the battle that was raging. Even some five miles away the noise of the German artillery was deafening. For minutes together it was absolutely a continuous crash upon crash and bang upon bang, huge German shells bursting in and all round the town, and the French guns answering from every slope. Silence seemed an impossible ideal. Yet even outside the town from time

to time there would come a silence, perhaps of 30 seconds, and it was more nerve-racking than the eternal boom of bursting German shells and the trembling of the earth beneath the reply of the French artillery. During these silences one was waiting in tense expectation for the infernal din to break loose again.

In the town, however, where several big German shells were falling every minute, there is comparative peace. Houses deaden sound to a surprising extent, and in some of the small winding streets of Verdun one can fancy that the explosions that are destroying houses a few hundred yards away are merely distant artillery practice. . . .

The Germans are shelling the gates heavily, and everyone in the town—so far as I have seen, there are exactly three civilians apart from ourselves—has been out to pick up the splinters that are raining down on the roofs of the houses with a pattering sound like that of rain.

This storm of steel flung its fury over the whole salient. It was so intense that at moments and in places only one in three of the supply columns sent up to the front ever got there. Yet the work went on, and hour by hour and day by day saw the concentration of more troops and more munitions in the threatened area. The French General Staff was unable in the first two days to dispatch to the Verdun sector all its available reserves. The intentions of the enemy were by no means certain. The attack upon Verdun, it was true, began with a tremendous power and vigour, but until the second or third day it was still open to the enemy to change his objective, to regard Verdun as a feint, and to bring the full weight of his effort to bear upon Nancy, Amiens, or Calais. The duty of the General Staff was to maintain an equal balance of force along the front, and to make the *riposte* fit the attack. Under the conditions of modern warfare it is essential, with the huge masses of men that have to be transported, not to displace the centre of gravity without the certainty that it has also been displaced on the other side. The attacking force in trench war is in consequence nearly always bound to have the supremacy during the first few days of a prolonged offensive. Limited success is assured to him, but it is only if he is able to exploit that success to its end, before his opponent has discovered the strength arrayed against him, that success becomes victory. The French, therefore, had to wait until they were certain of the enemy's intentions before altering the distribution of their forces on the east.

What was the position of the Germans? To place against the one narrow-gauge French railway they had no less than 14 railways.

DURING THE BATTLE: A VIEW OF VERDUN.

FRENCH TROOPS WITH SCALING LADDERS.

They had been able, having the initiative, to prepare for many months before the attack the shock army which was to carry it through. Following the precedent of their offensive of October, 1914, the enemy fixed their immediate requirements at four army corps. They were no longer able, as they had been then, to form fresh organizations, but had to assemble the new army from different points of the front. In Russia the margin of safety had very nearly been reached, and it was mainly from the Western front that the higher command drew its Verdun supplies and men. The 15th Corps was taken away from the 4th Army in front of the British; the 18th Corps from the 2nd Army on the Somme; the 7th Reserve Corps from the 7th Army on the Aisne; and the 3rd Corps was brought back from Serbia. According to M. Bidou, whose writings on the Battle of Verdun gained him a great reputation, the 7th Reserve Corps left the Aisne towards the end of October, 1915, so that it may be stated with some certainty that the preparation of an offensive was begun by the Germans immediately after the French offensive in the Champagne. The work of resting and training the troops which were to be called upon to make this fresh gigantic effort, therefore, took some three or four months. At the same time, as has already been pointed out, heavy artillery was brought back from the Serbian and Russian fronts, and accumulated in the rear of Verdun.

When the battle was begun the German order of battle, according to Lord Northcliffe's telegram to *The Times*, was as follows:

The German order of battle on February 21 running eastwards from a point north of Varennes comprised on the extreme German right the 7th Reserve Corps, consisting of the 2nd Landwehr Division, the 11th Reserve Division, and the 12th Reserve Division in the order named. During the fighting the 11th Reserve Division is understood to have been relieved by the 22nd Reserve Division. Immediately before the French line to the north-east of Verdun lay the 14th Reserve Division, with the 7th Reserve Corps and the 11th Bavarian Reserve Division in support. These troops were on the right of what may be called the central force. Next to them was ranged the 18th Corps, the 3rd Corps, the 15th Corps, and the Bavarian Ersatz Division in the order named, while south of Etain in the Woevre were ranged the 5th Landwehr Division, the 5th Army Corps, and the 3rd Bavarian Corps opposite Fresnes.

The French Intelligence Department was naturally aware of this concentration of troops. It knew, for instance, that the 3rd Corps and the 7th Reserve Corps reached the Verdun front on February 8, that the 15th Corps was moved up on the 11th, that in the districts of Damvillers, Ville, Azannes, and Gremilly there was a great concentration of troops about this period, and that the Gremilly wood was filled with heavy artillery, including several pieces of 380 and 420 millimetres.

The French, therefore, strengthened their central armies. Between February 11 and February 16 six divisions of infantry, six regiments of heavy artillery, as well as special heavy guns and heavy armoured trains, were sent to reinforce the Verdun armies. Finally on the eve of the German attack, on February 20, a further division was sent up, and two army corps were ordered to Bar-le-Duc and Révigny.

These forces had been unequal to the task of holding the first defences of the French line, and by February 25 the French had been forced back to the Pepper and Douaumont

Ridges. The situation was perhaps the gravest which had confronted the French General Staff since the dark days of Charleroi. Every possibility had to be foreseen. Retreat and the abandonment of the right bank of the Meuse was the first of these possibilities. The first, that is to say, in the urgency of staff work The troops holding the Woevre trenches to the east of the town were, therefore, brought on to the Meuse heights, whence their retreat was rendered more easy. An army was rapidly formed on the left bank of the river, with the duty of covering such a retreat, and of defending the Meuse. Meanwhile fresh troops were hurried over the river, and General Castelnau, acting under the orders of General Joffre, left for Verdun, entrusted with full powers to deal with the emergency which had arisen. He found the situation far from reassuring. Blunders had been committed; there had been weakness in the command, faltering over vital decisions, but still the French line, although driven back, had been neither cut nor overwhelmed. It held, indeed, positions incomparably better than those from which the French had been driven. There seemed, moreover, to be promise of a respite from the terribly concentrated fire of the German heavy artillery. The capture of some five miles of country made it necessary for the German heavy artillery to be brought forward, and the difficulties of advancing heavy artillery over ground such as a modern bombardment creates are better imagined than described. It was determined to profit by this slight delay to take in hand the vigorous organization of the Douaumont defence, to replace the worn-out troops who had been fighting since February 21, and to make a definite stand on the right bank of the river. With characteristic courage and decision the French took energetic action to give to the operations a more resolute character and a more determined leading. On the evening of February 25, as the result of General Castelnau's visit and survey of the situation, General Pétain, then commanding in the Champagne, arrived to take over direct control of the defence of Verdun.

BEHIND THE FIGHTING-LINE.
Serving out hot soup to the French troops.

General Pétain was an officer of a type the entire existence of which was unknown not only to foreigners, but to the French themselves. At the beginning of the war he was just one of hundreds of colonels who were about to retire, the jealousies of political and religious passion having barred the road to high office in his profession. He had spent his time in the army quietly, seeking neither notoriety nor fame, but conscientiously performing his regimental duties, sparing neither himself nor his men in the strict performance of duty. The fact that owing to his strong religious views (he was a devout Roman Catholic at a time when war had not taught tolerance) he had been passed over in the promotion lists, the frequent use of a somewhat ironical wit, gave to his character a flavour of bitterness, a touch of coldness, and this impression, upon those who came in contact with him, was increased by the austerity of his life. He was a tremendous worker, and dawn found him more frequently at his work-table than between the sheets.

At the outbreak of the war he commanded his regiment during the Charleroi retreat, and his conduct then marked him out for promotion, which in those days of wholesale removal of generals was not lacking. Very rapidly General Pétain got his brigade, and the step thus given him carried him to the great May offensive in the Artois. Here, for the first time, a new school of trench warfare tactics showed itself, and General Pétain was its most successful exponent. He, more than any one, was responsible for the successes of that offensive, and recognition came to him with speed. On the departure of Castelnau to take over command of the Centre Group of Armies in the Champagne Pétain assumed command of the 2nd Army. When Castelnau had completed his plans for the Champagne offensive he naturally called upon Pétain to assist in their execution. In the Champagne offensive Pétain again distinguished himself, and when Castelnau left to take over his new duties as Chief of the General Staff General Pétain again succeeded him in the command of the Centre Group of Armies.

He very soon made his presence felt in his new position. Surrounded by his own staff he immediately set to work on the great task of stopping the German advance. Well might it have been said of the battle of Verdun as it

UNDER FIRE IN THE FRENCH TRENCHES.

A soldier about to fire an aero-torpedo under the direction of a French officer.

FRENCH RESERVES NEAR VERDUN.

was of the battle of the Marne, that the moment had come to turn and to die rather than to yield another inch of ground. The moment was one of those great moments of history when peoples either fail through their hesitating weakness or put forth their strength in the final effort, as does the runner nearing the tape demand from his heart a last effort.

Already help was on the way, a division of the 20th Corps having crossed the river and taken up a position on the right bank. Other troops were on the move, but throughout the 25th, before the new changes could take effect, the enemy continued to progress along the centre. By two o'clock, after a tremendous onslaught, ridge 344 fell into the hands of the Germans. By nightfall both slopes of the ridge were occupied by German troops and farther along the centre they got within striking distance of the key to the whole position—the great Douaumont plateau upon the top of which stood the first of the old ring of Verdun forts. This Douaumont position consisted, going from west to east along the plateau, of the village of Douaumont, a redoubt, and the fort of Douaumont. The attacks upon this position were carried through with complete disregard of losses. Wave after wave of infantry surged up the slopes and through the ravine which scarred the plateau, only to melt away before the pitiless machine guns and 75's of the French. With a final convulsive effort a small detachment of the 24th Brandenburgers managed to reach the fort of Douaumont itself. Victory seemed to be within their grasp. But while throughout the world the Teuton was trumpeting his triumph the plans laid hurriedly by Pétain were beginning to yield results. Fresh troops, amongst them the famous 20th Corps, were pouring along the "moving platform" of the motor transport on the Verdun road, and when dawn broke on the 26th the Germans were confronted with new men and with new minds. A series of ferocious and admirably timed counter-attacks drove the enemy back beyond the Douaumont fort, and, from that moment on, battered and shaken though the French line was at this point, it never yielded



FRENCH TROOPS OFF TO THE FIGHTING-LINE.
Motor convoys passing through a ruined village.

Fighting continued with appalling intensity until the 29th. It centred mainly upon the village of Douaumont, situated about 600 yards west of the fort. Had the enemy been able to carry this point, he would have been able to exploit and enlarge the extremely precarious hold the Brandenburgers had got upon the fort of Douaumont.

The village was held by one of the finest regiments in France, which arrived at its position on the evening of February 24, after two days' march. After a night in the open under heavy snow they were subjected to a day's fierce bombardment, and towards three in the afternoon they saw the first five or six waves of the German assault moving out towards them under cover of what an officer described as a moving wall of shrapnel, the enemy artillery keeping its fire just in front of its advancing infantry throughout the attack. The bombardment to which the village had been subjected had been so systematic that the Germans were entitled to their surprise when from the smoking ruins they were greeted with steady and deadly rifle and machine gun fire. The first wave recled under the fire, stopped its advance, communicated its panic to those coming behind, and finally the whole advancing force turned tail and fled in disorder.

To the left the second regiment of the brigade had an even harder struggle, but managed to hang on to its positions throughout the day. Then after another night, filled with more horrible discomfort than the first, spent without food under the snow in the ruined farmhouses which were incessantly pounded by heavy shell, the brigade awoke to even fiercer struggles. To the right of the brigade a battalion of Moorish troops, caught under the nerve-destroying bombardments of 305's, showed signs of panic. A reservist captain who had spent some time in France's African colonies rushed forward from the neighbouring regiment to steady them, shouting to them in Arabic. The men returned with such dash that their officers had difficulty in preventing them from going too far in advance. The village was thus fought for throughout three days. On the 26th the double attack broke down completely. On the 27th the first attack carried the enemy into the village, whence he was thrown again after bloody hand-to-hand fighting. The Germans succeeded, however, in capturing a redoubt to the west of the village. Here, again, automatic counter-

attack drove him out. The afternoon of the 27th a second furious assault again led to hand-to-hand fighting. A third attack the same afternoon was unable to reach the French trenches, the advancing columns being literally crushed by French artillery fire. On the 28th the Germans attacked on both sides of the fort. They succeeded in carrying the village of Douaumont. but were unable to hold it, and to the east of the fort they captured La Caillette wood, where also they were unable to hold on. Throughout the 29th they attacked again with never-failing men and decision. Then came a pause, the most significant pause in battle since the war began, for it marked the end of the first portion of this titanic struggle and the failure of the German battering ram to force a way by brute strength of numbers and brute weight of gunfire through the eastern gate of France at the point where they themselves considered their chances were best. The further development of the battle followed the text-books. After the sledge-hammer blow on the centre came attacks on the wings. But the one condition of the text-books and of success, namely victory in the centre, was missing.

There are certain aspects of the first part of the battle of Verdun which may now be considered, leaving the course of the subsequent vast and important operations for treatment later.

The German effort at Verdun was certainly the most determined military enterprise recorded in the war up to that date. It was accompanied by an intensity of slaughter, a wildness of butchery which up till then had not been imagined possible. It was also accompanied by a riot of official lying for which history has no precedent. In days when the communications were slow and faulty there have been occasions on which a deliberate falsehood as to the fortunes of battle might have had a definite effect upon the political aspect of war. The very improvements of science—telegraph, telephone, wireless, and the printing press—have so tremendously shortened the process of transmitting and distributing news that it would seem at first sight as though a falsehood must have been deprived of even momentary virtue. It was one of the achievements of the German General Staff, aided by a blunder of the French General Staff, to show, in the course of the battle for Verdun, that if their lie were only big enough it would, thanks to science, resound throughout the world, heartening their friends, dismaying the enemy, and striking the trembling neutral into fresh if awful admiration of the might of Germany's "strong arm." Parallel with the Verdun offensive there was waged by Germany

ON THE ROAD TO VERDUN.
French convoys carrying fresh troops to the fighting-line.

an offensive of falsehood. Its first manifestation was to be found in the officially inspired comments of the German Press, which through its military critics invited the German public to see in the tremendous happenings of the first few days around Verdun nothing but a mild stirring of the German giant from his winter sleep. The operations were due to nothing more grandiose than a desire "to rectify" the German front. When their hopes became higher the offensive was admitted, but still it was a defensive offensive. They had no intention of taking Verdun, but only of anticipating a great French offensive against Metz, and had only desired to forestall any movement on the part of the Allies. They were afraid to raise hopes too high. Then as success followed success, the whole of the German General Staff was apparently seized by a mania for mendacity. The first definite falsehood proclaimed throughout the world was the announcement through German wireless, at 2 p.m. on February 25, of the capture of Champneuville. It took the Germans two days to establish the truth of this announcement, for the French on February 27 were still in possession of the village. On the same day the Germans claimed 10,000 prisoners. The French were unable to discover that they had lost more than about 5,000. On February 26, at 8.55 a.m., German wireless proclaimed the capture of the fort of Douaumont, the main pillar of the Verdun defences. The whole world was shaken by this news, and by an unfortunate blunder the German falsehood held the field throughout the world for twenty-four hours, the French military authorities having decided to suspend all telegraphic communications with abroad for a day. The German Empire was moved to transports of delight. The Emperor received allied addresses and congratulations from various public bodies, to one of which, the Brandenburger Landtag, he had the ignorance or impudence to reply, "I rejoice greatly at the new and great example of Brandenburg vigour and the faithfulness unto death displayed by the sons of that province during the last few days in the course of the irresistible assault against the most

ONCE A GERMAN TRENCH.
Havoc caused by a French mine explosion.

THE BRANDENBURGERS ATTACKING THE DISMANTLED FORT OF DOUAUMONT.
A series of fierce and admirably timed counter-attacks drove the enemy back beyond the fort, and, battered and shaken though the French line was at this point, it never yielded.

powerful fortress of our chief enemy. May God bless Brandenburg and the whole German fatherland." Even the gravity of history may perhaps be permitted to relax into a smile at the attempt made by the German General Staff and by the German Emperor to convey to the world at large that in launching a few men into the half-abandoned old fort of Douaumont the Germans had captured the most powerful fortress of their chief enemy. All the more amusement is to be found in this Imperial fib when it is remembered that it was the Germans themselves who, by their 17-inch guns, had shown the French at Liége, Antwerp, Namur,

Maubeuge, and Longwy, that the forts which were modern on August 3, 1914, had ceased to possess military value of any sort on August 4. The Paris correspondent of *The Times*, writing on February 27, said, "I have visited the whole zone of the battle and I can voueh for the fact that the Douaumont fort eeased to exist in the form which the German *communiqué* endeavours to give it many months ago."

The whole episode, possessed though it was of a eomic side to those who knew the facts, might have had a serious effect, both upon German internal conditions and upon neutrals and also upon eivilian *moral* in the allied eountries, had not the Freneh Government, by giving to Lord Northeliffe full facilities for proeeeding to the Verdun front and viewing the situation for himself, taken the best steps to eatch up the lie. The action was perhaps the best recognition given to the value of the Press as a part of the fighting forces of the Allies. Steps were taken to ensure the speedy transmission of Lord Northeliffe's first dispatch to *The Times* to all the leading papers of the world.

The dispateh was dated "Before Verdun, March 4." It began with a reference to the various theories regarding the motives of the German offensive, and proceeded:

From the evidence of German deserters it is known that the attack was originally intended to take place a month or two hence, when the ground was dry. Premature spring caused the Germans to accelerate their plans. There were two final delays owing to bad weather, and then came the colossal onslaught of February 21.

The Germans made a good many of the faults we made at Gallipoli. They announced that something large was pending by closing the Swiss frontier. The French were also fully warned by their own astuto Intelligence Department. Their *avions* were not idle, and, if confirmation were needed, it was given by deserters, who, surmising the horrors that were to come, crept out of the trenches at night, lay down by the edge of the Meuse till the morning, and then gave themselves up, together with information that has since proved to be accurate. Things went wrong with the Germans in other ways. A Zeppelin that was to have blown up important railway junctions on the French line of communications was brought down at Révigny, and incidentally the inhabitants of what remains of that much-bombarded town were avenged by the spectacle of the blazing dirigible crashing to the ground and the hoisting with their own petards of 30 Huns therein. It is not necessary to recapitulate that the gigantic effort of February 21 was frustrated by the coolness and tenacity of the French soldiers and the deadly curtain of fire of the French gunners.

Though a great deal of calculated nonsense has been sent out in official *communiqués* and dilated upon by dithyrambic Berlin newspaper correspondents as to the taking by storm of the long-dismantled Fort at Douaumont, nothing whatever has been admitted by the Germans as to the appalling price in blood they have paid since February 21 and are still paying. The French



FRENCH TROOPS CONVEYING A BOMB MORTAR.

FRENCH LIGHT RAILWAY AT VERDUN.

losses are, and have been, insignificant. I know the official figure. It has been verified by conversations with members of the British, French, and American Red Cross Societies, who are obviously in a position to know. The wounded who pass through their hands have, in many cases, come straight from where they have seen dead Germans, as has been described by scores of witnesses, lying as lay the Prussian Guard in the first battle of Ypres. The evidence of one army as to another army's losses needs careful corroboration, and I have that in the evidence of many German prisoners interrogated singly and independently at the French Headquarters.

Beyond this there are the careful conclusions, checked and sifted, of experienced and competent soldiers, who have every reason not to underestimate the remaining strength of the enemy. These conclusions are, roughly, that of the German Corps known to have been engaged the 3rd and 18th Corps have been entirely used up, or "spent," as the military phrase goes. The 7th Reserve Corps has lost half, and the 15th Corps three-quarters, of its available strengths. According to these authorities, whose opinion, I repeat, can be taken as erring on the side of prudence, the German forces had by the evening of March 3 "used up," in addition to those already mentioned, a part of the 113th Division, the 5th Reserve Corps, and the Bavarian Ersatz Division, without taking into account the losses of other reinforcements, whose presence on the battlefield has not yet been definitely ascertained.

More direct, though possibly less reliable, evidence was secured by questioning closely a number of the German prisoners. Among them were men from all parts of the Empire. Alsatians, Pomeranians, Hessians, Silesians, Prussians, Hanoverians, Bavarians, Würtemburgers, and Prussian Poles, all related experiences identical in substance, though varying in detail.

The case of one man belonging to the 3rd Battalion of the 12th Regiment of the 5th Division of the 3rd Army Corps may be taken as characteristic. On the morning of February 28 this prisoner reached the Fort of Douaumont and found there one battalion of the 24th Regiment, elements of the 64th Regiment and of the 3rd Battalion of Jäger. The strength of his company had been, on February 21, 200 rifles with four officers. On February 22 it had fallen to 70 rifles, with one officer. The other companies had suffered similar losses. On February 23 the prisoner's company was reinforced by 45 men, bearing the numbers of the 12th, the 52nd, the 35th, and the 205th Regiments. These men had been drawn from various depots in the interior. The men of the 12th Regiment believed that five regiments were in reserve in the woods behind the 3rd Corps, but, as time went on and losses increased without any sign of the actual presence of these reserves, doubt spread whether they were really in existence. The prisoner declared that his comrades were no longer capable of fresh effort.

None of the prisoners questioned estimated the losses suffered by their companies at less than one-third of the total effectives. Taking into account all available indications, it may safely be assumed that, during the fighting of the last 13 days, the Germans have lost in killed, wounded, and prisoners at least 100,000 men.

The profits—as the soldier speaks of such matters—being so small, what then are the overwhelming motives that impel the attack on Verdun, and the chicanery of the German *communiqués*? . . . . It cannot be pretended that the attack has in it anything of military necessity. It was urged forward at a time of year when weather conditions might prove, as they have proved, a serious handicap in such matters as the moving of big guns and the essential observation by aeroplanes. The district of Verdun lies in one of the coldest and also the most misty sectors in the long line between Nieuport and Switzerland. Changes of temperature, too, are somewhat more frequent here than elsewhere; and so sudden are these changes that not long ago here occurred on a part of the front one of Nature's furious and romantic

reminders of her power to impose her will. The opposing French and German trenches, their parapets hard frozen, are so close that they are actually within hearing of each other. Towards dawn a rapid thaw set in. The parapets melted and subsided, and two long lines of men stood up naked, as it were, before each other, face to face with only two possibilities—wholesale murder on the one side or the other or a temporary unofficial peace for the making of fresh parapet protections.

The situation was astounding and unique in the history of trench warfare. The French and German officers, without conferring and unwilling to negotiate, turned their backs so that they might not see officially so unwarlike a scene, and the men on each side rebuilt their parapets without the firing of a single shot.

This instance serves to illustrate the precarious weather in which the Germans have undertaken an adventure in the quick success of which the elements play such part. That the attack would certainly prove more costly to them than to the French the German Staff must have known. That the sufferings of the wounded lying out through the long nights of icy wind in the No Man's Land between the lines would be great did not probably disturb the Crown Prince. Yet it is a gruesome fact in the history of the war that the French peering through the moonlight at what they thought to be stealthily crawling Germans found them to be wounded men frozen to death.

During the war, in France and in Flanders, in camps and in hospitals, I have conversed with at least 100 Germans. Prisoners' talk is always to be accepted with great reserve, but the prisoners of the Verdun campaign have so plainly horror and misery depicted upon their countenances that I need no other evidence as to the tragedy through which they have passed.

The vast battle of Verdun might have been arranged for the benefit of interested spectators, were it not that the whole zone for miles around the great scene is as tightly closed to the outer world as a lodge of Freemasons. Furnished with every possible kind of pass, accompanied by a member of the French Headquarters Staff in a military car driven by a chauffeur whose steel helmet marked him as a soldier, I was nevertheless held up by intractable gendarmes. My colleague, the chief of the foreign department of *The Times*, who assisted me in the many inquiries I was presently allowed to make in and about the battlefield, was detained with me at a point 25 miles away from the great scene. Even at that distance the mournful and unceasing reverberation of the guns was insistent, and, as the sentry examined our papers and waited for telephonic instructions, I counted more than 200 of the distant voices of *Kultur*. As one gets nearer and nearer the great arena on which the whole world's eyes are turned to-day, proofs of French



A FRENCH PORTABLE SEARCHLIGHT.

FRENCH MACHINE-GUN SECTION IN THE TRENCHES.

efficiency and French thoroughness are countless. I do not pretend to any military knowledge other than a few scraps gathered in some half-dozen visits to the war, but the abundance of reserve shells for guns, from mighty howitzers to the graceful French mitrailleuse of the aeroplane, of rifle ammunition, of petrol stores, and of motor-wagons of every description, was remarkable. I can truly say that the volume exceeded anything in my previous experience.

As one approaches the battle the volume of sound becomes louder and at times terrific. And it is curious, the mingling of peace with war. The chocolate and the pneumatic tire advertisements on the village walls, the kilometre stone with its ten kilometres to Verdun, a village curé peacefully strolling along the village street, just as though it were March, 1914, and his congregation had not been sent away from the war zone, while their houses were filled by a swarming army of men in pale blue. Such a wonderful blue this new French invisible cloth ! A squadron of cavalry in the new blue and their steel helmets passes at the moment, and gives the impression that one is back again in what were known as the romantic days of war.

When one has arrived at the battlefield, there are a dozen vantage points from which with glasses, or, indeed, with the naked eye, one can take in much that has happened. Verdun lies in a great basin with the silvery Meuse twining in the valley. The scene is, on the whole, Scottish. Verdun, from where I saw it, might be Perth, and the Meuse the Tay. Small groups of firs darken some of the hills, giving a natural resemblance to Scotland.

The town is being made into a second Ypres by the Germans. Yet, as it stands out in the sunlight, it is difficult to realize that it is a place whose people have all gone, save a few of the faithful who live below ground. (Ypres looked like that the first time I saw it soon after the war began.) The tall towers of Verdun still stand. Close by us is a hidden French battery, and it is pretty to see the promptitude with which it sends its screaming shells back to the Germans within a few seconds of the dispatch of a missive from the Huns. One speedily grows accustomed to the sound and the scene, and can follow the position of the villages about which the Germans pretend to mislead the world by wireless every morning.

We journey farther afield, and the famous fort of Douaumont is pointed out. The storming of Fort Douaumont as related by the German dispatches is on a par with the sinking of the Tiger and the recent air bombardment of Liverpool. All the world knows that the Tiger is, as she was before the Germans sank her in their newspapers, one of the finest ships in the world, and that the air bombardment of Liverpool was imagined in Berlin. The storming of Fort Douaumont, gunless and unmanned. was about as important, a military operation of little value. A number of the Brandenburgers climbed into the gunless Fort of Douaumont, and some of them are still there, supplied precariously with food by their comrades at night. They are practically surrounded by the French, whose Headquarters Staff regard the whole incident as a simple episode in the give-and-take of war. The announcement of the fall of Fort Douaumont to the world evinces the great anxiety of the Germans to magnify anything concerning Verdun into a great event. It should also cause people to apply a grain of salt to German official *communiqués* before swallowing them.

These modern battles have now been described so frequently that there is little new to be said of them.

REINFORCEMENTS WAITING FOR TRAINS.

CIVILIANS LEAVING VERDUN.

One of the last inhabitants to leave the town.

Of the battle of Verdun it can be said that on a fine day and out of sight of the horrors of the hand-to-hand encounters its surroundings make it a beautiful battle. There is rather more bird life in this part of France than in some others, and we noticed with particular interest the spirit and the cheerful song of a lark as it rose warbling hard by the spot where a French "75" was splitting the ears with its snap and scream.

As we leave the battlefield and come to where is the first Red Cross Station it rejoices our English eyes to notice the number of English ambulances bearing the inscription of the British Red Cross and the Order of St. John of Jerusalem, which are allowed to aid the French. It will please the miners and mine-owners of Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire to know that many of the wonderful carriages are of their gift. The Red Cross flags that flutter pathetically gay, as the cars drive along the well-cared-for road, make one anxious, but a few inquiries prove that the losses of the day have been inconsiderable.

The dispatch spoke, as already quoted, of the wonderful transport service, and proceeded:

Who are the men who are organizing the great battle for the French side? Let me at once say that they are young men. General Pétain, one of the discoveries of the war, till lately colonel, is still in his fifties, and most of the members of his staff are much younger. One hears of luxury at Headquarters, but I have not experienced it, either at our own Headquarters or at the French. General Pétain, when I enjoyed his hospitality at luncheon, drank tea. Most of his young men contented themselves with water, or the white wine of the Meuse. There should be less excitement at Headquarters of armies than at any part of the battlefield.

In the brief meal he allowed himself the General discussed the battle as though he were merely an interested spectator. In appearance he resembles Lord Roberts, though he is of larger build. In accordance with the drastic changes that the French, like the Germans, are making in their Command, his rise has been so rapid that he is little known to the French people, though greatly trusted by General Joffre and the Government. I naturally did not ask his opinion on any matters connected with the war. We discussed the Australians, the Canadians, the great growth of the British Army, and kindred matters.

At another gathering of officers some one asked whether the French would not expect the British to draw off the Germans by making an attack in the West. "It is questionable," replied one young officer, "whether such an attack would not involve disproportionate losses that would weaken the Allies." The same officer pointed out that, although the capture of Verdun would cause great regret, owing to the historic name it bears, it would not, for many reasons, be more important than the pressing back of any other similar number of miles on the front. Forts being of little account since the introduction of the big German hammers, he believed that General Sarrail had said that the question was not one merely of dismantling the forts, but of blowing them up. As it is, whenever the Germans capture a piece of land where an old fort happens to be, they will

use it as an advertisement. But though the French officers are not looking to us, so far as I could learn, for active cooperation now, they are most certainly urging that when our new armies and their officers are trained we shall aid them by bearing our full share of the tremendous military burden they are now carrying.

The present attack on the French at Verdun is by far the most violent incident of the whole Western war. As I write it is late. Yet the bombardment is continuing, and the massed guns of the Germans are of greater calibre than have ever been used in such numbers. The superb calm of the French people, the efficiency of their organization, the equipment of their cheery soldiery, convince one that the men in the German machine would never be able to compare with them even if France had not the help of Russia, the five British nations, Belgium, Serbia, Italy, and Japan. It is unsafe to prophesy about war, as it is to prophesy about any other human affair, but this prediction one can make, and with certainty: that, whatever may be the result of the attack on the Verdun sector, every such effort will result in adding many more thousands of corpses to those now lying in the valley of the Meuse, numbers of which are being so carefully concealed from the neutral world and the Germans themselves; and could neutrals see the kind of men whom the Germans do not scruple to use as soldiers their faith in Teutonic efficiency would receive a shock.

Unluckily a pygmy behind a machine-gun is the equal of a giant. "What a pity your Highlanders cannot meet these fellows in fair fight," said a French officer, as we reviewed a gang of prisoners. "The war would be over in a month." Personal contact with the miserable creatures who form the bulk of the German prisoners is needed to convince an observer that such specimens of humanity can really have belonged to the German Army, and especially to a *corps d'élite* such as the 3rd, or Berlin, Army Corps. One ill-favoured youth hailing from Charlottenburg was barely 5 ft. 4 in. high. Narrow-chested and peak-faced, he had the quick-wittedness of the urban recruit, but seemed far better fitted for his stool as a railway clerk than for the life of the trenches or for the ordeal of attack. Yet he had been taken at the end of 1914 and sent to Flanders after six weeks' training, "educated" in trench-making for another month, then left to fend for himself and his comrades as a full-fledged Prussian eaglet. Like the bulk of the other prisoners belonging to other units, he had been withdrawn at the beginning of February from the Flanders front and sent to the neighbourhood of Verdun. He had known that there was to be an attack, but until the order was actually given neither he nor his comrades had received any hint of the precise purpose of the operation in which he was to be employed.

Of one thing he and his fellows were heartily glad—to be taken away from the neighbourhood of the "frightful" English and nearer to the kindly French. From all the reports which these men had received from their families during the last two months it appears that, in the words of one of them, "there reigns in Germany considerable misery." All agreed that butter is unobtainable, meat scarce (except in Alsace and parts of Pomerania), fat almost unknown even in the

GERMAN PRISONERS OF WAR.

Being interrogated by an officer of the French Intelligence Department.

Army, though in other respects the food of the Army was tolerable, though not good or abundant. All declared that enthusiasm for the war had long since evaporated, though, as two of the more intelligent among them maintained, the German Army does not expect to be beaten, even if it no longer hopes to win. The chief longing of the men, as of their families, was for peace.

The only good thing about these prisoners was their foot-gear. Their stout Blücher boots were an object-lesson in the necessity of tightening certain features of our blockade and of adding a shortage of leather to the other deficiencies of the military and civil supply that are wearing down tho German power of resistance.

The true moral of the fighting to the north and east of Verdun is that the French, with a comparatively small loss of ground, have warded off the attack of armies outnumbering them originally by three to one.

After giving the German order of battle, as already quoted, Lord Northcliffe added :

There are no means of estimating how long the battle of Verdun may still rage. To say that the French are confident of holding their own is not enough. They feel that they have the measure of the enemy, both in men and *matériel*. They know that, given the necessary concentration of heavy artillery, either side can drive the other from first, or even from the second, positions, but that. unless the bombardment be followed up by infantry attacks of far greater vigour and persistence than any yet executed by the enemy, and unless the advance of the enemy's artillery can keep pace with that of the infantry, the defending force will have time to make its third positions practically impregnable.

This is what has happened round Verdun. To the north and the north-east the first and second French lines were obliterated by an intense bombardment executed with guns of which the smallest were 105 mm., while the bulk were 210 mm. Large numbers of still heavier weapons up to 380 mm. were freely used both in direct and in curtain fire. The weakness of the French forces holding the first and second lines accounts for the insignificance of their losses. Ground having thus been gained by the Germans to the north the French evacuated voluntarily the marshy ground east of the Verdun Ridges in the Woevre.

The effect of this action was threefold. It gave the French a strong defensive line on high ground, it prevented the formation of a dangerous salient, and, apparently, it induced the Germans to believe that their enemy was demoralized.

Verdun is unlikely to be taken. Nothing justifies a belief that the spirit and the stamina of the German forces are equal to the task of dislodging the French from their present formidable positions.

The spirit of confident optimism, of efficiency and resolution reflected in this dispatch never failed the French in the long and bloody struggle which was still to come.

FRENCH RED-CROSS UNDER FIRE.

The heroism of ambulance men on the battlefield.

CHAPTER CXXIV.

BRITISH ADMINISTRATION IN WAR-TIME.

War Legislation—Nature of the Problems—War Control under Queen Elizabeth—And Under Pitt—Methods and Machinery in 1914—Royal Proclamations—Orders in Council—Orders from Government Departments—The King's Prerogatives—Defence of the Realm Acts—Trading with the Enemy—Aliens and Nationality—The Spy Peril and Control of Aliens—Some Remarkable Cases—The "Squire's Daughter"—New Passport System—Special Constables and Their Work—The Drink Problem—Stringent Measures—The Board of Control—Air Raids and Restriction of Lights—Daylight Saving—The Summer Time Act—National *Moral*.

THE abnormal conditions created by a state of war in the social and economic life of a people are necessarily reflected in the legislative and administrative activities of the nation, and it is therefore important to bring these particular results of the Great War into non-technical but explicit compass. It is the more important because war legislation invariably extends beyond the time-limits of the war and in certain respects permanently modifies the constitutional and economic structure of the realm.

Here it is only intended to deal primarily with the machinery that had to be set up to meet the innumerable economic and social questions that sprang from the state of war and demanded instant solution. There was the complex problem of subordinating the great private railways system of the country to the necessities of the war while preserving the use of these very railways for purposes of passenger traffic and trade. The Continental nations had no such problem to solve. Primarily the Continental railways are military instruments that in peace time are diverted to civil uses, but are always ready to be brought back to their military purpose. Peculiarly was this the case in Germany, where the fascination of interior lines really determined the method of campaign. Then England was faced by the great shipping problem, which was never adequately controlled until the summer of 1916; by the food question; by the drink problem; by labour difficulties that were no new question; by innumerable difficulties relating to the post, the press, the telegraph, the telephone, wireless installations, police, protection of railways, canals, waterworks, public buildings; by, above all, the amazingly difficult problem of the aliens who swarmed in England in 1914. None of these problems were really new. They had always arisen in past wars. But the operations of science and the increase of population, combined with immense facilities for the movement of workers and travellers, had largely transformed the problems and intensified the urgency of them. There were of course other vast home problems that arose: questions of national finance, in relation both to defence and trade; questions of the raising of armies and the manning of fleets; questions of high politics. These have been or will be dealt with elsewhere in this History, and it is sufficient here to lay stress upon the fact that the great questions of National Defence and National

AT AN ENGLISH COAST TOWN.
A photographer having his papers examined.

Finance were really inseparable from all the other questions that arose in the great effort of an ancient and united people to secure its future as adequately as it had maintained its past.

The record of the past gave the keynote to the whole of the legislative efforts that became operative from August, 1914, onwards, and we shall venture to explain in broad outline the steps taken by the nation in earlier ages to secure itself against the aggression of unscrupulous foes. It is not necessary for this purpose to dwell on the history of national defence, stretching back in unbroken record to Saxon times, save to say that the same spirit which for more than a thousand years had subordinated the entire resources of the Realm to national defence remained unbroken. But it is important to glance back at the practice of national defence in the great age of Queen Elizabeth. When England was threatened with invasion by France at the end of the eighteenth century, Pitt gave instructions that the precedents of the Elizabethan age should be searched out, and when this was done he went to Parliament for additional powers to meet circumstances that did not exist in the earlier period. We search the Statute Book in vain to discover the measures taken by Queen Elizabeth to meet the Spanish peril. The earlier statutes of the pre-Reformation ages and the Common Law of National Defence were considered adequate. For the records of national defence in the years 1586 to 1588 we look rather to the Registers of the Privy Council. We find some necessary legislation of readjustment

after the peril was past, but the work of national defence was undertaken by a small Committee of six or seven men sitting with the great Queen at the Palace of Placentia in Greenwich. The modern economist will, however, ask, how did this Committee get on without the money which Parliament alone could supply? The Committee of National Defence was a resourceful body, and one that put the fear as well as the praise of the Queen into the hearts of men. The Committee boldly substituted rates for taxes and the problem was solved. Thus, on March 30, 1586, the Privy Council at Greenwich directed the Lords Lieutenant of the maritime counties to make provision for the defence of the Realm, and for that purpose to make a collection in certain towns of money to be employed for the supply of match and powder, to be purchased at a reasonable rate from Henry Dale of London, merchant, the contractor nominated by the Crown, the immortal predecessor of the contractors of three centuries, but as yet unrepresented by statuary or legend in the purlieus of Parliament or the open spaces of Whitehall. We have no reason to suppose that he was other than an honest Englishman for the simple reason that there is no record of his death at the hands of justice. The ways of justice were swift, violent and effective in the spacious days of Queen Elizabeth.

The volumes of the Register of the Privy Council covering the years 1586, 1587, 1588 are of unequalled fascination, for in those golden pages we see England preparing herself for a great effort of national self-defence. Provision is made for the defence of the Channel Isles, the Isle of Wight, Portsmouth. The Sussex iron workers are busy forging guns, "all marked with her Highness's arms." The clergy are specially taxed to furnish "horses for her Highness's service in the Lowe Countries," and voluntary forces are raised for the same purpose. The raising and training of county levies at local expense went on apace. The justices had to provide petronels, had to repress carriers of news, had to look to the landing of spies in the outward fashion of priests. We see the Admiralty Court sitting for the condemnation of prizes, scouting skiffs are watching for the Spanish fleet, on the East Coast the gentry are raising contributions for the coast ordnance, the beacons of Kent are waiting for the match, while watchers are ready to prevent false alarms. The Lords Lieutenant have their trained bands ready at an hour's notice to repair to their appointed stations, and a Royal Fleet is watching for Parma. The Lord Treasurer was bidden to transfer all necessary funds to the Treasurer of the Navy. Kent was presented with a Government grant to enable it to defend the

TRADING WITH THE ENEMY TRIAL IN SCOTLAND.
A scene in the Court of Justice, Edinburgh.

Thames, Tilbury and Harwich. Trade with the Low Countries was forbidden and the export of provisions stopped. The raising of troops in London and elsewhere went on merrily, and local contributions were thankfully received. The "Liberties" of London, the rich French and Dutch churches in London, the clergy at Winchester and elsewhere poured out their gold. In 1588 many seaport towns were directed in mediæval fashion to furnish ships for the Queen's service, but the burden on the rates for this purpose was spread as widely as possible, and furnished the precedent that was destined to destroy Charles, King and Martyr. Where necessary the Council at Greenwich ordered the local rate for local victualling to be paid, and if any refused they had to appear and give explanations to the Council. Moreover letters were sent to the Lords Lieutenant of the southern and midland counties for the new mustering, training and reviewing of soldiers. Despite local grumbling, 18,000 troops and 2,000 horse were assembled at Tilbury and reviewed by the Queen in person; but in fact there was much difficulty in arming other local levies.

The picture of Elizabethan England in wartime has much in common with the picture of the Great War: a slow appreciation of danger, but much readiness to fight when the need was felt. But there was no hesitation in the supreme direction of affairs; Parliament was almost as non-existent as it is to-day, but the Privy Council knew its own mind, or the Queen's mind, and acted on it with speed and certitude. The costs of the war were met out of the local

LORD MAYOR OF LONDON AS RECRUITING OFFICER.

Swearing-in recruits at the Tower of London. Smaller picture: Alderman Sir Charles C. Wakefield, the Lord Mayor (1915-1916), arriving at his Recruiting Office.

COLONEL SIR EDWARD WARD INSPECTING SPECIAL CONSTABLES.

rates sparingly supplemented by the Treasury. After the war and all national danger had passed Parliament dealt with the economic position. In 1589 the embezzlement of military stores was made a felony. In 1593 and 1595 a parish rate was levied for the relief of maimed soldiers and mariners, and in 1601 the whole question of these poor fellows was raised anew at the same time that the great Poor Law Act was passed. The preamble to the Act deserves revival. It runs :—

> Forasmuch as it is now found more needful than it was at the making of the said Acts to provide relief and maintenance to soldiers and mariners that have lost their limbs and disabled their bodies in the defence and service of Her Majesty and the State, in respect the number of the said soldiers is so much the greater by how much Her Majesty's just and honourable defensive wars are increased. To the end that the said soldiers and mariners may reap the fruit of their good deservings and others may be encouraged to perform the like endeavours.

So there was set up very elaborate machinery of relief (entirely independent of the Poor Law) through parochial funds administered by the High Constables as treasurers.

No doubt all these points were brought before Pitt in 1798. It was clearly impossible for him to rely on the rates, and so he at once legislated (38 Geo. III, c. 27). He laid down two principles which, says Mr. Clode, the historian, "must be kept in view in considering the measures to be adopted to meet any similar emergency." These principles were :—

1. "Implicit confidence and obedience to the orders of the executive government, at the same time rendering to the Crown the use and disposal of all property that could be made available for the national defence."

2. "Compensation out of the Public Treasury for all losses sustained by those of His Majesty's subjects who should fulfil the obligations thrown upon them by the Act."

The Act directed the County and Deputy Lieutenants to procure returns of men of fifteen years of age and under sixty, distinguishing which were in volunteer corps and which were willing to be employed in defence of the country : returns of Quakers, aliens and infirm persons ; returns of available boats, waggons, horses and provisions. If there were not sufficient volunteers the Militia laws for compulsory service were to be put in force. Requisitions on the largest scale were authorized ; the principle of compulsory occupation and purchase of necessary land by the State was introduced.

The statutes of 1797 and 1798 are our first model of Parliamentary war legislation under conditions of some economic similarity to those of to-day. Thus on November 30, 1797, restrictions on payments of cash by the Bank,

OFF TO THE FRONT: A SCENE
Reservists with their relatives and friends awaiting the departure of the

introduced in the previous year, were to continue "until one month after the conclusion of the present war" *; on the same day the Scottish banks were authorized to issue notes. The "aid and contribution for the prosecution of the war" (January 12, 1798, c. 16) was in part provided by what was in fact a graduated income tax on persons with incomes over £60 a year. For incomes of £200 and upwards the tax was not to exceed one-tenth of the income. The tax was levied in respect of the residence of the victim and not directly on the income. Chapter 17 allowed men who belonged to the Supplementary Militia which had been created in 1797 to enlist for a period ending six months after the conclusion of a general peace. Chapter 28 cut off all communications with Holland. Chapter 32 raised the billeting rates to 10d. a day for each man in respect of diet and small beer in quarters and 10½d. in respect of each horse in respect of hay and straw. The former rate was 6d. "The traitorous practices of wicked and disaffected persons within the realm," persons prepared to aid invasion, were sternly dealt with by Chapter 36. Chapter 45 cut off communications with Switzerland. Chapter 46 was an Act for the more speedy and effectual manning of His Majesty's Navy and in effect suspended all statutory restrictions on impressment. Compulsory service for the Navy was in force from May 26, 1798. The King, moreover, was given power by proclamation to require aliens to register and to obtain licences for residence. No alien was to leave the kingdom without a passport, nor enter without a licence. Every person entertaining an alien for more than forty-eight hours had to report the fact. Suspect aliens were subject to arrest. Chapter 76 ordered all British ships to sail under convoy. Chapter 78 regulated the Press. Chapter 79 made it a felony for a British subject

* 37 Geo. III. c. 91, 45; 38 Geo. III. c. 1.

AT WATERLOO STATION.
Southampton train after the issue of the Mobilisation Orders, August, 1914.

voluntarily to repair to France, and felony for a British subject to correspond with a person who had already gone to France.

Pitt crystallized the Common Law of national defence into statutory form, he extended the Common Law principles to include compulsory purchase of land, he widely extended the Militia system, he introduced compulsory service for the Navy, he saw to it that Parliament was supreme in war finance, and made little use either of the Privy Council or the inherent powers of the Crown. Looking at the matter broadly, we see that war in the reign of Elizabeth was exclusively conducted by the Privy Council and in the reign of George III. it was as exclusively conducted by Parliament; but in both cases it was, in fact, conducted by a small group of determined and clear-headed patriots who respectively used the machinery that for the purposes of the age appeared the machinery best calculated to defeat the enemy In the Great War of 1914 both the Privy Council and Parliament played an active part in the conduct of affairs. The subservience of the Council to Parliament was in theory beyond doubt, but in fact the members of the Council exercised a controlling force in the deliberations of Parliament, a reversion to the Elizabethan model which was hardly accompanied by the same tenacity of administration or grasp of the essential features of the problem presented by the economics of the United Kingdom.

The economic complexities of Great Britain in 1914 certainly exceeded those of the age of the younger Pitt by far more than those of Pitt's time exceeded the national economic problems of the age of Elizabeth. Steam and electricity had revolutionized the commerce of all nations and science had transformed the art of war by sea and land. The English of the age of Jellicoe were very far away from the age of Pitt, Nelson and Napoleon, and while it was to be expected that the war legislation of

THE KING AND QUEEN ENTERTAIN WOUNDED.
Special constables taking the wounded soldiers to Buckingham Palace.

1914 would show the ancient principles of home defence at work, yet it would also show those principles applied in the most unexpected directions. When all the arts, industries, material and methods of peace production were of direct use in war it was inevitable that the new system of war legislation should cover the whole range of commerce and finance, should enlarge the ancient boundaries of military requisitions, place new limitations on aliens and strangers, bring all the operations of applied science within the confines of national safety and so reconstitute the national laws governing the economic structure of society as to enable English society to continue its normal labours screened from the dislocating operations of war. To maintain the condition of economic equilibrium necessary for the continuance of national life is as necessary a part of war legislation as the provision of arms and men · to do this was easier in earlier ages than in the second decade of the twentieth century, but the problem was faced on the whole as successfully as in the days of Elizabeth or George III., and though a critical age poured its searchlight on the operation it was perhaps hardly realized at the time how hard a problem the administrators of England had to solve.

In this place it is not necessary to refer again in detail to the problems of war finance and the provision of war funds, but the question of commercial finance needs an additional reference. The outbreak of war had checked remittances, had caused a breakdown in the foreign exchanges, had deterred banks from discounting bills in the normal way. This tremendous difficulty was rapidly surmounted by an arrangement between the Government and the Bank of England by which the Bank was able to discount home or foreign bank or trade bills accepted before August 4, 1914, and approved by the Bank. The position was further relieved by the Currency and Bank Notes Act of August 6, 1914, which sanctioned small notes and postal orders as legal tender. In February, 1915, the financial problem was so entirely in hand that postal orders ceased to be legal tender. Other arrangements with the Bank in relation to the Stock Exchange Loan scheme of October 31, 1914, and other matters, further illustrate the resourcefulness with which the

shock of war was warded off the economic basis of society. This was certainly a great achievement, and the economic thinkers who worked out the position of the Bank of England may be said to have played a great part in the successful prosecution of the war. The history of war finance has, however, been traced in an earlier chapter of this work, and the same is true of the Forces of the Crown; but it is necessary to keep in mind the fact that the raising of such Forces was one of the essential subjects of war legislation, and it is in this connexion that probably the most pungent criticism was aimed at the successive Governments led by Mr. Asquith. The slow approaches towards compulsory service undoubtedly delayed the progress of the war, but the problem was a very difficult one and the effort to avoid compulsory service certainly complicated the problem, for the voluntary system carried into the fighting line men whose services were required at home and kept at home men whose chief usefulness would have been in the field. The struggle, however, lasted until May, 1916, when it was at last recognized on all hands that national safety was bound up with compulsory service at home or abroad. The provision of money, arms and men, and the readjustment of the finance of commerce formed, however, only one aspect of the immense problem which faced the Legislature and the Executive. The problems of home life loomed largely from the moment that war was declared.

The outbreak of war brought forward, from the very necessities of the case, a subject of the profoundest constitutional importance—the method and machinery of war legislation. Such legislation in the Elizabethan age had been chiefly effected by the Queen in Council, in the age of Pitt by the King in Parliament. In this, as in all other matters, the early decades of the twentieth century were an eclectic age. Statesmen ransacked the records for new methods of legislation. There was hardly a possible form of legislative activity to which the Government of Great Britain had not to resort in order rapidly to create an economic screen between the nation and the war zone and at the same time to carry on the Great War with efficiency. Success in the field and on the sea was not alone necessary. It was

CITY CONSTABLES RECEIVE SWORDS ON OBTAINING COMMISSIONS.
Presenting swords at Snow Hill Police Station, London.

equally necessary to preserve a national life immune from social and economic dislocation.

The legislative methods—in addition to the normal passing of statutes by Parliament—by which this goal was sought were both remarkable and complex, and it is important to analyse the process. First in the list of methods we must name the Royal Proclamations. Some of these were prerogatival (as, for instance, the Proclamation of August 4, 1914, as to the Defence of the Realm), others were made "by and with the advice of our Privy Council" (as, for instance, the Bills (re-acceptance) Proclamation of August 2, 1914), others, again, were made in pursuance of powers contained in pre-war Acts of Parliament (such as the Army Acts and the Bank Holiday Acts), and yet

FOR CONSPICUOUS BRAVERY.
Sir Edward Henry, Commissioner of Police, decorates a constable, returned from France, for gallantry in the field.

others were made under special war statutes of the realm (such as the Currency and Bank Notes Act, 1914). The Bills (re-acceptance) Proclamation of August 2, 1914, was confirmed by statute the next day, but the prerogatival proclamations were never so confirmed, even in the case where the giving of financial assistance to the enemy was proclaimed to be high treason, with the assurance that traitors would be proceeded against with the utmost rigour of the law. With such proclamations in any formal classification must be ranked Royal Orders made under statutory authority, such as the Royal Order of August 4, 1914, authorizing general or field officers to issue requisitions of emergency.

Proclamations made "by and with the advice of our Privy Council" can hardly be distinguished from the second class of legislative instruments, Orders in Council, especially where such Orders have no statutory authority, as in the case of the Order in Council of August 3, 1914, calling officers of the reserved and retired lists into active service and suspending compulsory retirement from the active list. That is one type of Order in Council. A more notable type is that of August 28, 1914, providing for the cancellation of so much of the Royal Proclamation of September 17, 1900, as related to the distribution of the net proceeds of naval prizes. This type illustrates the close inter-relation of legislation by Proclamation and legislation by Order in Council. But there were other types. There were Councils at which King George V. was personally present, with or without nominated Councillors, at Buckingham Palace, and there were Councils at the famous Council Chambers, Whitehall, at which His Majesty was not present and which solely consisted of "the Lords of His Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council." These latter Councils sat to carry out the recommendations (authorized by statute) of a Government Department, as, for instance, where the Board of Trade, under section 2 of the Customs (Exportation Prohibition) Act, 1914, had power to recommend during the war the withdrawal of certain prohibitions of the exportation of provisions and metals to Colonies not possessing responsible government. These prohibitions were imposed under the Act by Royal Proclamation and were modified by Order in Council on the recommendation of the Board of Trade (August 28, 1914). Here could be observed an extraordinary combination of legislative machinery: an Act of Parliament, a Royal Proclamation, a recommendation of a Government Department and an Order in Council passed in the absence of the King. Very cumbrous it all looks, but, in fact, it was very speedy. The Act had been passed on August 28, and under it the desired recommendation and Order in Council were also carried through on August 28 to vary Proclamations of August 3, 5, and 10, made under an Act of 1879 which the Act of 1914 had extended to all articles during the war. But we get a third legislative method in connexion with Government Departments. The action of such Departments did not always require the formal assent and legislative authority of the Privy Council. Sometimes a Department could act



IN THE EVENT OF AIR RAIDS.

Voluntary Aid Detachment starting out with a motor-ambulance and extemporising a receiving station for casualties.

legislatively on its own initiative in virtue of statutory authority. Thus the Home Office, under the Aerial Navigation Acts, 1911, had power (which it exercised on August 2, 1914, when the outbreak of war was already imminent) to prohibit the navigation of aircraft. Then, again, the Postmaster-General, under the Wireless Telegraphy (Foreign Ships) Regulations, 1908, made by him under the Wireless Telegraphy Act, 1904, having been informed by the Home Office that an emergency had arisen, gave public notice, on August 1, 1914, that the use of wireless telegraphy on board foreign ships in British waters should be subject to Rules issued by the Admiralty. The Admiralty issued the Rules at once. Here we see three Government Departments combining to order, without the intervention of the Crown or the Privy Council,

THE ENEMY IN ENGLAND: VISITING DAY AT AN INTERNMENT CAMP NEAR LONDON.

Interned Germans had nothing to complain of save their loss of liberty and the enforced absence from their homes and families, but they were allowed to have visitors from time to time. At this particular camp the visitors entered the hall and passed between two long tables while the interned sat on the other side, so that there was always the width of a table between the visitors and the visited, this precaution being necessary to prevent secret communications from passing.

restrictions necessary for national defence. Many instances of such delegated legislative power might be quoted, but sufficient has been said to indicate the machinery that had grown up in 1914 to supplement the human limitations of Parliament, a machinery which had been evolved from the mechanism handed down from those far off simpler if less comfortable days when Proclamations and Orders in Council were the terror of the just. A fourth class of legislative activity that was apparent during the Great War is likely to be less pleasing to the student of constitutional history. The Treasury, on January 14, 1915, published an Order by which the issue of new capital under the Companies Acts was forbidden without the consent of the Treasury. This Order, which was tolerated by a puzzled financial world as being, on the whole, necessary and desirable was, in fact, totally illegal, and it obtained its sanction, if sanction it could be called, in a most curious way. By the Stock Exchange Loan scheme, formulated by the Treasury on October 31, 1914, the Stock Exchange agreed with the Treasury not to reopen without the consent and only on the conditions agreed to by the Treasury. Under the regulations issued in pursuance of this purely private agreement dealings in new issues were dependent on Treasury approval, and so the Treasury were in a position to check the issue of new capital by forbidding quotations on the London Stock Exchange. The fact that by the Government War Obligations Act 1914 advances to members of the Stock Exchange by the Bank of England were covered by a statutory guarantee may be said, in a sense, to have justified the Order, but even in war-time it would have been well to have kept within the limits of a very elastic constitutional system and not to have relied on the dispensing power of a Legislative Authority which tended to become restive under a process of delegation of powers which in the early decades of the twentieth century tended to reach a limit beyond which the wit of man could scarcely be expected to go.

It will be useful here to illustrate the great constitutional power of the Crown that the war showed still to be in existence. It is shown in a Prerogatival Order in Council dated April 13, 1915. It opens with the following recitals :—

Whereas a state of war exists between His Majesty and the German Emperor, the Emperor of Austria King of Hungary, and the Sultan of Turkey,

And whereas His Majesty Holds it to be His Prerogative Duty as well as His Prerogative Right to take all steps necessary for the defence and protection of the Realm.

And whereas it has been made to appear to His Majesty that it is essential to the defence and protection of the Realm that in the exercise of His Prerogatives as aforesaid He shall cause the whole of the insulated spaces in British steamships usually engaged in trading between any port or ports in the Commonwealth of Australia or in the Dominion of New Zealand respectively, and any port or ports in the United Kingdom, to be requisitioned for the carriage of refrigerated produce from any port or ports in the Commonwealth of Australia and in the Dominion of New Zealand.

Now, therefore, His Majesty is pleased, by and with the advice of His Privy Council and in the exercise of



A RAID NOTICE.

A warning to finders of unexploded shells.

His Prerogatives as aforesaid, and of all other powers Him thereunto enabling to order, and it is hereby ordered [*as recited*]

And His Majesty is further pleased, by and with the advice as aforesaid, to authorise and direct the President of the Board of Trade, the Minister of Trade and Customs in the Commonwealth of Australia and the Minister of Customs in the Dominion of New Zealand respectively to give effect to this Order in the following way . . . .

Here we have the perfectly sound but unfamiliar position of the King by his Prerogative Power directing the actions of the Ministers of a Self-governing Dominion without the intervention of the Dominion Parliament or the Dominion Cabinet. It was a valuable instance of the fact that the Prerogative Powers

of the Crown, so far from being exhausted, were still in 1915 of vast economic use in speedily arranging inter-Colonial affairs and concentrating the whole available forces of the Empire on any special or urgent problem. That was a very different thing from the attempt by the Treasury, as part of an arrangement with a private body of financiers, to interfere with the issue of capital for industrial enterprise in the British Empire overseas. The issue of new capital at that time required, no doubt, regulation, but that regulation should have been made by Orders in Council under the Defence of the Realm Act.

In the hours immediately preceding the outbreak of war the King issued a Proclamation regarding the Defence of the Realm. This was followed on August 8, 1914, by an Act conferring on His Majesty in Council power to make Regulations during the war for the Defence of the Realm, and on August 28 this was supplemented by a further Act, and these Acts were consolidated and amended by a third Act passed on November 27, 1914. This Act was amended on March 16 1915, by two Acts, the first of which dealt with questions of defence referred to above, while the second created powers for expediting the production of war materials. A further Act to extend the Defence of the Realm Consolidation Act 1914 brought in the State Control of Alcohol. The business of the legislation from August to November, 1914, was to provide against communications being set up with the enemy, to secure the safety of the powers of the Crown and of any means of communication, and of railways, ports and harbours, to prevent the spread of false and dangerous rumours, to secure the navigation of vessels in accordance with Admiralty directions, and generally to prevent assistance being given to the enemy or the successful prosecution of the war being endangered. From August 12, 1914, elaborate regulations with these ends in view were issued, such, for instance, as regulations dealing with the keeping of carrier pigeons or with the obscuration of lights, the latter subject being one that we deal with here in some elaboration as illustrating a peculiar

MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL GUARD.
Sir Charles Johnston, the Lord Mayor (1914-1915), inspecting the Corps of Citizens in the City of London.

PREPARING ALEXANDRA PALACE FOR THE INTERNMENT OF GERMAN PRISONERS.

Fixing barbed wire in the grounds of the Palace.

home feature of the war. While railways in matters of defence were fully dealt with, the taking over of the railways by the Crown was a different matter, and this was done on August 4, 1914, by the special provisions of Section 16 of the Regulation of the Forces Act 1871.

The question of legislation relating to the regulation of Trade and Industry in war-time is too vast a subject and one involving too many complex legal questions to be dealt with in this chapter, but it may generally be noted that by an Act of August 28, 1914, the Board of Trade was given powers to obtain information as to stocks of articles of commerce and for enabling possession to be taken of any such articles unreasonably withheld. The same day was passed the Customs (Exportation Prohibition) Act 1914, by which all articles of every description could be prohibited from exportation by Orders in Council, while the question of enemy proprietors of patents and trade marks was dealt with in an equitable fashion. On August 5, 1914, came the Royal Proclamation which forbade trading with Germany, and this was extended to Austria-Hungary on August 12. The Prohibition was extended by Proclamations of September 9, 30, and October 8 and 26. On September 18 was passed an Act to make provision with respect to penalties for trading with the enemy, and this Act was amended on November 27, 1914. This scheme of legislation, coupled with the provisions of the Common Law, practically stopped even indirect dealing with the enemy, though a few bad cases, such as the Fownes case, were severely punished. In any full consideration of the subject would have to be considered the restrictions involved in the doctrines of contraband and blockade, and the various limitations on the use of shipping that indirectly limited the trade of England during the Great War.

The question of nationality was, of course, of the greatest importance at the opening of the Great War, and unfortunately the legislation of 1914 had the tendency to blur the ancient defi-

ALIENS AT A LONDON POLICE STATION.
Waiting to be transferred to an Internment Camp.

nite lines The doctrine of quasi-allegiance due by aliens resident in England had, moreover sapped in some considerable measure the true doctrine of allegiance which underlies the whole conception of nationality. It is sufficient to say here that the subjects of the British Empire form one nationality, which is constituted by the common allegiance, despite many Parliaments, of many races to one King. In the war legislation of 1914, but certainly not of it, was included the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act. This Act, which repealed the famous Naturalization Act of 1870 and much earlier legislation from the time of Edward III., defined a natural born British subject as follows :

"(*a*) Any person born within His Majesty's dominions and allegiance ; and

"(*b*) Any person born out of His Majesty's dominions whose father was a British subject at the time of that person's birth, and either was born within His Majesty's allegiance or was a person to whom a certificate of naturalization had been granted ; and

"(*c*) Any person born on board a British ship whether in foreign territorial waters or not."

Moreover, the child of a British subject is deemed to have been born within the King's allegiance if born in any place where the King exercises jurisdiction over British subjects. From 1914 onwards the second generation born out of the jurisdiction was in all cases excluded from British citizenship, thus changing the ancient law. This was a hardship, and in the peculiar circumstances of the Empire an unnecessary and perhaps dangerous change designed to overcome one of the difficulties of double nationality. A further provision in the Act with the same end in view permitted the child of a foreign subject born in the Empire and the child of a British subject born abroad to adjust themselves as they thought fit to the environment they preferred. Thus the German could remain German still though born and living in the British Empire, while the Englishman's child born abroad was almost encouraged to renounce his father's nationality. Such a policy was opposed to national safety. The most dangerous class of traitors against England

in 1914 included not only naturalized Germans but the English children of German fathers. Such legislation encouraged children of this class to remain anti-British. In 1914 there was no adequate war legislation on the subject of nationality Thus the children of Belgians born in England in 1914-16 were presumably English though the parental residence was not only temporary but unwilling. Such was one of the sundry absurdities that the unwise Act of 1914 brought about. This Act, as ill-considered as the Declaration of London in another field, showed absolutely no foresight nor any appreciation of the often dangerous character of the hyphenated Anglo-Germans. The alien problem at the opening of the war proved this. On August 5, 1914, an Act was passed to enable the King in time of war or imminent national danger or great emergeney by Order in Council to impose restrictions on aliens and make such provisions as appear necessary or expedient for carrying such restrictions into effect. The Act dealt with numerous matters :

Prohibition of or restrictions on the landing or departure of aliens from the United Kingdom.

The deportation of aliens.

Restrictions on the residence of aliens in the United Kingdom and their total exclusion from certain areas.

The registration and the control of the movements of aliens in the United Kingdom.

The appointment of officials to carry orders into effect with powers of arrest and searcli.

Restrictions on the masters of ships and others.

" Any other matters which appear necessary or expedient with a view to the safety of the realm."

The last provision gave the Privy Council practically the powers of a dictator ; but it



GERMAN CONCENTRATION CAMP IN ENGLAND.

Sentries placed in such a position to enable them to see the whole of the camp.



A DRUM-HEAD SERVICE AT ST. PAUL'S.
The Bishop of London preaching to the troops.

should be remembered that similar powers in similar circumstances resided in the King at Common Law. There was no manner of doubt that the absence of earlier legislation requiring the registration of aliens in England had created a very dangerous situation. Neither the successive Governments up to 1908-9 (when a Special Intelligence Department was established by the Admiralty and the War Office) nor the people at large had realized, at any rate in adequate measure, the elaboration of the German spy system, a system degrading to any self-respecting people, but one that in its elaboration and its detestable character as well as in its curious inability to understand English institutions and the English people, exactly represented the people that had invented it.

One obvious criticism of the hasty Act of 1914 was that it failed to deal in terms with two classes of persons often more dangerous than the aliens with whom the very competent London police were well acquainted: naturalized subjects of the Crown and the children born in England of aliens but who had not renounced their English birth allegiance. But it was probable that they could be dealt with under the general powers reserved in the Act.

The first Order in Council under the Act was issued on the day that the Act was passed. By this Order there were only 13 approved ports by which aliens could enter and leave the kingdom. All other ports were closed, except under very special circumstances, even to alien friends; while an alien enemy could not use an approved port without a permit signed by the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and any alien could be excluded from entrance. Every master of every vessel arriving at or leaving a port in the United Kingdom was obliged to do all that was necessary to enforce the Order. The second part of the Order gave any Secretary of State power to restrict the area of residence of any alien enemy and forbade any alien enemy to reside in any of the prohibited areas, which practically included the whole coast line, except with special permission Any alien in a prohibited area and an alien enemy in any area had to register with very full particulars and could not change residence without notice. No alien enemy could travel more than five miles from his registered address without a permit, nor possess any thing of use in war-time. The Order was extended and amended on August 10. An alien enemy was forbidden to carry on any banking business without consent, or deal with any money or securities in his bank. The police were given full powers of search. The Order was further extended on August 12. The approved ports were varied; the re-entry of deported aliens forbidden. The powers as to passenger ships were enlarged and the list of forbidden articles in the possession of aliens was extended. The Order was further extended on August 20 by the restriction of the circulation of alien newspapers among alien enemies. All these Orders were consolidated and extended on September 29 and further extended by Statute to the Isle of Man. On October 8 alien enemies were forbidden by Order in Council to change their names. This Order did not extend to Anglo-Germans who were technically subjects of the Crown. These efforts to some extent met the acute dangers of the position. Spy charges in the Metropolis were frequent, while charges involving correspondence with Germany and the use of wireless created a feeling of unrest; and the fear of German spies became a somewhat well-grounded obsession, though it sometimes took amusing forms, persons with German names acquiring reputations for scientific powers of communication with their native land that would have adorned the genius of Roger Bacon.

The new special constables proved of considerable use in warding off expected attacks by German aliens on points of national importance, such as water works and gas works, and in fact there were some signs that such attacks would have been made early in the war had not elaborate precautions been taken. In some cases popular feeling bore somewhat hardly on Germans who were *bona fide* traders in various districts, but in view of the widespread nature of the German spy system popular feeling was on the whole justified, and there can be no doubt that as time passed on and German outrages in Belgium and France came to be verified the feeling against Germans who remained in England hardened.

On October 9 the Home Office issued an elaborate statement as to German espionage. The Official Secrets Act of 1911 had enabled the Government, by means of the Special Intelligence Department, between 1911 and 1914, to discover "the ramifications of the German Secret Service in England," and immediately before the outbreak of war 20 known spies were arrested and upwards of 200 kept under special observation.



THE GREAT CHURCH PARADE AT THE ALBERT HALL

Divisions of Special Constables attended from all parts of London.

The Home Office believed that the spy organization had been, at any rate temporarily, broken up. The cable and postal censorship created under the Defence of the Realm Acts had been of use in this respect. There had been no traces of secret conspiracies to commit outrages, but in order to ward off the possibility about 9,000 Germans and Austrians of military age had been interned. French critics severely criticized Mr. McKenna's tempered optimism. The German system of espionage in England was, in their judgment, very elaborate, and public opinion in England supported the French view. The Germans were using immense efforts to restore their

spy system. In mid-October 40 German spies disguised as Belgian refugees were arrested at Dover, and a few days later all alien enemies were ordered to quit Brighton, though naturalized Germans and Austrians were able to remain in residence.

Towards the end of October there were arrests of alien enemies, including many prominent business men, throughout the country. The east and south coast towns were cleared, but in all of them the most dangerous class, the naturalized German, remained at large. On October 30 the London Chamber of Commerce demanded more stringent precautions in the case of naturalized British subjects of enemy origin. On November 2 the trial of the German naval lieutenant, Carl Hans Lody, a spy of the first rank, was concluded. He was found guilty and condemned to be shot, a sentence duly carried out at the Tower. This was the first of several executions for espionage. On November 2 there was a debate in the House of Commons on the whole spy question, in which the vacillating policy of the Government on the alien question was vehemently denounced. Mr. Bonar Law, who was not yet a member of the Government, declared that the men who were likely to injure the country were the best educated and best class of aliens then in England. The warning took effect, for it was well known that persons of German origin were still exercising great influence both in English society and in English finance. Despite all these difficulties the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act of 1914 was allowed unamended to come into operation on January 1, 1915. Indeed, the alien difficulty was by no means in hand. Mr. McKenna on February 4 stated that there were 22,000 male alien enemies in the Metropolitan Police District, of whom about 16,000 were of military age, while there were still considerable numbers in the prohibited areas on the east and south coasts. To what extent German spies dressed in khaki were present in the country it is impossible to say; the wildest rumours on the subject were current early in 1915, and in fact the Admiralty warned contractors against workers of this type. In Ireland alien enemies of both sexes were alleged, by the Grand Jury at the County Mayo Assizes at Castlebar on March 18, to be at large in the country and it was stated that no adequate precautions had been taken to prevent communication between such persons and enemy ships and submarines. This warning was apparently neglected by the Government.

On March 23 and April 13, 1915, Orders in Council further amended the Defence of the Realm (Consolidation) Regulations, 1914. These were issued partly in connexion with the Defence of the Realm (Amendment) Act, 1915, which provided for the trial by civil courts, with a jury, but *in camera* if the prosecution thought it necessary, of offences hitherto triable only by court-martial. Under the new Act sentence had, in any case, to be delivered in public. The Order of April 13 enabled persons who were to be tried under the Act to be arrested without warrant on the formal request of the competent naval or military authorities. An Order of the same date also tightened the existing provision as to passports in the case of incoming aliens. It also provided that after April 25 all persons staying at inns or boarding-houses should be registered. But, despite many precautions and many arrests under the Orders in Council, unrest on the alien question pervaded the country, and in May, 1915, reached a crisis in Liverpool and London, after the sinking of the Lusitania. The Royal Exchange, and other exchanges, decided to exclude persons of enemy birth, and a large deputation urged upon the Government more stringent action. There was a growing movement in favour of a new measure of internment even in the case of women. On May 13 all enemy Knights of the Garter were struck off the Roll by the Order of the King, and the Cabinet decided to intern all alien enemies unless grounds for exceptional treatment were shown, and a special tribunal to decide claims, under Mr. Justice Younger, was set up. Many naturalized citizens of German birth, including certain eminent professors, publicly protested their loyalty, and there were, no doubt, many persons of German birth who were entirely loyal to the country of their adoption. In all such cases it is certain that complete justice was done. The Prime Minister, on May 22, publicly testified to the loyalty of Sir Edgar Speyer. That member of the Privy Council, however, resented so strongly the allegations against his loyalty that he eventually left his adopted country and retired to America. Meantime many spy trials became necessary. The Germans had evidently reorganized with some success their espionage system, while the story from America of Ignatius Timothy Tribitch Lincoln, ex-M.P. for Dar-

ON GUARD.
Territorials on the English Coast.

lington, a spy of considerable gifts, rang through the country. But naturalized Germans of eminence still remained at large, even in cases that gave rise to unrest and serious suspicion. A desperate attempt was made to secure the freedom of Baron von Bissing, the half-brother of the infamous military Governor of Belgium, and was only rejected by the Courts late in July, a few days before a series of important arrests of very dangerous German spies. Any hard cases of social estrangement could well be justified in the autumn of 1915 by the fact that the reorganization of the German spy system synchronized with a new Zeppelin campaign. Though there were a series of executions these were kept within the closest limits. No woman was executed, and Mr. Roosevelt in America testified to English magnanimity in the extremely difficult position presented by the alien problem.

On January 27, 1916, an Order in Council amended the Aliens Restrictions Orders by extending the duty to register with the police to all aliens everywhere except in the Metropolitan Police District, where only alien friends who entered the area after February 14 were required to register. One of the difficulties of dealing with dangerous aliens was that the minute pacifist party in the House of Commons was always ready to raise a cry against control Thus Mr. Charles Trevelyan, on March 23, 1916, dealt with fine indignation with the case of "a squire's daughter." who was stated to be a lady of pure English extraction, arrested in September at her father's house in his absence and wrongly detained for months in an internment camp The Attorney-General thereupon related the facts. Since 1909 "the squire's daughter" had been an intimate friend of a person who had to flee from England because he was associated with sedition and attempts at assassination Near the beginning of the war he left England and went to Berlin. He had since been employed as an agent of the enemy in Berlin—an agent of a particularly dangerous and vile kind. He had from time to time left Berlin and visited neutral countries for the purpose of arranging meetings with people in England with whom he found it convenient or profitable to continue his relations. In May, 1915, this lady went to Switzerland to meet the spy and the two stayed in the same hotel several days. She had admitted that she was told by this spy that he was in the employment of the German Government and had an office in Berlin. She returned to England carrying a message from him to one of his proved accomplices in this country. On the occasion of her arrest there was found literature of an extremely seditious character advocating revolution and murder.

Some reference must be made at this point to the passport system, which was the natural supplement to the legislation against alien enemies. England moved slowly in the matter. It was not until January 19, 1915, that the Foreign Office revised the system and form of passports granted to British subjects for travelling to foreign countries. On February 1, 1915, all British passports held by British subjects in the United Kingdom and issued before August 5, 1914, became invalid, and the holders needing them had to make application for new passports. Similar passports held by British subjects in France, Algiers, Morocco, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Switzerland, Holland, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden became invalid on March 1, 1915, and could only be made out anew on application to the nearest British Consul. In all other countries the British passport became invalid

from August 1, 1915. Passports issued between August 5, 1914, and February 1, 1915, at a cost of five shillings were to be valid for two years only, but were capable of renewal. If the holders desired to proceed to France or Belgium there was necessary a supplementary document and *visa* from a French or Belgian diplomatic or consular officer. From February 1, 1915, no person was allowed to leave the United Kingdom for France or Belgium without a valid passport, and this principle was extended to all sailings.

By the Aliens Restriction (Amendment) Order of April 13, 1915, it was directed that after April 25, 1915, an alien coming from or intending to proceed to any place out of the United Kingdom as a passenger should not without the special permission of a Secretary of State, land or embark at any port in the United Kingdom unless he had in his possession a passport issued to him not more than two years previously by or on behalf of the Government of the country of which he was a subject or citizen, or some other document satisfactorily establishing his nationality and identity, to which passport or document there had to be attached a photograph of the alien to whom it related. Moreover, after the same date an alien could not, without the special permission of the registration officer, enter any prohibited area unless he had in his possession such a passport and photograph. Moreover, by the Defence of the Realm Consolidated Regulations the forgery of naval or military or police passes or of passports became an offence, while if any person was found in possession of a false passport, or being an alien enemy passed under a false name, heavy penalties could be imposed. The passport system which was being freely abused in the earlier months of the war, and was with some skill evaded by Germans under the guise and carrying the passports of American subjects was thus in some measure safeguarded and amended. The system worked better than appeared likely on paper, and it was largely due to this method that the German system of espionage was brought within something like tolerable limits

TALES OF FLANDERS.
(From a painting by Joseph Clark)

The fundamental question of civil control in war-time was, of course, chiefly associated with the civil police, though in proclaimed areas the control, in a large measure, was neeessarily in the hands of the military authorities. The interesting story of the history of the police forces in England cannot be related here in detail, but in order to appreciate the position that existed in 1914 it is necessary to draw attention to the local, and in a sense voluntary, character of the policing of England from Saxon days.



BARON VON BISSING WITH HIS WIFE.
The Baron was the half-brother of the German Military Governor of Belgium. He was interned July, 1915.

The principle of suretyship underlay the whole system. In the earliest times men were elected by their fellows for the preservation of the peaee, and. though the system gradually died away as the central authorities grew stronger, yet the elective officers of what were called head-boroughs were still in existence in the mid-nineteenth century. Besides this universal organization, so peculiarly English, for maintaining law and order, each hundred had and still has a high constable, while petty constables were appointed in each township and parish. The origin of those officers was the necessity of having persons who could report to the central authorities as to local readiness in connexion with the furnishing of men and arms for national defence, and on such officials ever increasing civil police duties were imposed by the local courts that appointed them. The petty constable could still exist in rural districts: the common-law power of creating local means of defence against crime was still existent. Shakespeare has made these constables famous for all time. Their place in towns was taken by beadles and watchmen, but these had long since disappeared at the date of the Great War. As town conditions became more complex and the growth of crime, drunkenness, and sedition in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries became entirely beyond the grasp of the amateur, new means had to be taken, after a long period of chaos, to deal with town police problems. Thus in 1829 the famous Metropolitan Police Force was formed by the Home Secretary, who became Sir Robert Peel. In 1839 the City of London (which was not within the Metropolitan Police area, and had always policed itself) secured by statute its own police force, and in the same year the County Police Act came into operation, and provided a new national organization which became compulsory in 1856. There were in 1914 no fewer than sixty county police forces in England and Wales. Thus the local principle had been maintained, and had been found to work with a high degree of efficiency. In a practical sense all these various forces were united and worked together against crime; but there was much local independence, and the various forces, no doubt, reacted upon one another with a beneficial form of competition in efficiency. In addition to these there were in existence borough police forces, and in 1914, according to Sir Robert Anderson's admirable article in Lord Halsbury's volumes on *The Laws of England*, there were no fewer than "128 cases of boroughs which maintain a separate police force." Over the whole system the Home Office kept a paternal eye, but it is probable that on the outbreak of war the extraordinary local complexity of the English police system made the control of aliens and of motor traffic an extremely difficult matter. But the various



COURT-MARTIAL ON A GERMAN SPY.

The trial of Carl Hans Lody at the Middlesex Guildhall, under the presidency of Major-General Lord Cheylesmore. The prisoner was found guilty and condemned to be shot, a sentence which was duly carried out at the Tower of London.

bodies of police had ample statutory power to assist one another, and this power was of great use in the time of the Great War. Yet in that war, as in many earlier times of great emergency, it was plain that the police was inadequate for the whole of the work that, in due course, would have fallen upon it; and for two reasons. First, it was anticipated that large numbers of the younger constables would join or rejoin the fighting forces of the Crown, and this contingency was, in fact, dealt with by Statute, and in any event without such reduction the police system of the country was undermanned for the new conditions and for the immense amount of local supervision, inspection, and control that auto-

AT THE UNION JACK CLUB, WATERLOO ROAD, LONDON.

Back from the Front: Arrival of soldiers and sailors from France—in the background is a group of Russian troops.

matically became necessary with the outbreak of war against a country whose nationals had so deeply penetrated England. Consequently the Government decided to supplement the regular police with men found under the old practice of appointing special constables. It has always, it is believed, been possible at common law for the local authority responsible for law and order to swear in special constables. Indeed, that was, in fact, the regular practice from Saxon times. But in 1820 doubts had arisen as to the power of the Crown to compel persons to act as special constables except in cases of tumult, riot, or felony, and so on July 8 an Act was passed enabling the justices to appoint special constables on the reasonable apprehension and for the prevention of tumult and riot. On October 15, 1831, the law on the subject was amended, and the following oath formulated:

> I, *A. B.*, do swear, that I will well and truly serve our Sovereign Lord the King in the office of Special Constable for the parish or [township] of ——— without favour or affection, malice or ill-will; and that I will to the best of my power cause the peace to be kept and preserved, and prevent all offences against the persons and properties of His Majesty's subjects: and that while I continue to hold the said office I will to the best of my skill and knowledge discharge all the duties thereof faithfully according to law. So help me God.

This extremely important Act laid down the fundamental principle that persons liable to be nominated as parish constables could be compelled to serve, and this provision was in force at the opening of the war. On August 28, 1914, an Act was passed enabling the King by Order in Council to make regulations with respect to the appointment and position of special constables appointed during the war under the Act of 1831 or the Municipal Corporations Act, 1882. The Act applied to Ireland in virtue of the Special Constables (Ireland) Act, 1832 and other Acts, and to Scotland in virtue of the Burgh Police (Scotland) Act, 1892. It is significant of the Irish position that no Order in Council brought the Act of 1914 into effective operation in Ireland until March 11, 1915. It was not clear whether, before or after this order, the special constabulary system was ever effectively used for the vital purpose of coast land control. Had such a system been fully at work the wild attempt at the Prussianization of Ireland might, perhaps, never have been made.

While Ireland had to wait for her special constables till March, 1915, the English system was at work in August, 1914, and was specially regulated by Order in Council on September 9. An Order dealing with Scotland followed on September 17 in pursuance of a Special Act passed on August 10. The English Order was amended on February 3, 1915, and by subsequent Orders. The Scottish Act was amended on May 19, 1915.

It is unnecessary to pursue further the machinery of the special constabulary system in England and Scotland, but it is desirable to say a few words about a force that was of the highest value at the opening of the war in defending points of so vital and vulnerable a character that any sudden attack by high explosives would have disorganized the entire economics of the great cities of England. The special constabulary steadily tended to become a highly organized body of men despite the fact that most of the constables were busily engaged in their ordinary avocations all day. No doubt a certain number of men in the early days were in the special police ranks who ought to have been at the front, and a certain number of men in some divisions carried the badge while only doing a very low minimum of serious work, but taking the vast majority of the special constables the country through, the work rendered was worthy of the highest praise. It was work that involved neither glory nor, at first, uniform; it involved much discomfort and much deprivation of sleep, but it was of the highest importance since it created a great reserve police force which should never again have been allowed to lapse. This amateur force was received in the kindest fashion by the regular police, who rapidly instilled the lesson that civil control in England is secured not by force or threats but by tact, consideration and kindliness. The inherent capacity of Englishmen for government was shown fully in this small field where the men drawn from every class rapidly became efficient in the management of men, women, children and traffic, the control of the urgent lighting problem, and in many cases in the very difficult work of street control. For some time there was a tendency among the public to smile at the special constable, but before many months elapsed it was realized that he was efficiently taking the place of men on more urgent service, and was well illustrating the Miltonic thesis that they too serve who only stand and wait. When large numbers of special constables in April, 1916, marched through London and attended Divine service at the Albert Hall and elsewhere it was realized what a competent

police force had been brought into existence, largely by the assistance of the regular police, to deal with the many problems of metropolitan life. What was true of London was equally true of the other great towns and of the country districts. The importance of the work done by the special constabulary on the East Coast is not likely to be forgotten. This new force also answered a more remote purpose. It brought men of all classes and opinions together, it created a new sense of fraternity among dif ferent grades and different political sections, and in the poorer districts aroused a sense of confidence and law-abidingness that had rather tended to be sapped by the course of events in the early stages of the war. The movement was an example of something of lasting importance arising from small beginnings. The earlier use

NON-TREATING NOTICE
Posted up in public-houses.

of special constables was at the most for a few days in limited areas. In the Great War the new police perambulated the land from end to end with the most useful social results. Such results were the recognition that the special constable chiefly desired.

One of the most notable legislative events arising out of the Great War was the attempt, which proved unexpectedly successful, to control the evils of the traffic in alcohol. The question was attacked in an inadequate fashion at the opening of the war. On August 31, 1914, an Act was passed enabling the licensing justices upon the recommendation of the chief officer of police in any licensing district to restrict by order the sale or consumption of intoxicating liquor in licensed houses or registered clubs, with the proviso that if a restriction was to become operative earlier than nine at night it had to be approved by the Secretary of State. Before this date, on August 12, 1914, by the Defence of the Realm Regulations, passed under the Defence of the Realm Act of August 8, the competent naval and military authorities were enabled to require all licensed premises within or in the neighbourhood of any defended harbour to be closed except during specified hours, and this power was, on September 1, 1914, extended to all proclaimed areas. The same Order imposed the liability to penal servitude for life on any person who gave or sold intoxicating liquor to a member of any of His Majesty's Forces with the object of eliciting information for the benefit of the enemy, or of making any member of His Majesty's Forces employed in the defence of any railway, dock, or harbour drunk when not on duty, or who gave or sold intoxicating liquor to such member when on duty, whatever the intent might be.

These various provisions, intended to preserve order and efficiency among the civil and military population, proved totally inadequate to meet a rapidly growing danger, and during May, June, and July, 1915, after tremendous agitation in and out of Parliament, stringent machinery was created by Mr. Lloyd George, the Minister of Munitions, to deal with the whole question of excessive drinking. The White Paper of May 1, 1915, showed the vastness of the evil and the necessity of immediate action By the Defence of the Realm (Amendment) (No. 3) Act, 1915, passed on May 19, and the Order in Council establishing the Defence of the Realm (Liquor Control) Regulations of June 10, 1915, the Central Control Board (Liquor Traffic) was established as the central authority for the State control in liquor traffic in such areas as should from time to time be defined by Order in Council. On July 6, 1915, ten such areas were defined in England, on July 28 two Scottish areas were defined, a third Scottish area followed on September 14, and the London area on September 24. Orders by the Central Control Board in each case followed, with ten days' notice. These Orders, which, with the exception of the London Order, were practically identical, came into force as follows: Newhaven (July 26), Southampton (August 2), Barrow-in-Furness (August 2), Dartford (August 6), North-East Coast (August 10), Bristol and Avonmouth (August 10), Liverpool and Mersey District



A SOLDIERS' REFRESHMENT BAR.
A scene at Victoria Station.

(August 16), Newport, Cardiff and Barry (August 18), Scotland, West Central (August 23), Scotland, East Central (August 23), Scotland, Northern (September 27). Thus we may say that a whole year was allowed to elapse before any substantial attempt was made to deal with the problem.

The Orders of July and August, 1915, provided that the sale or supply of intoxicating liquor, whether for consumption on or off the premises, should ordinarily be restricted to two and a half hours in the middle of the day and to three (or in some cases two) hours in the evening. Thus sale was prohibited before noon and between 2.30 and 6 or 6.30 p.m. The sale of spirits for off consumption was

AT A YOUNG MEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION BUFFET.

The Duchess of Argyll with Major-General Sir Francis Lloyd, General Officer Commanding London District, serving out tea at Wimbledon.

prohibited in the evenings and on Saturdays. "Treating" and eredit sales were absolutely prohibited, and clubs were brought within the mischief aimed at by the Order But licensed premises could sell non-aleoholie liquors during the prohibited hours. The first Report of the Central Control Board, dated October 12, 1915, showed that the Order had had an immediate effect on the prosecutions and convictions for drunkenness, and there was evidence that drinking had materially diminished and that social order and the condition of homes and of children had improved, while increased wages were being saved. But it was neeessary to wait for some months before the full effeet of the Orders could be measured. For some totally inexplieable reason London was practically excluded from the benefit of these provisions. "Treating," "on the urgent representations of the military authorities," was forbidden in the Metropolis and the dilution of spirits was sanctioned, but the question of the restriction of drinking hours (extraordinarily neeessary from the point of view of the troops) was "earefully considered with a view to the speeial requirements of London."

But the need, in the interests both of labour and war problems, as well as of national health, was so urgent, the example of Russia and France so splendid, that London could not stand out, and the second Report of the Central Control Board, dated May 1, 1916, shows in detail how the Ministry of Munitions and other Departments involved in unison with the Board attacked the drink problem from its bases all over the country. The Board realized that the evil results arising from excessive indulgence in intoxicating liquor are frequently due, not so much to the unrestricted facilities for obtaining it, or even to the detrimental practice of consuming it at irregular times and unaccompanied by a meal, as to the absence of wholesome and satisfying substitutes, whether food or drink. The Board, therefore, pending a large reform of the machinery for the provision of refreshments, took steps at once to urge the improvement of public-houses and the provision of good cheap canteens. Moreover, in October, 1915, a Committee of Women under Mrs. Creighton was appointed to consider the question of excessive drinking among women. The London District, with a population of over 7,600,000 persons, was brought under Order on November 29, 1915, some 16 months after the outbreak of war. It is diffieult to measure the misery and loss that this unpardonable

delay entailed. The Report of May, 1916, sets out as an example of the Orders that then applied to over 30 millions of people the Order that on February 17, 1916, was applied to the southern military and transport area, including Portsmouth and Southampton. Licensed premises and clubs were only to be open for the consumption of alcohol on week days between noon and 2.30 p.m. and 6 and 9 p.m.; on Sundays between 12.30 and 2.30 p.m. and 6 and 9 p.m. In certain other areas the closing hour was 8 p.m., in others there were no midday hours on Saturdays, and the places of resort were open instead between 4 and 9 p.m. For purposes of consumption off the premises in most cases off-sales had to cease an hour earlier than on-sales to prevent the carrying away of intoxicants for the purposes of continuing drinking at home. The off-sale of spirits was only permitted from Mondays to Fridays in the midday period and was forbidden altogether in the evening and on Sundays, while a minimum sale of a quart bottle was imposed, thus destroying the trade in small flasks. The Orders placed substantial restrictions on the distribution of alcohol. Alcohol sold by distribution had to be definitely ordered and invoiced and entered in a day book, and no money was allowed to be taken at the door on delivery. These provisions were aimed at checking what the Report called the "pushing" of intoxicants into private houses The Order permitted alcohol to be drunk with meals in a club or licensed premises during a period of half an hour after closing time if ordered before closing time, and did not limit the consumption of alcohol by persons residing on the premises. It also allowed the sale of alcohol at all hours on medical certificate for immediate medicinal purposes. These restrictions were reasonable. "Treating" was totally prohibited with effective results, and especially when the act of treating was extended from the licensed premises to the vicinity, thus meeting a rather obvious method of evasion. The giving of credit for intoxicants was absolutely forbidden in all the Orders, and the good effect of the provision has been universal. The Orders, moreover, abolished that vague and incredible person the bona-fide traveller and with him destroyed the last vestige of the wandering tramps and scholars of the Middle Ages.

But the business of the Board was not only to discourage and penalize the drink traffic but to facilitate and encourage and even undertake the supply of food for munition and transport workers. For this purpose the Board strove to increase facilities at public houses and establish where necessary industrial canteens inside or within easy access of the works, supplying both substantial meals and light refreshments at reasonable prices. The Report gives a useful account of the establishment of these canteens, which had become, in view of the vast aggregation in certain areas of munition and transport workers, an absolute necessity. Canteens were, in fact, established in large numbers by the

THE REDUCTION OF LIGHT.

Whitewashing the kerbs to enable pedestrians to discern the edge of the pavement after dark.

Government itself, by the owners of controlled establishments, and by voluntary agencies. In the case of the vast majority of the workers

this new supply of nourishment, combined with its change of surroundings and its welcome period of rest, has contributed substantially to the formation of more temperate habits, with an improvement in physical health or well-being, and an increased energy and output. The results which have already been obtained, and the increased provision which is constantly being made, cannot fail to produce far-reaching effects upon the industrial life of the nation.

The Report shows us a further development, the acquisition of licensed premises by the Board itself in certain cases where it was

clear that the liquor supply should be under direct control. It was a new departure and was not an unlikely beginning of a new system of State control. The results of the whole new system of restraint were reported by the Board in May, 1916. In every area there was a notable decline in convictions for drunkenness. The decline began in the first year of the war as a result of the earlier restrictions, but the decrease was enormously accelerated when the Orders of the Board were

LIGHTING REGULATIONS.

After dark all vehicles, including perambulators, had to carry lights.

issued. But apart from convictions the restrictions proved, in the words of the naval authorities, "decidedly beneficial," not only in England but also, despite special difficulties, in Scotland. The one dark note was "the undoubted increase of excessive drinking amongst women" reported by Mrs. Creighton's Committee, but fortunately this was "mainly among those who drank before," though various witnesses declared that "excessive drinking in the homes is on the increase." But the Committee "have received no evidence that women and girls who did not drink before have taken in any considerable numbers to drinking to excess in consequence of the war or the receipt of allowances," while "there is much evidence of improvement in the homes and in the condition of the children, and of wise spending on the part of the great majority of those in receipt of war allowances." The net result of the English war legislation as to the consumption of alcohol seemed to show that the ancient evil of drunkenness was not only capable of cure, but of rapid prevention.

In various matters the war of 1914 gave rise to quite new problems. The capacity of Zeppelins and other enemy airships and flying machines to raid England raised the whole question of defence against air attacks. That question is only relevant here from the point of view of the lighting of English towns. It was held, rightly or wrongly, that a considerable measure of obscuration and equalization of lights in the towns would so confuse the enemy pilots that it would be impossible for raids to take place with a specific goal in mind. Thus the dealing with lights was part of the anti-aircraft policy. In another matter lights had to be restricted. From very early days it was alleged, in and out of Parliament, that Zeppelins were led by the upturned lights of swift motor cars and that the positions of towns and even houses were indicated in this way. It was very difficult to know if a Zeppelin could be led by a car in any efficient way, but the possibility made prevention or an attempt at prevention necessary. The lighting question was first dealt with on September 17, 1914, by an Order in Council making, under the Defence of the Realm Act 1914, Regulations for the Defence of the Realm amending those of August 12. The following Regulation was the basis of the whole system of lighting control:

> The Secretary of State may by order direct that all or any lights, or lights of any class or description, shall be extinguished, or obscured, in such manner and between such hours as the Order directs, within any area specified in the Order and during such period as may be so specified, and if the person having control of the lighting fails to comply with the Order, the Secretary of State may cause the light to be extinguished or obscured as the case may be, and for that purpose any person authorized by the Secretary of State in that behalf, or any police constable, may enter the premises in which the light is displayed, and do any other act which may be necessary for the purpose.

In pursuance of this Regulation Mr. McKenna, then Home Secretary, issued an Order

LONDON'S NATIONAL GUARD.

Rescue drill at St. Bartholomew's Hospital: Volunteers carrying a "patient" downstairs during a practice alarm.

on the subject which directed that in all legally lighted streets and squares and on bridges the rows of lights were to be broken up and the unextinguished lights must be shaded; all sky signs and illuminated fascias were to be extinguished, in tall buildings the greater part of the windows to be shrouded and the lighting of lighted roof areas reduced to a minimum, and the lighting of railway stations, sidings and yards reduced to a minimum consistent with safety; the lights of trams and omnibuses to be not more than sufficient to collect fares and to be wholly obscured on crossing bridges, while "the use of powerful head-lights on motor cars" was totally prohibited, the use of market flares was also for-



KING GEORGE VISITS THE MUNITION FACTORIES: HIS MAJESTY'S ARRIVAL IN BIRMINGHAM.

bidden, while the Admiralty and the police were given power to order further reductions. These rules were imposed on London and the Metropolitan Police District as from November 1, 1914. In addition to these provisions the naval and military authorities throughout the country in a radius from any defended harbour or proclaimed district had the widest powers to control the lights in houses and the streets in the whole area. It is probable that these military powers were more effectively exercised in the earlier days of the war than the special London powers. On January 20, 1915, Mr. McKenna, under Regulation 11 of the Defence of the Realm (Consolidation) Regulations 1914, forbade in all places where the lighting of the streets had been reduced, whether by Order under the Regulation or by a competent naval or military authority, the use of powerful lights on motor or other vehicles. On January 25 the Order was extended to Scotland. On December 9, 1914, the Order as to London had been renewed, and on March 17, 1915, this Order was varied as to the times when lights in shops should be reduced so as to make the Order applicable to successive seasons. On April 8, 1915, Mr. McKenna issued special regulations as to lights in the prohibited area from Northumberland to Dorset, ordering all lights visible from the sea to be extinguished and extending the London Order to this vast area. An Order of the same date and to the same effect dealt with lights in places on the coast from Dorset to Cumberland, and a third Order of the same date and character controlled the lights in places on the coast in Scotland. On April 3, 1915, all lights for the assistance of navigation within the jurisdiction of the Dee Conservancy Board were extinguished.

It is probable that these limited Orders were not strictly enforced, at any rate in London and other inland towns, and certainly half-measures were useless if any protection from aircraft was to be secured by the obscuration and equalization of lights. The Zeppelin raids of the autumn of 1915 on the East Coast and the London area—raids entirely insignificant so far as military results were concerned, but nevertheless forming a distinct danger to historic buildings, and causing, though a very small, yet a disturbing loss of life among civilians—roused the authorities to further action. This is not the place in which to relate the story of the reorganization of Britain's air defences: it is

sufficient here to refer to the new development of the obscuration of lights policy. On September 29, 1915, Sir John Simon, as Home Secretary, issued a new Order (revoking an interim Order of July 31) for the regulation of lighting in the Metropolis. It considerably intensified the restrictions of the previous autumn and directed all sources of light to be screened. It made it, moreover, necessary to keep all railway carriage blinds drawn. The area affected covered nearly 700 square miles and contained nearly 7,000,000 inhabitants. The Order came into effect from Oetober 1 and received the hearty cooperation of most of the public, opinion having been hardened by the September raids. The first night of the new conditions found London for the first time in something almost approaching darkness, and the experience of those who had to perambulate the streets was both unfamiliar and dangerous. The streets were very full of people, and the good-natured crowd took the new eonditions as something of almost a humorous nature. The effect was peeuliar. The sense of familiarity with the town-plan was lost ; it was difficult to find the way ; a mist seemed to have descended on the autumnal thoroughfares, through which the darkened and skilfully-driven vehieles moved with caution. London had become a place of mystery and was probably not unlike in many ways the London of the eighteenth century. Crime, despite the darkness, and despite many lurid fictions in the German Press, was notably absent. But there were at first many offenders against the new regulations. There were still blazing lights and undraped windows, and it was felt by the public that there were still many aliens about ready to welcome a new raid. But the policy was not one of Cimmerian darkness. The authorities wanted a weak uniform illumination throughout the area, and this was practically secured. The arc of light that had marked London from the hills that surround it had almost disappeared. The reduction of light led at onee to earlier shopping and banking and earlier hours, and Londoners quickly relapsed into a home-keeping people. Night elubs were suppressed by the Order of the Home Secretary on November 18. The police issued special warnings to motorists for reduction of speed and greater care under the new conditions of the streets. On December 20, 1915, a new Order was issued for the greater part of the country by whieh two red lamps were neeessary

THE DAYLIGHT SAVING BILL.
Reading one of the Notices issued by the Government.

in the rear of every vehiele ; the use of head lamps was prohibited ; while the eoast Orders of April 8, 1915, were re-enacted in an amended form incorporating the experience gained by the authorities. On March 10, 1916, a new lighting order for London of a still stricter eharaeter came into force. Light-eoloured curtains or blinds were no longer permissible and no direct light was in any case allowed to shine into the street.

Under all these eircumstanecs it was not, perhaps, a matter for surprise that the Daylight Saving proposals put forward before the war by the late Mr. William Willett should have been revived and adopted by the Government—although not until Germany and several other countries had led the way. Those proposals made more daylight available for workers and that at a time when artifieial lighting was not only a danger but an expense that it was desirable to eut down. It promised to reduce substantially the national expenditure. The Summer Time Act came into operation on Sunday, May 21, 1916. The law provided that cloeks should be put forward one hour, from 2 a.m. on that day, and that "summer time" should remain in force up to and including September 30.

The whole practice of civil control in wartime shows, perhaps, as well as any other aspect of the Great War tho fundamentally balaneed and quiet attitude of the eommunity towards the new conditions. No doubt the

population was far less constrained in England than in any other European country, but still the actual constraint was quite unfamiliar to the English mind and character. It was, however, received with even more patience than in the Elizabethan or the Napoleonic period. The war exploded many fallacies as to the British people, and not the least of these was the fallacy, of German origin, that the people had become inefficient, fickle, pleasure-loving, and idle. In fact, the circumstances of the war disproved the alleged change of character. It showed a people ready to dispense, in the interests of national safety, with familiar freedom, and to tolerate many things that were positively shocking from the traditional point of view. The people not only showed this, but they showed also in every class a new restraint; while crime increased in Germany it practically disappeared in England. The new restraints had a good effect on the entire *moral* of the people and gave some promise that the Great War would prove the beginning of the future that the mystic Blake had prophesied for "England's green and pleasant land."

CHAPTER CXXV.

THE BATTLE OF VERDUN (II.).

Position at the End of February—General Castelnau Arrives at Verdun—German Dispositions—Attack on the Forges Salient—The Fight at Vaux—German Endeavours at Mort Homme—Germans Announce Its Capture—End of the Second Stage of the Battle—German Casualties—A Campaign of Mendacity—Effects in France and on Neutral Opinion—Resignation of General Galliéni—French Heroism—Third Stage of the Battle—Fresh Attack on Mort Homme—Malancourt Evacuated—Fighting at Avocourt and Cumieres—Fresh Struggle for Douaumont—A Lull in the Fighting—Results and Lessons of the First Two Months.

IN Chapter CXXIII. the opening moves of the Battle of Verdun were described. The attack, which began on February 21, against the French salient from Brabant to Ornes had resulted in the gradual withdrawal of the French from these advanced positions, from the are to the chord of the salient. By the morning of February 25, when General Castelnau, acting under orders from General Joffre, had reached Verdun, the French had been forced back to the Pepper and Douaumont Ridges. Then followed the furious German assaults on the fort and village of Douaumont. A detachment of the 24th Brandenburgers succeeded on the 25th in reaching the fort of Douaumont, but General Pétain's counter-attack drove the enemy back beyond it, and not till the 28th did the Germans carry Douaumont village, which, however, they were unable to hold. The narrative was broken off at the 29th, when, after extraordinarily violent fighting, a pause ensued which marked the end of the first phase of the fighting. Fresh French troops had been hurried up to the scene of the struggle during the last three days, and General Pétain's line was growing stronger.

The closing days of February, 1916, were among the most fateful of the war. The great German battering ram of heavy artillery and big columns had smashed the first French defences, and, pressing on in spite of tremendous losses, had reached the main defences of Verdun and of the Meuse salient. The Germans were perhaps to be excused in thinking that victory was theirs, just as the splendid French *fantassin*, who had been fighting blindly and ferociously for days under the most terrible conditions of weather, suffering from lack of food and from the shattering effects of sustained bombardment, might well have thought that at last the great dyke in the West was breaking and that again the floods of invasion were to roll through France.

The worst had to be foreseen, or at any rate provided for. No General starts his operations of determined defence with the order for retreat, but nevertheless no General in the conditions of the fight around the northern front of Verdun could fail to prepare the machinery for that solution. This having been done, and the worst having been foreseen, the French command turned all its energy and decision to the task of proving the superfluity of such precautions. The withdrawal of the French lines in the Woevre had been ordered, and the movement was to be effected on the night of February 24–25. But events of the highest importance to the whole war were meanwhile preparing in the offices of the Grand Quartier-Général. On the morning of February 23 General Langle de Cary, who was

GENERAL PETAIN (×) WATCHING THE BATTLE AT MORT HOMME.

subsequently succeeded by General Pétain in the command of the Central Group of Armies, had informed the troops on the right bank of the river that the occupation of every point, even though it had become an island surrounded by the enemy, must be maintained at all cost, and that there was but one order, "Hold Out." On the evening of the 24th, the moment when the withdrawal from the Woevre front was to be effected, General Joffre issued orders to the effect that the front between the Meuso and the Woevre should be held by every possible means. The same day General Castelnau, Chief of the General Staff, was despatched by Joffre to the scene of the fighting, entrusted with full powers to deal with the situation as he thought best. On his way to the Verdun front he stopped at the Headquarters of the Central Group of Armies, and thence telephoned through to General Herr, who was in direct command at Verdun, confirming General Joffre's instruetions that the detence on the right bank of the Meuse had to be made good. Castelnau arrived at Verdun on the morning of February 25, and that same evening General Pétain joined him and took over the control of the troops on both banks of the river The order he received on assuming this post was: "Yesterday I ordered that the right bank of the Meuse north of Verdun should be held. Any commander giving the order of retreat will be brought before court martial."

On the following day the impetus of the German blow broke itself upon the ridge of Douaumont, and three days later General Castelnau felt at liberty to return to General Headquarters, satisfied that the situation was for the moment at any rate in hand, and that the best possible dispositions had been taken for the defeat of the German attack. In those four days the whole aspect of the battle changed. All question of defeat or of retreat became impossible. The situation then was that from every side the French were receiving fresh troops. The initial questioning as to how far the enemy was letting himself go in the Verdun attack, as to whether it was or was not a feint, was settled, and adequate steps had been taken to ward off the main onslaught.

The Germans on their side had suffered heavily. The position of the enemy during the short breathing space which preeeded the further battering upon Douaumont and the extension of the front to both banks of the Meuse was, according to M. Bidou, the French military writer, as follows :—

"In front of the Freneh left the attack had been led by the VIIth Reserve Corps. It had advanced its two divisions one behind the

other. The 13th Division was ahead and suffered greatly during the first days of the struggle. On February 28 it was relieved by the 14th Division, which extended its left as far as Pepper Ridge. In front of the French centre the XVIIIth Corps had fought with both its divisions in the firing line. The 21st Division had marched on the west from the Bois des Caures towards Ridge 344, while the division on the left, the 25th Division, had led in the attack on Beaumont and on the Bois des Fosses on February 24, and on the following day at Louvemont. It lost heavily in the desperate fighting. On the 27th it went back into support, its place being taken by the 21st Division, which had not been so badly tried. On the French right it was the IIIrd Corps which led the attack. Its two divisions were in line, the fifth on the west, and the sixth to the east, but each division was in column, so that a regiment in the second line could relieve a tired regiment from the first line. Thus, on the evening of February 24, as the army corps reached the southern edge of the Vauche Wood, the place of the 12th Regiment had been taken by the 52nd. It was elements of the 6th Division (24th and 64th Regiments and 3rd Jäger Battalion) which, on the evening of the 25th, got into Douaumont Fort. During this time the 6th Division was a little to the west, in front of Douaumont village. Finally, in order to link up the IIIrd and XVIIIth Corps, the German command detached a supporting regiment from the XVth Corps, which had not taken part in the attack, and which was in the Woevre. This regiment, the 105th, passed through Ornes, behind the front of the IIIrd Corps, and took up a position in the Bois des Caurières; and on the morning of February 26 attacked Chauffour Wood, while the right of the IIIrd Corps (52nd Regiment, 5th Division) attacked Douaumont village. This attack failed, and the 105th, in advancing on Chauffour Wood, was completely shattered by machine-gun fire. It was the IIIrd Corps which again attacked on February 28. . . . On the 29th the exhausted troops were sent back to the rear. In order to take their place the XVIIIth Corps (21st Division) moved up on the left, while part of the gap was filled up by a new division, the 113th, belonging to the army detachment operating between the Meuse and Moselle under the orders of General von Strantz."

These were the first fresh troops to make their appearance on the enemy's side. The

GENERAL JOFFRE INSPECTING THE GERMAN PRISONERS.

German position, at the beginning of the second phase of the fighting, was roughly that the first shock army formed for the purpose of the offensive, and specially trained and rested, had been very badly handled. Of the VIIth Army Corps one division had been sent back to recuperate, while the other had come through with losses which probably did not exceed 10 per cent. The IIIrd Corps was completely broken by its constant fighting and heavy losses, and had been withdrawn. This also was the condition of the XVIIIth Corps. Thus of the three corps which were formed for the effort of taking Verdun only one remained in condition to hold the field, and all that had been accomplished was the capture of the two first lines of the French defence. The attack upon the centre at Douaumont had been held by the French at the last moment, and the further development of the battle was jeopardised by that failure. The enemy had to attack upon the wings without having been able to achieve success on the centre. The special German shock army having worn itself out in the first onslaughts, the ordinary troops of the Crown Prince's command were called upon. The front they had to attack stretched from Malancourt, on the west bank of the Meuse, to the eastern cliffs of the Meuse heights, on the right bank of the river.

The front, therefore, at the beginning of this extended effort of the enemy was marked on the left bank of the river by the villages along the stream of Forges, Malancourt, Bethincourt, and Forges village. East of Forges the front dropped down to the Meuse, and west of Malancourt it cut through the Avocourt Wood. These localities marked out the first line of the French defence. It was not a very efficient line, nor one capable of long defence, but was intended rather to serve as a series of advanced posts to the bigger and more formidable lines of defence which nature had provided farther to the south, on the heights of the Mort Homme, Ridge 304, and the Côte de l'Oie. Still farther south the strength of the French position grew more and more formidable on the hills of Montzeville, Bourrus Wood, and the Marre Fort.

The Germans on the east bank of the river having swept through the French first and second lines, the French artillery on the west bank, from the excellent artillery positions of the Mort Homme, the Côte de l'Oie, and the Cumières Wood, was enabled to sweep the flank of any German attacks upon Douaumont on the east bank of the Meuse. It became, there-

ON THE VERDUN FRONT.
Entrance to a French communication-trench.

POSTS IN THE FRENCH LINES.

An officer leaving the gallery of a counter-mine from which the mining operations of the enemy are checked.

Circle picture: Masked troops on the look-out.

fore, vital that before anything further was attempted on the centre, the attack upon the wings should be developed, and the French artillery on the left bank forced out of its positions. The extent to which the artillery fire from these positions had been disquieting to the opening stages of the German offensive on the other side of the river, was shown by the violent bombardment which they had undergone. The preliminary bombardment which prepared the way to the first infantry assaults along the northern Verdun front was also directed upon the whole of the Meuse section of the front, both east and west of the river, and extended, indeed, far into the Argonne. While the infantry were unloosed on the northern front, the artillery maintained its bombardment along the rest of the front. On March 2 there was a noticeable increase in the strength of the bombardment of the Mort Homme, of Cumières Woods, and the Côte de l'Oie. This increased fire was maintained until noon on March 6, when infantry for the first time in the Verdun battle entered into action upon the western bank of the Meuse. The attack was begun with two divisions of the reserve, the 22nd and the 12th, one belonging to the VIth Reserve Corps, and the other to the Xth, which formed part of the General Reserve of the German Army, which made its first appearance in the fighting at this moment.

The first assault was launched on the right of the left bank positions, and aimed at reducing of the salient around Forges. This was done without very much difficulty, the nature of the position favouring the enemy in

BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF THE AREA OF BATTLE.

many ways. Forges and Régneville having been carried, the Germans then turned to the west and sought to come to grips with the main French point of defence, the Mort Homme. But the advance already made on the left bank of the river was deemed sufficiently important by the German General Staff to enable the main frontal attack to be resumed.

While the attack upon the outworks of the Mort Homme position was pushed with the utmost vigour, the whole northern line of Verdun burst into the flame of fighting, such as had not been witnessed up till then, and right along the front, practically from Malancourt to Vaux, the battle raged for three days from March 8 to March 10. The front on the right bank of the river consisted of four distinct regions of activity.

(1) Pepper Ridge district, which stretched from the north of Vacherauville to the Ravine of Haudromont Farm.

(2) District south-west of Haudromont Farm.

(3) From Douaumont Village to the Hardaumont redoubt.

(4) Vaux village and Vaux fort.

On this battle front the reconstituted corps which had taken part in the first days of the offensive from February 21 to February 24, troops had got a footing on the Hardaumont position, having, as shown above, captured a small redoubt.

On the 9th, the Vth Corps moved out to the attack of the village of Vaux, at the foot of the ravine, and of the Fort of Vaux, on the southern wall of that ravine. The first assaults were led by the 9th Reserve Division, which debouched from the neighbourhood of Maucourt-Ornes early in the morning and marched on Vaux village. The operation had, of course, been preceded by tremendous bombardment, in the course of which the village had crumbled away. Either confident that all defence had been smothered by high explosives, or else misled by some erroneous report into the belief that the village had been evacuated by the French, the first troops of the attack (the 1st Battalion 19th Reserve) advanced upon the village in column of fours without even troubling about patrols or advanced guard. The determined French, however, still lurked in the cellars and ruins of the village, and waited with beating hearts for the enemy. One French officer, on seeing the enemy marching tranquilly forward four abreast, as though out on manœuvres, after the "Cease fire," declared that they only needed their band to complete the picture of

A GERMAN [illegible]

waiting Frenchmen sprang from their shelters and their parapets and finished their rout with the bayonet. The battalion fled in disorder. There was a wild rush for cover, and those who found it in the cellars of the houses on the fringe of the village did not succeed in holding out. They were finished off in a series of grenade engagements. The second and third battalions meanwhile passed to the east of the village, and advanced towards the trenches occupied by the French on the north of the slopes dominated by the fort of Vaux. At a little distance from these trenches the assailants were mown down by the fire of the French, and retired in disorder.

During the night of March 9–10 the 3rd Battalion of the 64th Regiment (6th Infantry Division of the IIIrd Corps) took post to the north of Vaux in order to relieve the 19th Regiment, which was destroyed, and to attempt again the capture of the village. This undertaking was rendered impossible by the French artillery fire. During the day infantry attacks upon the ruined village followed one after the other with scarcely a pause. The enemy managed to gain possession of a few houses on the eastern outskirts of the place; but from the Fort he was repulsed with heavy loss,

about a third of its effectives. In this, its second venture, after refitting, its losses were about the same. It had to be removed again from the first line, having lost 22,000 men since the beginning of the battle.

Right and left of the IIIrd Corps, on March 9, the battle spread along the whole line. The fighting on March 9 formed, as it were, the seventh wave of fury hurled upon the Verdun defences. East and west of the river storm after storm of infantry sought in vain to pierce the French lines.

In the Pepper Ridge district of the front on the eastern bank of the river a violent attack was made by the 14th and 15th Reserve Divisions. It failed to make any headway whatever up the bare slopes of the position. The enemy here lost very heavily indeed, being caught time after time in splendidly timed curtain fire.

Simultaneously, in the region south-west of Haudromont Farm, the 21st Division, which had been taken out of the first line for repairs on March 2, moved out through the ravines to attack the crests to the west of Douaumont along the road leading from Bras to Douaumont. The losses here also were extraordinarily heavy. Time after time the assaulting columns were scattered by the French guns before they got to grips with the French infantry and, even before the attack started, the casualty list was already high. The French artillery got very correct observation reports of what was going on in the valleys, and plied the ranks of the assailants with shell as they were gathering for their forward movement. Indeed, at one spot where six companies of infantry had gathered the guns got on to them as they were standing in their ranks and swept almost the whole lot out of existence

By far the most determined and most costly efforts of the enemy on those fateful days of March were directed against the position of Vaux. The village lay at the foot of the Meuse heights, at the entrance of a ravine into the Woevre Plain. This ravine, winding gently up the heights, reached the crest just in the rear of the centre of the French position at Douaumont. Frontal attack upon that position having failed time after time the Germans endeavoured to force their way through Vaux to the rear of the defence. There were many obstacles to their progress. The ravine of Vaux was shut in by two plateaux, upon the southern of which was the Fort of Vaux, while to the north the tableland bore the well organized positions of Hardaumont and the Caillette Wood.

THE FORT OF VAUX.
Showing the effect of the German Artillery.

In the attack upon these positions the Germans used their Vth Reserve Corps. On the first day of the fighting the neighbouring troops had got a footing on the Hardaumont position, having, as shown above, captured a small redoubt.

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FILTERED WATER FOR THE FRENCH TROOPS.

Sterilising with chemicals before being stored. Centre picture: French soldier drawing his supply. Bottom picture: Barrels containing the water near the trenches.

leaving the wire entanglements of the slopes leading to the Fort burdened with his dead. His only other gain was the Hardaumont Spur, the capture of which by no means opened the road to Douaumont or Vaux, since there still remained the strong position of the Caillette Wood. Another attack on the 16th and on the 18th ended in failure, and also marked the close of the great battle for the wings, at any rate on the eastern wing.

The fight for Vaux on the eastern wing and on the right bank of the river was accompanied by fighting of equal fury on the western wing around the key position of the Mort Homme. In this sector of the battlefield the first step—namely, the forcing of the Forges-Régneville salient—had been accomplished by March 8. This was considered sufficiently important as to allow the fighting on the right bank to proceed while the Germans in the western field of battle were to follow up their success by the capture of the Mort Homme, which would greatly improve the chances of a successful action against the centre at Douaumont.

In this action on the left bank of the river, which went on at the same time as the frenzied but unsuccessful assaults upon Vaux on the right bank, but little more gain was made. Despite reckless sacrifice and valour the Germans were unable to bite upon the Mort Homme. For the position leading to it they had to fight to the last. The Crows Wood, through which they hoped to advance in triumph on the Mort Homme, was captured by them, but their possession was not long undisputed. Twelve hours after the French had been driven from the wood the French went out to the counter-attack with such vigour that by the end of the day they had succeeded after fighting which time after time came to

the bayonet, in driving the Germans out of all but a small portion of the eastern fringe of the wood.

On the 10th, after uninterrupted bombardment throughout the day, the Germans made a really great effort to make good their loss at this point. They accumulated heavy artillery and men and dispatched wave after wave of men to meet the deluge of the French fire. The German losses might well have made them pause. but throughout the whole history of Verdun it was noticeable that at no moment did loss of men appear to matter to the General Staff. No price was apparently too high to pay for success even of a minor nature. At the end of the day they dashed a whole division on to the Crows Wood and got through, driving the French from the portion of the wood which the Germans had lost in the counter-attack of March 8. Then followed a period of suspense, throughout which on both banks of the river the guns alone were heard.

This pause was so general that for a day or so it looked as though the offensive in that region had come to an end. An artillery duel, without any infantry action, marked the 11th on both sides of the Meuse, and the French heavy artillery inflicted great loss on enemy troops gathering in a ravine north of Pepper Ridge. On the 12th the German infantry again took no part in the battle, but the artillery ceaselessly bombarded Béthincourt, Douaumont and Moulainville, a fort and village almost due east of Verdun and south of Vaux. The French reply was particularly spirited in this region.

During the lull in infantry fighting it was possible to take account of various significant facts. It became obvious that the German losses in the later attacks on Vaux had been so heavy that the gaps had had to filled by young recruits of the 1916 class, in some companies to the extent of one-third of their strength. They had been at the front since December, after only three or four months' training, and were not used before Verdun till the first week of fighting had rendered their presence absolutely necessary.

On the 12th the bombardment in the Verdun region became more violent on the west bank, the French positions in the first and second lines at Mort Homme and Bourrus Wood were heavily shelled. The French observers had seen sufficient movement of troops behind the German lines to understand the reason for this, and the violent attack launched against these positions in the afternoon of the 13th was expected, and although the assault was made with extreme energy, it was repulsed

THE SHATTERED VILLAGE OF VAUX.

along the whole line, the enemy only gaining a footing in two points of the trenches, between Béthincourt and the Mort Homme.

March 14 saw the long-expected attack in force upon the Mort Homme. The battle for the Mort Homme was as important and as costly as the struggle for Douaumont. The nature of the country calls for description not on that account alone, but also on account of the claims made by the German General Staff during the progress of the fighting.

After the Germans had carried the French advanced line formed by the villages of Forges and of Béthincourt, they found themselves at the

GENERAL VON STRANTZ.

foot of a series of hills running almost perpendicularly to their positions between Béthincourt and Forges. The first of these hills was double crowned. The hill nearest to them rose to the height of 265 metres, and immediately beyond, and a little to the south-east, was the higher point (295 metres), known locally as the Mort Homme, the exact meaning of which no one has been able to decide with certainty. The attack of this position was facilitated by the ravines leading up to it, in one of which, the Crows Wood, plenty of cover was available, as well as protection from bombardment from the southern battery positions of the French. Having captured this position in the earlier fighting, the Germans were at once able to use it as the starting-point for a direct assault upon the main bastion of the French line. The front attacked by the enemy measured only about three miles. Upon it great masses of men were concentrated, which were moved out from the Forges-Béthincourt Road, from the Crows Wood, and from Régneville. There was very heavy fighting, at the end of which the French had been forced to withdraw from their positions to a new line, which ran through Béthincourt, the height of the Mort Homme, the southern edge of Cumières Wood and Cumières Village. The Germans had carried Hill 265, but the French still remained in possession of the 295 Height known as the Mort Homme, which constituted the objective of the German attack.

On the strength of this very partial and most costly success, the Germans announced the taking of the position.

On the 16th they attempted to achieve the success they had announced. At three o'clock in the afternoon, after the usual bombardment, a division moved forward from the Bois des Corbeaux, straight towards the formidable cliff. The French curtain fire fell between them and the French trenches, but they were not daunted until five successive waves of men, separated by two or three hundred yards, had failed to pass the screen of death between them and their objective. Their artillery gave them less support than they had expected in this open ground, for the French observers had discovered its position, and it had to reply to the French bombardment that ceaselessly fell upon it. At the end of the afternoon the Germans were back in the Bois des Corbeaux, having abandoned even the small advantages they had previously gained.

The Germans were to find to their cost that the Mort Homme was a position easier to capture by *communiqué* than by fighting. The formidable nature of their reception on its slopes forced them to abandon their plan of turning the French position from the right and of capturing the Mort Homme. Their next endeavour in this long drawn out and bloody battle of the wings was to seek to turn the French lines on the left bank of the Meuse from the extreme left.

The Mort Homme was on the right of the French left; Hill 304 was at its extreme left. The south-east horn of Hill 304 is the village of Avocourt, lying snugly among rolling downlands, and sheltered by its wood, through

SCENES IN AND NEAR THE VILLAGE OF VAUX AFTER THE GERMAN ATTACKS.

On March 16, 1916, five successive attacks were hurled forward by the enemy in this region. Two were directed against the village, two against the slopes of the ridge crowned by the fort, and finally an attempt was made on the south-east of the village. All attacks were shattered by the curtain fire and machine guns of the French.



FRENCH SOLDIER RESTING IN A RUINED HOUSE AT VERDUN.

which the only easy ascent of Hill 304 could be made. On the 20th the Crown Prince threw a fresh division, the 11th Bavarian, against this position. This division was one of the prides of the Germany army. It had been through the Galician and Polish campaigns under Mackensen. These crack troops were thrown upon Avocourt Wood, and, attacking with flame throwers, managed to make slight progress in the eastern part of the Bois de Malancourt, and, capturing the Avocourt Wood, managed to reach the lower slopes of the little mound known as the Mamelon d'Haucourt. When the Germans endeavoured, however, to debouch towards Hill 304, they had to cross open country, and suffered so terribly under the concentrated fire of the French guns that the attempt was abandoned, the three regiments of this division having lost in two days between 50 and 60 per cent. of their strength. The battle for the wings was at an end, and on both sides of the Meuse silence reigned for a while.

The Crown Prince, after the gigantic effort of his armies, was confronted with problems more vast, with a resistance more confident and more efficient, than those which he had had to face in the opening days of the Verdun offensive. In three days the French had been driven off their first positions along a large portion of the Verdun front; over a month later they were still defending with increasing vigour their second line. Behind that line lay yet another, and the prospect of the fall of Verdun was but faint upon the German horizon. The French could already count upon

BRINGING UP AMMUNITION.

Engine drawing a trainload of ammunition behind the battle area.

FRENCH MACHINE-GUN SECTION IN ACTION.

Smaller picture: A gun in a trench hidden from observation.

vietory, the price of Verdun having already been exacted in the enemy's blood, without the position having been eaptured. That priee, it was said, had been fixed by the Imperial General Staff at 200,000 easualties. The exact loss sustained on either side will probably never be known; but certain indications will be suffieient to show that the German losses up to the close of the battle of the wings were extraordinarily heavy. Throughout this period of the fighting the enemy was still advancing in masses, and relied to a foolhardy extent upon the devastating effeet of artillery. Time after time large bodies of troops, gathering in the valleys and ravines behind the German front, were located and pounded by the French guns. The Germans, instead of adopting the system of relieving their worn-out divisions with new divisions, brought baek the used-up troops, and, after filling up their gaps with material from the depôts, sent the divisions back to the firing line after three or four days' rest. The IIIrd and XVIIIth Army Corps were thus removed from the front, after having, as shown above, left about a third of their men on the field during the attacks upon the first line. They reappeared during the period under review, and again lost about the same number, before again being drawn out. The XVIIIth Corps had a total casualty list of 17,000 men, while for the IIIrd Corps the figure was 22,000.

The details are more precise as regards the losses of the 121st Division of Infantry, which moved on to the front to the north of Vaux about Mareh 12. More than half the 7th Reserve Regiment was mown down by the maehine guns during the fruitless attacks on the slopes of the fort; the same fate overtook the 60th Regiment, and the 19th Regiment, in attaeking the village of Vaux, on Mareh 9, lost about 60 per eent. of its men. Its 13th eompany was surprised and destroyed eompletely in the houses of the village.

The three infantry regiments of the 11th Bavarian Division, which arrived fresh from the east to take part in the fighting on the left bank of the Meuse between Mareh 20 and 22, suffered terribly. The losses of these regiments varied between 50 and 60 per cent. The four regiments of the 2nd Landwehr Division, which were engaged in the same eonditions as the 11th, had to pay similar toll. These indications deal only with troops aetually engaged in active operations, and they do not take into aeeount the tremendous daily wastage that went on in a battle of this sort when the whole

FRENCH GUNS ON THE WAY TO THE FRONT.

countryside was plastered with shrapnel and high explosive shells. As an instance of the extent of this sort of loss, the fate of the 37th infantry regiment, which was surprised by artillery when relieving another regiment and lost 500 men, may be cited.

The great shock army which was formed to give the Crown Prince his fame as the Captor of Verdun, was maimed and bleeding. Only one-third of its effectives were in a position to take the field. The army of the Crown Prince himself had been fighting for many weary days, beating its head without avail upon the French second line positions, and, in some cases even, still upon positions of the first line. A tremendous amount had been done, and yet but little had been accomplished. Verdun was stronger than ever, and blood had flowed very much more freely on the German than on the French side. So much for the military effect of this first month of battle.

What effect the Germans had expected from a moral point of view, both upon their allies and upon neutral countries, was set out in the following order of the day issued by General Joffre to the Army defending Verdun: "Soldiers of the Army of Verdun! For three weeks you have been exposed to the most formidable assaults yet attempted against us by the enemy. Germany counted upon the success of this effort, which she believed to be irresistible, and to which she has devoted her best troops and her most powerful artillery. She hoped that the capture of Verdun would revive the courage of her allies and would convince neutral countries of German superiority. She had reckoned without you. Night and day, despite a bombardment without precedent, you have resisted all attacks and maintained our positions. The struggle is not yet at an end, for the Germans require a victory. You will succeed in wresting it from them. We have munitions and reserves in abundance; but, above all, you have indomitable courage and faith in the destinies of the Republic. The eyes of the country are upon you. You will be among those of whom it will be said: they barred the road to Verdun to the Germans."

Allusion has been already made in the previous chapter dealing with the battle of Verdun, to the means by which the Germans sought to reap in neutral countries the advantages of the victories they failed to achieve. Thus, in the period under review, the Germans more than once claimed successes which were never theirs. On March 9 a German official telegram asserted that by a brilliant attack made in the course of the previous night the Posen reserve regiments Nos. 6 and 19, under the direction of General von Guretzky-Cornitz, had carried by assault the fort of Vaux, as well as a number of adjoining fortifications. The French, who had learned by experience the nature of Germany's "wireless offensive," immediately took steps to publish a convincing denial of this false assertion. At the very hour when the German wireless was sent—namely, at two o'clock in the afternoon—a French staff officer entered the fort of Vaux and found that it had not been attacked. It was being bombarded, like the rest of the zone of battle, and the troops occupying it were perfectly calm, most of them, indeed, being engaged in the game of manille. The same wireless report further asserted (1) that German troops were occupied in clearing Crows Wood of parties of French who were still there; (2) that the Germans had taken by assault the village of Vaux. At that time the greater part of Crows Wood was held by the French, the Germans only occupying the eastern fringes. The village of Vaux had been attacked and vigorously defended. It remained in French hands, and the German troops which had succeeded in getting into the village had been driven out at the point of the bayonet. The effect upon neutrals, upon Germany, and upon the Entente Allies was completely contrary to that which Germany desired to create. For a time the German people, misled by inspired press comment and official falsehood, saw in the Verdun battle a success which would shorten the war. As, day after day, the casualties grew and the front remained the same, that feeling of elation changed to one of apprehension. Among the Entente Allies official expression was given to the admiration of the people in exchanges of telegrams. Sir Douglas Haig, telegraphing to General Joffre on March 10, said: "While deploring the loss of gallant Frenchmen in the great battle still raging, the British Army desires me to assure you of its admiration for the heroic performances of the French army round Verdun, where Germany has chosen to break her strength in vain against the unconquerable soldiers of France." General Alexeieff, in the name of the Czar, conveyed to General Balfourier and the XXth Army Corps, which had taken part in the counter-attacks

of Douaumont, the Emperor's warmest admiration of its brilliant conduct. The telegram said: "His Majesty is firmly convinced that under the command of its gallant leaders the French Army, faithful to its glorious traditions, will not fail to bring its savage enemy to his knees." General Alexeieff added: "The whole Russian Army follows with sustained attention the great deeds of the French Army. It expresses to its brothers in arms its best wishes for complete victory, and is merely awaiting orders to engage the common enemy.

These were certainly not the sentiments which the Germans desired to call forth in the allied countries. Upon French civilian and political *moral* the effects were equally disconcerting to the Germans, who, at the close of the battle of the wings, found all their efforts, in whatever direction they tended, baffled and held in check. In Paris the temper of the public became day by day more confident. For the first time perhaps a consciousness of equipoise in the opposing forces, rather than an intense admiration for a gallant fight against odds, occupied the public mind. After the first days of darkness and disaster along the Belgian frontier the French had realised, faintly perhaps, the tremendous strength of the German fighting machine. The resistance on the Aisne, the unyielding wall of German trench, showed them still more clearly how great would have to be the successful preparation of victory. At the outbreak of war the French had been caught in the middle of a period of restoration, during which some of the defects and remedies of an extreme anti-political *régime* were being slowly repaired. Their supply of heavy artillery, of machine guns, and of shells was completely inadequate to the demands of modern war.

The Marne had prevented the creation of any legend of German invincibility. The fight for the road to Calais had shown that in sticking power the Allies need fear no comparison with their enemies. In the Champagne were seen for the first time the fruits of the war industries which had covered France with factories since the battle of the Marne. After the first few days of anxious tension during the battle of Verdun, French public opinion began to perceive that here at last the German artillery and German "tackle" had found their equal, if not their master, in the products of France.

In political circles, which in Paris were always peculiarly sensitive, there were moments



BARBED-WIRE ENTANGLEMENTS AT CROWS WOOD.
The scene of the German attack on March 10, 1916.

FRENCH REINFORCEMENTS.
Troops on foot and by motor lorries on the way to the fighting line.

when rumour disturbed the balance of judgment; but it sufficed for the Prime Minister to speak a few reassuring words as he passed through the lobbies to restore calm and confidence.

The quietness with which the politicians of France watched the progress of the struggle, and the lack of internal effect it had, were best shown by the fact that in the middle of the action, on March 16, General Galliéni, Minister of War, was able to resign without in any way disturbing the public mind. The main cause of his resignation was ill-health, but there were contributing reasons of a more political nature, which, had the German offensive had the morally disturbing powers the enemy imagined, would have caused considerable commotion.

General Galliéni became Minister of War when the French Cabinet was reconstituted under M. Briand's presidency at the end of October, 1915. He succeeded M. Millerand, whose administration had been widely condemned both in the Chamber of Deputies and in the Senate, on account of its routine character and resistance to the large and imaginative changes rendered necessary by the gigantic scale of modern war, and the necessity for mobilising every latent force of efficiency and goodwill throughout the country. The appointment of a soldier was in keeping with the principle which guided M. Briand in the selection of all his colleagues. He chose Admiral Lacaze as successor to the Radical

THE LAST OF A GERMAN AVIATOR.

A German aeroplane brought down at Verdun in flames.

politician, M. Augagneur, at the Ministry of Marine, and, while himself taking the portfolio of Foreign Affairs, the principle was maintained by the appointment of M. Jules Cambon, one of the foremost diplomats of France, to the post of Secretary-General of the Foreign Office.

General Galliéni, before his appointment as Minister of War, had held a post which in happier circumstances would have remained without any direct responsibility in the actual operations of war—that of Military Governor of Paris. This post, in ordinary times, was one of honour and of distinction, rather than of action and responsibility. The great drive of the Germans at the beginning of the war gave to General Galliéni's functions an extraordinary importance. The arrival of the enemy almost at the gates of Paris, the consequent departure of the Government for Bordeaux, gave to him a *rôle* full reference to which has already been made in a previous chapter. The energy he displayed as Military Governor of Paris during the critical moment of the Battle of the Marne he brought with him to the performance of his duties as Minister of War. He left this office for a nursing home in order to undergo an operation, and was succeeded by another of those generals who had earned their reputation on the field of battle, and not in the Parliamentary lobby or in the anti-chambers of ministers. That such a change was effected without causing any apprehension on the part of the public, to whom Galliéni was an idol, was the best proof of French confidence in the ability of the Verdun defenders. Broadly viewed, there was indeed ample justification for the assurance of the French. They saw Germany embarked upon an enterprise which the German General Staff had considered to be so desperate at the outbreak of the war that they had preferred, rather than to attempt it, to run the almost certain risk of British intervention by tearing up the Scrap of Paper, and to strike at France across the corpse of Belgium and through her northern frontier.

There was another side effect which the psychologists of the German General Staff may have hoped to produce by this terrific onslaught upon the country which, after many hesitations, after many campaigns of the Gott strafe England and the Hymn of Hate variety, the Germans had decided to honour, for the moment at any rate, with the title of "our chief enemy." It was but a simple calculation upon the frailty of human and especially of political alliances to imagine that the French, when they saw their sons falling by the thousand on the hills of the Meuse, should exclaim in their agony: "What are the English doing? Why don't they counter-attack, and draw off some of the troops which the Crown Prince is hurling on us?" It was inevitable that among the uninstructed classes of the population there should be some talk of this sort. The great intelligent mass of the country had too great a confidence in the loyalty of their tried and proved Ally, too great a confidence in the closeness of the understanding between the British and the French General Staffs to allow themselves to be influenced by any such ideas. Great Britain had given too many proofs of her determination for it to be imagined possible by the French that she would refuse her help had it been needed. At Verdun the situation was that in their offensive the Germans were losing three men to one. The French, a logical people, did not require much convincing before they saw that for the British in the north to repeat the German folly in the east, would be a certain and disastrous way of neutralising the fruits of the gallantry of the defence of Verdun. The help of the British, although it did not take the form of an offensive, was none the less valuable. It would have been impossible for administrative and military reasons, for the British to have dispatched any appreciable body of men to fight side by side with the French on the battlefields of the Meuse. British assistance took the more practicable form, the more fruitful if less glorious form, of the extension of the British line in France. General Joffre, in replying to the telegram of congratulation from Sir Douglas Haig, expressing the admiration of the British Army for the doughty deeds of the defenders of Verdun, said: "The French Army thanks the British Army for the expression of hearty goodwill which it has been good enough to address to us while the great battle of Verdun is proceeding. From its fierce struggle the French Army is convinced that it will achieve results from which all the Allies will reap an advantage. It remembers also that its recent call on the comradeship of the British Army met with an immediate and complete response." That complete response consisted in relieving the 10th French Army by British troops.

Throughout the whole world the defence of

"WE EXPLODED A MINE AND OCCUPIED THE CRATER."

Survivors of a French mine-explosion in the German trenches attacked by French Infantry with bomb and bayonet.

Verdun arouse a fire of admiration, and restored without question in the neutral countries, in America, and in the Allied States of Europe, the old military prestige of France. "Even the ranks of Tusculum could scarce forbear to cheer;" and cries of admiration, reluctant, it calculated, were heard from Germany, where, indeed, a growing necessity was being felt for some explanation of the unavailing slaughter around Verdun. This admiration was based not only on the heroism, but also on the science of leadership displayed by the French. Above all, was it due to the further revelation of the France which had lain unsuspected by the outside world, a dogged France, a France proud boast of Waterloo: "The Guard dies, it does not surrender." A sub-lieutenant of the same regiment, under the concentrated shell fire of the enemy, walked about smoking a cigarette, exposed to the view of the Germans, as an example of coolness to his men. A corporal of that same regiment, who was seriously wounded, refused to be carried away, saying: "Don't trouble about me, look after the Boches." Another soldier, still belonging to this regiment without a history, was wounded at the beginning of the attack, and refused to leave the firing line. He was unable to hold a gun, and busied himself cleaning and loading the weapons of his comrades.

IN THE ENEMY'S WIRE ENTANGLEMENTS.
The leader can be seen cutting the wire with pincers

stoic almost to the point of callousness, when the defence of the country was concerned.

Never can all the acts of heroism which built up molecule by molecule the great defence of Verdun, in the two first battles which ended on March 22, become known to the world. Each inch of ground ceded by the French, each parcel of territory held against the Germans, was drenched with glory. The old splendour of war-like France illumined the words and thoughts even of the most humdrum of regiments. During the Douaumont fighting, where a line regiment, possessed of no particular distinction, was holding out superbly under frenzied bombardment, a sergeant cheered up his men by adapting to his own regiment the

The spirit which animated all was indicated in a story told by Mr. Warner Allen, special correspondent of the British Press with the French armies, who, writing from Verdun, said:

> The endurance of the French troops during this battle has been beyond all praise. After two days and two nights' continuous fighting they still retained their dash and unshakeable *moral*. "We are going to stay here" said one of these *poilus* to a Staff officer, "until we are killed, and in that way we are sure the reserves will be able to come up in time." I spoke to a wounded man just back from the firing trench. He had lost his right hand, and I condoled with him on his bad luck. "That is nothing," he replied cheerfully. "I offered my life to France, and she has only taken my hand, so there I gain."
>
> In the utter fatigue of the third day, when under the storm of German shells convoys were few and far between to reach the advanced positions, the men fought

on doggedly without food or drink. An artillery captain told me the following story of his battery: It was in the full height of the assault, and their guns had been firing round after round at the highest speed. After seven or eight hundred rounds the 75's become so hot that it is impossible to fire any longer until the pieces have been cooled. Their guns had reached this stage of heat, and there was no water left except in the men's water-bottles. The men were almost dying of thirst, and yet of their own free will they refused to drink a single drop, reserving all the water in their flasks for the cooling of the pieces which were defending the infantry a mile or two away.

As an instance of collective spirit of heroism, Mr. Warner Allen quoted the following:

In the first battle a certain army corps, which included soldiers of all classes, from the 1915 contingent to men

FRENCH SAPPERS WORKING UNDERGROUND.

of the Territorial Reserve, resisted for five days and five nights the attacks of an enemy with a numerical superiority of four to one. The soldiers knew that it was their duty to gain time and play the part of covering troops, and so untiringly they struggled on, exacting a heavy price from the enemy for every yard of ground gained.

On the 26th these men were worn out and fresh troops took their place. They held the line until March 10, and they are now for the first time returning to the rear, so that we are able to obtain their personal account of the terrible struggle.

On the left of the village of Douaumont a certain infantry brigade has opposed to the German assaults a wall of steel that nothing could break. It is commanded by a young colonel who, like General Foch and General Maud'huy, had in time of peace made a brilliant reputation as a professor at the Ecole de Guerre. Brought up at full speed to the front, this brigade was hurled forward on the 26th to relieve the worn-out troops who were defending the all-important position of Douaumont. Its commander at once decided that the only tactics possible was an immediate offensive. Any delay under the terrible bombardment could only be fatal, and the enemy promptly discovered that there were fresh troops before him.

For fourteen days these troops remained under the enemy's fire. Four times they met the furious assaults of the Germans, and four times they not only repelled the enemy but followed up their success with counter-attacks. On the first day officers and men vied together in deeds of heroism. Wounded soldiers refused to go to hospital, or, if sent back against their will, insisted on rejoining their comrades as soon as their wounds were bandaged. The colonel, to his surprise, found an old sergeant whose white beard suggested that his place was away behind the lines. "What are you doing here?" he asked. "Mon colonel," was the reply, "my son has been killed. I have come to avenge him."

After the attack of the 26th the enemy retired, and the six following days the brigade set to work to dig themselves in, under a terrible bombardment. The Germans attempted no further infantry attacks, although they had on the spot one of the finest regiments of their army. It was not till the fourth that they ventured to return to the charge. Once again a French counter-attack threw back the enemy in disorder, and for four more days the French concentrated their efforts on strengthening their position. Then, on the tenth, the Germans, seeing that the French lines were fast becoming impregnable, determined to put an end to this stubborn resistance, and throughout the day hurled wave after wave of assault against them.

The first attack was preceded by a tremendous bombardment, but it was met and broken by the French infantry. An hour after a second assault, two hours after a third assault, and the French line still held. Finally, the enemy attempted his heaviest blow—an assault in columns of fours, which was to break through the thin French line like a battering ram. "Then," said one of the officers who took part in the battle, "everything we possessed opened upon them, particularly our 75's and machine-guns, and half an hour after it was over. Thousands of German corpses covered the ground and we still held the positions that had been entrusted to us. The next day we were relieved, and our regiments marched through a village in the rear with the same magnificent dash and discipline as though they were just returning from repose."

Among the bodies left in front of the French lines the numbers of six different regiments were identified. The two regiments who had held so gloriously richly deserved the congratulations of France, which a few days later were brought to them at their cantonments by the Generalissimo.

It was examples of this magnificent heroism which stirred the imagination even of the most sluggish of neutrals to an appreciation of the splendid fighting qualities of the French, to a realisation of the fact that now the French had in every way taken an accurate measure of their opponents. The military correspondent of *The Times*, summing up the situation, wrote:

If a German officer could visit the French armies he would probably gather that no doubt at all is felt of their ability to deal with the Crown Prince. Should the latter report faithfully to his Imperial father he would tell him that, though an unprecedented deployment of guns, an unheard-of expenditure of ammunition, and an immense superiority of numbers had enabled him at first to win some advanced positions from General Herr's weak garrison of reserve troops at Verdun, the German armies had subsequently failed, and, after suffering a

TWO BRAVE ZOUAVES AT VERDUN

During the German attack on the Fort of Vaux, the machine gun of two Zouaves fell into a small shell hole. In order to continue firing, one of them lifted the gun on his shoulder, while the other kept the gun in action until all the cartridges were spent.

loss of half their strength, had not achieved the aim of their venture. He would add that the fire of the first impulsion had died down; that the attack threatened to degenerate into trench wrangling of the normal type; and that reinforcements were needed to save his military reputation from demise.

That military reputation was too precious an asset for the Hohenzollern house and for Imperial Germany, for them not to make a further desperate effort to restore it. Reinforcements were needed, but the situation of Germany was such that she was unable to conduct a general offensive against the Allies along the whole front with any hope of success. The Germans were maintaining on the west two



large groups of forces, tho one round Verdun, and the other opposed to the British north of the Somme. The rest of their line was but lightly held, and in reserve on the Verdun front from Vauquois to St. Mihiel, the Germans only had two divisions in addition to the IIIrd and XVIIIth Corps, which had been taken out of the line for refitting.

The Germans might have drawn upon the three divisions they still had south of the Danube, but the political and military effects of this upon so treacherous and unsteady an ally as Bulgaria might have been serious. On the Russian front the country was as yet impracticable for any operations on a large scale, the roads being still useless on account of the thaw; so that from there the enemy was entitled to draw some additional strength for the Verdun sector. This step he took, and for the new battle which was in preparation during those six days, from March 22 to March 28, he sent in the 192nd Brigade on the left bank in the neighbourhood of Malancourt. On the centre, around the hotly disputed points of Bras, Douaumont and Vaux, he massed the 113th, 58th, and 121st Reserve Divisions, which, with the 19th Reserve Division, took the place of what was left of the XVIIIth and IIIrd Army Corps. A division from Russia arrived on the German left. With these new pieces on the board the Germans, who throughout the period of infantry lull had maintained a regular bombardment of the whole of the French positions, opened the third great period of fighting, which was to extend from March 28 to April 25.

The two first portions of the battle of Verdun were clear-cut in their design and in their execution. The first, which lasted from February 21 to March 6, had witnessed the attempt

and bloody failure of the enemy to repeat Mackensen's great operation on the Dunajec; when, by massed concentration of artillery fire, the ill-equipped if heroic resistance of the Russians had been broken down and a great gap rent in the centre of the line attacked. There the Germans had heroism alone to deal with. At Verdun they met heroism armed with the products of industry and science, and their first move brought them no profit.

Still pursuing what was, at any rate at that time, a carefully thought out and orthodox strategic idea, the Germans opened the second phase of the battle with tremendous onslaughts on the wings, which lasted from March 6 to March 22. There again they failed to achieve their purpose

Their position at the beginning of the third period, now under discussion, might be likened to that of an impetuous and gambling chess-player, who, having started an attack upon his enemy, captures a few pawns, brings several major pieces on to advanced squares on his opponent's side of the board, and then discovers that his adversary, too, has had his plan, and that that plan has been consolidated and improved at the very moment when the scheme of attack seemed most likely to result in mate. Obstacle after obstacle had been encountered; fresh difficulties, fresh and unsuspected centres of resistance had made their power felt; so that the Germans, at the opening of this third phase, had to revise their procedure almost entirely, and devote themselves at first to the reduction of positions which, up till then, they had thought it possible to ignore.

The attack was renewed upon the left bank. The extension of the fighting to the left had been the consequence of the failure to pierce the centre at Douaumont, and of the resulting necessity to clear the French out from their artillery positions on the left bank, the fire from which raked all operations on the right bank of the river. This business of crushing in the French positions on the western edge of the battle had proved extremely costly. At the beginning of February the French line had run roughly between Avocourt and Forges. Behind this line rose up the two main pillars of the chief defensive position, Hill 304 and the Mort Homme. This line the Germans had attacked at both ends, in the east at Forges, in the west in Avocourt Wood. They had cut through it by their pressure and formed a salient from Malancourt to Béthincourt. As has been seen, the enemy deemed this success sufficient to enable him to begin at once the attack upon these two staple points of the French line, Hill 304 and the Mort Homme. From Forges they had endeavoured to advance through the Crows Wood upon the slopes of the Mort Homme. From Avocourt they had essayed to push up to the ridge of Hill 304. The mag-

VERDUN.

Removing the heaps of French shell cases behind the lines.

nificent opposition against which these two endeavours broke on March 14 and March 22 has been described. On the Mort Homme the enemy was able to get but the barest footing. His attack upon Hill 304 had never pierced through to its objective. The Germans, therefore, in the period of reconsideration allowed them by the lull after March 22, realized that the French were after all a stubborn and tenacious nation; that they were also a nation with military ideas of defence. They saw that before they could possibly hope to carry these two tremendous points of the French line it was not sufficient to have cut through it on the two flanking positions, and that it was necessary to crush in the whole of the advanced French lines, so as to be able to deliver a direct attack upon Hill 304 and the Mort Homme, along the whole of the front constituted by those natural fortresses. General Pétain, who, once he had assured the safety of the Verdun salient by his splendidly timed and organized counter-attacks at Douaumont in the closing days of February, had deliberately adopted a defensive rôle, naturally expected and hoped that the Germans would endeavour, by sacrificing if necessary two or three men to one, to carry position after position. Confident in the defensive quality of his troops, he was able to count with certainty that, whatever successes the Germans made, would be piecemeal and extremely costly. This in effect was the history of this third great operation of the enemy.

The course of events during the lull which preceded this stage of the fighting was a monotonous repetition of artillery action. On March 23 the bombardment slackened down on the west of the Meuse in the course of the morning, but later developed into a sustained battering of the Malancourt region and of the French front Béthincourt - Mort Homme-Cumières, where the next infantry assaults were to be launched. This bombardment was distributed with almost equal strength upon the centre and the west throughout the lull.

Towards three o'clock on March 28 the first German infantry set to work upon their task of flattening out this salient on the west, which stretched out into the German lines north-west of Hill 304. The opening stages of the action were unfavourable for the Germans, and contained a menace of new and aggressive features in the French defence. The first assault was delivered upon Malancourt, where the enemy failed to achieve anything except a notable casualty list, due to the efficiency of the French curtain fire. While the Germans were coming to grief here, the French in Avocourt Wood were giving further proof of the complete freshness of their troops and the confidence of their leaders. Up till then, French counter-attacks had been few in number, and had been for the most part confined to actions rendered imperatively necessary by the still warm triumph of the enemy. Here in the Avocourt Wood, which had been occupied by the Germans on the 20th after a bitterly contested struggle in which they used much liquid flame, the French began an operation which amounted to a considered offensive rather than to the counter-attack delivered immediately after the blow.

Pushing forward with great energy, the French got about three hundred yards of the south-eastern corner of Avocourt Wood, and carried a point which was afterwards destined to play an important part in the operations. This point, known as the Avocourt Redoubt, had been very thoroughly prepared for defence, and the enemy took its loss to heart. Throwing one of the newly-arrived brigades into action, he made desperate but ineffectual attempts to recapture this position. These counter-attacks were repeated no less than three times in the course of the day. The Germans suffered heavy losses during these operations, and left prisoners in the French hands. On the following day, the 29th, an attack in great strength was launched upon the village of Malancourt, which, lying in a hollow, had been exposed to particularly heavy bombardments. After ferocious bayonet and grenade fighting, the enemy was able to report that at the close of the day he had captured an advance work situated to the north of the village and was in occupation of two houses in the village itself. The following days were filled with terrific fighting, in the course of which the Germans lost tremendously. The scene of this fighting was the south-eastern horn of the Avocourt Wood, in the defence of which the captured redoubt played an all-important part. Four counter-attacks were launched upon the position in the course of the 29th, and throughout the early hours of the 30th the enemy returned again and again to the assault, leaving mounds of dead before the position.

By March 31 the Germans had succeeded in a very small portion of their full purpose,

ON THE SLOPE AT MORT HOMME.

A fire due to German shells.

and the French evaeuated Malancourt: on the same afternoon, towards four o'clock, a vigorous attempt was made upon the French position north-east of the Mort Homme. The attack was preceded and accompanied by a heavy bombardment of laehrymatory shells. For a time the attack was suceessful; a footing was obtained in part of the first line, but before the enemy had had time to fortify himself and consolidate his gain, the ever-ready Freneh counter-attaek was upon him, and he was forced to evaeuate his newly-conquered position. An attempt farther west to ierce through to the main Mort Homme defences was crushed under artillery fire. On April 1 a series of powerful assaults was made again upon the Avoeourt Redoubt, after the usual bombardment, but without any success. Meanwhile the village of Haueourt was being continuously bombarded. On the 2nd this bombardment gave way to a violent thrust by the infantry between Haueourt and Béthincourt. This attack was aimed at the positions held by the French on the northern bank of the little stream of Forges; and it resulted in a complete surprise for the Germans. The Freneh line at this point was much exposed to the German artillery fire, as well as to machine-guns; and during the night before the German movement the whole position had been stealthily evaeuated, and the Freneh had taken up positions of mueh greater strength on the south bank of the stream, where they eommanded a mueh better field of fire. When the enemy reached his supposed objective he was eaught not only by steady fire from the new Freneh standpoint on the other side of the stream, but also by a withering fire from enfilading positions at Béthineourt, and the attack melted away with intolerable losses before the Germans had even been given an opportunity of getting to grips with their enemy.

On April 3, at about two o'cloek in the afternoon, the first unsuceessful attack upon the village of Haueourt was delivered. It was not resumed again until April 5. Onee more the chess-player had too boldly advanced his

AN OPEN-AIR ENTERTAINMENT NEAR THE BATTLE FRONT.

French troops from the trenches enjoying an entertainment. A German shell is bursting near the church, but this is ignored both by actors and audience, who have grown used to such interruptions.



pieces upon ground which had been too little studied. Once more, for a day or two, the artillery held sway upon this front. On the 5th a series of attacks, in which large numbers of men were engaged, was launched upon the two principal salients then left—Béthincourt and Haucourt. At Béthincourt, on the French right, all attempts were broken by the French fire; but at Haucourt the enemy was able to register an advance of another stage upon the reduction of the main salient—that of the capture of the village of Haucourt. It was effected at the price of tremendous sacrifice. Time after time the Germans, after sweeping right up to the entrance of the village, were caught by the withering fire of machine-guns, and those who remained alive were forced to seek the shelter of their trenches. In the course of the night the enemy gained a footing in the village, and gradually, by systematic if minor siege operations, drove the heroic defenders out of the cellars in which they had made their last desperate resistance.

The next day the enemy made an attempt to clear the approaches to the village, where the French had established themselves to the south and east. The attack, which was carried out on a front of two kilometres, failed to reach its objective. This endeavour was repeated on the following day, when the only success to the enemy's account was the capture of two small works between Haucourt and Hill 287. Throughout April 9 violent fighting was in progress along the whole of the French front from Avocourt to Cumières. The French, who had evacuated Béthincourt and the salient of which it formed the centre on the previous night, had fallen back upon a continuous line of defence, starting from the Avocourt Redoubt, running upon the first of the wooded slopes to the west of Hill 304; thence, taking the southern bank of Forges Brook, it went to the north-east of Haucourt, rejoining the French position a little to the south of the Béthincourt-Esnes and Béthincourt-Chataucourt cross roads.

The whole of this line was fiercely tried. It stood the test well. On the front, between Mort Homme and Cumières, the Germans received a staggering blow. They advanced in massed formation from Cumières Wood, and were thus caught as they debouched by French shrapnel and mitrailleuses. The men hesitated, then broke, running in all directions, leaving the ground littered with corpses. A simultaneous action, directed against the French line between Avocourt and Forges, met with the same reception, and achieved the same result. After the evacuation of Béthincourt the Crown Prince had deemed his first objective attained. The remaining portion of the French advance line—namely, the troops occupying the villages of Malancourt, Béthincourt and Haucourt—had been driven back. The Crown Prince therefore thought the moment come to deliver his great onslaught

upon tho two chief strongholds of the main French line. This was the result. Simultaneously the Crown Prince, with the object no doubt of weakening and dividing the French reserves, delivered a great blow at the old point of attraction on the right bank of the river, and on March 31 the enemy returned to the blood-drenched approaches of the village of Vaux and Douaumont Fort. There had been no infantry action in this region for about three weeks, the lull being due to the fact that all advances in this part were rendered impossible until the French positions on the left bank of the river had been reduced. The French on the left bank having been engaged, and their artillery having quite enough with which to occupy itself in that portion of the fighting, the Crown Prince thought the time had arrived to make one more effort to push through the main line at this point. On March 11 the enemy had succeeded in occupying a few houses situated at the eastern end of the village, but had been unable to carry the whole agglomeration, and unable therefore to reap a tactical profit from this gain. After three weeks' inactivity, on the morning of April 1 fighting broke forth again with all its previous fury, and in the course of the morning the French, gallantly though they fought, were compelled to evacuate the cellars and the ruins of this historic spot. All attempts on the part of the Germans to exploit this advantage, to debouch upon the village and advance up the ravine which winds away from Vaux among the hills to the back of Douaumont, ended in bloody disaster.

But the enemy was embarked on one of those long and pertinacious enterprises the series of which turned the Hauts de Meuse into an inferno of flame and fire for many weeks on end. The next day, after an extremely violent bombardment, in which guns of the heaviest calibre were used, an attack in force was made, in which more than one division was employed against the Douaumont Fort - village of Vaux line of defences. No less than four of these tremendous blows were rained upon the line, and south-east of the fort of Douaumont the enemy, fighting almost inch by inch, succeeded in penetrating the tangled, tumbled mass of timber which had once been the Caillette Wood. They were not long left in undisturbed possesssion. Again the counter-attack flared out, driving the enemy back from much of the ground he had won at such heavy cost, and leaving to him the possession of only the northern portion of the wood. The fighting around Vaux developed to a degree of great



DOUAUMONT.

A photograph of one of the entrances of the dismantled fortress after bombardment.

FRENCH RED CROSS AT WORK.
Wounded soldiers being removed to the rear of the fighting line.

intensity on the following day, April 3. The successful French counter-attack, which had driven the Germans up to the northern portion of Caillette Wood, was developed still further, and only the fringe of that position remained in the enemy's hands. A counter-attack of special violence, carried out by some of the best troops of France, bore the French back again into the western part of the village of Vaux. Towards three o'clock in the afternoon of April 4 the Germans attacked south of the village of Douaumont; the successive waves of the enemy were followed by small attacking columns which came under the deadly rain of curtain shrapnel, and were forced to make a hurried retreat into Chauffour Wood, upon which all the available guns of the sector were concentrated. The losses suffered by the enemy here were very heavy.

In this engagement the Germans, perhaps for the first time since the Verdun fighting began, showed an evident desire to spare their men as much as possible. The method of throwing solid masses upon the French lines had been abandoned. With the scientific use of artillery, such tactics had proved themselves costly out of all proportion to the moral effect upon the men concerned in the attack. The new system consisted in sending forward two or three lines of infantry in open order. These were followed by smaller bodies of better-trained troops. The idea of the German General Staff was apparently that those machine guns which might have been left untouched by a bombardment were better employed killing inferior troops than in mowing down well-trained men; further, that if either of the first lines succeeded in effecting a footing in the enemy's trench, the defenders of the neighbouring trench would be too busy in attempting to evict them to be able to devote much of their attention to the advance of further columns. This method proved no more successful than its predecessors.

On the following day the Germans made an unsuccessful attempt on Pepper Ridge, and endeavoured to clear the French out of Caillette Wood.

During this early period of the month of April the French began imparting a little more aggression to their tactics; and, while not undertaking any offensive on a large scale, by

a series of vigorous and short counter-attacks they began to make slow if steady progress. They applied to the German gains both on the east and on the west banks of the Meuse the Joffre policy of nibbling. Throughout April 9 and 10 the bombardment of the Douaumont-Vaux line was incessant, and on the 11th the first reaction against this nibbling policy led the enemy to an attack in force upon Vaux.

The character of the engagements which filled the latter half of April differed from that of previous operations. They were no longer pure offensives, undertaken with the intention of achieving immediate tactical results. The

RECONSTRUCTING CAPTURED TRENCHES.

slow wear and tear of the new French policy upon the German line was having effects both material and moral, to which an end had to be put by vigorous methods. The assault on the 11th was therefore a defensive offensive. It carried the Germans at the close of the day into some advanced elements of the French trenches between Douaumont and Vaux, whence before night closed they were ejected, after heavy bombing operations. The ground attacked was among that nibbled away, and in spite of the liberal use of suffocating gas, tear-shells, and liquid flame, the attempt to retake it failed. A similar effort achieved similar negative results on the following day.

The next of these defensive offensives was launched on April 17, with greater use of artillery, and in even greater numbers. The attacking troops, consisting of troops drawn from at least five divisions, advanced upon a front of about two and a half kilometres, from a point between Champneuville and Vacherauville to Douaumont. The action, which was one of concentrated violence, lasted for about two hours, and the losses of the enemy were about thirty per cent. of the effectives he had engaged in it. Casualties inflicted upon the Germans in the ravine between Pepper Ridge and Haudromont Wood were especially heavy. The only progress made was the capture of a small salient of the French line south of the Chauffour Wood, north-west of Douaumont village.

A diversion of the enemy in the neighbourhood of Les Esparges failed to give him any local advantage, and in no way disturbed the disposition of the French troops in the main centre.

After two months of the most tremendous fighting history had until then recorded, upon a front of some twenty-five or thirty kilometres, the massed power of the German Empire was still vainly seeking a "chink in the armour" of Verdun. At this stage the battle was already, if not a French victory, at least a German defeat. The enemy had been driven to take the offensive upon this gigantic scale because he was unable to stand still and watch the steady growth in military power of his opponents. Incapable of continuing much further his resistance to the wearing-down policy of the Allies, he was forced, in one tremendous stroke of his sword, to seek freedom from the steady grip of his enemies. At the end of two months he had reached on the right bank of the river the main defences of Verdun, where, for twenty-five days, all his efforts at further progress had resulted in heavy loss. On the left bank his success had been even slighter. He was still struggling in desperation to force his way through to the main defences of that side. The Germans had failed to impose their will upon their enemy.

The completeness with which they were forced to fight under the conditions which best suited the French gave to the latter the right to claim victory in the first two months of the battle. Everywhere along the eastern salient

Warning to beware of "Fritz," the name given to a German shell.

A notice advising people who pass along the ravine that they might be sniped, and passage is forbidden unless military requirements necessitate the journey being made. Circle picture: Warning to drivers that cars must proceed slowly and in succession.

DANGER ZONES NEAR THE BATTLE FRONT.

the Germans had been fruitlessly using their men. The French, moreover, were not in the position of the man who in the ring just manages to preserve enough strength and enough skill to avoid the knock-out. Daily they were giving proofs of their complete hold over themselves, of increasing vigour and initiative. The policy of small local counter-attacks, which began towards the close of the first two months of fighting, was receiving ever more and more frequent application and development.

It might have been optimistic to think that the fighting had reached a point when the defence was reacting so vigorously as to deprive the assailants of the initiative ; but it certainly was the case that the French, to a great extent, had assumed the direction of affairs in the Verdun sector. The French counter-attacks seemed almost to have reached a point when they became counter-offensives. This was especially the ease on the left wing, but on the centre the enemy still retained his eapacity for hard hitting. On April 20 he delivered a terrific blow along a two-mile front between Thiamont Farm and Vaux Lake. His infantry got into the French lines south of Douaumont Fort, and also ate into the defence north of Vaux Lake. But here, too, the French reaction was more vigorous than it had been at any other time throughout the fighting ; and the enemy was thrown out of these positions in the course of the same night. Elsewhere along the line the Germans were pinned down to the defensive, and seemed unable to hinder the list of small French successes, growing with every day. So stagnant did the enemy become that towards the end of April there was a growing, if mistaken, belief that the tremendous effort of the enemy had worn itself out, that the oeeasional attacks on the Mort Homme and upon Douaumont were but the spurting flames of a dying conflagration. This feeling was, perhaps, strengthened by the appointment on April 28 of General Pétain as Grand Officer of the Legion of Honour. His name was inscribed on the special tablet of the Legion with the following note : " He is a most valuable general officer. Since the beginning of the war he has not ceased, as commander successively of a brigade, of a division, of an army corps, and of an army, to give proof of the most remarkable military qualities. By his calmness and firmness and the skilfulness of his dispositions, he has been able to adjust a most delicate situation, and to inspire all with confidence. Thus has he rendered most important services to his country."

Indeed, in the French Army itself there was considerable difference of opinion as to whether or not the Germans had sped their bolt, as to whether the lull which marked the closing week of April did not also mark the end of the most ambitious and most costly failure of German arms in the campaign up till then. A semi-official review of events before Verdun, issued in Paris on April 27, said indeed : " There is every reason to believe that the German operation, which, for want of a better term, will be known as the battle of Verdun, is in a military sense ended. The check to the enemy's aims can now be regarded as final."

There was considerable discussion, indeed, as to where the next manifestation of German activity would be seen. There were some who maintained that Russia, and particularly the Riga sector of the front, was the next objective. Events upon the British front foreshadowed a resumption of activity there. The Germans had shown a marked activity in the Ypres region. On the 21st and 22nd they carried out no less than four fairly serious attacks, each one of which was more than the usual trench raiding which constitutes the normal warfare of a lull. On April 26 and 27 a series of heavy attacks was made. There was also a further support to be found for the theory that Great Britain was about to become the " chief enemy " in her turn, in the great Zeppelin raid over Great Britain at this period, the naval raid upon the English East Coast, and in the outbreak of armed revolt in Ireland.

The fighting along the British front looked uncommonly like the beginning of a big drive. The Germans had kept massed against the British lines an aggregate of eight hundred thousand men, including army troops, heavy guns, and cavalry. In addition the field depôts, from which losses could be made good, were full up. The attack on the British front was delivered on Wednesday night, April 26, and was continued until the 29th. The assault was launched upon several points between Ypres and Souchez, at Frelinghen, Hill 60, St. Eloi, the Hohenzollern sector, and the neighbourhood of Loos. The most serious effort was between Hulluch and Loos, where the Germans made two gas attacks. The enemy troops gained a footing in the British front, on support lines near Loos which had been heavily bombarded, but they were driven out again by counter-



GERMANS SURRENDERING ON THE VERDUN BATTLEFIELD.

Germans who survived a French Infantry assault near Douaumont hurrying over the French lines to surrender.

attack by Irish troops. It is probable that this activity was partly undertaken in connexion with events in Ireland. It was also, no doubt, intended to encourage the French in the belief that the Verdun battle had come to an end. In this latter object the attack failed. And when the storm again burst the French were found fully prepared for it, the dispositions of their troops having undergone no numerical changes.

Before proceeding to describe the next phase of the struggle it will be well to summarise the results and teaching of the first two months of the battle. From October to January Germany was preparing a first-class movement of some kind upon the French front. M. Bidou thinks

GERMAN PRISONERS BEING MARCHED TO THE REAR.

that possibly she wished to take the wind out of the sails of any Allied offensive, possibly that she had need of a prompt and decisive action. In any case, even if she had not meant in the first place that the battle should assume a character of capital importance, it did so afterwards without her wish. Her preparations, however, give colour to the supposition that all along she meant her offensive to be on a large scale.

The enemy had always kept a large part of his available forces on the French front, even when engaged in larger operations elsewhere. Between October and February he reinforced these troops, and re-disposed them. At the opening of the battle of Verdun six divisions were in action; but as the offensive broke on the rock of French resistance, time after time, as the object they had in view became ever more difficult of attainment, and, at the same time, of more and more importance if they were not to be openly and irremediably convicted of failure in the eyes of the Allies, of neutrals, and, worst of all, in the eyes of public opinion at home in Germany, a determination amounting almost to fury became the characteristic of the German onslaught, and the original six divisions had mounted to thirty before the first two months of the colossal struggle had finished.

In return for his expenditure the enemy had by then gained hardly enough to save his face in his daily *communiqués*. On the right bank of the Meuse they had succeeded, as has been said, in reaching the main French lines of defence on the French right. They had even bitten into the line at Douaumont, but the mouthful had cost them more, much more, than it was worth. On the French left, on this side of the river, they were held, and had been for a long time, on a semi-circular front around the ravine of Bras.

On the left bank they had been able to rush the first line, and held the positions right along the Forges Brook which the French had found untenable. Behind these rose the terrible heights of the Mort Homme and Hill 304. On the Mort Homme they had been able to gain a footing for a few minutes at a time, and no more: they were so convinced of its importance that they had adopted their favourite tactics of announcing its capture before they had even entered upon its attack; and the convenient confusion they created between Hill 265 and

its neighbour, the Mort Homme, had not sufficed to prevent their claim to the latter from being a joke to the Allies and no comfort to the German public. On Hill 304 they had been able to deliver no direct attack. Their onslaughts on Avocourt, which represented the best approach to this hill, had cost them dear, and such success as they had been able to achieve had been wrested from them, in the shape of Avocourt Redoubt. The few shapeless stones remaining of Avocourt itself, once a little village, snug between wood and wold, were drenched in German blood and French glory.

So much for the gain made in ground since the opening of the battle. It was little enough, but viewed from the aspect of time, it dwindled to less. The advances made on the right bank had dated from February 21 to 26. Since then, they had managed to take, after disproportionate effort and outlay, the village of Douaumont on March 4, and, four days later, half the village or German shambles of Vaux. With these two exceptions, they had not moved forward an inch since March 26, and their occupation of the seven kilometres they had originally gained had not been profitable, since to hold it at all they had had to fight with as much fury as if engaged on an advance.

On the left bank they had made their advances on two separate occasions. They had succeeded in pushing back the French front line between March 6 and 10, and a few days later this success had enabled them to take Hill 265, which they thought fit to announce as the Mort Homme; and between March 30 and April 8 they had made such progress on the French left front that they had gathered confidence for the general attack of April 9, which was anything but profitable to them.

Thus, on the right bank, they had been idle in advance, but not in casualties, for six weeks. On the left, where they attacked the untenable first line a fortnight later, they had pushed through to the second line by April 8. But the German forces on the right bank from March 8, and on the left from April 8, had been completely unable to gain a foot more ground. They were like an angry sea, accustomed to wreak its will upon a sandy shore, which finds itself suddenly broken and hurled back from a solid dyke. In addition to this check, the Germans were being assailed by French counter-offensives, and the French positions

DOUAUMONT.

A photograph of the "glacis" of the fort, taken whilst in the occupation of the French troops and after one of the German attacks.

had been enlarged from the north of Vaux Lake to the south of Douaumont, and also in the Haudromont Wood, and at the Mort Homme.

The Germans had wished to overcome the French resistance on this front by a violent onslaught; they had failed. The French had wished to resist; they had succeeded, and they had gone further—they had reached the point when they were able to make onslaughts of their own. To prevent this French success, the Germans had vainly spent themselves, weakening their line elsewhere, hurling men to death by the thousand, almost destroying the whole of their class '16. They knew themselves to be, says M. Bidou, the weaker in a war of resistance and endurance, and had staked heavily, almost to their fullest means, on a decisive throw. And after two months they found themselves in a worse position than at the beginning, crippled with losses at which the imagination reels. They had lost on their throw, and on many minor stakes the French were continuously winning. If Verdun were to be yet a German success, a completely new problem must be faced, a completely new scale of losses accepted.

FRENCH SOLDIERS

Leaving their rest-camp to return to the firing line.

CHAPTER CXXVI.

THE ADOPTION OF COMPULSORY MILITARY SERVICE.

The End of the Derby Campaign—Further Government Delays—Mr. Asquith's Pledges—The First Military Service Bill—Its Provisions Described—The Opposition to the Bill—Labour Party Crisis and its Solution—The Exclusion of Ireland—The "Simonites"—The Bill Passed—Historic Proclamation—How the Scheme Broke Down—The Tribunals and their Work—Grievances of the Married Men—Cabinet Crisis—A Secret Session of Parliament—Orders in Council and Official Secrets—"Contingent Compulsion"—Government Bill Introduced and Withdrawn—Compulsion at Last—The Second Military Service Bill—Its Provisions Described—The Bill becomes Law—The King to His People—The Triumph of Patriotism over Politics.

WE have seen (Vol. VI., Chapter CIII.) that Lord Derby's final report on the result of his recruiting scheme was presented to the Government on December 21, 1915, and that the decision to adopt the principle of compulsion was reached, after grave differences of opinion, a few days after Christmas. No one familiar with Mr. Asquith's methods can have seriously expected that an immediate declaration of policy would have been forthcoming.

The recruiting campaign had come to an end on December 12. The intake of recruits under the group system for four days of the final rush had indeed been 1,070,478—a remarkable proportion of the total of 2,829,263 men attested, enlisted, and rejected up to the closing of the campaign. But everything had been done to make it easy for men to enlist. The medical examination, if any, had in many cases been very trivial. The eyesight test had been suspended. It was certain that after the second and more serious medical examination which attested men would undergo on their being called up to join their depôts, the total of useful recruits would show a very considerable reduction upon the figures of attestation. Meanwhile, the only question of immediate interest was the extent to which the single men had come forward. Figures purporting to be authentic were freely bandied about in private discussion and in the Press, but no two statisticians were found to agree. The delay which intervened before the publication of the report on January 4, 1916, and the introduction of the Military Service Bill on January 5, gave abundant opportunity for the inveterate opponents of compulsion to prejudge the issue. The Labour Recruiting Committee met at the House of Commons and issued a report on December 14, in which, while deprecating any hasty judgment of the campaign as liable to cause "only injury to national unity," they somewhat inconsistently committed themselves to the belief that "a change in the methods of recruiting would not be justified." Lord Derby lost no time in rebuking these speculations, on the ground that the value of the figures, without deduction for starred men, unfit men, and men indispensable to trade, "must be purely guesswork." Nevertheless, on the following day a band of 40 Liberal and Labour members waited

privately upon the Prime Minister to beg him, before introducing compulsion, to give another chance to the single men who had not attested. The deputation urged that the Derby scheme had yielded recruits in such numbers that compulsion was unthinkable. Supposing, however, that it were regarded as possible, it would be scandalous to brand the unenlisted single men as "slackers." Some of them had mothers and other relatives to support; others had two or three brothers already serving: others, again, had conscientious objections to joining the army. Mr. Asquith promised to take all that had been said into "serious consideration."

Meanwhile the Derby scheme received an additional touch of reality by the calling up, on December 20, of the single attested men belonging to the second, third, fourth, and fifth groups, who were to present themselves for service from January 20. The first group, consisting of men between eighteen and nineteen years of age, was left until they should have grown older, and was actually called up, as will be seen, on February 25.

In his speech on December 21, in which he asked Parliament to sanction the addition to the Army of yet another 1,000,000 men—making the fourth million since August 5, 1914—Mr. Asquith renewed the pledge to the married men which he had given on November 2. The net result of this pledge, repeated several times in various forms, was to assure the attested married men that, unless all but a negligible quantity of available unmarried men attested, compulsion would be applied to them. But Mr. Asquith still hoped that those who had hung back would come forward. His views were shared by the minority of the Cabinet, who were in favour of yet another attempt to keep the voluntary system on its legs before abandoning the position to their

THE CALLING UP OF GROUPS 33 TO 41.

Married men from twenty-seven to thirty-five waiting to be examined at the Recruiting Booth at the Horse Guards Parade, London, May 29, 1916. Smaller picture: Wives of recruits waiting in Whitehall.

MARRIED RECRUITS AFTER BEING EXAMINED.

opponents. The desperate state which the voluntary system had now reached may be judged from the fact that its supporters were driven to propose that the single unattested men should be compelled to show cause before the local tribunals why they should not attest!

Meanwhile, there were not lacking those who pointed out that the mere adding up of the figures would by no means have settled the matter. The German Press, which was naturally watching the situation with intense interest, took pleasure in emphasizing the difficulties. Thus, the *Cologne Gazette* remarked:

> There are still quite a number of complicated questions. In the first place, the real army which is to be trained has to be extracted from this enormous mass of figures by a series of calculations. To begin with, it has to be decided whether really enough unmarried men—they are the kernel of this whole recruiting system—have volunteered. Then the fit men will have to be picked out among them, as the medical examination which has already taken place was quite superficial. Then comes the question of the men who are indispensable. . . . Then the lists will be checked to see whether all the unmarried men whose names are on the National Register have really volunteered, and an appeal will be made to those whose names are missing. Only after all these questions have been disposed of will the call to the married men be issued.

As the days went by, and the conviction that compulsion had been justified by the Derby report became stronger, a different note was struck. In an eloquent passage on December 31 the *Cologne Gazette* declared:

> The introduction of compulsion is the formal admission of Germany's military successes and of England's defeats. The old England has already lost the war. If an English Minister were ever in a position to speak the truth, Asquith and his colleagues would have to say this. The last attempt to avoid military service—Lord Derby's recruiting scheme—has proved an enormous failure. It is not without reason that the figures have again and again been held back, and have still not been published. If only half a million of able-bodied unmarried men had enlisted, the figures, duly decked out, would have been published with pride, and there would have been endless talk about the tremendous success of voluntary patriotism. But the men simply did not enlist.

When the report was published*, the facts were seen to be that, while out of a total of 2,179,231 single men of military age, 1,150,000 had been accounted for, there still remained 651,160 unstarred single men who had not answered the call. "This," as Lord Derby observed, "is far from being a negligible quantity." "Under the circumstances," he added, "I am very distinctly of opinion that, in order to redeem the pledge mentioned above, it will not be possible to hold married men to their attestation unless and until the services of single men have been obtained by other means, the present system having failed to bring them to the colours."

* The text of the report was given in Vol. VI. Chap. ciii.

THE LAST WEEK OF LORD DERBY'S SCHEME.

Recruits waiting their turn to enlist under the group system. A scene in London by night.

He urged further that steps should be taken to replace as far as possible the single men now "starred" or engaged in reserved occupations by older and married men, even if these men had to a certain extent to be drawn from the ranks of those already serving. Finally, Lord Derby protested against any further extension of the list of reserved occupations. It was indeed high time that the process whereby one Minister, by the frequent announcement of new occupations, membership of which implied exemption from military service, interfered with the efforts of another Minister, whose duty it was to provide soldiers for the army, should be stopped. For even while the Derby report was under the consideration of the Government, a fresh list of reserved occupations, supplementary to that published on November 29, was issued, and it was announced that yet a further list was in preparation.

Simultaneously it was decided that men who had been rejected on medical grounds should, except in special circumstances, be required to undergo another examination. Those certified as medically unfit on account of organic disease would be registered, and those rejected on account of eyesight or slight physical defects would be attested and passed to the Army Reserve, to be utilized as required.

The haste with which medical examinations had had to be conducted, while involving, as in the above cases, a further scrutiny, had at the same time resulted in the admission into the army of large numbers of men who in no circumstances whatever were likely to become efficient soldiers. The difficulty of getting enough men into the army under the voluntary system was only equalled by the difficulty of getting them out of it again. Cases were not rare in which an unfit man, often enlisting at an age having little relation to the truth, had spent half a year or more in going to and emerging from hospital before it had become possible to obtain his dismissal by a Medical Board. Then, when dismissed—with a gratuity—he would as often as not re-enlist, and the whole weary round would be gone through once more, the man, entirely useless as a soldier, being all the while naturally kept at the public expense. It was even suggested in the House of Commons on March 15 that something like 200,000 men unfit for any military purpose had been taken into the Army during the past year. Under compulsion, with the entire manhood of the nation to pick and choose from, only the physically fit need be selected. But with voluntary enlistment, with zealous recruiting officers and with civilian doctors eager to fill the ranks to the tune of 2s. 6d. a head for every man passed, this wasteful and unsatisfactory state of things was almost inevitable.

But in the midst of all these conflicting tendencies, and in spite of the Cabinet difficulties due to the resistance to compulsion, on various grounds, of Mr. McKenna, Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Mr. Runciman, President of the Board of Trade—difficulties which led the German Press to indulge in triumphant prophecies of British national disintegration—

MEN WHO WORE TWO ARMLETS.

All men of the Volunteer Corps who attested under Lord Derby's scheme were ordered to wear their G.R. (General Reserve) armlet in addition to the one served out on attestation.

the cold facts of military necessity were forcing the Government to the only logical conclusion. As for the country as a whole, it had long since made up its mind. While to the *Cologne Gazette*. and probably to other foreign observers, it appeared that

> The division in the Government is only the reflection of the division throughout the country. All England is to-day in a state of upheaval,

the fact was that at this moment the country was quite exceptionally unmoved. It was not until the Military Service Bill was introduced that "the country" can be said to have shown any emotion whatever, and then the

THE CALL TO ARMS.

Recruits taking the oath of allegiance before a magistrate at a recruiting office in London.

cause was not the principle of compulsion, but the half-heartedness with which it was proposed to be applied.

In one sense, indeed, the division in the Government did reflect a division in the country On the one hand stood the men who quite sincerely contemplated the war as an excrescence on the national life, to be waged without impairing normal conditions more than seemed agreeable. On the other stood those who realized that war involved the very national life itself. For people who have ever been accustomed to think in terms of peace, and especially of the peace in which "money" seems infinitely desirable, and "militarism" infinitely detestable, it was hard to learn the bitter lesson of the war, that money without the means of protecting it is a vain thing. The politician, even though in his heart a patriot, is slow to forget his shibboleths, and the "little men with little minds" who still clamoured for a fixed limit to the expansion of the army merely represented the echo of bygone political controversies, and not the sense of any serious body of public opinion.

On January 5 the Prime Minister at last introduced "A Bill to make provision with respect to military service in connexion with the present war." When it had become evident that the Derby recruiting scheme would not meet the necessities of the situation, the Government had contemplated for a moment the immediate introduction of a sweeping measure, really embodying all-round National Service. Such a measure had, indeed, been drafted. But, as usual, political considerations and considerations of supposed "expediency" defeated any such wisdom, and the Government followed the principle of doing the *minimum* that their circumstances required.

The Military Service Bill was, in fact, nothing but a measure to compel unmarried men to do what they had failed to do at Lord Derby's invitation. Mr. Asquith positively insisted that the Bill was "confined to a specific purpose"—the "redemption" of his pledges, given in November, 1915, to the married men who attested under Lord Derby's scheme. He argued that the Government had only two courses open. Either it must release the married men who had attested upon the con-

dition that all but a negligible number of unmarried men attested too, or it must hold the married men to their obligation, and compel the unmarried to fulfil the necessary condition of that obligation. The course now adopted by the Government was "to provide that if after due opportunity of inquiry it is found that there are single men of military age who have no ground whatever for exemption or excuse, they should be deemed to have done what every one agrees it is their duty to the State in times like these to do, and be treated as though they had attested for enlistment."

In a word, the Bill proposed compulsory service—with various exceptions or exemptions—for all male British subjects who were between the ages of 18 and 41 on August 15, 1915 (the date of the National Register), and who at that date were unmarried or widowers without children dependent upon them

Throughout the proceedings in Parliament the Government stoutly resisted all efforts to extend the scope of the Bill, although they could have had an immense majority for any improvements of an always feeble measure. On the other hand, they allowed its provisions to be watered down in not unimportant respects—the only consolation being that, grievous though the waste of time was bound to be, they were thus making the ultimate fate of their scheme, and the need for real National Service, inevitable.

The Bill was read a first time in the House of Commons on January 6, by a majority of 298 (403 against 105). The second reading was carried on January 12 by a majority of 392 (431 against 39). The Bill passed through Committee on January 21, and was read a third time on January 24 by a majority of 347 (383 against 36). It passed the House of Lords on January 26, received the Royal Assent on January 27, and came into operation on February 10.

It will be most convenient to state at once the main provisions of the Military Service Act as it thus emerged from Parliament.

Clause I. provided:

> Every male British subject who—
>
> (*a*) on the fifteenth day of August nineteen hundred and fifteen, was ordinarily resident in Great Britain, and had attained the age of eighteen years and had not attained the age of forty-one; and
>
> (*b*) on the second day of November nineteen hundred and fifteen was unmarried or was a widower without any child dependent on him;
>
> shall, unless he either is within the exceptions set out in the First Schedule to this Act, or has attained the age of forty-one years before the appointed date, be deemed as from the appointed date to have been duly enlisted in His Majesty's regular forces for general service with the colours or in the reserve for the period of the war, and to have been forthwith transferred to the reserve.

Consequently men thus "deemed to have been enlisted" would come under the provisions of the Army Act and certain other legislation. But it was provided that charges arising out of "membership of the reserve" under the Act should come before civil, not

AT A TRIBUNAL IN LONDON.

Hearing an applicant for postponement to a later group under Lord Derby's scheme.

military, courts; that alleged offences should lapse six months after the end of the war; and that failure to obey a call to permanent service should not be punishable by death.

Clause II. provided that application for a certificate of exemption could be made as follows "by or in respect of any man":

(*a*) on the ground that it is expedient in the national interests that he should, instead of being employed in military service, be engaged in other work in which he is habitually engaged or in which he wishes to be engaged or, if he is being educated or trained for any work, that he should continue to be so educated or trained; or

(*b*) on the ground that serious hardship would ensue, if the man were called up for Army Service, owing to his exceptional financial or business obligations or domestic position; or

(*c*) on the ground of ill-health or infirmity; or

(*d*) on the ground of a conscientious objection to the undertaking of combatant service.

THE PROCLAMATION

Calling up the first eight groups of married men to the Colours.

Secondly, it was provided that—

Certificates of exemption from the provisions of this Act may also be granted by any Government Department, after consultation with the Army Council, to men, or classes or bodies of men, in the service or employment of that Department, or, in cases where it appears to the department that certificates can be more conveniently granted by the department than by the Local Tribunal, to men or classes or bodies of men who are employed or engaged or qualified for employment or engagement in any work which is certified by the Department to be work of national importance and whose exemption comes within the sphere of the Department.

Thirdly, Clause II. dealt with the duration of certificates of exemption, the treatment of "conscientious objection" to military service, and the prevention of "industrial compulsion"—matters which, as we shall see, caused grave inconvenience and bitter controversy:

Any certificate of exemption may be absolute, conditional, or temporary, as the authority by whom it was granted think best suited to the case, and also, in the case of an application on conscientious grounds, may take the form of an exemption from combatant service only, or may be conditional on the applicant being engaged in some work which in the opinion of the Tribunal dealing with the case is of national importance:

Provided that a certificate granted on the ground of the continuance of education or training, or on the ground of exceptional financial or business obligations or domestic position, shall be a conditional or temporary certificate only

No certificate of exemption shall be conditional upon a person to whom it is granted continuing in or entering into employment under any specified employer or in any specified place or establishment.

Clause III. contained "supplemental provisions as to certificates of exemption." They were the cause of infinite delay in the working of the scheme of compulsion, and one of the chief reasons for the ultimate failure of the Act. The main provisions ran:

It shall be the duty of any man holding a conditional certificate, if the conditions on which the certificate was granted are no longer satisfied, to give notice to the authority mentioned in the certificate that the conditions are no longer satisfied; and if he fails without reasonable cause or excuse to do so, he shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding fifty pounds.

Where a certificate of exemption ceases to be in force owing to the withdrawal of the certificate or the failure to comply with the conditions on which the certificate was granted or the expiration of the time for which the certificate was granted, the man to whom the certificate was granted shall, as from the expiration of two months after the date on which the certificate so ceases to be in force, be deemed to have been enlisted and transferred to the reserve in the same manner as if no such certificate had been granted unless in the meantime the man has obtained a renewal of his certificate.

Finally, it was laid down that, when an application for a certificate of exemption had been made, a man could not be called to the colours "until the application had been finally disposed of."

A First Schedule defined the "exceptions" of men otherwise liable to military service. They released men "ordinarily resident in His Majesty's Dominions abroad" or resident in Great Britain for the purpose only of their education or for some other special purpose"; members of the Forces; "men in holy orders or regular ministers of any religious administration"; discharged or "time-expired" men, and men who "have offered themselves for enlistment and been rejected" since August 14, 1915.

A Second Schedule provided the machinery for consideration of claims to exemption. It established (*a*) Local Tribunals, consisting of not less than five and not more than 25 persons,

CITY OF LONDON NATIONAL GUARD DRILLING AT THE GUILDHALL.

The Volunteers approximated a "Home Defence Territorial Force," trained under a system by which leave was given for those serving to look after their own urgent private affairs.

in every local registration district; (*b*) Appeal Tribunals, in areas to be defined by the Crown; and (*c*) a Central Tribunal for Great Britain. "Any person aggrieved by the decision of a Local Tribunal" should have the right of appeal to an Appeal Tribunal. The Appeal Tribunals could grant leave to appeal to the Central Tribunal.

In introducing the Bill, Mr Asquith expressed the hope that it would receive "something in the nature, not of universal, but of general

TRAINING DERBY RECRUITS.
Members of the City of London National Guard leading a batch of recruits on a route march.

consent." "Will any general sympathy," he asked, "be felt for men, for the most part still young—all of them under 41—who, after full opportunity of presenting their case, are not deemed in law to have done what everyone recognizes to be their duty as a matter of moral and national obligation in a time of greatest stress in all our history?" He announced at the same time that the Derby group system would be reopened, so that the men could still "come in of their own free will."

What were the real prospects of opposition? What was the true importance of the antagonism to "conscription" about which the Government had itself shown such timidity? It depended, first and foremost, upon the attitude of Labour; for the rest upon the amount of rebellion with which Mr. Asquith might be faced among his own followers. When he brought in the Bill Mr. Asquith knew that he had avoided the danger of serious revolt among the Liberal Ministers in his Coalition Cabinet. Mr. Runciman and Mr. McKenna, and others who preferred a greater obscurity, had been reconciled to the needs of the situation. Only the Home Secretary, Sir John Simon, had resigned office, and he at once attempted to create a sort of opposition. But the prospects were not bright. Prominent party politicians and former Liberal Ministers like Mr. Hobhouse and Mr. J. M. Robertson, after leading a "no conscription" movement up to the last moment, left their followers in the lurch and supported the second reading of the Bill. In the divisions in the House the minority only once rose above 40—on the first reading, when the Nationalists voted against the Bill. Ireland had been deliberately excluded from the Bill—a matter upon which later events were to shed a peculiar light. But Mr. Redmond opposed the first reading, saying that he and his colleagues felt that to be their duty, "taking the view that they did about conscription," and "in the absence of proof that this little Bill, which contained the principle of conscription, was a military necessity needed to end the war." But on the second reading Mr. Redmond said that the Nationalists, "having made their protest," would withdraw their opposition to "this purely British Bill," which had "a British majority in its favour of close upon ten to one."

Far more important than the behaviour of either the Nationalists or the "Simonites," as they soon came to be called, was the attitude of Labour. The situation was a difficult one.

The event proved afresh the determination of every section of the population to allow no political "principles" to stand in the way of the single British purpose—the achievement of victory.

On January 6, the day after the introduction of the Bill, a Labour congress was held in London, under the presidency of Mr. H. Gosling, chairman of the Parliamentary Committee of the Trade Union Congress. Its scope was extended so as to include delegates of societies affiliated with the Labour Party and the General Federation of Trade Unions. On the other hand, the Miners' Federation refused to send representatives. The real question before the congress was whether the three Labour Ministers—Mr. Henderson, Mr. Brace and Mr. G. H. Roberts—should be authorized to retain office, and whether the Labour members should be left to vote on the Bill as they pleased. The following ambiguous motion was, therefore, officially presented:

This conference reaffirms the decision of the Bristol Trades Congress when it unanimously protested in the name of over three millions of organized workers against compulsory military service; it regrets that the unity and solidarity of the nation have been gravely imperilled and industrial and political liberty menaced by the action of the compulsionists, against which it makes a most emphatic protest.

The conference rejoices at the magnificent success of the voluntary principle, which in so short a period has supplied this country with an army of four millions of free men; but it is compelled with regret to recognize that, in spite of Lord Derby's scheme having produced nearly three million volunteers, the net results are governed by the Prime Minister's pledge to the married recruits, which, in the opinion of the Government, has rendered necessary the Military Service Bill.

The conference regards the results as not yet ascertained with sufficient accuracy and certainty to warrant so momentous a proposal being passed by Parliament, but wishes nevertheless to leave the Labour members to vote upon it as they individually think fit.

The reference to the Bristol Trades Congress was to the annual gathering, held in September, 1915. A resolution had then been adopted upholding the system of voluntary enlistment, and "emphatically protesting against the sinister efforts of a section of the reactionary Press in formulating newspaper policies for party purposes, and attempting to foist on this country conscription, which always proves a burden to the workers, and will divide the country at a time when absolute unanimity is essential." There was, however, abundant evidence that this hesitating policy, based mainly upon the fiction that the call for national service was "a newspaper conspiracy," could not hold

MARRIED MEN SIGNING-ON FOR MUNITION TRAINING.

Married men in the Derby groups, beginning at No. 36, were given free instruction in munition making, in order that they might be substituted for single men then engaged in this work.

opinion in the country. At the end of November, when the death of Mr. Keir Hardie caused a vacancy in the representation of Merthyr Boroughs, Mr. C. B. Stanton, with a majority of 4,206 votes, won a tremendous victory over the official Labour candidate. And Mr. Stanton was victorious just because he promised, if it proved necessary, to give unequivocal support to any measure of compulsion which the Government might demand.

At the London Congress, however, matters proceeded as follows: after a rather heated debate, in the course of which Mr. Henderson declared that, if he retired from the Cabinet,

OFFICER OF THE ARTISTS RIFLES.
Giving instructions to scouts.

he would also retire from Parliament and appeal to his constituents, the congress decided definitely against the Bill. Its main decision consisted in the adoption by a majority of 1,215,000 (1,998,000 against 783,000) of the following motion, introduced by the National Union of Railwaymen:

This conference reaffirms the decision of the Bristol Trades Congress when it unanimously protested, in the name of over three million organized workers, against compulsory military service. It regrets that the unity and solidarity of the nation has been gravely imperilled, and industrial and political liberty menaced, by the proposal to introduce such a system, against which it makes a most emphatic protest, and decides to use every means in its power to oppose.

The conference rejoices at the magnificent success of the appeal to the voluntary principle, which in so short a period has supplied this country with an army of four million free men, and is emphatically of opinion that no case has been made out for any measure of limited or temporary compulsion, which we regard as the first step of a general application of a vicious principle. We declare that all the men required for military and industrial purposes can be obtained by a continuance of the voluntary method.

This conference further considers that the proposals of the Government would be economically disastrous to the life of the nation, and declares its opposition to the Bill, and recommends the Labour Party in Parliament to oppose the measure in all its stages.

Thereupon the Labour Party in the House of Commons formally decided to oppose the Bill, and it was announced that Mr. Henderson, Mr. Brace and Mr. Roberts would resign their offices immediately. They actually abstained from voting on the first reading of the Bill, which was taken that night (January 6). The Labour vote was otherwise divided, 13 members voting against the Bill, and eight voting for it.

It soon appeared, however, that the decision of the London Congress, reached by the much-condemned system of "card voting," was in hardly any quarter taken to represent the certain voice of Labour. Meetings in the country gave warm support to the Bill, and Mr. Asquith entered into negotiations with his Labour colleagues. Their resignations were kept in suspense, and on January 12, on the eve of the second reading of the Bill, they were withdrawn. Mr. Henderson actually wound up for the Government, in a speech of great eloquence, the second reading debate. The arrangement was that the Labour members should for the time be free to vote as they chose—the whole subject to be reviewed at the annual conference of the Labour Party on January 26, when the Bill would have passed its third reading. Meanwhile Mr. Asquith had given fresh assurances—that the Bill was not intended to do more than redeem the Government pledges, and that fresh safeguards would be provided against "industrial compulsion."

It may be said at once that the final discussion at Bristol ended in smoke. There was again a "card vote," and again the delegates (by a majority of nearly 1,600,000) registered their protest against the adoption of conscription in any form. By another huge majority they declared their opposition to the Military Service Bill. But, having done that, they promptly decided, by 649,000 votes to 614,000 votes, against an agitation for the repeal of the Bill in the event of its becoming law. Throughout the agitation against the Bill every effort had been made to whittle down Lord Derby's estimate; it was even asserted that com-

RENDERING SERVICE TO THE REGULAR.

A member of the City of London National Guard piloting soldiers fresh from the trenches to their destinations in London.

pulsion would at best yield only some 50,000 men. Mr. Henderson was able to say that, since the Derby Report had been completed, there had been enlisted no fewer than 113,987 single men!

Thus ended all prospect of serious opposition by Labour.

We must return to the proceedings in Parliament. As already observed, Sir John Simon had no sooner left the Cabinet than he attempted to wreck the Bill. He first devoted himself to proving that England was about to "sell her birthright for a mess of pottage without making sure that it was likely to provide a square meal," and to fomenting suspicion about "newspaper pressure," and especially an alleged desire of *The*



RECRUITS IN CANADA.
The first stage: Drilling recruits in Vancouver.

Times to have "the principle of compulsion given legislative sanction before the House of Lords has dealt with the Parliament Act Amendment Bill." Of the other "Simonites," Sir W. Byles gravely doubted whether the war would be worth winning "if we were to surrender our liberties and to Germanize our institutions." As to this point, it is worth while to record a remarkable prediction by Mr. Herbert Samuel, a Minister who in these debates greatly increased his reputation:

> If anybody asked me what the danger of the future military organization of this country is, I should say that we should rely after this war too much upon the notion that we can call armies out of the ground by a wave of the wand. I am afraid that the fact that we have under the stress of these abnormal times done what no nation has ever done yet will delude us into a false security, and we shall be apt to believe that when the moment of danger came a similar miracle can always be performed. That is the danger I am afraid of—not the illusory danger that we shall find ourselves involved in a system of conscription.

On the second reading the opponents of the Bill began to concentrate on the two points which they had conceived to be the most promising for their purpose—"conscientious objection" to military service, and the fear of "industrial compulsion." Sir John Simon, while disclaiming any sympathy with "shirkers," declared that the conscientious objector was "a perfectly genuine person," and cheerfully predicted that his case could not adequately be met without "making the meshes of the net too wide." As to "industrial compulsion," Mr. Anderson (Labour) triumphantly quoted the *Manchester Guardian* for a description of the Bill as "a Bill for reducing the millions to industrial serfdom on the ground that the conjectural thousands ought to do military service." Mr. Asquith dealt at once with this dangerous argument. He accepted as genuine the fear that unscrupulous employers might put pressure on men—especially on active trade unionists—who would be liable to military service if they were dismissed, and thereby lost their certificates of exemption. The Prime Minister promised "to devise machinery and safeguards which would prevent the possibility of any such abuse."

The proceedings in Committee occupied only four sittings. They began with an entirely unsuccessful attempt to obtain the inclusion of Ireland in the Bill, Mr. Redmond delivering an eloquent speech on the services of Irish troops,

declaring that recruiting in Ireland had been "on the whole very satisfactory," and saying to the House:—"Rest satisfied; do not seek to drive Ireland." As to the military age, the opponents of the Bill tried to raise the lowest age from 18 years to 21 years, and to reduce the age limit from 41 years to 30 years.

At the same time another amendment produced an extraordinary exposure of the feebleness and lack of courage to which the Government were reduced by their promise that the Bill should not go one step beyond the bare fulfilment of the Prime Minister's pledges. The Bill dealt only with men who were between the ages of 18 and 41 on August 15, 1915. General Sir Ivor Herbert moved that the Bill should include "every male subject who, after August 15, 1915, had attained, or during the course of the war might attain, the age of 18 years." There could be no reasoned objection. But the Government were tied hand and foot. Mr. Bonar Law was put up to say that "the Bill did not pretend to be a measure for dealing in the most effective way with the military situation." As this did not suffice, the Government took the strange course of dragging in Lord Kitchener as an opponent of General Herbert's amendment. Mr. Long declared that "he was authorized by Lord Kitchener to say that he did not desire this amendment to be made, that he hoped the Bill would be passed practically as the Government had introduced it, that the measure by bringing in the unmarried men and enabling the others to be called up *would provide the troops the nation required, and enable him to do all that it was necessary to do.*" Events were soon to prove that this statement was the most eloquent condemnation that could be conceived of the Bill, and of the foresight of its promoters. The Government had its way, and General Herbert withdrew his amendment—after declaring, however, that "one of the

RECRUITS FROM TRINIDAD.

most remarkable things in the whole war was the total eclipse of the office of the Secretary of State for War behind the shadow of a figure-head," and that "in the matter of recruiting Lord Kitchener had been wrong from first to last."

The only change actually made in the proposed age limits was a provision releasing men who, although under 41 years of age on August 15, 1915, passed that age before the date appointed for the application of the Act.

As to "industrial compulsion" and "conscientious objection," all the important concessions made by the Government will be found in the clauses of the Act already quoted (pp. 123-4). It was provided that a certificate of exemption might be granted on the ground of it being held "expedient" that a man should be "engaged in work in which he is habitually engaged *or in which he wishes to be engaged*." In the event of a man leaving "certified" employment, and so losing his certificate of exemption, it was provided that a period of *two months* should expire before, if he had not obtained a renewal of his certificate, he should be liable to military service. And, in the case of an application "on conscientious grounds," it was provided that exemption "may take the form of an exemption from combatant service only, or may be conditional on the applicant being engaged in some work which, in the opinion of the tribunal dealing with the case, is of national importance."

The Military Service Act came into operation on February 10. By the terms of the Act the "appointed day" for its provisions to take effect was the twenty-first day after it came into operation—that was to say, March 2. As already noted, the Derby "groups" were reopened when the Military Service Bill was introduced. They remained open for single as well as married men until March 1, after which date all men liable for service were brought automatically into the Reserve by law. In order, for administrative purposes, to distinguish them from the men in "groups," men coming under the Act were classified according to age in "classes," as follows:

Year of Birth.	Class.	Year of Birth.	Class.
1897	1	1885	13
1896	2	1884	14
1895	3	1883	15
1894	4	1882	16
1893	5	1881	17
1892	6	1880	18
1891	7	1879	19
1890	8	1878	20
1889	9	1877	21
1888	10	1876	22
1887	11	1875	23
1886	12		



SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS TRAINING IN CAPE TOWN.

RECRUITS FROM CEYLON ARRIVING IN LONDON.

On February 10 a Proclamation was published which summoned the "classes" of men between the ages of 19 and 30—the "classes" being thus made to correspond roughly with the "groups" already called up. This historic document ran :

THE PROCLAMATION.

10th February, 1916.

ARMY RESERVE.

(Military Service Act, 1916.)

WHEREAS by a Proclamation dated the 4th August, 1914, His Majesty in exercise of powers conferred on him by the Reserve Forces Act, 1882, ordered (The Right Honourable Herbert Henry Asquith) one of His Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State, from time to time to give, and, when given, to revoke or vary such directions as might seem necessary or proper for calling out the Army Reserve or all or any of the men belonging thereto.

And Whereas under the provisions of the Military Service Act, 1916, certain persons will, on the 2nd March, 1916, be deemed to have been duly enlisted in His Majesty's Regular Forces for general service with the Colours or in the Reserve for the period of the War, and to have been forthwith transferred to the Reserve.

And Whereas such Reservists have been assigned to Classes according to the year of their birth.

Now, therefore I, Field-Marshal the Right Honourable Earl Kitchener, K.G., K.P., one of His Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State, do hereby direct as follows :—

Every Reservist under the Provisions of the Military Service Act, 1916, who belongs to any of the Classes mentioned in the subjoined Schedule is, unless an application for a certificate of exemption has been made and has not been finally disposed of, hereby required to report himself for the purpose of joining the Colours on such date and at such place as may hereafter be notified, or, if on or before the 17th day of March, 1916, he has not received any such notice, to report himself to the Commander of the Recruiting Sub-Area at the Recruiting Office nearest to his usual place of residence on the aforesaid 17th day of March, 1916.

A Reservist who fails without reasonable cause or excuse to comply with these directions will be guilty of an offence under the Reserve Forces Act, 1882 (45 and 46 Vic., Cap. 48).

SCHEDULE.

Class.				Date on which the Classes will commence to be called up.
Second Class, Men born in			1896	
Third Class	,,	,,	1895	
Fourth Class	,,	,,	1894	
Fifth Class	,,	,,	1893	
Sixth Class	,,	,,	1892	
Seventh Class	,,	,,	1891	3rd March, 1916.
Eighth Class	,,	,,	1890	
Ninth Class	,,	,,	1889	
Tenth Class	,,	,,	1888	
Eleventh Class	,,	,,	1887	
Twelfth Class	,,	,,	1886	

Only a few days later fresh Proclamations called up for service on March 18 all the remaining "groups" of unmarried men (14 to 23) * and all the remaining "classes" (13 to 23). There remained only the Derby "groups" of married men. We shall shortly see how their fate combined with the unsatisfactory operation of the new Act to render further and more thorough reforms inevitable.

The work of the tribunals charged with the duty of granting exemptions now assumed an ever-increasing importance. A series of instructions had been issued for their guidance. The principal duty of the local tribunals was the decision of claims of men of military age and fitness to be excused service, or to be temporarily postponed, on the ground that they were indis-

* "Groups" 2 to 5, as noted above, were called up on January 20. Further proclamations on January 8 called up "groups" 6 to 9 for service on February 8, and on January 30 "groups" 10 to 13 for service on February 29. "Group" 1 was called on February 25 for service on March 28.



THE MILITARY SERVICE (No. 2) BILL PASSED ITS THIRI

On the division the Government obtained a majority of 34

READING IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON JANUARY 24, 1916.
the number of votes being—for the third reading, 383, against, 36.

pensable in a trade, or for reasons, business or domestic, personal to themselves. Under the Derby scheme a claim was made by filling up a form showing the grounds on which it was put forward. This claim was sent by the local tribunal to the military representative in the locality, who had the assistance of an advisory committee composed of persons conversant with local industries and conditions of life, and representing both employers and employees. If they and the military representative considered the claim reasonable, they informed the local tribunal and the man was placed in a later group. If it was thought that the claim required further investigation, a date was fixed for hearing. The military representative was present and any necessary witnesses were called. A man could not be put back more than ten groups on any one claim, but it was provided that an informal application to the military representative, made a reasonable time after the claim had been decided, might with his consent and that of the advisory committee result in a further postponement without the necessity of any further formal claim.

As for men in the "reserved occupations," those who had attested were placed in their group of the Army Reserve, but were not to be called up for military service until it had been decided by the tribunals that it was no longer necessary in the national interest to retain them in civil employment. The tribunals were, in fact, required to investigate the accuracy of, and to revise, the "starring" already supposed to have been done at the time of the making of the National Register. In considering a claim made by an employer on the ground that an attested man was individually indispensable, the tribunal was directed to require the employer to show:

(1) Good reason why the man was individually indispensable and that the business in which the man was employed could not be properly maintained if the man were called up for service with his group.

(2) That the employer had made every effort temporarily to fill the man's place;

(3) That the business ministered to war requirements, to essential domestic needs, or to the export trade in such a manner that the maintenance of the business was important in the national interest; and

(4) That the employer had given reasonable facilities for enlistment to other men (if any) in his employment.

"Men engaged in operations connected with coalmining," by which was meant all men working below ground and all colliery mechanics, electricians, pumpmen, weighmen, and winding-engine men, were not to be called up for military service without the consent of the Home Office. This provision was soon to prove the cause of a very large increase in the numbers of young men of military age who were anxious to embrace the hardships of the miner's life.

With the reopening of the group system, the tribunals continued to consider the claims of the voluntarily attested. It became necessary to issue a fresh batch of instructions. On January 8, 1916, it was announced that "indispensable" must be strictly interpreted. It was not enough that the employer should be able to show that he would be inconvenienced, even seriously inconvenienced. Employers were urged to do all in their power "in this time of critical need" to adapt themselves to changed conditions and by the employment of men not eligible for military service and of women, and by reorganization, to do their very utmost to release men for the Forces. Tribunals were to confine their concessions of postponement to the minimum that was reasonable.

The reopening of the group system on January 10 was advertised in London by an announcement by the Lord Mayor that he would be present at the Mansion House every day to welcome recruits. During the dinner hour, the Lord Mayor, wearing uniform and accompanied by the Sheriffs, used to address large crowds, and the results, for a time, were highly satisfactory. A further public campaign was organized, and new posters—of a somewhat different type from the old, though in some respects equally objectionable—began to make their appearance. It is worth while to recall, as showing the characteristically narrow and political spirit which still persisted in these productions, the wording of one headed "Rights of Citizenship":

Your Rights.

Your Rights of Citizenship give you the Privilege of joining your fellows in the defence of your Honour and your Homes.

Join under the Group System to-day and safeguard both.

Your Duty.

Your Duty is to fight the Common Foe and to get your Comrades to join you.

The cynical observer will perceive the respective positions which "Rights" and "Duty" were thought to have assumed, under the political teaching of past generations, in the eyes of the mass of the British public.

Owing to the large number of exemptions granted by the tribunals, the Derby groups hitherto called up for service had produced but a meagre output of actual recruits.

GLASGOW HIGHLANDERS IN TRAINING: IN THE TRENCHES.

Under the Military Service Act, as has been seen, local tribunals, consisting of at least five members, were established in every local registration district. In an explanatory circular issued by the President of the Board of Trade on February 4, it was suggested that the existing Derby tribunals should, owing to the experience which they had already gained, be appointed as the tribunals under the Act. The various interests of the district were to be fairly represented, and an adequate representation of Labour was enjoined. Women also were recognized as being likely to prove advantageous members. In dealing with different classes of claims for exemption, whether absolute, conditional, or temporary, tribunals were instructed to adopt the following main principles:

In employment cases the question to be considered was to be, not whether the man had a claim for exceptional treatment in his own interests, but whether or not it was in the national interests that he should be retained in civil employment. The expression "national interest" was to be construed broadly. It covered not only services which ministered directly to the prosecution of the war, but also services which were essential to the country, whether, for instance, in the maintenance of the food supply or of the export trade, or in the performance of other services which it was desirable should be carried on in the interests of the community.

In cases of ill health or infirmity a certificate of absolute exemption was not to be given unless the ill health or infirmity was clearly permanent. In doubtful cases, tribunals were invited to leave the question of medical fitness to the military authorities, who had now revised their standards and were prepared to certify recruits in different classes according to the work for which they were physically fit. Thus, failing fitness for general service, a man might be deemed fit enough for field service at

GLASGOW HIGHLANDERS IN TRAINING: CHARGE!



THE KING INSPECTING THE NEW ARMY AT ALDERSHOT: THE MARCH PAST OF INFANTRY.

home, for garrison service at home or abroad, for labour, such as road and trench making, or for sedentary work, such as clerical occupations.

The case of the conscientious objector was to be considered in an impartial and tolerant spirit. As will be seen later, this unattractive product of peaceful prosperity and semi-religious, semi-political aberration was, although negligible in quantity, to cause much trouble before he was finally disposed of. Meanwhile, the man whose objections genuinely rested on religious and moral convictions was to receive every consideration. It was for the tribunal to accomplish the unenviable task of deciding as to the genuineness of the claim.

Before the end of February, 1916, a fresh batch of instructions was announced, of which the general tendency was to deprecate undue leniency on the part of the tribunals. It was felt that in a good many cases the tribunals had been guided too much by local sentiment in the granting of exemptions. Cases of "serious hardship" were in future to be shown to be really serious before a claim could be approved. Many of the claims were made on trivial grounds; others were obviously absurd. Among the "indispensable men," applications on whose behalf were rejected by various tribunals, were a revue comedian, a church organist, the cartoonist of a weekly paper, and a packer employed by the Naval and Military Bible Society. Men claimed exemption very often because they were the sole maintenance of their widowed mother, but it was frequently found, on inquiry, that the mother could be perfectly well cared for by brothers or sisters of the applicant, while she would, of course, be entitled to the allowance fixed for soldiers' dependents. Among the conscientious objectors many extreme cases of repugnance to take life were forthcoming. It was with difficulty that some of these unnatural sons would admit that if their mother or sister were attacked they would defend them to the point of killing their adversary. There were, indeed, cases in which they frankly said that they would allow their mother to be killed rather than take the life of anyone who attacked her. Among the applications refused was that of a Civil servant who said that he did not like to leave his mother "in these times of Zeppelin raids." But, on the other hand, many conscientious objectors were perfectly willing to undertake non-com-

batant service—although some regarded the work of the Red Cross or Army Service Corps with disfavour on the ground that it "helped warfare."

Gradually, however, means were found for dealing with the conscientious objector, whether the offspring of foolish parents or the Christadelphian who had hurriedly embraced the teaching of that obscure sect in the hope of saving his skin. In a few cases of refusal to obey military orders terms of imprisonment were inflicted. A more satisfactory step was the formation in March of a Non-Combatant Battalion, which was reported in May to be doing honest and useful work quite contentedly at the Front. The men's conduct was exemplary, an unusually large percentage of them being total abstainers as well as non-smokers. They were engaged, like the Navvies Battalion, on railway work, receiving, like the navvies, an additional allowance of meat. Otherwise, they were treated exactly like any other infantry battalion, except that they wore no belts, and, of course, carried no arms. They used no military titles among themselves, but addressed each other as "Mr.," or by nicknames. The soldiers generally regarded them with good-natured indifference. It was reported that, as the result, doubtless, of the fine physical condition induced by hard work in the open air, one man had found his conscience less obdurate than he had supposed, and had asked to be allowed to become a combatant. Other conversions were anticipated.

Notwithstanding, however, the increasingly stern official disapproval of the laxity of some of the tribunals, it was becoming clear that more drastic steps would be necessary if the tale of useful recruits were to attain the hoped-for figure. It was decided forthwith, under pressure from the War Office, to revise the list of reserved occupations. Meanwhile, in many cases, the irregularity of action on the part of the tribunals produced great dissatisfaction among the men. Numerous cases were reported from agricultural districts in which able-bodied young sons of farmers were unfairly obtaining exemption by masquerading, for the first time in their lives, as shepherds or cowmen. Simultaneously, thousands of men were being enlisted for "light sedentary duties" who ought never to have been taken from civil life at all. It was reported that in one Midland hospital of 210 beds no fewer than 70 young men were engaged in washing dishes, polishing floors, handing dressings, feeding patients, running messages, and doing similar feminine work. In another hospital the telephone and inquiry offices were being conducted by young soldiers. The existence of these and similar cases of "shirking" on the part of single men tended, as time went on and the calling up of further groups of the unmarried brought the moment ever nearer when the turn of the married would come, to produce a strong sense of injustice, which was reflected in complaints from all parts of the country.

On March 1 voluntary enlistment under the group system was, as we have seen, closed to single men. It remained open to the married.

Those of the latter who had already attested had, as they admitted, in many cases done so in the belief that they would not be required, or at any rate not until the whole supply of single men was exhausted. This belief, however erroneous, was to a certain extent justified by the ambiguous nature of many of the public declarations which had been made on the subject. The recruiting phrase "Single men first" had been taken, all too literally, to mean, not that the single groups would be summoned before the married, which had been done, but that no married men should be summoned while there yet remained single men available and unattested. And now, when it was recognized that large numbers of single men had been permitted to escape into the haven of a reserved occupation, the married men lifted up their voice. It is not to be assumed that the married men were lacking in a sense of their duty. We have seen from the Derby report that 1,344,979 of them had attested up to the end of the year, as against 840,000 single men, and since January 1 it appeared that 130,000 married men had attested, as against about 400,000 single. They were for the most part reasonable and patriotic men, with little sympathy with agitation. But, in the absence of any Government scheme for their relief, they were oppressed by all kinds of anxieties as to their contractual liabilities in the matter of rent, mortgages, and the like. It was not until April 26 that the Government produced a plan for mitigating these harassing obstacles to voluntary enlistment. (See pages 146-7.) This scheme, coupled with the power given to sanitary authorities under the Local Government (Emergency Provisions) Act to make arrangements for storing furniture for men called up, "reasonable expenditure" to

INNS OF COURT OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS.
Bayonet Practice.

be defrayed out of the rates, did much to obviate the "breaking up of the home."

Meanwhile Lord Derby strove valiantly to save the situation. He declared that the Government would have to take far stronger measures than they had yet taken if the men necessary for the Army were to be got. The men must be extracted from the reserved occupations and women put in their place. No single man who had not attained the age of 31 should be allowed to plead for exemption on the ground that he was "starred," badged, or in a reserved occupation. All other single men, and all married men, should not be considered as being in the starred or reserved occupations unless they held their present positions or positions of a similar character in other firms before the previous August 15. These proposals would not apply to skilled munition workers. At the same time, Lord Derby, while maintaining that Mr. Asquith's pledge to the married men had been kept in the letter, insisted that the Government must, by limiting exemptions, enable it to be kept in the spirit as well. He recognized that the effect of the exemptions had been to make the married men feel that they were going to be called up much sooner than they could reasonably have anticipated.

The proclamation calling up the first eight married groups was posted on March 7. These groups (25 to 32) included men between 19 and 26 years of age. The married men, aged 18–19 (Group 24), were, as in the case of single men, called up later.

With this summons to the first married groups the recruiting question entered on a new phase. Lord Derby hastened to explain to the married men the reasons of the unexpectedly early call. In a speech at Manchester he declared:

> The whole essence of the situation is time. We must have men. I am perfectly certain that, given time—and, mind you, Parliament has lengthened that time—we shall get all the single men, but at the present moment there is no doubt that unless the married men come forward there will be a shortage—a shortage which may be absolutely fatal to this country, not only in this generation but for all time.

Meanwhile the Cabinet, now seriously alarmed, appointed a committee to consider the whole question of reserved trades and occupations. This committee, on March 14, announced that, as evidence had accumulated

to show that men had been entering certified occupations in order to avoid military service, it had been decided that men in those occupations only be exempted from military service if they could show that they were similarly occupied at the date of the National Register, August 15, 1915. Unmarried men up to the age of 25 or 30, or, in some cases, up to 41, were to be released for service. Only in those occupations which were vital to the conduct of the war and where the evidence against any depletion was overwhelming were the younger unmarried men to be retained on the reserved list. It was further decided to delete from the list of reservations occupations connected with certain industries such as the luxury trades concerned with the manufacture of tobacco, silk and lace, which had received protection on account of the importance of their exports.

It is significant of the embarrassment of the Government at this juncture that at the moment when Lord Derby was doing his utmost to compel them to enable him to fulfil his word to the married men they should have appointed him to preside over a committee on the construction of aircraft—an occupation, indeed, which he soon found a sheer waste of time and energy.

The attitude of the extremer married objectors may be gathered from the following resolutions, passed at a mass meeting at Portsmouth on March 8. The men protested against

(1) The calling up of the married groups for service until the Prime Minister's pledge to the married men has been fulfilled in the spirit as well as the letter by withdrawing and sending into the Services all single men from reserved occupations, starred men in Government and controlled establishments [munition factories] who have only recently been trained and entered for this class of work, and single clerks in Government and public offices; and by a stringent revision of the cases of single men exempted by tribunals or rejected as medically unfit.

(2) The calling up of married groups for service before compulsory service has been introduced for all unattested married men of military age, the attestation of married men having been obtained by statements in recruiting literature that attested married men would be in a better position than those who did not attest.

The posters publishing the proclamation of the call of the last groups of married men had been printed, and were on the point of being issued, when, on March 15, an indefinite postponement was announced. A week later it was explained that this had been merely due to the

A LONDON REGIMENT IN TRAINING.
Bomb-throwing practice.



"BACK TO THE ARMY AGAIN": A SCENE AT VICTORIA STATION, LONDON.
British soldiers waiting for the troop train to France after a spell of furlough.

congestion of the tribunals, but for the public it served to emphasize the fact that the Government were now floundering in very deep water. Matters were not helped by an unfortunate indisposition of Mr. Asquith's, which occurred at this moment. While Lord Derby attached to the reserved occupations the whole blame of the shortage which had led to the premature calling up of the married groups, and described how the Board of Agriculture had refused to follow the proposals of the Reserved Occupations Committee in the matter of reducing exemptions, he was able to point to the various steps which the Government were now taking, at the eleventh hour, to undo the mischief caused by their own half-hearted mismanagement of the whole recruiting question. There had been an inter-departmental conference, which had "found" that an insufficiently representative Committee was already sitting at the Board of Trade. The Committee had been strengthened, and had, as we have seen, already dealt with a certain portion of the industries of the country. Meanwhile, the Home Office had agreed, with regard to the mining industry, that any men challenged by the military authorities who could not be shown by the employer at the Colliery Courts to be indispensable should cease to be exempted. The Admiralty, the War Office, and the Ministry of Munitions were joining in a revision of badges. Women were being introduced to the lighter forms of shell work at the rate of 15,000 a month. Lord Kitchener followed with the frank warning that the married men would be wanted within the next few weeks.

An interval followed, filled with hot political controversy. The Cabinet, distracted with the problem of devising measures for the relief of married recruits from pressing civil liabilities, was attacked from all quarters of the House of Commons, and on every conceivable ground, for its inability to make up its mind. It seemed to be utterly powerless in the absence of its leader. Meanwhile, the question of all-round compulsion was daily looming larger, and married men's meetings in its favour grew ever more imperative in their demands. *The Times*, which had throughout the whole recruiting muddle been indefatigable in its criticism of the glaring injustice of the existing system, and in its calls for resolute action on the part of the Government, thus summarized its advice at this juncture:

> First let us have a plain authoritative statement of the true position of recruiting and the numbers actually required. Nothing has been such a handicap as the mystery in which this question has been involved. Then let us have such an amendment of the Military Service Act as will do away with all the injustice of attestation by including impartially all men of military age. Let us reverse the whole system of reserved occupations by placing the onus of obtaining exemption on each individual or his employers. That is the one sure safeguard against the possibility of single "shirkers." And let us deal with the contractual liabilities of the married recruits before, and not after, they are called to the Colours. If the Government would have the courage to announce such a programme at once, they would be far on the way to solving a critical problem.

It need hardly be said that this period of delay and indecision produced an extremely bad impression upon our troops at the Front, as well as upon our Allies, who, regarding compulsory service almost as part of the order of nature, found it difficult to reconcile the Government's professions of determination to win the war with their reluctance to take the first essential step to that end.

Mr. Asquith was now absent on the Continent, visiting Paris and Rome, and the task of representing him in Parliament fell to Mr. Walter Long. He sought at first, incredible as it may seem, to shift the responsibility on to the tribunals! If, he said, they had taken the view that men with heavy liabilities ought not to be called upon to serve as soldiers, this particular grievance of the married would not have arisen. But, he added, as a matter of fact, the question of the men with obligations had been in existence ever since the first call for recruits was made. He now told the House that the Government had decided to give the necessary sums to the Statutory Pensions Committee to enable them to make grants to men already in the Army, or in process of being called up, to meet cases of hardship arising out of their liabilities.

By about the third week in March the whole position had become impossible. While the tribunals and advisory committees were struggling with their thankless task, and the Government was still unable to call up the married "groups," the state of the Army in regard to numbers was clearly critical. The seventy divisions which were the minimum of our field formations required 1,400,000 recruits for their maintenance and completion during the year 1916. Men must be found, and found soon.

Ministerial and departmental conferences were now constant, but no results were forth-

A LONDON REGIMENT IN CAMP: DIGGING TRENCHES.

coming. Public opinion became impatient. In the House of Commons "War Committees," consisting of the most energetic members of the Unionist and Liberal parties respectively, became ever more insistent. On March 28 these two "Ginger" groups, as they were called, definitely announced their adhesion to the principle of "equal sacrifices from all men of military age." The Unionist group, led by Sir Edward Carson, decided to move a vote of censure on the Ministry, if no satisfactory solution of the recruiting problem were produced in one week. The Cabinet tried to gain time by the familiar plea that they were "examining all the figures," and Mr. Bonar Law was particularly persuasive in curbing the zeal of his own party. By one device and another time was, indeed, gained, but it could not be long. On April 11 *The Times* announced that Sir William Robertson, whose influence had grown steadily since he became Chief of the Imperial General Staff in December, 1915, and the military members of the Army Council had "furnished the Cabinet with a very plain statement of their immediate requirements in men." On April 12 Sir Edward Carson handed in the following notice:

To move that this House is of opinion that the present system of recruiting is unfair in its incidence and inadequate to secure the men urgently needed in order to achieve the objects which this country has set before itself in this war and to fulfil our obligations to our Allies; and resolves that no further time should be lost in amending the Military Service Act so as to require, as far as possible, equal sacrifice from all men of military age, by rendering all alike liable for military service during the present war.

Lord Milner announced his intention to move the following even more definite resolution in the House of Lords:

That in the opinion of this House it is necessary, in order to secure the objects for which the country is fighting, that an Act should be passed without further delay rendering all men of military age liable to be called upon for military service during the continuance of the war.

On the day of Sir Edward Carson's notice, a deputation of the National Union of Attested Married Men waited upon Mr. Asquith, Lord Derby, and Mr. Walter Long, and told them plainly what they thought of the position in which attested married men had been placed by the recruiting methods of the Government and their agents. The leader of the deputation contended that every attested married man was prepared to fulfil his pledge, but in the name of justice there must be that equality of sacrifice which they had all been led to expect. "We think," he added, "that the present Derby scheme is in a hopeless muddle, and that the only way to rectify it is to apply the Military Service Bill to all men up to the age of 41." The Government should not allow it to be recorded that over a million men had been pressed into military service by trickery.

This allegation of trickery was based upon a recruiting poster which stated "no attestation, no appeal." It appeared that the men had inferred from this that those who attested

voluntarily would have some advantage over those who had to be "fetched." Lord Derby explained that, from the point of view of the War Office, if a man did not attest he did not exist. It was impossible, under the voluntary system, for a man who had not attested to come before the tribunals and ask for exemption. But he admitted that there had been statements made locally which went a great deal farther than that complained of, and which, if he had heard of them at the time, he should undoubtedly have repudiated.

The Prime Minister declared that the only pledge for which he and Lord Derby were answerable had been fulfilled both in the letter and in the spirit. He also admitted, however, that cases of misapprehension had arisen, owing to unauthorized statements, and he undertook to consider whether machinery could be set up to release men who could prove that they had attested as the result of such misleading statements. As for the alternative of compulsion, which one member of the deputation had suggested would "solve the whole thing," that was "another matter."

In the Cabinet matters were understood to be in the hands of a Committee consisting of the Prime Minister, Mr. McKenna, Lord Lansdowne, and Mr. Chamberlain. On April 15 *The Times* indicated that this Committee had reported against an extension of the Military Service Act to all men of military age, and were proposing (1) the extension of the Act to include those men who had reached the age of eighteen since August 15, and who reached that age hereafter; (2) the retention with the Colours of all time-expired Regulars and Territorials; (3) further "combing out" of single men from "starred" trades and munition factories; and (4) perseverance with all existing methods of enlistment, including the Derby scheme and the Military Service Act. On April 18 matters were reaching a head, and there were all appearances of a serious political crisis. On the 19th Mr. Asquith met a House of Commons which was expecting to hear the decision of the Government. But what he said was this:

> There are still, I regret to say, material points of disagreement in the Cabinet, and if these points are not settled by agreement the result must be the break-up of the Government. The Cabinet is united in believing that such an event would be a national disaster of the most formidable kind, and it is in the hope that it may be averted by a few more days of deliberation that I shall propose that the House adjourn to-day until Tuesday next, April 25.

On the following day, the Thursday before Easter, it was announced that the Cabinet had come to an agreement, and that their proposals would be submitted on April 25 to a secret session in each House of Parliament. *The Times* stated that what the Cabinet proposed was to introduce a Bill for the extension of the Military Service Act—but a Bill which would only take effect if in the next few weeks

THE NEW ARMY IN TRAINING: CHARGE!

THE NEW ARMY IN

"the regular intake of recruits from all sources had fallen below the definite minimum figure accepted by the Cabinet and the Army Council as the margin of safety." The arrangement of a secret session was described as a direct concession to the wishes of the Labour members, who held that they must be convinced of the necessity of any extension of the Military Service Act by military evidence which could not be disclosed in public.

On Easter Eve a Privy Council was held at Windsor, and new Regulations of a most remarkable kind were inserted in the Defence of the Realm Regulations. The main passages were as follows:

If either House of Parliament in pursuance of a resolution passed by that House holds a secret session, it shall not be lawful for any person in any newspaper, periodical, circular, or other printed publication, or in any public speech, to publish any report of, or to purport to describe, or to refer to, the proceedings at such session, except such report thereof as may be officially communicated through the Directors of the Official Press Bureau.

It shall not be lawful for any person in any newspaper, periodical, circular, or other printed publication, or in any public speech, to publish any report of, or to purport to describe, or to refer to, the proceedings at any meeting of the Cabinet, or without lawful authority to publish the contents of any confidential document belonging to, or any confidential information obtained from, any Government department, or any person in the service of his Majesty.

The second paragraph was obviously due to considerations arising out of the published reports of Cabinet discussions and hesitations in the past few weeks. It provoked much criticism, which, however, need not delay us here.

The secret session occupied two days. Very brief reports were communicated to the Press. They stated that the Prime Minister gave particulars of the total military effort of the Empire. The report of the first day's proceedings also said:

To meet with the situation the Government have determined upon three relatively minor proposals:

(*a*) The prolongation until the end of the war of the service of time-expired men whose period of service under the present law can be extended for one year only;

(*b*) To empower the military authority to transfer men enlisted for territorial battalions to any unit where they are needed:

(*c*) To render an exempted man liable to military service immediately on the expiry of his certificate of exemption.

With a view to an ultimate addition to the forces available, they will further propose to bring under the terms of the Military Service Act all youths under 18 on August 15 last as they reach that age. Further the Prime Minister stated:

(1) That the Government, recognizing that the necessary numbers required for the discharge of our military obligations will not be available for service at the time required under the present arrangements, agree that an immediate effort be made to obtain the men required



TRAINING: PHYSICAL DRILL.

by voluntary enlistment from amongst the unattested married men.

(2) That if at the end of four weeks ending May 27 50,000 of these men have not been secured by direct enlistment, the Government will forthwith ask Parliament for compulsory powers.

(3) That if in any week after May 27 15,000 men have not been secured by direct enlistment, the same course will he taken, any surplus over 15,000 in one week being carried over to the next.

(4) That the arrangements in paragraphs 2 and 3 are to hold good until 200,000 unattested men have been obtained. In the meantime the position will be under constant review by the Government.

It was pointed out that, as under this scheme all available unattested married men would be enlisted either voluntarily or hy compulsion, the main ground alleged for the release of attested married men would disappear.

Civil Liabilities.

The Prime Minister also referred to the question of the assistance to be given to enable men in his Majesty's forces to meet their civil liabilities.

On March 29 Mr. Long informed the House of Commons that his Majesty's Government proposed to take certain steps with a view to meeting cases of hardship which might arise out of the civil liabilities of men joining the Forces. In addition to the proposed amendment of the Courts (Emergency Powers) Act, Mr. Long intimated that financial assistance would be provided through the medium of the Statutory Committee.

As the Statutory Committee found that they could not undertake this work, it was decided to set up a special committee for the purpose. This committee consists of Mr. Hayes Fisher, the Solicitor-General, the Lord Advocate, Sir Paul Harvey, and Mr. A. V. Symonds.

The Committee have made considerable progress with the scheme and have obtained the concurrence of the Treasury to the following general principles:

(1) The scheme of assistance will apply to all men who have joined the Forces since the 4th August, 1914, or who may join hereafter, and to single as well as to married men.

(2) The items in respect of which assistance will be granted include rent (including ground rent and rent of business premises), mortgage interest, payments in instalments in virtue of contracts such as purchase of premises, business, or furniture, taxes, rates, insurance premiums, and school fees. Relief will not be given for the purpose of enabling any person to discharge such liabilities as ordinary debts to tradesmen.

(3) It is not contemplated that the assistance to be granted in any individual case should exceed £104 per annum.

(4) Persons desiring relief will be required to make application in a prescribed form.

(5) These applications will be investigated locally by Commissioners (who will be barristers) specially appointed for the purpose. The Commissioners will make recommendations to the central committee, who will be authorized to make grants.

How serious was the financial aspect of this relief scheme was shown by the earmarking of £20,000,000 as a first instalment of the money required.

On April 27, the day after the secret session, Mr. Long asked for leave to introduce the Bill which the Prime Minister had foreshadowed. In a few hours the whole scheme was dead. As soon as Mr. Long had sketched the proposals, they were denounced on all sides. Sir E. Carson showed that the Government, while still shrinking from a policy of equal sacrifice, was sacrificing time-expired soldiers, Terri-

torials, and boys; they were proposing "one of the most cruel acts that had ever been attempted." Mr. Walsh, on behalf of Labour, demanded that the Bill should be withdrawn. Otherwise the House should reject it, temporise no longer, and "insist on the straight thing." Let the Government say, "The necessity has now arisen and must be met," and they need not fear the response of the country. The prospect was hopeless. Mr. Asquith was hurriedly summoned to the House. He recognized the strength of the arguments against the Bill, and "suggested" that the motion for leave to introduce the Bill should be withdrawn. "Contingent compulsion" thus perished ingloriously with all the other makeshifts and compromises. The collapse of the Bill was a humiliating blow to the Government. But the public paid little attention to their humiliation; there was only a feeling of almost universal relief that the problem was now sure to be solved in the only possible way.

The same day, April 27, saw the belated issue of the proclamation calling up Groups 33–41.*

A curious minor incident which occurred at this juncture was the sending to the King by the Married Men's League of an appeal that his Majesty should receive a deputation. "In days of national stress and urgency," declared the appeal, "your Majesty's Ministers are apparently in a hopeless muddle over the important question of recruiting. . . . We appeal to you, Sire, to receive our deputation, knowing that national improvements are more likely to result when you receive opinions through the direct representatives of those most deeply concerned than through the intermediary of those whose lives, homes, and future employment after the war are not in such jeopardy."

The married men, in fact, as one of them phrased it, were "not going to wait for the politicians."

On May 2 the Prime Minister made a statement on the whole situation, and announced that a new Bill would propose "a general and immediate compulsion." Incidentally, he announced that the "total military and naval effort of the Empire" from the beginning of the war up to that date exceeded 5,000,000 men, and that the whole military force had been raised to a strength of eighty-three divisions in all.

* The final five groups were called up by a proclamation dated May 13.

On the following day, May 3, Mr. Asquith introduced "a Bill to make further provision with respect to military Service during the present war."

The new Bill had a very rapid passage through Parliament. It was read a first time without a division, and a second time by a majority of 292 (328 votes against 36). It passed through Committee in the early hours of May 12, was read a third time on May 16 by a majority of 215 (250 votes against 35), and received the Royal assent on May 25.

The main difference between the new Bill and the measure so speedily withdrawn by the Government was the inclusion within its scope of the unattested married men—of all of them, not a limited number. In the main the Bill was an amendment of the Military Service Act which we have already described, but it also contained important new features. Especially as most of the text is unintelligible without comparison with the earlier measure, it will be best to sketch at once the main effects of the new legislation, so as to show the position now established.

From June 24, the "appointed date" under the new Act—30 days after it had become law—every male British subject between the ages of 18 and 41 and ordinarily resident in Great Britain was "to be deemed to have been duly enlisted in His Majesty's Regular Forces for general service with the Colours or in the Reserve for the period of the war." Men who came within the operation of the Act at a later date would be subject to its provisions 30 days subsequently. At the same time it was expressly provided that "steps shall be taken to prevent so far as possible the sending of men to serve abroad before they attain the age of 19."

Regular soldiers and Territorials whose term of service expired would in future be retained with the Colours until the end of the war, and men already discharged on the termination of their period of service would be recalled to the Colours and restored to their former military rank. An exception, however, was made in the case of men who had served 12 years or more and had attained the age of 41.

The main "exceptions" to the obligation to perform military service remained as stated in the first schedule of the earlier Act (see page 124). But whereas under the first Act men who had "offered themselves for enlistment and been rejected since August 14, 1915" were "ex-

cepted", it was now provided that on September 1, 1916, this exception would cease to apply to any man, if the Army Council were satisfied that he should again present himself for medical examination, and sent him written notice to that effect. In other words, the authorities were empowered to examine afresh the large number of men who had been rejected without exhaustive medical examination. On the other hand, the new Act "excepted" all men who at any time during the war had been prisoners of war, captured or interned by the enemy, and released or exchanged.

Otherwise, perhaps the most important amendment of the first Military Service Act was that which concerned the safeguards against so-called "industrial compulsion." As shown in the clause quoted on page 124, men whose certificates of exemption for any reason ceased to be in force had been given two months' grace during which they might obtain renewal of their certificates. This provision had soon been found to be one of the worst loopholes for evasion of military service. By the new Act the provision of *two months'* grace was made to apply only to men who had been engaged in work certified to be of national importance, or who had been munition workers—and to apply to them only if they had been engaged in the same or similar work before August 14, 1915. In all other cases of lapsed exemption certificates a man would be deemed to have been enlisted at the expiration of *two weeks*, unless he had made an application for a renewal of his certificate.

Other clauses of the new Act provided that any Territorial might be transferred without his consent from one corps to another or to a Regular battalion; that the liability which any Territorial had accepted to serve in any place outside the United Kingdom should continue, notwithstanding anything in the conditions of service, during the continuance of the war; and that every man holding a certificate of exemption must produce it, or give particulars of it, to any constable or person with authority from the Army Council.



A SCHOOL OF FARRIERY.

Teaching the soldier the art of shoeing horses by the aid of a diagram of a hoof of a horse.

We need deal only very briefly with the proceedings in Parliament. Mr. Asquith presented the Bill as "a complete and rounded policy." It was warmly welcomed by Mr. Barnes on behalf of Labour, and read a first time on the day of its introduction. In the second reading debate a most powerful speech was made by Mr. Lloyd George, who had been the main instrument in the Cabinet in securing the adoption of compulsory service, and who had received in consequence a full measure of violent abuse from disappointed Radical journalists. He said that the military authorities believed

TRAINING OFFICERS FOR THE ROYAL GARRISON ARTILLERY: GUN DRILL.

that the men supplied by this Bill alone would make the difference between defeat and victory, and rather than have on his conscience opposition to this military opinion he would rather be driven out of the Liberal party, and indeed out of public life. Mr. Lloyd George declared that, so far from being unable to "stay the course," we could outstay Germany by years, and he warmly denounced those who dared to regard the British working classes as if they were "doubtful neutrals." Sir John Simon again led the feeble opposition, and cast doubts upon the numbers set up by the Government as the probable or possible yield of the Bill. Mr. Henderson made a crushing reply. He reminded the "Simonites" that they had ridiculed Lord Derby's estimate that in December, 1915, there were 650,000 unattested single men, and that they had said the Military Service Act would not secure 50,000 men. In reality the number of unattested single men had proved to be 750,000; the military authorities had obtained 300,000 of them, and already 187,826 were with the Colours.

In Committee another unsuccessful attempt was made to include Ireland. It was defeated by Mr. Asquith and Mr. Redmond, the latter declaring that "it would not only be a wrong thing, an unwise thing, but it would be well nigh an insane thing, to attempt to enforce conscription in Ireland."

For the rest, discussion turned mainly upon "industrial compulsion," "conscientious objection," and the question of medical re-examination of men who had been rejected. A curious episode was an attempt to secure special consideration for married men who were the "sole heads" of a business—in other words, for small shopkeepers. The Government was bombarded with telegrams and Members of Parliament were visited by countless deputations—with the result that, although the matter was not dealt with in the Act, the Government promised to issue special instructions to the tribunals. It should be added that the amendment of the clause dealing with "industrial compulsion" was effected by the House of Lords, their proposals being accepted by the House of Commons by a majority of 91.

Let us conclude this review of the memorable military service legislation of 1916 with the names of those who on May 16 finally opposed

the third reading of the new Bill. The minority of 35 was composed as follows :—

Abraham, Rt. Hon. W.; Anderson, W. C.; Arnold Sydney; Baker, Joseph Allen (Finsbury, E.); Barlow, Sir John Emmott (Somerset); Burns, Rt. Hon. John; Byles, Sir William Pollard; Chancellor, Henry George; Clynes, J. R.; Harvey, T. E. (Leeds, West); Hogge, James Myles; Holt, Richard Durning; John, Edward Thomas; Jowett, F. W.; King, Joseph; Lamb, Sir Ernest Henry; Lough, Rt. Hon. Thomas; Macdonald, J. Ramsay (Leicester); Mason, David M. (Coventry); Molteno, Percy Alport; Morrell, Philip; Outhwaite, R. L.; Ponsonby, Arthur A. W. H.; Pringle, William M. R.; Richards, Thomas; Richardson, Thomas (Whitehaven); Rowntree, Arnold; Runciman, Sir Walter (Hartlepool); Sherwell, Arthur James; Simon, Rt. Hon. Sir John Allsebrook; Snowden, Philip; Thomas, J. H.; Trevelyan, Charles Philips; Whitehouse, John Howard; Williams, Llewelyn (Carmarthen).
Tellers: Mr. Leif Jones and Mr. Goldstone.

On the day on which the Royal Assent was given to the new Military Service Act, the King addressed the following message to his people:

"BUCKINGHAM PALACE,
"MAY 25, 1916.

"To enable our Country to organize more effectively its military resources in the present great struggle for the cause of civilization I have, acting on the advice of my Ministers, deemed it necessary to enrol every able-bodied man between the ages of 18 and 41.

"I desire to take this opportunity of expressing to my people my recognition and appreciation of the splendid patriotism and self-sacrifice which they have displayed in raising by voluntary enlistment, since the commencement of the war, no less than 5,041,000 men, an effort far surpassing that of any other nation in similar circumstances recorded in history, and one which will be a lasting source of pride to future generations.

"I am confident that the magnificent spirit which has hitherto sustained my people through the trials of this terrible war will inspire them to endure the additional sacrifice now imposed upon them, and that it will with God's help lead us and our Allies to a victory which shall achieve the liberation of Europe.

"GEORGE R.I."

Thus, after more than 21 months of war, England "muddled through" to the inevitable solution of the recruiting problem—compulsory service for every able-bodied man of military age. We have seen with what difficulties her progress to this end was beset. We have seen how slowly the country roused itself from its comfortable slumber to face the stern necessities of a struggle for its very existence. We have seen how worthy was the effort which it voluntarily exerted whenever, though all too seldom, a clear issue was put before it by its

BAYONET PRACTICE.

leaders. The story, indeed, is not without its melancholy aspects. But while we may deplore the lack of imagination, the refusal to accept clear warnings, and the consequent utter unpreparedness, except of the Royal Navy, in which England was surprised at the outbreak of war, it is not the people of England, and still less of the Empire, who will be sternly judged by the historian of the future. We English, from our very insularity, have never been, in the Continental sense, a military race. That we have always been a warlike race there is no part of the world that does not testify. Nor did our warlike qualities ever shine brighter than in the Great War. But our minds move slowly until we get angry or afraid—and peaceful island-folk who are at the same time prosperous and confident in their Navy do not grow angry or afraid so readily as do nations with nothing but a line of frontier-marks between them and the permanent menace of their neighbours. Above all, we dislike experiments; we are inclined to say that what we are "accustomed to" is "good enough for *us*." We had been "accustomed to" voluntary service, and though we were also accustomed to compulsion in many of the affairs of life, our shrinking from military "compulsion" was largely a shrinking from the unknown.

This characteristic reluctance to take a bold step was accentuated by the fact that with our Prime Minister and a considerable number of his colleagues in the Government the stalwart device of our enemy "First think and then act" took the invertebrate form of "Wait and see." "The fact is," said Lord Derby on May 6, 1915, "we ought to have had universal compulsion in the first week of the war." This History has recorded what we had in its place. Not having "thought," we were powerless to "act" until it was almost too late. Our first idea was to double the Expeditionary Force, while retaining the ancient machinery and at the same time allowing the men most competent to work that machinery to leave it for active service at the Front. Then, as our ideas expanded, came the chaos of recruits without accommodation or equipment, an army altogether beyond the powers of the ancient machinery to cope with. Then, as the machinery expanded and the maintenance of some 70 divisions became the ideal, there followed the long and painful struggle to make up for the shortage of men. It has been seen to what a plight the Government were reduced by their having allowed the business of recruiting to be conducted on the lines of an electioneering campaign and by their failure to realize that what the country really needed was, not soft words, compromises, and jugglings with height standards and separation allowances, but a clear-cut policy of all-round justice.

If the Government had known their countrymen better, three-quarters of the difficulties caused by the attempt to treat the married men separately from the single need never have arisen. It was not lack of patriotism that made the married men protest against being called up while more than half a million single men remained unaccounted for. They were perfectly willing to fulfil their obligations, but their sense of justice revolted against the unfairness of a state of things in which the unpatriotic citizen was left to profit from the sacrifice of his patriotic fellow. Hence, as has been seen, although compulsion was, in principle, no more congenial to the married than to the single men, its merits from the point of view of all-round justice led them to insist upon its application to themselves as soon as military necessity had compelled its application to the rest.

But this was only one more instance of the manner in which the people of England led their leaders throughout the war. Much of the fear of "destroying the unity of the country" which the politicians alleged as their reason for their own failure to make up their minds was a pure hallucination. The strikes and industrial unrest which formed a dark episode at an earlier period were, although serious enough in themselves, but echoes of bygone controversies, signs of mismanagement on the part of the Government rather than of halfheartedness on the part of the people. To the question whether the people could be trusted the millions of voluntary recruits, to say nothing of the infinite and willing self-sacrifice of all classes, was a sufficient answer. To call forth this effort, and to equalize, so far as possible, the burden, was the duty of the Government. But the Government could not be trusted to do its duty without compulsion. It was public opinion, not the initiative of politicians, which took the vast majority of the steps essential to the winning of the war.

CHAPTER CXXVII.

THE GERMANS IN RUSSIAN POLAND.

THREE INVASIONS—ADMINISTRATIVE PARTITION OF RUSSIAN POLAND BETWEEN GERMANY AND AUSTRIA—CLUMSY GERMAN EFFORTS AT CONCILIATION—DROPPING THE MASK—PRUSSIAN RULE AT ITS WORST—ADMINISTRATIVE MACHINERY—THE POLES AND THEIR MASTERS—LAW—EDUCATION—WARSAW UNIVERSITY REOPENED—TYRANNY IN THE SCHOOLS—LANGUAGE QUESTION—THE JEWS—THE CENSORSHIP—ECONOMIC EXPLOITATION—SPOLIATION OF FOOD AND RAW MATERIALS—GENERAL DEVASTATION—CRUSHING TAXATION—BRITISH RELIEF OFFER REJECTED.

THE occupation of Russian Poland by the Germanic Powers was the result of three campaigns: Hindenburg's first offensive against Warsaw, in October, 1914; his second invasion of Poland culminating in the battle of Lodz, in November, 1914; and the great Austro-German advance in the summer of 1915 which, after the fall of Warsaw on August 5, left the Central Powers in possession of the entire country. During the lull which intervened in the winter and spring of 1914–15, the battle-front to the west of the Vistula extended along a practically straight line running north and south from the mouth of the Bzura to the mouth of the Nida. This line was during that period the eastern boundary of the part of Russian Poland occupied by the enemy. Meantime north of the Lower Vistula and of the Nareff, and in the government of Suvalki, the respective positions of the German and the Russian armies continued to undergo rapid and frequent changes. Hence no attempt was made by the enemy to introduce in those districts any form of government other than that exercised by the commanders of the occupying armies. The Lower Vistula between Vyshograd and the Prussian frontier remained, up to the time when the German Government-General of Warsaw was established, the northern frontier of Poland subject to a regular German administration.

Within the occupied area, the border-line between the Austrian and the German spheres was settled by a compact concluded at Posen in January, 1915. The Austrians received the southern part, shorn, however, of its richest and most populous regions; the country bordering on Prussian Silesia and comprising the industrial centres of Tchenstochova and Sosnoviets, as well as a large portion of the mining district of the "Zaglembie" ("Depression"), was included in the German sphere of occupation. With some small modifications this delimitation was maintained even after the great advance in the summer of 1915; the disposal of the new acquisitions was settled at a conference of Austrian and German delegates in September, and by an agreement concluded at Berlin on December 14, 1915, between the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, Prince Gottfried zu Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst and the German Foreign Secretary, Herr von Jagow. East of Tomashoff the boundary was made to follow the Pilitsa down to its junction with the Vistula and from there it ran up the Vistula to Ivangorod; between that fortress and the



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GERMAN OCCUPATION OF POLAND.

Prince Leopold of Bavaria (1); the Archduke Franz Josef, Heir Apparent of Austria-Hungary (2); and General von Woyrsch (3).

River Bug, the southern frontier of the late Government of Siedltse was aeeepted as dividing line between the two oeeupations. In the north, the Government of Suvalki was separated from Poland, and on May 1, 1916, was linked up with the Government of Vilna. In the east, the Government of Cholm, though it formed no longer part of Russian Poland, was ineluded in the part administered by the Austrians. Some 74,647 square kilometres were thus ineluded in the German, and only about 52,303 in the Austrian sphere. The disproportion of population and wealth between the two divisions was infinitely more striking, as praetically all the industrial distriets and all the chief eities of Russian Poland were ineluded in the German share. The history of Russian Poland under the enemy is therefore primarily that of the eountry under German administration. Every agreement eoneerning the delimitation of the two spheres emphasised that its stipulations were not meant to prejudge in any way "the arrangements hereinafter to be made on the basis of the future peaee-treaty." Yet it was elear that from the very beginning the Germans were eareful to seeure for themselves a favourable *status possidendi* with regard to their allies, and to oeeupy distriets whieh eould be made to yield rieh returns to the German treasury and the German traders.

In the early days of August, 1914, a distinguished Russian Pole and his wife, whom the outbreak of the war had caught in Posen, were making their way with the help of borrowed passports through Eastern Germany. They expected the war-fever only to have sharpened the inveterate German hatred of Poles, and therefore, anxious as they were to avoid any kind of ineident, were eareful not to be heard talking Polish. Suddenly at some station, a Prussian offieer who shared their railway compartment, put his head through the window and shouted out to some fellow offieer in frightfully broken Polish: "How do you do, kind folk? We are eoming to liberate you!"

Whilst German offieers were thus praetising the phrase whieh was meant to win them the hearts of the Poles, a detaehment of their troops under Major Preusker entered the town ef Kalish; and, to use a historie phrase,

"it therefore was soon ablaze.' * Some 30,000 of its inhabitants scattered through Poland, a living evidence of the frightful fate of their homes. After that many a Polish peasant answered the prescribed greeting of the German officers by muttering some grim question about Kalish, and, whilst bowing deep in feigned reverence, followed it up by unrepeatable curses, naturally incomprehensible to the new Polish "scholars" of the German army. The moral effect produced by the catastrophe of Kalish frightened the Germans themselves, and a certain measure of restraint was imposed on the commanders. Even then German officers and soldiers continued to rob and steal, churches were desecrated, acts of gratuitous vandalism were committed (the destruction of the ethnographic museum at Lovitch may be quoted as an example). Nevertheless it is true to say that during the first offensive in October, 1914, a definite attempt was made by the Germans to conciliate the Polish population. Foremost in these endeavours was the politician General von Liebert, the first German governor of Lodz. In the past a well-known enemy of the Poles, he discharged his new duties with considerable tact and honesty. Most of all, he earned the thanks of the local population by confining his interference within the real limits of the military requirements, and by not obstructing the self-help and autonomous activities in his district. Conditions were difficult, as they are bound to be in an invaded country, but as yet not unbearable.

Then came the German retreat to the west and the second invasion of Poland. The new German rule began with the note of displeasure and disappointment; the Poles had not risen in their support. The old propaganda tricks were dropped, and the doctrine was now openly avowed that Poland was enemy-country (*Feindesland*), and that it had to be treated accordingly. Henceforth no Polish social activity, no self-government was tolerated except in so far as it served the convenience of the German army and administration. A complicated system was established of a partly military and partly civilian government. The supreme master in the country was naturally Field-Marshal von Hindenburg, the *Oberbefehlshaber Ost* (Chief Commander in the East). It was by his order that, in January 1915, was formed the "Imperial German Civilian Administration for Russian Poland." † At first Posen was chosen for its headquarters, and even when a few months later it migrated to the province which it was to administer, its seat was fixed in the border town of Kalish, from where it was by no means easy to communicate with the different parts of the country. The civilian administration was therefore unable to develop the full measure of its activity until after its transfer to the conquered capital of Warsaw. German civilian officials, called *Kreischefs*, were placed at the head of the provincial districts, nominally responsible to the civilian administration, but in reality bound hand and foot by the orders of the Army Command. The district of Lodz, the most important industrial area in the whole

* Kalish was bombarded and burnt between August 4–8, 1914. Destruction was in those days, in Poland as in Belgium, the approved German method of dealing with towns in which any assault against German soldiers was alleged to have occurred. Here is a typical army order: "Houses or blocks from which shots are fired at German soldiers will be instantly blown up or razed. Not even women or children will be allowed to leave those houses." (Signed) COLONEL ZOLLERN. (Dated) Tchenstochova, August 6, 1914.

† When the Germans resumed their advance into Poland, in June, 1915, its name was changed to "Imperial German Civilian Administration for Poland, on the Left Bank of the Vistula" (*links der Weichsel*).

country. was entrusted to a *Polizei-Präsident* (President of the Police); Herr von Oppen, a member of the Diplomatic Corps, not an administrative bureaucrat, was appointed to that important post. Lodz was also made the headquarters of a number of departments directly dependent on the Army Command (thus, *e.g.*, the railway-administration, the censorship and press bureau, etc.). It became the real centre of German official and military opinion, and the *Kindergarten* for the future government of a much wider province. It was here that the policy of the German administration in Poland was evolved and settled, and that its first experiments were tried.

GENERAL VON ETZDORFF,
German Governor of Warsaw.

The new rulers of Poland were taken almost without exception from the ranks of the Prussian bureaucracy, as some of them used to insist with pride and pleasure. Administrative reasons demanded that the bureaucratic personnel sent to Russian Poland should have some knowledge of Polish conditions; this was naturally to be found only in the eastern provinces of Prussia, in the so-called *Ostmarken* (Eastern Marches). The officials in these districts belonged, however, to a quite peculiar category—their main tradition was hostility to everything Polish. For years they had been trained to fight the "Polish peril," and were rewarded for efficiency in repressing any signs of national life and ambitions among the Poles. They were permeated with hatred and contempt for Poland and the Poles.

It was from among these champions of the *Drang nach Osten*—the German advance pressing eastwards—that the Chief of the Civilian Administration, Dr. von Kries, his assistant Herr von Born-Fallois, and the whole host of minor officials, were chosen. Assurances were given from Berlin in the matter of regulations issued to them; after the fall of Warsaw, Herr von Delbrück, the German Minister of the Interior, whilst on a visit to the Polish capital, personally lectured the Prussian officials on their attitude towards the native population. All this proved of no avail. Insulting expressions continued to be freely used by the Germans in their official dealings; *Polnische Schweine* (Polish swine) became a household word. Women of the upper classes were insulted; Major Schultz, Commander of Sosnovicts, actually used his riding-whip on Polish faces. The German Town-Chief of Zgiezh, bearing the attractive name of Stübl, made a regular practice of slapping people in the face; he inflicted this treatment, for instance, upon a woman in a baker's shop because she did not know the exchange of mark and rouble, fixed by the German authorities! * The host of minor German clerks, N.C.O.'s, etc., naturally followed the example of their superiors, and the "smart" Prussian manner could be seen everywhere in full éclat.†

Then negligence, the usual companion of arbitrary and irresponsible power, soon became a marked feature of the German management of local affairs in Poland; only where the interests of the Fatherland and of the German army were concerned did the Prussian officials maintain the high level of efficiency exacted from them at home. Yet, as payment for all

* Later on Herr Stübl came to grief owing to a "most regrettable mistake." A dog barked at him in the street; he therefore gave a beating to its owner. The owner retaliated. He happened to be the local German manufacturer, Herr Hoffmann. Herr Stübl had him arrested, together with his whole family, and, having him properly bound, tried once more his strength on him. The incident caused violent indignation in the local German colony, and as they were Germans, Herr Stübl's brilliant official career came to a premature end.

† The well-known Styrian novelist R. H. Bartsch, a captain in the Austro-Hungarian army, was sent as an official reporter to Germany. He visited also the "occupied districts" and saw some samples of Prussian *Schneidigkeit* (military smartness). In a letter to the Viennese *Neuesh Wiener Tageblatt* he describes how his criticism of the insolent behaviour of a Prussian officer was answered with the remark that this man was prepared at any moment to lay down his life for his country. "Thereupon I replied: 'I know and appreciate that. But however great a hero he may be, he can never kill even one-tenth of the enemies which his manners create for his Fatherland.' . . . I should like to see it calculated how much blood has flowed, simply because that smartness has become fashionable! It would make a ghastly account . . ."

ENEMY TROOPS ENTERING A POLISH VILLAGE.
The inhabitants have to take off their hats to a detachment of Austrian cavalry.

their brutality and indolence, the bureaueratic army of oeeupation exacted a heavy tribute. As was pointed out in the German Reichstag on May 20, 1916, by the Socialist Herr Stücklen, the German officials in Russian Poland, though not exposed to any particular dangers, were paid twiee the salaries whieh they would have reeeived at home. His demand for a reduction of that unjustified expenditure was answered by the Under-Seeretary, Dr. Lewald, with the statement that "not a single penny is paid by the German Empire for the administration of the occupied districts. These districts themselves have to raise the necessary sums. . . ."

In these circumstances the chief desire and eoneern of the local population was to restrict their dealings with the German offieials to a minimum, and to settle by themselves and among themselves their own affairs. And indeed the Germans were quite willing to

allow this within certain strictly defined limits. The one thing which they could never admit was the establishment of a co-ordinated system of self-governing bodies acting independently of the German authorities—in short, anything which might have suggested the idea of Polish autonomy and government. A certain semblance of corporate action and of government by consent was nevertheless welcome to the Germans. It was more convenient to exact from towns and districts the performance of services required by the German army and administration, and to burden them with the execution of works of military value, than to

POLISH REFUGEES.
A family leaving a town just before the arrival of German troops.

have to transact business with an unorganized crowd. "Where there is nothing, even the Emperor forfeits his claim," says an old German proverb. This is true with regard to individuals, but corporations can be made to mortgage their future. Polish towns and districts, where nothing more could have been raised by taxation or even confiscation, were made to undertake costly works of strategic importance on money borrowed in Germany—clearly the raising of loans was a transaction which could not have been undertaken without some appearance of representative government. Thus—*e.g.*, in 1915–1916, whilst the expenditure of the City of Warsaw exceeded *five to six times* its income, it had to spend between August 5, 1915, and March 14, 1916, on executing the orders of the German administration, practically its entire revenue. Finally, once the country had been thoroughly stripped of all resources and foodstuffs, it was advantageous to have local bodies to take charge of the starving population, beg for help in foreign countries, search for food among neutral neighbours, and clamour for the relaxation of embargoes and blockades—and as their desperate efforts were bearing fruit, the Germans could start again the work of spoliation.

At the time of the new Austro-German advance in the summer of 1915, Russian Poland, and especially the Government of Warsaw, was covered by a network of Citizens' Committees, presided over by the Central Committee at Warsaw, and developing a most energetic and beneficial relief activity. On the evacuation of Poland by the Russians, these Committees had naturally to take over certain government functions, if only to prevent the country from being plunged into anarchy. Hardly had the Prussian bureaucracy had time to settle in the newly occupied territory, when the Central Citizens' Committee and all the local committees (with the exception of that of the City of Warsaw) were dissolved by an order of the new Governor-General of Warsaw,* von Beseler, dated September 12, 1915. The explanation given was that the Central Committee had undertaken "political action" by appointing judges; by raising taxes; and by organizing police forces and issuing permissions to carry arms. "The organization of relief-action passes therefore entirely into the hands of the German administration. . . ."

The results of the dissolution of the Citizens' Committees were catastrophical. In the Government of Warsaw alone it entailed the closing of 20 hospitals and 30 dispensaries, the stopping of sanitary and hygienic action (*e.g.*, vaccination); the closing of some 100 centres of food-distribution,

* During the first month after the fall of Warsaw, the German commanders and governors changed in quick succession. The first military commander of Warsaw was General Baron von Scheffer-Boyadel, the first governor General Gereke. After some ten days the latter was succeeded by General von Etzdorff. In the final settlement of the Government, General von Beseler became Governor-General of Poland under German occupation, General von Etzdorff remained Governor of Warsaw, Herr von Glasenapp became police-president of Warsaw, whilst Dr. von Kries and Herr von Born-Fallois retained their places at the head of the German Civilian Administration.

POLISH REFUGEES.
Inhabitants leaving a town in Poland before the German occupation.

some 150 tea-houses, and about 200 wholesale provision shops; of a refugee bureau helping about 8,000 people; of 300 schools, and many libraries and halls. Eleven inspectorates of civic police and about 6,000 special constables were prevented from discharging their duties, thus leaving many districts practically without any police protection. All work undertaken by the committees on the reconstruction of destroyed towns and villages came to an abrupt end.

The German "relief-action," which in the autumn of 1915 was to replace the work of the Citizens' Committees, consisted, as will be shown further on, mainly in the issuing of regulations for the trade in foodstuffs; these regulations were designed in such a manner as to enable the Germans to export considerable amounts of food from Poland, whilst taxing the population most heavily on whatever was left for local consumption. The misery in the country was growing rapidly; the death rate in Warsaw—which was by no means worst off—rose between August and October, 1915, from 15·88 to 34 pro mill. (calculated by the year), while in some provincial towns conditions were even worse. At last, in December, 1915, the German authorities allowed the reconstitution of the Committees under a new name, and with a very strict limitation of their work to purely philanthropic action. However, even in this domain conflicts could not be avoided; thus, *e.g.*, in April, 1916, all the members of the Food Section handed in their resignation, because the German officials, besides hampering their work, took it upon themselves to sign with the name of the Section

INHABITANTS LINED UP TO RECEIVE BREAD RATIONS.

orders relating to food questions which the Section had definitely refused to accept.

Early in 1916 the Government-General of Warsaw published an order which created a kind of "councils" for 20 districts of Western Poland. Their competence was to include poor relief, the care of roads, and payments towards the building of new railways (*i.e.*, those required for military purposes), public health (in so far as the stamping out and prevention of epidemics which might have spread to the German Army were concerned, the Germans did very good work, sometimes in a grimly humorous manner); * lastly, "other economic affairs." The executive power of the district council was vested in the German *Kreischef* and the officials appointed by him. The council itself was to consist of the *Kreischef* and twelve to twenty-four members. These "are elected by the inhabitants; the franchise is to be determined by the Governor-General; the life of the council covers six years. The members of the *first* council, however, or their successors in case of vacancies, *will be appointed by the Chief of the Civilian Administration. . . .*" A bigger farce of "representative" government could hardly have been enacted.

Towards the end of November, 1915, articles on German administration in Russian Poland were published in different German papers. They resembled one another to a remarkable extent—*e.g.*, concerning the establishment of jurisdiction after the withdrawal of the Russian armies and administration they told the same lie in very similar words. There were three degrees of jurisdiction in Russian Poland, of which the lowest—the offices of justices of peace and magistrates—were filled by local citizens, the two higher degrees by professional judges. These judges, being Russian officials, left with the Russian armies. According to the German Press, the local barristers then refused to fill their places "for fear of a return of the

* The following is an authentic story: On entering the town of Lovitch the German commander summoned the local notables and told them that unless the town was properly clean by the next day he would have them all shot. They knew that he meant what he said, and took good care to save their lives. On the next day the commander assured them that had they failed to clean the town he would have gone on appointing and court-martialling the "cleaning committees" until the desired effect was reached.

In April, 1916, an Order was published by the German authorities in Lodz for the arrest of all dirty and ragged people covered with vermin. They were to be properly cleaned—but at their own expense. For this purpose they were to be kept at forced labour until they had compensated the authorities for the expense of the operation.

Russians," * and thus through *their* fault the entire judicial system was upset, until German judges were brought to fill the empty seats of justice. This statement, incredible in itself, stands in glaring contradiction to the fact that one of the reasons given for the dissolution of the Citizens' Committees by the Germans, had been their attempt to appoint judges. But from the earlier history of the judicial system under the German administration, and the regulations then introduced, can be got a full explanation of the refusal of Polish barristers to take a share in jurisdiction.

At first the administration of the law, in so far as it was not affected by the military government, was left in the hands of the citizens themselves. Suddenly, in March, 1915, without any apparent reason, the German administration published a new Order to operate from April 1. In the local courts the law, procedure, and language remained unchanged; but only for the time being, and for practical reasons, the remark being added: "If all the parties in the local court speak German, the case ought to be carried on in German." Into the higher courts the German language and procedure were introduced. The new organization of the jurisdiction, framed haphazard by the German bureaucracy, without any consultation with the lawyers of Russian Poland, and without any regard to the traditions and needs of the country, produced indignation among the Poles. It was a political *coup d'état*, which imposed on Poland the German language as official, introduced German officials and German procedure, fixed the Supreme Court outside the borders of the country (at Posen), and finally superseded the practice which had lasted for more than a century by which the Code Napoleon was binding.† From the point of view of law it was absurd, for the procedure was now mixed so that a case was judged in the first instance according to the procedure of Russian Poland, but in the second instance according to the German procedure.

* Max Wiessner, in the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, November 23, 1915: "The work in the higher courts had come to a standstill. . . . An attempt was made to get barristers to accept the places; these refused, perhaps because they were afraid that they might have to suffer if the Russians returned."

Paul Harms, in the *Berliner Tageblatt*, November 25, 1915: "Difficulties arose in the higher courts. . . . The attempt to fill the places with Polish lawyers failed in view of their refusal: they were evidently afraid of the possible consequences in the case if the Russians returned."

Paul Lensch (a German Socialist), in the Vienna *Arbeiter-Zeitung* of November 30, 1915: ". . . No officials, no police, no judges. . . . And the Poles frequently refused co-operation, because they were still counting upon a return of the Russians. . . ."

† The Code Napoleon in Russian Poland is a survival of the Napoleonic Grand-Duchy of Warsaw.

THE CONTENTS OF A POLISH CHURCH THROWN OUT AND DESTROYED BY THE GERMANS.

POLISH REFUGEES AT A GERMAN QUARANTINE STATION.

In certain districts the German authorities called upon the Polish lawyers to take part in the organization of the jurisdiction, which was to be based on the principles given above; naturally they met with a refusal. The barristers pointed out the defects of the new Order with regard to the law; they showed that it did not fit the political conditions and protested against the introduction of a Germanizing principle into the jurisdiction. They also emphasized the fact that the population itself was quite capable of undertaking the care of the law, and that the barristers, as citizens of Poland, would not assist in the work of Germanization. This attitude of the local barristers gave rise to all kinds of oppression by the authorities. Contributions were imposed on towns (Lodz, Sosnoviets, Bendzin) under the pretext that the money was needed for the importation of German officials; in certain places the barristers were deprived of the right of practising. At Lodz, the President of the Police, Herr von Oppen, having met with a sharp criticism of the new arrangement on the part of the lawyers, demanded from the legal section of the Citizens' Committee that within 24 hours judges be supplied to act under the new system (of course, only for the courts of the first instance). In case of refusal he threatened severe reprisals against the town and the lawyers; naturally, under these circumstances, the only possible answer was a categorical refusal. He then imposed a contribution on the city and closed the law courts. Not even pending cases were allowed to be concluded. The barristers were deprived of the right of practising in the German courts. At the doors of the chambers of the barristers of Lodz appeared the compulsory notice of refusal to accept any cases, whereas new plates appeared at the doors of unqualified clerks of doubtful standing. In case of contravention of the German prohibition, the barristers of Lodz were threatened with internment in a German camp for civilian prisoners; one actually suffered that penalty. In a city with a population of 500,000 inhabitants jurisdiction was suspended for two months. When, at last, German courts were opened, different tricks were invented in order to keep away the parties (*e.g.*, fees were exacted beforehand). As a matter of fact these precautions were unnecessary: the German officials who were brought to preside in those courts showed such exemplary inefficiency and such terrifying ignorance of conditions, that the population did all it could to avoid having its business brought before the judges. But the Germans claim that it was they who introduced law and order into Russian Poland.

Mutatis mutandis the history of the law courts of Lodz is also that of the Warsaw tribunals and of the jurisdiction in other parts of the country. A few significant passages may be quoted from papers appearing under Austrian or German censorship. The *Nowa Reforma* (Cracow) stated under

date of November 1, 1915, that a meeting of Warsaw lawyers took place on October 28. "H. Konic was in the chair. After heated discussions which lasted from 10 a.m. till after midnight a vote was taken at 1 a.m. on the question whether Polish lawyers are to act as justices of peace in the courts." (Here follow six lines suppressed by the Austrian censor.) The question was decided in the negative. On November 18, M. H. Konic was deported to Germany. Herr Wiessner, in his eulogy of the German administration in the *Frankfurter Zeitung* of November 23, stated that "even barristers had to be summoned from Germany." The reader can guess by himself the other parts of the story.

To the whole world the German Press announced the news of the reopening of the Polish University at Warsaw—the rest was silence. And yet it is the question of primary and secondary education which is the most important from the national point of view, for they, and not the University, concern the wide masses of the population most intimately, and even in the life of the comparatively few chosen, cover the decisive, formative period.

In Warsaw, on the retreat of the Russians, the care for education devolved on the Citizens' Committee. This body immediately formed a Board of Education, consisting of four of the most prominent citizens of Warsaw, two Poles and two Jews. It was then reinforced by technical experts, and the four religious bodies (Roman Catholic, Jewish, Lutheran and Calvinist) were invited to select representatives. On August 23, 1915, on the motion of the Board, compulsory primary education was decided upon by the Citizens' Committee, and however bad was the financial condition of the city, a credit of £182,700 was voted for education. Meantime the work on primary and secondary schools. and even on kindergartens, was carried on.

Then came the unavoidable intervention of the German authorities. Field-Marshal von Hindenburg appeared in the new role of an educationalist. In an Order published from Headquarters on August 24, 1915, he laid down the law for school organization and educational policy in Poland under German occupation. No new school boards were to be formed, no schools were to be founded, no teachers appointed without the consent of the German authorities. Teachers in primary schools are appointed and may be removed by the German *Kreischefs*. All books used in schools require the sanction of the German administration. A

HERR DELBRÜCK, (×) German Imperial Minister of the Interior, and HERR VON LÖBELL, Prussian Minister of the Interior, on a tour of inspection in Russian Poland.

distinction was made between schools on a basis of nationality and confession. There were to be (1) German, (2) Jewish, and (3) Polish schools. All Protestant schools were classed as German. In all German and Jewish elementary schools the language of instruction was to be German: in the Polish schools, Polish; but in these German was to be taught in the higher forms.

A more flagrant attempt at enforced Germanization and the sowing of internal dissension among the population of Poland could have hardly been made. Many of the Protestants in Poland are of German extraction, but the greater part even of these are no more German than the Brandenburg Huguenots are French. Although a certain small group of the Jewish upper classes in Poland have become Polonised, the great mass of the Jews in Poland forms undoubtedly a nation in itself, owing to race, traditions, culture and language. Yet if their language is not to be Polish (which in itself would hardly destroy their separate nationality), it can be only Yiddish or Hebrew—never German.

As the result of a most vigorous protest on the part of the Jewish community of Warsaw against the introduction of German into its schools, the German administration allowed Polish to remain the language of instruction in Jewish schools in which it had been taught before the publication of the Order of August 24, 1915. The Jewish community answered with a new memorandum pointing out that ignorance of the Polish language is for the Jews a serious handicap in professional life; that the peaceful intercourse of Poles and Jews requires that the Jews should learn Polish; that they wish to do so; and therefore ask that Polish should be the language of

THE REGISTRATION OF CATTLE.

Peasant farmers registering the number of cows and horses preparatory to having them commandeered by the German military authority.

GERMAN RULE IN POLAND.
Inhabitants of a Polish town drawn up for registration.

instruction in their schools. Even the Zionists and the Jewish workmen's organizations, whilst petitioning for Hebrew and Yiddish as the languages of instruction, demanded that Polish also should be taught in the Jewish schools. All petitions proved of little use. Whilst proposing to establish a new Ghetto for the Polish Jews and developing plans to prevent their immigration into Germany (*Grenzsperre*), the German authorities were determined to Germanize them in Poland; *divide et impera*.

Similarly the Protestant community of Warsaw petitioned against the Germanization of its schools. In a memorandum to the Civilian Administration they pointed out that the Protestants in Poland must not be identified with German nationality; that according to the estimates made in 1907 by the Superintendent-General of the Protestant community of Warsaw, out of 20,000 members at the utmost 6,000 were Germans; that the percentage was now even less, as most of the German Protestants had been removed by the Russians from the war-zone, etc. All these arguments naturally fell on deaf ears.

But even the Polish schools had not yet seen the end of their troubles. Hindenburg's Order of August 24, 1915, was merely the starting point of a long series of measures, some general, others local, but all aiming at the same object: to withdraw the elementary schools from the control of the Polish Board of Education, and to put them under German supervision. These different, particular injunctions were codified in an Order of Dr. von Kries, dated October 3, 1915, and stating that the only competent authorities in school matters in Poland under German occupation would be henceforth the German Board of Education, which will issue orders concerning the plan of teaching, the books to be used, and the entire organization of schools. Thereupon, on October 29, Prince Z. Lubomirski, in the name of the Citizens' Committee, presented a memorandum to Governor-General von Beseler arguing that the only proper authority for issuing these regulations is the Polish Board of Education which is anyhow subject to German control. "Let the German authorities leave to the Polish nation the education of its children, and the teaching of adults. No one will do it better for us than we can ourselves."

No attention was paid to the memorandum; petty oppression and senseless interference even in the smallest details continued as before. The host of overpaid German officials * was desirous to establish its absolute authority over Polish education, and every day brought some new Germanizing innovations (thus—*e.g.*, contrary to Hindenburg's Order of August 24, an attempt was made to introduce the teaching

* Men without any knowledge of Polish conditions or even of the Polish language were put in charge of Polish education. The chief of the German Board was Prof. Dr. Herold, from Düsseldorf; under him Herren Schauenburg, Thaer and Müller, of whom only one understood Polish. The school-inspectors were all either Germans (Fratske, Grühn, Otto, etc.) or Germanized Slavs, as is shown by the spelling of their names (Sakobielsky, Szumansky, Jendruschke, Datschko, Cebulka, etc.).

MILITARY COURT-MARTIAL.
A Russian soldier charged with espionage.

of German even into the lowest forms of the Polish schools). On November 17, 1915, the Citizens' Committee of Warsaw addressed to the German authorities a second memorandum. It deals in a most dignified manner with a number of questions arising out of the German interference,* and concludes with the following summary :

" 1. The issuing of new Orders by the German authorities is a denial of our natural rights, and of rights which we claim in the name of our culture.

" 2. The Orders issued are contrary to our needs.

" 3. In view of the local pedagogical needs, the teaching of a foreign language (German) is out of place."

" Having considered the Memorandum of the Citizens Committee," began General von Beseler's reply, " I am compelled in view of its tenor to refuse an answer. It entirely ignores the position which becomes the Citizens' Committee in relations with a Power of occupation."

Matters were clearly driving towards a crisis. Herr von Glasenapp, Police-President of Warsaw, forbade members of the Board to visit schools or assist at the examinations of teachers. The Board, seeing itself deprived one by one of all its rights, decided to dissolve. Prince Lubomirski tried to plead with the German authorities ; it was useless. In the last days of January, 1916, the Warsaw Board of Education closed its activities in view of the impossibility of cooperating with the German authorities.

Very similar was the fate of the Polish schools in other parts of the country under German administration. It will be sufficient to quote but one fact : that in November, 1915, all the Polish town councillors of Lodz voted against the grants of money for education " as under the conditions created by Herr Sakobielsky (the German school inspector) all work seems hopeless."

But what about the famous University and Technical High School opened at Warsaw by the Germans ? Some light is thrown on that subject by an interview with Father Gralewski, one of the most prominent members of the Polish Board of Education at Warsaw, published in the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* of March 20, 1916. " The German authorities refused to let the Board bear the expenses of establishing and maintaining the High Schools, and agreed to their establishment only on the express condition that they should be maintained by the German authorities. ' The Germans,' said Father Gralewski, ' in founding these High Schools, were playing a political game, whereas we Poles saw in them a place of learning.' "

In all countries the censorship secured for itself during the war a place in history by its unconscious humour and exotic enterprise. Yet none can dispute the first place to the German censorship in Poland. We pass over the things which it suppressed or deleted, the corrections which it prescribed—sometimes even in poetry—its standing orders concerning " things not to be mentioned," etc. It was all done under the expert guidance of Geheimrat Herr Georg Cleinow, the author of several books on Poland and Polish history, notorious for their hostile bias against the Poles. Yet more interesting than his literary activities were his business dealings.

From the very outset of his career as chief censor at Lodz he knew how to combine this office with the part of a newspaper proprietor. He spoke in all the languages ; he founded, ran, or supported newspapers in Polish, German and

* Of special interest is the point concerning the preparation of a school map for Poland. " We have not been summoned," says the memorandum, " to assist in the work of drafting a map of our country, the *whole* of which we know. Who will decide for us where Poland begins and where it ends, since it has hitherto remained partitioned ? The Polish nation enters a firm and categorical protest against the fixing of the borders of Poland by the authorities of occupation of one State before the conclusion of the war, in which so many States take part."

Yiddish * ; he claimed to voice the thoughts of every nationality. Could anyone have been a more fit censor to control their thoughts in less authoritative publications ? Anyhow, his papers were the best ; they always knew everything first (at Warsaw the censor's office closed at 6 p.m., so that only the censor's papers could publish the freshest news). Then the supply of paper gave rise to anxiety to other editors · not to the censor and newspaper owner in one person. The providential German *Pressewaltung* (Press administration) took the trade in printing paper into its own hands, fixed its price at £275 for the wagon, and refused to sell it in smaller quantities. In 1916 it even started to ration papers. But even that was not yet the worst. Distribution by mail was refused to independent papers. And finally, however much they were muzzled and curtailed, no Polish papers were allowed to leave the country under German occupation. They were not to carry through the world the news of German oppression, economic spoliation and financial exactions, the marks of which it was almost impossible to remove altogether from the daily news of local events.

It was through other channels that the truth of the situation was made known to the world. Articles which kept appearing periodically in *The Times* unfolded a picture of barefaced robbery and endless suffering such as could hardly have been accepted as true, had not each assertion been supported by data and facts, none of which was ever disproved, or even seriously challenged, by any German statesman or writer.

The economic exploitation of Poland by the Germans assumed every possible form of spoliation. Money was extorted by means of crushingly heavy taxes, contributions, fines, fees, excise duties, fiscal monopolies, and enforced fraudulent money exchanges. The material resources of the country were sucked dry by the confiscation and requisitioning of foodstuffs, cattle, raw materials, and machinery, and by the devastation of forests—in short, by the carrying away of everything which it was possible to remove. Commercially, Poland was ruined by the deliberate immobilization of its industries, by most unfair forms of prefer-

* Especially interesting is the story of the daily paper, *Godzina Polska*, which started publication at Lodz at the New Year of 1916. By misrepresentations its editor obtained from different distinguished Polish writers the promise of cooperation. When they became aware of the true situation they tried to withdraw their names, but the censorship did not allow their letters to be printed. It also suppressed the letter of M. C. X. Jankowski denying in terms in no way offensive to the paper the news that he was going to act as its secretary.

A POLISH FAMILY, WITH ALL THEIR WORLDLY BELONGINGS, STRANDED BY THE WAYSIDE.

ence conceded to German traders, and by commercial monopolies created in their favour. Finally, labour which might have been employed in the reconstruction of the country devastated by the war, had only the necessary materials been spared from German requisitions, was made to serve the German strategic needs, wherever an opportunity arose; and where it could not be employed locally for German aims, an organized attempt was made to carry it away to Germany for the use of German industries, to work under conditions amounting practically to indenture.

German spoliation began with the requisitioning of food, cattle, and raw materials.

GENERAL VON BESELER.

For weeks in the autumn of 1914 thousands of German wagons were carrying off from Poland the grain, potatoes, etc., which had been commandeered. Early in 1915 an Order was published forbidding private trade in grain, flour, and other country produce between different districts of Poland under German occupation, and the sole right of trading in them was vested in a German Import Company, the notorious *Wareneinfuhr-Gesellschaft*. Field-Marshal von Hindenburg was closely connected with it, and it was he who arbitrarily fixed the prices at which the monopoly bought and sold foodstuffs in Russian Poland. Thus the fact was quoted at a meeting of the Town Council of Lodz, in November 1915, that the Import Company was paying $7\frac{1}{2}$ roubles for 1 cwt. of rye, when it bought it in the districts of Russian Poland under German occupation, but charged at Lodz 23 roubles for a bag of "war flour" which contained hardly 40 per cent. of the 1 cwt. of rye. Herr Schoppen, a German official, pointed out in reply to the above statement that the German authorities at Lodz were unable to do anything in the matter, as these prices had been fixed by Field-Marshal von Hindenburg. Under these circumstances it was but natural if the Import Company yielded a profit of over 140 per cent., and if the death-rate in Russian Poland rose in proportion to its profits.

Agriculture itself was crippled by the frightful robberies which the German armies had committed on occupying the country. The Austro-Hungarian Governor of the District of Lublin, Major-General Anton Madziara, said to Herr Max Winter, correspondent of the Viennese *Arbeiter-Zeitung*: "In the eastern parts (of the district of Lublin) work in the fields is badly done, chiefly *because the Germans on their advance carried away all that could be removed.* The scarcity of animals for draft purposes is especially bad. I know a landowner who has 500 acres of land to till, but is left with only 6 horses and 3 cows. . . ." * Yet in spite of the reduced productivity of agriculture in 1915, the Germans continued their work of spoliation. The whole new harvest was requisitioned, and again thousands of wagons of grain and millions of quintals of potatoes from Poland found their way into Germany. On January 15, 1916, in the German Reichstag, General von Wandel, Deputy-Minister of War, was able to speak with pride of the work of the military "economic committees"; it was due to their skill and "untiring activity . . . that large stocks, which have made it easier for us to feed our people, have been brought from the occupied territories into Germany." He might also have added a word about the cheapness of those imports. Whilst the price for potatoes fixed by the authorities in Germany amounted to $2\frac{3}{4}$ marks a quintal, and according to the *Frankfurter Zeitung* oscillated in reality between 3 and $3\frac{1}{2}$ marks, in Poland only $1\frac{1}{4}$ mark was paid for the quintal of sequestrated potatoes.

The amount of foodstuffs available for local consumption in Russian Poland was shrinking

* *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, March 5, 1916, p. 7. The eastern parts of the district lay on the "war-path" of Mackensen, the western were crossed by the Fourth Austro-Hungarian Army under Archduke Joseph Ferdinand. An editorial footnote to this article states that it had been heavily censored. What must have been its original disclosures, if the statement quoted above was passed by the censor!



WORKING FOR THE GERMAN ARMY.
Bridge across the Nareff, at Pultusk, burnt by the Russians during their retreat. Smaller picture: The construction of a temporary bridge.

constantly. Bread and flour tickets were introduced in Warsaw a few weeks after its occupation by the German armies. At first the *per capita* quantities were fixed at 205 grammes (about 7 oz.) of bread a day, and 205 grammes of flour a week, or 24,000 cwt. of flour a week for Warsaw. On November 1 the amount was reduced to 20,000 cwt., on December 10 to 18,000 cwt.—*i.e.*, far below the rations allotted in Germany, where the population was much less dependent on farinaceous foodstuffs for its nourishment. In the course of February the allotted quantities were still further reduced by one-fourth. Moreover, a monopoly in meat was introduced, the maximum number of cattle to be slaughtered in a town of a million inhabitants being fixed at 800 a week, a quantity wholly insufficient, considering that the consumption of mutton in Poland is small, and that most of the Jews, who form more than one-third of the population of Warsaw, do not eat pork. That, in spite of the ever-growing scarcity of foodstuffs in Russian Poland and of the hypocritical cries for relief which German agents were raising abroad, the export of foodstuffs from Poland to Germany continued is best shown by Art. 6 of the Memorandum presented by the Central Council of the Relief-Committees (the reconstituted Citizens' Committees) to Dr. von Kries early in February, 1916. It runs as follows: "That foodstuffs requisitioned by the German authorities should not be taken out of the country, but handed over at cost price to the local relief organizations." Were these likely to ask for things which were already actually done, or to petition against non-existing abuses?

From the very beginning the Germans proceeded to requisition all raw materials which could be of use to their own industries. The whole stock of oil, leather, sulphur, iron, and finally the entire store of wool and cotton was

BEWARE OF CHOLERA.

How the Germans warned their troops newly arriving in an infected town in Russian Poland.

carried away from the Polish factories—*e.g.*, in the factories of the district of Lodz alone, according to the most modest calculations, wool and cotton had been requisitioned to a value exceeding considerably £5,000,000. Not even their machinery was spared : the factories were crippled, if not ruined, for many years to come. The prices for the requisitioned materials were fixed in a most arbitrary fashion, but always so as to favour the German buyers ; thus the valuation of cotton was made on the basis of the *pre-war* price at Bremen—although the price had more than doubled since then ; not even freights and custom dues, which had originally been paid on it by the Lodz manufacturers, were considered. Out of the sum thus acknowledged as due to them, the German Government first of all paid claims of German firms against the Lodz manufacturers, and then promised to pay out the remainder to the owners three months after the conclusion of peace. A similar procedure was applied also in other districts, whilst the list of things requisitioned or to be given up to the German authorities was growing every month—contraventions of these orders being punishable with a fine not exceeding £500, or imprisonment up to five years. Meantime, a true *furor Teutonicus* was shown in the work of devastating the forests of Poland.

By May, 1916, hardly any form of textile, metal, or wooden goods could be manufactured in Poland. Similarly, most of the corn mills, alcohol distilleries, breweries, starch factories, etc., had to stop work for lack of raw materials, though these had always been produced in the country itself. By 1916 Poland, a great sugar-exporting country, could no longer cover even one-fourth of its own normal consumption. Out of 54 sugar refineries, 13 had been destroyed ; 11 were in need of repairs, which could not be made as the Germans had carried off the necessary materials ; 15 were unworkable, because the copper or other parts of their machinery had been removed by the Germans, and only 15 were still fit to work, provided they were able to obtain the necessary supply of sugar-beet and auxiliary materials. General unemployment was the natural consequence of this systematic work of destruction carried on by the Germans in Poland. In a memorandum presented to the German authorities in March, 1916, Prince Z. Lubomirski mentioned the fact that, for instance, in the Warsaw industries,

only 10 per eent. of the normal number of workmen were at that time employed, and then proceeded to make the truly pathetic suggestion that in future "the faetory installations, maehinery and tools, and the most indispensable raw and auxiliary materials (*e.g.*, grease) be freed from requisitions and sequestration . . . especially in the ease of those faetories and workshops which use small amounts of raw materials, whilst giving employment to a considerable number of workmen."

But of what use was it to plead in favour of Polish manufaeturers, the competitors of German industry? Time after time the ease had been put before the German rulers of Russian Poland, appeals were made for mercy on the people to whom the measures spelled death from starvation—the answers given by the German officials merely added by their irony insult to injury. On September 25, 1915, the Polish manufaeturers had presented a memorandum to Governor-General von Beseler, asking that maehinery be exempted from requisitions, and only such parts be taken which it was possible to replace; that raw materials be not requisitioned unless needed for the army, and be not eommandeered for the benefit of German manufacturers, etc. General von Beseler's answer was simply this: that the German administration entertained the most friendly feelings towards the local population, though it must eonsider the country hostile territory; that the position of the German industry would be equally diffieult had it not been for the ease with which it readjusted itself to the production of war materials (how eould the Polish industry have done it when it was given neither orders nor materials?); and, finally, he asked that these views should be spread in the eountry.

The conquest of the Polish market for the German industries was organized with remarkable thoroughness. The customs frontier bebetween Poland and Germany was abolished without any period of transition being granted, and freights on the railways were manipulated in such a way as to turn the measure entirely to the advantage of the Germans. The German railway administration contributed in every way it could to the ruin of Polish industries. Speeially ingenious were its devices with regard to eoal; even where the Germans did not introduee a monopoly of it (as Herr von Oppen had done at Lodz, making about £10 profit on each railway truek of eoal), its priee was raised very eonsiderably, and most amazing of all, German coal finished by being cheaper in Poland

THE TYPHUS EPIDEMIC.
A sentry guarding a typhus-stricken house.

than the local output. After the fall of Warsaw an official German Bureau of Commerce was established in Poland to take charge of the interests of German manufacturers and traders. It enjoyed great privileges in the matter of telephones and wires ; its letters passed uncensored ; on the railways its goods were labelled *Amtliche Handelsgüter* (official goods), which insured them priority before all other goods—they were second only to transports required by the army. Special privileges were given to it in the matter of suing for debts. Finally, a regular system of commercial studies (or rather espionage) was organized under its auspices.

Ruined by requisitions, exploited commercially, economically dead, Russian Poland under German administration had to stand the burden of crushing taxation. It assumed every thinkable form. A poll-tax was introduced. A special permit had to be bought for travelling from one district to another. But besides that, every inhabitant above the age of 15 had to buy a passport, which entitled him to nothing. A very heavy tax was introduced on dogs, in towns as well as in the country. Fiscal monopolies were established in alcohol, tobacco, and tea (the sale of " vodka " was reintroduced in Poland, simply in order that German distilleries might be able to grow rich by making spirits out of potatoes robbed from Poland, and that the German State might increase its revenue). The *pre-war* taxes were reintroduced, and even increased. Manufacturers had to pay industrial taxes on idle factories. In 1914 the Russian Government, in view of the general distress, had suspended the payment of certain taxes. In 1915 the Germans insisted on the payment of those arrears ! It is a matter of utter impossibility to go into the details of all these exactions : no sum was too small, no man was too poor, no trick was too dirty for the Germans, if only some profit could be reaped by it. The net result of their fiscal measures can, however, be summed up in one

AN INNOCENT VICTIM.

Sisters and playmates of a six-year-old Polish girl killed by a German bomb, bearing her coffin to the grave.

THE GERMAN BAND IN POLAND.
In a main street, Warsaw, on the occasion of the re-opening of the University by the Germans. Smaller picture: Polish boys compelled by the Germans to act as music-stands.

sentence: about the New Year of 1916 the Germans were drawing from the ravaged, impoverished part of Russian Poland under their occupation, where industries were idle, stocks exhausted, workmen unemployed, the same average monthly revenue which the Russian Government had been deriving from the *entire* country in the prosperous days which preceded the war.

Even volumes would not be sufficient to sum up the results of German economic rule in Poland in terms of human suffering. There is no exaggeration in saying that its population was simply dying off from sickness and starvation. The death-rate more than doubled after three or four months of German occupation; all the efforts of charitable organizations were unable to cope with the appalling misery. "A city of a million inhabitants cannot be fed except by a revival of its own trade activities," wrote Prince Lubomirski in his Memorandum on the economic condition of Warsaw. The same applies to a whole country. The Germans were fully conscious of what they were doing when they ruined the economic life of Russian Poland. It was throughout deliberate murder. "Should ever the British blockade conquer us," once said General von Beseler to a prominent Pole, "you will not see it: you will be dead, all of you, long before that." The British Government, though fully aware that imports of food into Poland from neutral countries must in the long run benefit also its German masters, was still prepared to relax its blockade with regard to Poland, provided the guarantees were given without which it knew that no schemes could relieve the German-created misery in the unhappy country. It demanded that no food should be exported from Poland, either to Germany or to Austria-Hungary, nor be taken for the use of the German armies. But were the Germans to renounce the possibility of direct commandeering in exchange for possible round-about gains (for the misery of the Polish population was never any concern to them)? No; they refused the British offer. Von Beseler was a grim prophet, and knew the mind of his masters.

CHAPTER CXXVIII.

GERMAN AIR RAIDS: FEBRUARY TO MAY, 1916.

NEED OF BETTER METHODS OF DEFENCE—ACTION OF MAYORS OF ENGLISH TOWNS—SUPPLY OF ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS—THE QUESTION OF REPRISALS—SEAPLANE RAIDS—ZEPPELIN RAID OF MARCH 5, 1916—SEAPLANE BROUGHT DOWN BY FLIGHT-COMMANDER BONE—RAID OF MARCH 31—ZEPPELIN WRECKED NEAR THE KNOCK LIGHTSHIP—EXPLOIT OF LIEUTENANT BRANDON—RAIDS OF APRIL 1, 2, AND 5—IMPROVED DEFENCE ARRANGEMENTS—EXTRAVAGANT GERMAN CLAIMS—OTHER RAIDS IN APRIL AND MAY—THE L20 WRECKED IN NORWAY—ZEPPELIN DESTROYED AT SALONIKA.

THE Zeppelin raid on the Midlands on the night of January 31, 1916, followed as it was shortly afterwards by raids on the East Coast of Scotland, aroused the British people to the urgent need of adequate aerial defence. Up to this time there had been a tendency to regard the matter as affecting only limited areas on the East Coast and around London, and as not of great military importance. But when the Zeppelins showed their power to travel so far inland and so far north; and when it was demonstrated that a large part of the country was practically defenceless against this form of attack; even sceptics of yesterday became unwilling converts to the necessity for further preparation.

The Mayors of many parts of the country, led by Mr. Neville Chamberlain, Lord Mayor of Birmingham, strongly urged on Lord French, the Home Office, and the other authorities concerned, the need of better methods of defence. While there was much difference of opinion concerning the best steps to be taken, it was generally felt that no changes would be adequate unless and until the control of the Air services as a whole was placed in the hands of a single Department, presided over by a strong Minister of Cabinet rank.

Many experts strongly supported the plea vigorously and constantly advocated in *The Times* that the only sure method of defence was not to await the attacks of the German aircraft, but to attack them in their own country. The raid of January 31 had shed a strong light on our shortcomings. In many districts when the Zeppelins had flown low there had been no anti-aircraft guns to fire against them. There had been no recognized general system of warning, with the result that the first intimation many localities received of danger was when the Zeppelin bombs exploded in their streets.

Active steps were now taken. The supply of anti-aircraft guns was greatly increased, and their range of efficiency much improved. A system for warning the local authorities was established. The restrictions on public and private lighting already in force in the eastern and south-eastern counties were extended to almost the whole of the central and north-western areas, from Northumberland and Durham to Dorsetshire, Wiltshire, Berkshire, and Bucks.

Some towns took special precautions on their own account, closing factories early and arranging for complete darkness early in the evening. One factory established a listening post, fitted with the latest and most effective type of

WRECK OF THE "L 20" ON THE NORWEGIAN COAST, MAY 3, 1916.

View of the Zeppelin after the vessel broke up. The airship returned from a raid on the North-East Coast, where she had been hit by gunfire, and became a total wreck at Stavanger. Smaller picture: Norwegian soldiers examining portions of the engines.

microphone, by which it was hoped to detect the noise of any aircraft at a distance of 60 or 70 miles. In some parts, immediate notice of the approach of Zeppelins was given by the extinction of the electric light from the supply station. In others, the public were warned by steam whistles or sirens. One great drawback to all systems of public warning was soon found to be that warnings had to be given if hostile aircraft came within 80 or 100 miles, although the aircraft might turn in quite another direction. This produced much unnecessary unrest among private citizens in some East Coast districts. In one place the warning was given for several nights in succession, as soon as hostile aircraft were announced to be on their way to this country. But the hostile aircraft never once came near the place.

The raid on the Midlands led to a renewal of the controversy about the advisability of a policy of reprisals. It was strongly urged in some quarters that when Zeppelin attacks were made on undefended towns in this country our aircraft should in turn attack and destroy towns in Germany. This demand found many distinguished advocates among those who were unaware of the practical difficulties, but was not supported generally. Convocation, on the motion of the Archbishop of Canterbury, passed a resolution to the effect that principles of morality forbade a policy of reprisal which had as a deliberate object the killing or wounding of non-combatants. This view was approved by Sir Evelyn Wood, who maintained that the killing and maiming of non-combatants was an accidental side of the Zeppelin attacks. "The Germans," he wrote, "would not willingly waste one air bomb, after having carried it hundreds of miles, in killing and maiming non-combatants." Professor Sanday also voiced the opposition to reprisals. "It is a strange kind of homeopathy," he wrote, "to suppose that we should check these" (atrocities) "by adding to them."

On the other hand, it was maintained that our first duty was to protect ourselves. "Retaliation may be the only defensive alternative," wrote Lord Dunraven. "Reprisal is a choice among evils of which that is the least as being the surest protection of our own women and children and as a measure which is therefore due to them," maintained Lord Rosebery. Sir

Arthur Conan Doyle took the same line. "Some of these days," he wrote, "there may be a great catastrophe, and then it will be too late for anything but revenge. I claim that this catastrophe may be averted by a public declaration of our intention to hit back, coupled with such preparations as will show that we can do what we threaten."

While the debate about the best methods of defence and the advisability of retaliation was in full progress, the Germans struck again. On Thursday, February 9, two German seaplanes flew over the Isle of Thanet. Thousands of people saw them over Ramsgate shortly before four in the afternoon, and at first they were generally mistaken for British. Two men were arguing whether the aircraft were British or German when their controversy was settled by a bomb falling within a comparatively short distance of them and exploding. One bomb fell on the road close behind a tramway car full of women and children, exploding without doing any damage. The car was pulled up and the passengers alighted without panic. Three more bombs were dropped, but fell in a neighbouring field. The second raider attacked a large girls' school at Broadstairs. Most of the girls were in the playing fields. One bomb, falling through the roof, exploded in an upper storey, doing some damage and causing portions of the ceiling to fall into the room below, where a class of small children was being held. A little girl and a maid were slightly injured. Three other bombs fell in the school grounds. British naval and military aeroplanes went up as quickly as possible in pursuit, and the hostile aircraft at once hurried off. The Germans published later a fanciful account of this raid, claiming that their aircraft had dropped "a number of bombs on the ports and manufacturing establishments as well as the barracks at Ramsgate."

Another seaplane raid of a very similar kind, but on a more extended scale, was made on Sunday, February 20, at Lowestoft and Walmer. Two of the raiders appeared over Lowestoft shortly before the time for morning service. They remained over the south side of the town for a few minutes, attracting people into the streets, and then dropped some bombs. Rising to a great height they disappeared from view, only to return a quarter of an hour later for a short time. In all, seventeen small high explosive bombs were dropped. No one was killed or injured, but several persons had narrow escapes. A bomb struck the roof of one house and penetrated through to the back of the bedroom, but failed to explode. The family were sitting in the kitchen at the time. Another bomb struck the roof of a large house and exploded on the upper floors. A mother and daughter on the ground floor suffered no injury. The explosion of this bomb broke the windows of a Primitive Methodist chapel close by. The chapel was full. The service, which had just



A SEAPLANE ABOUT TO TAKE FLIGHT.

BRITISH NAVAL AIRSHIP.

begun, was stopped and the people quietly left the building.

That same morning two other German seaplanes made for the Kentish coast. One of them passed over the Knock lightship and tried to destroy it with bombs; the other made straight for Walmer, dropped six bombs and immediately turned sharply, making back home. Two seaplanes went up from Dover, but were unable to catch the raiders. Four bombs all fell within a small area. One landed close to a church, blowing in the windows as the congregation were singing the *Te Deum*. One bomb killed a boy who was walking along the roadway and fatally injured a man close to him. Another bomb, falling on the roadway running along the beach, killed one civilian and injured a marine. The total casualties of the raid were two men and one boy killed and one marine wounded.

On March 1 a small, futile raid was again made on the coast of Kent, when a German seaplane passed over a town and dropped several bombs. The only casualty reported on this occasion was caused in a somewhat curious manner. A bomb fell on the back of a dwelling house, destroying the roof and some of the brickwork. A lady who was in the nursery with a baby snatched up the child from the floor and in her excitement dropped it; the infant, falling to the ground, struck and injured its head and died almost immediately afterwards. It was thought that the main purpose of the raider on this occasion was reconnaissance, and that the dropping of bombs on the town was a mere incident in his journey. The French authorities at Dunkirk reported a day or two later that a German seaplane had been picked up three miles north of Middelkerke Bank, having been obliged to descend when returning from England. One of the occupants was drowned and the other taken prisoner. It was the raiding seaplane of that night.

On the evening of the following Sunday, March 5, a Zeppelin raid on a large scale was carried out over a considerable portion of the East Coast, from Kent to Yorkshire, and although no military damage of any description was done, a large number of civilians were killed and injured. A heavy snowstorm was raging at the time. Hitherto, it had been considered impossible for Zeppelins to cross the sea in safety under such conditions, but the Zeppelins now proved that this belief was wrong. They visited Yorkshire, Lincolnshire, Rutland, Huntingdon, Norfolk, Essex, and Kent. There were, so far as could be discovered, three Zeppelins. They made their main attack on a town in Yorkshire. They sent a dozen bombs into a field near Rutland, doing no damage. Apparently they did nothing in four of the counties they passed over. Six bombs were supposed to have fallen in Kent and to have exploded harmlessly in a marshy field, but many careful observers declared that there was no explosion whatever in that county. In one town in Lincolnshire the Zeppelins approached



THE END OF THE ZEPPELIN TRIP TO THE NORFOLK COAST.

The "L 3," wrecked off Fanö, Denmark, February 17, 1915. The crew was interned. The airship came down on her return journey from the English coast.

during the time of church service, and the congregations were informed of their coming from the pulpits. Service was stopped in one church, and the congregation dismissed; in others, services proceeded as usual. The Zeppelins did not arrive until some hours later. A signalman was killed by a fragment of a bomb while moving from his box to a place of shelter. An invalid lady died through heart failure.

In the important city by the East Coast where the main attack was made, the results were much more serious. Two Zeppelins visited this place, dropping in all about twenty-five explosive bombs, and killing—according to the local Member of Parliament—seventeen persons and wounding fifty. Six persons died after the raid, purely of shock, all untouched and uninjured. One large shop was blown to pieces, those immediately opposite were severely shattered, and the roof of a public-house was blown off. Two small fires were started. Large pieces of iron were blown off a gigantic crane. A parish church was badly damaged, the amount of damage being valued at £25,000.

Some of the cases of deaths were very pitiful. In one house alone a woman and her four young children, two boys and two girls, aged eight, six, four and two, were killed, and the father was severely injured. The house was wrecked and the baby boy of two was found dead by his mother's side. When the explosion of bombs was heard, the caretaker of an almshouse hurried round to rouse the inmates and bring some of them out. One old man, 89 years of age, remained in bed. A bomb struck the building and set the room on fire. The caretaker vainly tried to put out the flames with buckets of water. Before the fire brigade could come, the old man was burned to death. A mother left her house with her two children to try to reach a safer place. As they were hurrying along, a bomb burst quite close to them, killing one of the boys. In another house the father and the son had gone to bed, leaving three daughters downstairs. A bomb fell outside the house and wrecked the front. As soon as the father heard the crash he came downstairs and found two of his daughters lying at the foot of the stairs. They had been on the way upstairs to fetch him down when they were struck. The third daughter was also injured by the bomb explosion, but managed to make her way out of the house, and was taken to a hospital. The three daughters all died.

A man and a boy were killed in the street.

The boy was found sitting at a door-step with his hands pressed to his eyes. When he was touched, the hands fell limply down and it could be seen that a piece of bomb had passed through his head, just above the nose, killing him instantly. The proprietor of one café, a Swede, had his head blown off.

Great indignation was expressed in the district at the fact that no precautionary measures had been taken to defend this important place. The Zeppelins remained over it for in all about one and a half hours, dropping bombs at their leisure. During all that time no adequate blow was delivered against them. According to the official figures, the total casualties for all areas in this raid were 18 killed and 52 injured. The total was made up of 31 men, 26 women, and 13 children.

On Sunday, March 19, four seaplanes visited East Kent, attacking Dover, Deal, Margate, and Ramsgate. They arrived over Dover about two o'clock in the afternoon and dropped over a dozen bombs, doing a considerable amount of damage. One bomb went through the roof of a Home where there were a large number of children; fortunately, the children, at the first sound of the raiders, had been taken to the shelter of the basement. Several children going to Sunday school were killed or injured. A woman walking along the street was blown into a doorway of a shop and badly hurt. The invaders were given very little time to do their work. British aeroplanes rose in pursuit. A sharp fight followed, both attackers and defenders using their machine guns freely in the air. One British airman particularly distinguished himself. Flight-Commander R. J. Bone, R.N., pursued one of the German seaplanes out to sea for nearly 30 miles, in a small single-seater land machine. There, after an engagement lasting about a quarter of an hour, he forced it to descend, the German machine having been hit many times, and the observer disabled or killed. For this, Flight-Commander Bone received the D.S.O.

Full official details of this action were published later. The commander left the aerodrome while the enemy machine was still in sight, and making no attempt to climb steeply, kept the enemy in view. After a pursuit of nearly 30 miles he rose to 9,000 feet, 2,000 feet above the enemy. Rapidly overhauling the other machine, he attempted to make a vertical dive for it, both sides firing vigorously. Then he manœuvred ahead of the other and steered straight at him, diving below him and turning with a vertical right-hand bank immediately under him. The German pilot swerved his machine to the left before they met, and the Englishman as he passed could see the German observer hanging over the right side of the fuselage, apparently dead or severely wounded. The gun was cocked at an angle of 45 degrees. Continuing his courageous manœuvres, Flight-Commander Bone brought his machine within 15 or 20 feet of the enemy, and poured in five or six bursts of six rounds until the enemy dived deeply, with smoke pouring from his machine. The propeller stopped, but the pilot kept control and succeeded in landing safely on the water. Here the English airman had to leave him, as he could not come down on a land

FLIGHT-COMMANDER BONE, R.N.
Awarded the D.S.O. for pursuing and bringing down a German seaplane, March 19, 1916.

machine, and his engine showed signs of giving out.

One machine apparently escaped from the fight at Dover and rapidly made its way to Deal, where it dropped seven bombs, doing considerable damage to property, but not killing or injuring any persons. A second pair of seaplanes appeared over Ramsgate at 2.10 p.m. and dropped bombs on the town. Four children on their way to Sunday school were killed, and a man driving a motor-car near by was also killed. A hospital for Canadian troops was damaged, but no one in the building was hurt, and the nurses went out in the streets to assist in the work of tending the injured. One of the seaplanes travelled on from Ramsgate to Margate, where it dropped a bomb, damaging

a house. The German aircraft were all now pursued by British machines and were driven out to sea.

In a crowded meeting held the following evening in Ramsgate Town Hall the Mayor, who was in the chair, uttered a very strong protest against the absence of adequate defence for the coast towns. Sirens giving the alarm had not sounded until the bombs were falling. Had notice been given earlier, the children going to Sunday school would not have lost their lives. "We in Ramsgate are simply living in a fool's paradise," he declared. A resolution, already carried by the Town Council, protesting against the absence of due warning was passed unanimously. According to the official reports, three men, one woman, and five children were killed in this raid in all the towns, and seventeen men five women, and nine children were injured.

At the end of March began a period of nights exceedingly favourable for Zeppelins, moonless, clear, and comparatively still. The Germans took full advantage of this, and for several nights in succession attempts on a considerable scale were made. A marked advance had now been made in the British defensive methods. London had been equipped with a number of anti-aircraft guns of greatly improved range, and many more searchlights had been installed. Some of these searchlights were far more powerful than anything known before. Extensive preparations had been made in many parts of the country supposed to be within Zeppelin range to give the enemy a warm reception.

Darkness and silence were the main methods used to baffle the enemy. Church bells were silenced, and public clocks did not strike. All towns within the affected areas lay in a condition of semi-darkness or of complete darkness. In some places faint lights were permitted in the streets. In others, all street lights were put out, and no lights allowed to show, even faintly, from the windows of houses. At the first signal of the approach of the Zeppelins all trains were stopped, save those running underground, and railway services were suspended. Signal lights were put out, and the fires of the engines were banked. The stoppage of trains naturally caused great inconvenience. People living in the outer suburbs of towns found it impossible to reach home except by walking; railway travellers were held up at small stations, and had to pass many hours during the evening and night there, unable to go forward or back.



AN ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUN IN ACTION AT NIGHT.



THE RAID OVER THE EASTERN COUNTIES.
A Zeppelin raider caught by searchlight rays.

It was evident from the German reports that, unless deliberately false statements were being made in them, these precautions did succeed on different occasions in completely deceiving the invaders as to their whereabouts. This was specially seen in the report of the first of the April raids. On the night of March 31–April 1 a number of Zeppelins, estimated at five, made an attack on the Eastern coast, from the estuary of the Thames to Yorkshire. On the following day the German Main Headquarters published an account of what had been accom-



ZEPPELIN RAID ON PARIS.
A five-storied house wrecked by a bomb.

plished, which was wildly and almost ridiculously inaccurate. It was claimed that bombs were freely dropped on the City between Tower Bridge and London Docks, the military camps in the north-west of the City, and other parts around London; and that various towns had been attacked, batteries silenced, manufacturing works destroyed, and incendiary fires caused. Actually, the Zeppelins never reached London, and town after town named in their report was not touched by them. Places that they did attack were not even mentioned. It was clear that they had travelled almost blindly, unable to pick out the places at which they aimed.

The most dramatic feature of the raid of March 31 was a sustained attack by several of the invaders on the coast near the mouth of the Thames. As they approached they were picked up by powerful searchlights, which concentrated on them from a large area around. These lights were so powerful and so well directed that, even at the great height at which the Zeppelins were flying, the effect must have been almost blinding. Batteries along the coast opened fire, and the Germans soon realized that the British now had at command some guns capable of sending shells as high as Zeppelins could fly. Searchlights from many points stabbed the sky, keeping the shining bodies of the Zeppelins all the time in view. The airships dropped bombs in rapid succession, seeking to reach the batteries, and the bursts of flame below were met by the bright flashes from exploding shells in the sky. Time after time it seemed as though the airships had been hit. Then one shot went home, hitting one of the airships right in the centre and breaking its back. The Zeppelin made a quick dive, crumpling up as it fell. Then it recovered slightly, tried to get away, but fell in the water before it had gone far, collapsing a little over a mile from the Knock lightship.

It was quickly surrounded by torpedo-boat destroyers, mine-sweepers and patrol-vessels. Two officers and fifteen men crept out of their cabins. The Zeppelin, whose marks showed it to be L15, was sinking, and they climbed up on to the envelope, making signs that they were willing to surrender. It was said at the time that they left one young officer in the cabin, whose business it was to blow up the airship when the others got off. He failed to do this, but it nevertheless sank. The steam trawler Olivine rescued the German crew, and they were taken to Chatham as prisoners of war. Their leader was a young officer of 33, Lieutenant-Commander Breithaupt, decorated with the Iron Cross, and his second officer was Lieutenant Kühne. They were evidently under some apprehension that they would be shot, for as soon as they arrived Lieutenant-Commander Breithaupt formally declared to the British officers who received him, "I take all responsibility upon myself. My men are not responsible." They were treated as ordinary prisoners of war. Some of the men were without coats, and barefooted, and one was without trousers. These were quickly provided with clothing and boots.

Some foreign journalists were permitted to see the prisoners and to talk with them. They found them convinced that their craft had inflicted great damage on British military positions. Lieutenant-Commander Breithaupt strongly maintained that the killing of women and children in the raids was an accident. "You must not suppose that we set out to kill women and children," he declared. "We have higher military aims. You would not find one officer in the German Army or Navy who would go to kill women or children. Such things happen

accidentally in war." Some of the crew, when asked if it was not a sorry business to go on baby-killing campaigns, gave the only possible reply, "We do as we are ordered."

That same night Zeppelins passed over a number of towns on or near the coast. They had a very warm reception, being fired on from numerous batteries. At least one Zeppelin was hit, and showed by its erratic movements afterwards that it had been badly damaged. It had to discard part of its cargo, and a machine gun, belts of cartridges, a new magneto a shot-riddled petrol tank, and a tank containing four gallons of petrol were thrown overboard. The Zeppelins had a very busy time in endeavouring to escape the guns and searchlights, and their evolutions were watched by thousands of people, who, defying the instructions to remain indoors under shelter, crowded every place of vantage.

The damage inflicted during this raid was not important. Many bombs fell in fields. Five bombs fell on one town, killing five persons by suffocation and badly injuring four more. A bomb fell on one house where there were an old lady of seventy, her daughter-in-law, and two grandchildren. The old lady was killed instantly, and the other three were injured. Three people next door, a mechanic, his wife and a young child, were suffocated by a gas bomb. One village farther north suffered most, the Germans evidently mistaking it for a military station. It was twice visited that night. On the first occasion eight bombs were dropped in a field. Later a Zeppelin came back, dropped first an illuminating bomb, then two explosive bombs, and then after an interval two bombs more. These did much damage to houses and killed thirty people. Two raiders passing over an East Anglian town that night dropped some

ZEPPELIN RAID ON PARIS, JANUARY 29, 1916.
A hole caused by a bomb in the roof of the Underground Railway.

bombs, killing two women and a man and injuring several. In addition to the airship which raided the Eastern Counties, another ship went over the North-East Coast, attacking various points there. The total casualties on that Friday night were officially given as 43 killed and 66 injured. The military damage was nil.

In addition to fire from anti-aircraft guns the Zeppelins received the attacks of a number of aeroplanes. These do not seem to have accomplished much. Lieutenant Brandon, of the Royal Flying Corps, a young New Zealander, climbed 9,000 feet and dropped several bombs on an airship underneath him, his own machine being hit many times by machine-gun bullets. He was fortunate in finding a Zeppelin flying so low that night, for in many places, particularly where they suspected the presence of anti-aircraft guns, they flew so high as to make it a serious undertaking for aeroplanes to rise above them.

The following evening a Zeppelin raided a working-class district on the North-East Coast and did considerable damage to a number of small houses, killing eighteen people and injuring one hundred. A well-known magistrate, the leader of the local Labour party, was struck as he was walking along the street and was found lying face downwards dead, fifteen yards from a place where a bomb had exploded. His body was torn with fragments of shrapnel and glass. A tramway inspector went into the tram sheds as soon as the airship was sighted. He was standing next to a wall, and one bomb burst in front of him and another behind the wall. The inspector was killed by a wound in the heart. A brother and sister were killed in a very similar way. A man took his family downstairs when the sound of the firing was heard, and as his son, a boy of 16, was following the house was struck and wrecked, the boy being killed. A widow, aged 66, her daughter-in-law and a grandchild, aged 5, were in a house which was demolished. The widow and the child were killed and the mother injured. Two elderly men keeping a grocer's shop were behind the counter when a bomb dropped and practically wrecked the place. In the débris of the shop next morning their bodies were found on the one side of the counter, and on the other side was the body of a seventeen-year-old girl who had been sent on an errand from the house opposite. A pattern maker and his wife were in their house together when they heard the explosion of the bombs. In her fright the wife ran out. Her husband followed and fetched her back. At that moment a



THE "L 15" SINKING OFF THE KENTISH COAST, APRIL 1, 1916.

[*Official photograph issued by the Press Bureau.*

LIEUTENANT-COMMANDER BREITHAUPT. LIEUTENANT KÜHNE.

The commander, decorated with the Iron Cross, and the second officer of the Zeppelin "L 15," which was hit by gun-fire and came down in the estuary of the Thames, April 1, 1916. The crew were rescued and made prisoners.

bomb fell on the house; both husband and wife were badly injured, the husband dying in hospital next day. A man was walking along the street with a daughter holding each arm. His wife was in front with two other girls. A bomb burst in the road between them. One of the girls was thrown against a plate glass window and was killed, the other girls were injured, but the man escaped unhurt. Of the eighteen deaths, ten occurred indoors and eight outdoors.

On the following night a fresh raid was made. This time the Germans went farther afield, and, as in the January raid in the Midlands, they reached a part of the country whose inhabitants had considered it practically immune from attack. Six Zeppelins crossed the North Sea. Two raided the Eastern Counties of England, one the North-East Coast of England, and three the East Coast of Scotland. This was the first time that Zeppelins had penetrated north of the Tweed.

Word was brought to an East Coast Scottish city early in the evening that Zeppelins were approaching. By nine o'clock the news became generally known. Various precautions, planned in advance, were taken. The electric light was reduced, the trams were stopped, and people had an opportunity of seeking shelter, of which most refused to avail themselves.

The Zeppelins arrived shortly before midnight, flying at a great height. They remained over the district for forty minutes, and dropped perhaps thirty bombs. The noise of the exploding bombs and the blaze of a great fire of a warehouse, struck by the first bomb, gave the impression that much damage had been done. When, however, it was possible to learn what had happened, it was found that the actual loss had been amazingly small. Ten persons had been killed, eleven seriously injured, and a dozen or two more slightly hurt. One warehouse had been burned, and some damage done to houses. Several important public buildings had been barely missed, and a number of people had narrow escapes.

A bomb dropped on the pavement in a poor tenement street, penetrated into the cellar of one of the tenements and exploded. Six men



ZEPPELIN "L 15" SINKING OFF THE KENTISH COAST, APRIL 1, 1916.
The airship had been hit by British anti-aircraft guns.

were killed and a number of people injured. One of the victims was a young fellow just of age, who had been spending the week-end with his mother, a widow. Having brought a neighbour in to keep his mother company, he was on his way out to inquire after another woman near by who was living alone, when he was killed. Another was an old man who had been blown into a shop by the force of the explosion. His body was found lying across the shop counter. The tenement, which was substantially built of stone, as is the custom in that part of the country, had its staircase blocked up by the shattered masonry, and the tenants in the floors above had to be rescued by means of fire escapes. One bomb fell on the boiler-house of a large hospital, and others fell around the hospital, but no people were injured. One tenement was struck and a bomb exploded on the upper part of the building, blowing off the roof and blocking up the staircase. The father of one family on the upper floor was out at the time of the raid. On his return he learned that his five-year-old daughter had been killed by the falling stones, and his wife and other child seriously injured. The other tenants in the building were severely shaken, some of them who were in bed at the time being thrown out of bed by the shock.

It was found, however, that the fact that the buildings in this part of the country are so solidly constructed greatly minimised the loss. When bombs explode in the much more lightly built brick houses in the south, the whole of the buildings often enough collapses; in the north, with stone houses, the loss was often limited to the rooms immediately around where the explosion took place.

In one case a man, his wife and several children were in bed asleep, despite the bursting of several bombs in the district. Suddenly there came a tremendous explosion which aroused them all. "The house shook," said the man. "The windows were broken in and articles of furniture moved and creaked. My wife and I at once rose and to our dismay found everything in great disorder. After dressing with a view to leaving the house to get shelter, my wife took our youngest child, a year old, out of the crib and shortly afterwards made the terrible discovery that it was dead. On examining it we found that a piece of bomb had struck it on the left shoulder and in all probability had penetrated the heart. The bomb had struck the hard ground fifty yards away from the window and a splinter from it had passed through the bottom sash of the window (about 16 feet from the ground) and then through the wooden shutter at the head of the crib (an inch thick) and after going through two bed covers had passed into the body of the child. I never heard such a terrific explosion in my life; it seemed as if it would tear everything to pieces."*

One of the Zeppelins travelling through England that night attacked a little wood outside a peaceful country town. No less than fifteen bombs were dropped in a sylvan glade. Three fowls were killed and some windows were broken, and owing to the vibration a part of the roof of a house collapsed. No one was hurt. The inhabitants, half proud that their little place at last, after many centuries of somnolent life, had stepped for the moment into the heart of world events, declared that they would put up a pillar stone on the spot with a suitable inscription.

In another spot in East Anglia over one hundred bombs were dropped that night in an area of half a mile in which there are only two houses. The commanders of the Zeppelins—there were evidently two airships—clearly believed that they were over some very important place, for this tract of waste land was torn over and over with shells. Some panes of glass were broken in a lonely farm-house, and one side of the roof of a kennel was smashed in. In the north-east that same night the raid was also a failure, the Zeppelin commander being completely baffled in an attempt to find his location. One Zeppelin tried to tackle a town in a south-eastern county, but found itself met by a very warm fusillade and made off after dropping about a hundred bombs in fields. The Sunday night raid was perhaps the most ambitious the Germans had yet undertaken. The Zeppelins which reached Scotland killed and injured a few civilians and aroused Scotland to a deeper detestation than ever of the methods of our foe. The Zeppelins that wandered through England lost their way. The military results were insignificant. Yet the German official statement described the raid as though it were a great success:

For the third time, on the night of April 2–3, a naval air squadron attacked the English East Coast, this time the northern part.

Edinburgh and Leith, with the docks on the Firth of Forth, Newcastle, and important wharves and buildings, blast furnaces, and factories on the Tyne were bombarded with numerous explosive and incendiary bombs

* Quoted in the *Scotsman*.

DESTRUCTION OF ZEPPELIN "L 77" IN FRANCE, FEBRUARY 21, 1916.

The airship was brought down at Brabant-le-Roi by a shot from a French "75" gun. It was set on fire by an incendiary shell, and on coming to earth was further destroyed by the explosion of bombs on board.

with very good results. Heavy explosions with extensive collapses were observed. A battery near Newcastle was silenced.

In spite of the heavy bombardment all the airships safely returned and landed.

The total absence of effective military precautions on the east coast of Scotland against raiders aroused much indignation there and steps were at once taken to remedy this.

On Wednesday, April 5, a Zeppelin attacked a district on the North-East Coast where the enemy had previously done some considerable damage. On the earlier occasions the resistance to the Zeppelins had been very slight. Now, as soon as the airship was discovered, searchlights lit it up and kept it in view. Guns immediately opened fire and shells could be seen bursting all around the raider. The Zeppelin crew were apparently surprised by their reception. Blinded by the fierce beams of light, the airship ducked suddenly, but the light still held it. Then it rose again, trying to escape, and suddenly made out to sea. Crowds of people standing in the streets watched the guns, applauding every close shot and bursting into a cheer as one shell apparently hit the enemy. A few bombs were dropped but fell outside the city, doing no damage beyond slightly wounding a boy.

People of this city who had been somewhat downcast by previous failures to offer resistance to raiders could not now express their gratitude and satisfaction with sufficient emphasis, and the Chief Magistrate formally sent to the military authorities the thanks and congratulations of the city. Numbers of people were anxious to raise a reward for the splendid services of the gunners and searchlight operators. The complete repulse of the raider here was really the first test of the new gun and searchlight defences of English cities, and competent authorities regarded it as a good omen for what would happen should the enemy try to come to London, now equipped with even more complete defences on the same lines as the sea-coast city in the North.

The feeling began to grow that the German authorities now regarded another attack upon the heart of London as unsafe, for none was made during the spring months.

Soon afterwards a German official version of the supposed effects of this series of raids from March 31 to April 5 was published. For pure imaginativeness it must take a high place even among German official accounts of the war. It was claimed that the attack on the London

LIEUTENANT BRANDON, R.F.C.
Who, on the night of March 31, 1916, dropped several bombs on a Zeppelin.

docks during the night of March 31–April 1 far surpassed all earlier attacks in severity and effectiveness. In the north-eastern quarter of the city numerous fires were started and serious damage was done. The district around Great Eastern Street and Great Tower Street had suffered particularly heavily and a factory had been burned down there. A transport steamer had been bombed between Tower Bridge and London Bridge and severely damaged. Numerous other docks had been damaged,



[*Official photograph—Crown copyright reserved*

THE DESTROYED ZEPPELIN AT SALONIKA, MAY 7, 1916.

The framework was stripped bare by the flames from the airship's own petrol-tanks. The survivors of the crew, four officers and eight men, were made prisoners.



[*Official photograph—Crown copyright reserved.*

AT SALONIKA.

The control officer of the anti-aircraft gun, and the gun-layer who aimed the gun and fired the shot that destroyed the Zeppelin.

warehouses burned down, anti-aircraft guns damaged, and numerous ships in the docks hit. A munition factory had been destroyed at Purfleet, great fires had been started on the Humber, widespread destruction had been caused at Grimsby, and several munition factories and sheds containing munition stores had been completely destroyed at Sunderland. A munition factory had been destroyed at Hexham and a whole series of factories and slips put out of action at Gateshead.

The claims for Edinburgh and Leith were perhaps the most extravagant.

"Barracks, munition depôts, ironworks and other factories lie in ruins. Two munition works broke out in flames and were destroyed. A large spirit factory was hit by incendiary bombs and was burned to the ground. The railway station was also materially damaged. A train with material was destroyed. In the port several ships were hit; one English four-masted ship was almost completely destroyed, and a transport steamer with war material was so badly damaged that it could not start on its voyage."

The belief that London had been seriously damaged in the April raid was widely held throughout Germany and was the subject of much comment in the German Press, and many papers declared their delight at the terror

produced in England by the Zeppelins and the devastation caused by their bombs. The *Cologne Gazette* heartened its readers by tales of Stockton and Middlesbrough reduced in parts to a vast heap of ruins, and Newcastle with dozens of its factories and shipyards dissolved in flame and smoke.

The Berlin *Lokalanzeiger* drew a lurid picture of the fate of London, hit in its most susceptible quarters and most important places by the Zeppelin attack. The Munich *Neueste Nachrichten* hoped the visits of the Zeppelins would be repeated until the Asquith Cabinet shuddered with terror and realized that its war aims were unattainable. German soldiers made prisoners in the fighting at the front were full of tales of the ruin of London, of the destruction of its streets, and the wreck of its buildings. When their British captors assured them that London had not even been touched during the spring raids, and that all London had heard of them was the sound of some very distant guns, they refused to believe them.

A fresh series of raids began when the next spell of moonless nights came along at Easter week. The Germans had planned a great general offensive for this week. The uprising of the Sinn Fein group in Dublin began on Easter Monday; a hurried attack from the sea was made on Yarmouth and Lowestoft on the Tuesday morning; and an offensive was actively pushed on the Western front. The aircraft joined in the campaign. On Easter Monday a hostile aeroplane appeared over Dover from the east at a height estimated to be 6,000 feet. Anti-aircraft guns at once came into action, and it was driven off without dropping any bombs. That same evening there was a Zeppelin raid over Norfolk and Suffolk, but it seems to have been more for the purpose of reconnaissance than for a serious offensive, for the three airships which took part in it dropped only a few bombs and remained a very short time. On the following night four Zeppelins raided Essex and Kent. Here, too, possibly because of the brisk fire of the anti-aircraft guns which met them at point after point, they fell back after having accomplished little or nothing. Two hundred bombs were dropped and one casualty was reported. On the following night the Zeppelins came back again over the east coast of Kent with equally negative results.

The raid of May 2 witnessed the dispatch of probably the greatest number of Zeppelins ever directed against England at one time. They arrived at different points all along the coast. One came southwards from the Scottish coast; another proceeded northwards to Aberdeenshire. They were noted at different points from the coast of Norfolk northwards. The astonishing feature of this raid was that so little was accomplished. Only two of the airships made a serious attempt to penetrate inwards. The airships did not discharge anything like their normal load of bombs; in only one locality was any serious

[*Official photograph.*

CAPTURED AT SALONIKA.

Sub-Lieutenant Thelen, the engineer, and Lieutenant Scherzer, the commander, of the Zeppelin wrecked by British gunners at Salonika.

mischief done, and there the total casualties only amounted to 36.

In several instances the Zeppelins were clearly baffled. They missed certain obvious points at which they were aiming. The most striking instance of this was shown by "L 20," which went northwards in Scotland. It missed Edinburgh, at which it was probably aiming, and wandered away to Aberdeenshire. Here it missed the towns and dropped bombs in fields far away. One or two quiet Scottish manses in rural districts were startled by the noise of the explosion of bombs. "L 20" then crossed to Norway, which it reached next morning. It came down in Hafsfiord much damaged.

The erew abandoned it after destroying parts of the maehinery. They were arrested and interned. The eommander of a Norwegian regiment stationed near by had the wrecked airship destroyed. Apparently it had been greatly damaged by British gunfire. One of the erew told a eorrespondent that during the attack on Britain the airship was so injured by British shells that the eommander had hurried towards home to avoid eapture.

The spring air eampaign may be said to have finished with two raids by seaplanes on the south-east eoast towards the end of May. They

As between Zeppelins and anti-aireraft guns the greater advanee was made by the guns. The destruetion of "L 15" at the mouth of the Thames and the damage inflieted on "L 20" in Seotland were due to gunfire. A raiding Zeppelin approaehing Salonika on May 7 was heavily fired on by the Fleet and eame down in a blaze at the mouth of the Vardar River. The experienee of our Allies also demonstrated that anti-aireraft guns of suffieient ealibre ean sometimes be used with great effeet, not merely to eompel an attaeking Zeppelin to soar high, but also to bring it down, even at a maximum height.

The main disappointments of the spring from the British point of view were two. The first was the failure of the Government to eonsolidate and unify the air departments and to build up a great Air Ministry. The Ministry was feeling its way, through a maze of eommittees and boards, to the best means of remedying the shorteomings of previous years. The seeond disappointment was our inability to launeh sustained and vigorous attacks against the German air bases. Notwithstanding these disappointments, there was reason for encouragement. Slowly, in face of deep-seated prejudiees, the Government was awakening to a realization of the almost vital neeessity of supremaey in the air if vietory in the war were to be assured.



CHAPTER CXXIX.

RUSSIA AT WAR.

Russian Feeling at Outbreak of War—Relations with Germany—Internal Politics—Outburst of Patriotism—The Tsar and the Duma—The Goremykin Government—Demand for Reforms—Dissolution of the Duma—Ministerial Changes—M. Goremykin Resigns—Premiership of M. Sturmer—The Drink Problem and its Radical Solution—The Church—The Making of the Russian Armies—Finance—Trade Routes and the Murman Railway—German "Penetration" of Russia and its Consequences—Food Problems—Industries and Munitions Question—The Anti-German Movement and its Meaning—Attitude of the Jews—German Espionage—Anti-German Riots at Moscow—Refugees—Red Cross Work—Russia and her Allies—Anglo-Russian Relations

WHEN Germany declared war, Russia was in the midst of a great transformation. The agrarian reforms undertaken in 1906 had already yielded surprising results. Communal holdings were being rapidly superseded by farmsteads, and these, again, combining in a network of cooperative societies, greatly enhanced the output of farm produce. In an empire containing over 100,000,000 of rural population this change bade fair to exercise a very auspicious influence upon the social and economic forces of the country. The communal system had offered little incentive to private enterprise; in passing away it might leave a few scars, but its disappearance would strengthen and invigorate the whole body corporate. Such remarkable changes could not escape the notice of Russia's neighbours. Each successive development of the agrarian reform had been watched by the Germans with anxious attention. Agricultural commissions went to Russia and reported on the work of the land settlement boards, the growth of individual holdings and, later, of the cooperative societies.

As Russia waxed strong in the arts of peace, Germany came to discuss the advantage of a "preventive war," the idea being that Russia should be crushed before she grew stronger and more enlightened, and so prevented from becoming too independent of Germany. Few, if any, Russians seriously believed in the possibility of such a war. The enormous interests Germany had at stake, her trade with the country, the innumerable ties of business or kinship that bound so many of her people to the Tsar's subjects were adduced as convincing arguments against the theory of German aggression. Russia was flooded with German goods, and German influence embraced science, literature, art, even political institutions; German Marxism permeated and poisoned Russian labour; German models were copied in the fashioning of ladies' dress and in the rules of parliamentary procedure. Thousands of Russians who had studied in Germany were holding high office; tens of thousands of officials and officers were of German parentage; the so-called monarchist parties in Russia were all imbued with the utmost reverence for German ideas, and only in the closest friendship with Germany saw any salvation for the Throne and institutions of Russia.

Nothing short of brutal violence could, indeed, have brought the Russian people into a fighting mood. Yet there were deep-seated causes of dislike towards the Germans. They held a position of privilege and favour that the Russians could never regard with equanimity. Moreover, enlightened Russians perceived that modern Germany, while continuing to exert an undue influence over Russian affairs, had herself sunk into the abyss of materialism, and that Russia must cut herself loose from this contamination.*

* In an article entitled "The Dangers of German Artistic Culture," published in 1915, V. Kurbatov wrote: "Formerly the basic features of German art were triviality and the striving for easy and noisy success. This cannot but induce a levelling down of requirements in all domains of culture, which, of course, leads to the

THE TSAR.
Conversing with General Williams, of the British Army, in Petrograd.

It was this revolt from everything German that prompted the decision to change the name of St. Petersburg to the purely Russian form of Petrograd, a decision which was made shortly after the outbreak of hostilities.

During the last days of July, 1914, the Russian people were at last fully alive to the gravity of the situation. The war found them and their Government united in a common purpose, smarting under a sense of wrong, indignant at the mendacity of the German Emperor, who could dare to blame Russia for the war. The scales had fallen from their eyes. The French Presidential visit to Petrograd in July, 1914, coincided with a general strike which German agents had abetted and perhaps

wrecking of culture itself. Investigation of this aspect of the question is of the utmost importance for Russia, since, thanks to the fact that masses of Russian youth have obtained their higher education in Germany and that masses of books have been translated from the German, Russian culture is infected with the many defects of German culture. Such investigation does not involve an attempt to show that German culture is bad in all respects, just as it is equally impossible to prove that Germans in all respects are barbarians. It is possible that other peoples also, finding themselves in the position of conquerors of the world, as the Germans regard themselves, would display a certain insolence towards others. In the Germans, however, that insolence has passed all bounds known to history. . . . Russian art as yet has kept itself aloof from Germany and has gravitated almost exclusively towards France. Our artists who have been to Munich have not given us anything remarkable, whereas France has influenced Somov (who himself influenced Germany) and Ostroumov and Levitan and Serov, while Italy captivated Vrubel. . . . Acquaintance with the culture of modern Europe in no case permits us to put Germany in the first place. In the domain of art there is none to compare with France; in the domain of science England unquestionably stands ahead of her, while, when discussing technical perfection, America must be included with European countries. The question of German culture is especially important to Russians because, by virtue of geographical and historical conditions, Germany has powerfully affected Russian culture. The present war may prove salutary if it forces us to reappraise these questions."

M. Kurbatov cites the baneful influences of the German school upon Russian architecture. The horrors of the "monumental" style offend the eye in Moscow, Petrograd and other cities. Unconsciously, by virtue of the intuition that the uneducated masses frequently display, the common people, long before the war, had conceived a violent dislike for the German "art" exemplified in the new Embassy building in Petrograd. Designed to resemble a prison or a universal store, the edifice was surmounted by two colossal bronze horses led by a nude male figure, symbolizing diplomacy and trade dominated by Force. The untutored *muzhik* knew nothing about the "niceties" of the German school, but he instinctively felt that the idea of this ugly fabric was a challenge and an affront to his country. Long before the war it was not an uncommon sight to behold the common people stop in front of the Embassy building and give outward expression to their disapproval. Soon after the war began the edifice was wrecked and the colossal figures were cast down.

SIR GEORGE BUCHANAN

SIR GEORGE BUCHANAN.

The British Ambassador at Petrograd. Elected honorary citizen of Moscow, May, 1916.

provoked. Money was certainly forthcoming from unknown sources to pay the strikers, but if German calculations had been based upon the spread of internal unrest in Russia they were woefully ill-founded. No sooner had the menace of war become apparent than the strikers willingly resumed work, and whatever difficulties were subsequently experienced in the labour domain they never engendered any doubt as to the deep loyalty of the working classes of Russia. Russia's enemies had underestimated the spirit of the nation. Complete union between parties, classes, races, and religions was the response of the Empire to Germanic aggression.

In the manifesto issued to his subjects at the outbreak of the Great War, Nicholas II. said :

> At present we have not only to succour a kindred land which has been unjustly wronged, but to safeguard the honour, dignity and integrity of Russia as a great Power. We firmly believe that in the defence of their country all our true subjects will rise united in a spirit of self-sacrifice. At this dread hour of trial may all internal differences be forgotten ; may the union of the Tsar and his people become closer and stronger.

In the rescript to M. Goremykin, March 6/19, 1914, the Premier was told that the "welfare of his people should not be sacrificed to futile aspirations, sometimes quite alien to those national traditions and historical foundations upon which Russia had grown and become strong."

These two pronouncements were destined to introduce an element of uncertainty into internal politics.

During the first stages of the war, and until the disastrous retreat of the Russian armies had aroused misgivings as to the efficiency of the administration, all parties and classes loyally refrained from political agitation. The Tsar's call to union was implicitly obeyed.

It is difficult to exaggerate the enthusiasm which prevailed throughout the country during the memorable days of July and August, 1914. A remarkable scene of reverent enthusiasm was witnessed on August 2 outside the Winter Palace, within which the whole Imperial family and the Court were attending a Te Deum for victory. Over 300,000 people of all ranks stood in the burning sun for three hours. The popularity of the high personages who entered the Palace could be gauged by the cheering of the crowd. General Sukhomlinoff, M. Sazonoff, M. Krivoshein, and M. Goremykin were enthusiastically greeted. A storm of applause accompanied the Grand Duke Nicholas as he drove by in a motor-car flying the black and yellow striped pennant of Commander-in-Chief. The French Embassy and Serbian Legation, alone of the

THE GERMAN EMBASSY AT PETROGRAD.

The figures on the parapet were pulled down by the mob.

foreign missions, attended the funetion and were received with the heartiest applause by the demonstrators.

Inside the Palaee, the Tsar told the assembled gathering of statesmen, eourtiers, soldiers, and seamen: "War has been foreed upon us. I hereby take a solemn pledge not to eonclude peaee so long as a single enemy remains on Russian soil." Then the Emperor and Empress appeared on the baleony. The sturdy figure of the Sovereign, elad in a khaki field tunie, was seen bowing repeatedly to the multitudo. The innumerable banner bearers of patriotie soeieties bent the knee devoutly, invoking the blessing of the Sovereign. The eommon people, especially the reservists, remained kneeling, their gaze riveted on the Little Father. It was a sight destined to live long in Russian history.

A week later, the reeeption of the Houses at the Winter Palaee and the speeehes of the Tsar and the two Presidents left an indelible impression on all who heard them. President Rodzianko addressed Russia's enemies thus: "You think dissension and dislike disunite us, whereas all the nationalities inhabiting the boundless territories of Russia have joined together in one vast family sinee danger threatens our common fatherland."

That old enmities, party hatreds, personal jealousies had been forgotten became evident from sueh an extraordinary sight as the Cadet leader, M. Miliukoff, walking arm and arm with the reaetionary Jew-baiter, M. Purishkeviteh. M. Purishkeviteh had earlier made publie reeantation before a representative gathering of Jews. The Constitutionalist, M. Rodzianko, sat on the window-sill beside the reaetionary M. Zamyslovsky.

At 11 o'eloek the Emperor eame out and stood in the midst of a eirele formed by Ministers, Deputies, and Councillors. His Majesty wore the eampaign dress of a eolonel of the Foot Guards, and was attended only by the Minister of the Court. Amid deep silenee rang out words that went straight to the hearts of his hearers. He weleomed them in these ominous and troubled days when Germany and Austria had deelared war on Russia. The great outburst of love of eountry and loyalty to the Throne that had swept tempest-like over the land was the warrant that the great mother Russia would earry the war to the desired end. He was animated by the same sentiments of love and saerifiee, and was also willing to lay down his life, and from that eonseiousness of unity with his people he derived strength and eonfidenee. They were not only defending the honour and dignity of their own soil, but also their brothers by blood and faith. He rejoieed to see the union of the Slavs developing as strongly as that of Russia. He knew that everyone there would do his duty. Then, raising his voiee, the Tsar uttered the homely Russian saying: "Great is the God of the Russian land." The legislators responded with a thunderous hurrah, and immediately afterwards sang "God save the Tsar." When silenee had been restored, the aeting Viee-President, M. Golubeff, replied on behalf of the Upper House. President Rodzianko, who followed, made a speeeh whieh deeply moved the Sovereign, who was seen to press his hand to his heart as if overeome by tho depth of his feeling.

The Tsar after a slight pause said, in a voice as strong and firm as ever: "Gentlemen, I thank you from my heart for the sineere feelings of patriotism that you have shown in word and deed. I never doubted them. With all my soul I wish you sueeess." Then, raising his voiee and devoutly erossing himself, he added, "God be with us."

In this very hall, on the previous Sunday,

over a thousand young soldiers about to go to the front had prayed together with the Tsar. Old courtiers, mindful, even at such an hour, of etiquette, had insisted that this would be irregular, but the young Empress overrode all their objections, and in a fine blaze of indignation exclaimed, "It is they who are going to fight. It is with them that the Tsar must mingle his prayers."

The special session of the Duma lasted three and a half hours. The voting of three Bills dealing with war supplies occupied only as many minutes.

Unfeigned and deep had been the delight of the masses when it had become known that Great Britain would join hands with France and Russia. Public feeling was thoroughly represented in the proceedings of the Duma. The *Times* correspondent wrote that during the ten years he had attended the sittings of the Duma he had never heard such ovations as those which greeted M. Sazonoff and the representatives of the Allied Powers. First the Serbian, then the Belgian Ministers, and later the French and British Ambassadors were cheered with indescribable enthusiasm. When Sir George Buchanan rose to bow his thanks, the whole House—the public and the Press galleries, the President and officers of the House, and all the Ministers—rose shouting "Hurrah for old England."

One after another the representatives of all the nationalities—Jews, Germans, Tartars, and all parties ascended the rostrum, each proclaiming his love of the Fatherland and determination to stand shoulder to shoulder. The declaration of the Polish Deputy was particularly impressive. The Poles, he said, were throwing in their lot with the Slavs against Teutonic oppression, as they had done 500 years ago at the battle of Grunewald.*

Apparently nothing could mar the truce that had been called between political parties. The disastrous battle of Soldau-Tannenberg

* Known in German history as the Battle of Tannenberg.

THE TSAR REVIEWING COSSACKS.
He is accompanied by the Tsarevitch.

RUSSIAN IMPERIAL PALACE AT TSARSKOE SELO, CONVERTED INTO A HOSPITAL FOR WOUNDED OFFICERS.
Left to right: Grand Duchess Maria (1); Grand Duchess Olga (2); The Tsaritza (3); Grand Duchess Tatiana (4); Grand Duchess Anastasia (5).

at the end of September, 1914, caused scarcely a ripple on the broad, deep waters of Russian confidence.

The people did not for an instant doubt the country's determination to carry on the war, but there was not the same confidence in the ability of the Government to resist an offer of premature peace. The Moscow merchants telegraphed a loyal address to the Tsar in which they ventured to expose their doubts and uncertainties on the subject :

> Recognizing all the historical importance and necessities of the moment, we, in common with the whole of the Russian people, desire that this war should be carried on, even if all the energies of the Empire have to be exerted, and that peace negotiations should not be permitted until our victorious armies have penetrated into the very heart of hostile Germany.

The Tsar telegraphed on November 4 :

> Please tell the Moscow merchants that I sincerely esteem and, at the same time, share the sentiments they have expressed. Their apprehensions are groundless as to the possibility of any peace negotiations whatsoever being permitted until our enemies are completely crushed.

If anything could heighten the popular satisfaction, it was the Grand Duke's proclamation to the Poles, announcing the resurrection of the Polish nation.

Internal politics remained in an eminently satisfactory condition for several months. The arrest and trial of M. Vladimir Bourtseff in February, 1915, was the only noteworthy event. M. Bourtseff, who had played an important part in disclosing the abuses connected with the political police system, decided when the war broke out that it was time for all Russia's sons to rally to their country. He returned home after publishing in *The Times* a letter explaining his motives, only to find that the police, acting upon a legal formality, considered him a fugitive from justice. He was taken under arrest, and subsequently tried for *lèse-majesté*, incurring a nominal penalty.

The Government and the people had expected a hard struggle with Germany, but few if any Russians entertained any serious fear as to the war lasting much beyond the winter of 1914. So long as the Russian armies were advancing in Galicia, even if they had had to fall back in Poland, apprehension as to the struggle being long protracted did not arise; and although the lack of munitions, well known to the army since the previous autumn, should have engendered some disquiet, it was only when *The Times* began its campaign for the mobilization of industries that Russian opinion awoke to the gravity of the situation. Russia's disasters in the Galician theatre and the enforced retirement of her forces brought matters to a crisis, resulting in the departure from office of General Sukhomlinoff and the appointment of General Polivanoff as Minister of War.

Many sensational reports were current at the time as to the causes of this change, and they cropped up afresh many months later, when General Sukhomlinoff was arrested on charges of neglecting and exceeding his official powers ; but it is not necessary to say more. The lack of high explosive shells, and deficiency in the calling out and training of reserves afforded ample cause for the change decreed by the Tsar.

M. BOURTSEFF.

For some weeks before this event, which took place at the end of June, 1915, the political atmosphere had become much obscured. Russian public men belonging to all parties were engaged in Red Cross and other war work, and knew quite well that there was a serious shortage of munitions and men. The truce could not be continued, at least not as between the Duma and the Government. Representatives of the nation had to speak up, or be accused by the people of neglecting their duty. President Rodzianko, acting with the concurrence of his colleagues, made his voice felt in high quarters, and it was said that the retirement of General Sukhomlinoff and the appointment of General Polivanoff were decided somewhat hurriedly at the Grand Duke's

ABOUT TO SET OUT FOR A SLEDGE RIDE.

The Tsarevitch (×) and some of his cousins in the grounds of the Tsar's palace at Tsarskoe Selo.

headquarters, after an Imperial conference at which the President of the Duma played no inconsiderable part.

During the sad months of the great retreat the feeling of dissatisfaction naturally grew. It was unanimously agreed by all parties, excepting the extreme reactionaries, that other ministerial changes were essential. M. Goremykin appeared to be concerned only with the carrying out of the Tsar's behests about "futile aspirations"—mentioned above. The Tsar's idea had been expressed in the phrase, "Reforms later; meanwhile, all for the war." This sentiment, however, could not be reconciled with the internal situation after the failure of the War Office had become manifest. M. Goremykin cannot be excused from the grave responsibility he incurred in not advising the Emperor accordingly. Any change or departure from the existing order of things was regarded by him as an insidious attempt to introduce Parliamentary government, which he regarded as utterly "irreconcilable with the national traditions and historical foundations." The "union of the Tsar and his people" proclaimed in the Manifesto of August 2 was never understood by M. Goremykin in a broad sense.

M. Krivoshein, the strongest man in the Government, who had carried out the marvellous agrarian reforms, was looked upon as the coming premier. There seems to be every reason to suppose that the post was actually offered to him at the time when General Polivanoff entered the ministry, and that he declined the offer, because he wanted a free hand in choosing all his colleagues, whereas three of the ministers were notoriously incompatible with any policy of conciliation.

As the summer of 1915 waxed and waned popular discontent steadily grew. It everywhere took the form of an insistent demand for the assembling of the Duma. Both Houses at length met in August. After much criticism of the Government, the various constitutional parties both in the Duma and in the Council of the Empire agreed to draw up a list of demands, and to press them upon the sovereign's attention. The movement resulted in what was known as the programme of the Progressive *bloc*.

As these demands were backed up by a large majority of the Duma and a substantial section

of the Upper House, and insisted in the first place upon the summoning of ministers enjoying the confidence of the nation, M. Goremykin had to make up his mind either to resign or to dissolve the Duma. He chose the latter course, and he did so without even consulting his colleagues. The terms of the rescript cited above probably satisfied him that he was only doing his duty. Through his influence M. Rodzianko's application for an audience was unduly postponed. M. Goremykin was confirmed in his opinion by the absence of any trouble after the prorogation—a circumstance which he somewhat hastily interpreted in his own favour.

Public attention was much engaged at this time by the Tsar's decision to take personal command of the land and sea forces engaged in military operations. The command had been temporarily confided to the Grand Duke Nicholas at the outbreak of war, because, as the terms of his appointment read, the Emperor "for reasons of a general character found it impossible to assume these duties then." M. Goremykin would not support the majority of the other ministers, who did their very best to dissuade the Tsar from taking upon himself the direct responsibility of operations at a time when the Army was still being extricated from a difficult position. His Majesty said, with characteristic directness and nobility, that in the first place he felt it to be his mission and his duty to assume this responsibility; in the second place he preferred to take over the command at a time when he could do so without wresting the laurels from anyone's brow; and thirdly, that if it was written that he and his dynasty should perish—well, it was written, and he could not alter it. The Tsar and subsequently the Tsarevitch accordingly went to the Front, where in the course of the campaign they received the cross and medal of St. George respectively from the hands of their generals.

M. Goremykin's *coup* against the parliamentary institution of the country stimulated and encouraged the reactionary elements. This movement led to a congress of the so-called Monarchist parties at Nizhni Novgorod, in December, 1915, at which resolutions condemning the idea of a constitution and advocating the abolition of the Duma were carried, much to the disgust and disapproval of all genuine and self-respecting Conservatives in Russia. The high-sounding phrases of this congress did not, however, bring good luck to the Prime Minister, who had called them forth.



MEMBERS OF THE HOLY SYNOD.
The Metropolitan of Petrograd (in centre).

He was destined to fall within two months, when it had become too obvious that his policy towards the Duma had only strengthened the extreme parties and was calculated to weaken the forees of the country.

Long before M. Goremykin's vain struggle against constitutional development came to an end, important ehanges had been made among the members of his Ministry. In June, 1915, M. Maklakoff had been relieved of his duties as Minister of the Interior. Public opinion had long regarded him as one of the main obstacles to a working agreement between

GENERAL SHUVAEFF.
Russian Minister of War.

the Duma and the Government. He was notoriously a retrograde in polities, but so long as the administration of his department was not marked by any serious disorders he retained office. But soon after the Moseow disturbanees (see page 225) he had to resign, and his post was eonferred upon Prinee Shcherbatoff. As Prince Shcherbatoff had long held important eleetive posts in the provineial administration, his appointment was regarded as a distinct promise of reform in the bureaueratic police methods. He did nothing to provoke criticism, but neither did he merit any partieular recognition. M. Maklakoff's departure coincided with that of M. Shcheglovitoff, the Minister of Justice, who, together with M. Kasso, the Minister of Education, had for many years been the pillars of reaetion in the Government. He was replaeed by M. Khvostoff, a moderate Conservative sitting in the Upper House, who beeame known as a eonseientious member of the Government.

After the events conneeted with the dissolution of the Duma, the position of M. Krivoshein and other Ministers who had resolutely opposed that measure beeame inereasingly diffieult. It is true that the workmen had remained quiet and that there was no outward evidenee of diseontent, but hostility towards the Goremykin administration was undoubtedly assuming an acute form throughout the country. M. Goremykin's dream of breaking up the progressive *bloc* and organizing a Conservative majority argued his entire inability to understand the situation. Popular diseontent was voieed by innumerable resolutions of censure passed by various public bodies. Moreover, the rapid rise in the priee of commodities and the searcity of food and fuel in the great eities, superadded to the terrible eircumstances attending the invasion of fifteen provinees, espeeially the wholesale exodus of millions of homeless refugees, all served to inerease the general tension.

Faeed by the alternative of rendering himself a party to a continuation of M. Goremykin's politieal experiments or of resigning offiee, M. Krivoshein decided upon the latter course. His resignation was probably hastened by the appointment of a new Home Minister in the plaee of Prince Shcherbatoff, and the dramatic dismissal of M. Samarin, the procurator of the Holy Synod, an event whieh shocked publie opinion because he was known to have played a very energetic part in an attempt to put an end to the Rasputin seandal.* M. Khvostoff, a nephew of the Minister of Justice, was Prinee Sheherbatoff's sueeessor. He had reeently attraeted notiee by a somewhat violent speeeh in the Duma, direeting attention to the rise in price of neeessaries of life and to the dangerous influence of German capital in the Russian banks. The new Home Secretary immediately began to conciliate the Press and the publie by giving innumerable "interviews" in whieh he promised to apply remedies to all the ills complained of. The introduetion of such a Falstaffian element into the Ministry was

* Cf. page 207.

TSAR INSPECTING MUNITION WORKS.

calculated to dissolve the last elements of cohesion among its members. It is said that a group of them, including M. Krivoshein, M. Kharitonoff, and Count Ignatieff, the new Minister of Education, met and decided to present their collective resignations to the Tsar.

M. Khvostoff's quasi-Liberal declarations offended the extreme Right party in the Duma, of which he was leader, and at the same time aroused some hopes that he might be in earnest, and in that case M. Goremykin would have to resign the Premiership to him. Meanwhile the reassembling of the Houses had been indefinitely postponed. M. Goremykin was still under the delusion that he could rally a sufficient number of supporters in the Duma. After waiting two months, the Emperor, realizing that the aged Prime Minister had been ill-informed, decided to allow him to resign. His successor, M. Sturmer, a statesman of Conservative, but not uncompromising tendencies, immediately succeeded in relieving the tension, and on his advice not only was the Duma assembled, but, making a departure from all precedent, the Tsar went in person to attend its opening —a step which called forth profound and unanimous approbation.

The dismissal of M. Khvostoff from the Home Office shortly afterwards led to the disclosure of another scandal connected with the name of Rasputin.

In March, 1916, the country learned with deep regret that General Polivanoff had resigned. It was surmised that difficulties had arisen with respect to the submission of certain military questions to the Duma. Under the Russian constitution the affairs of the Army, Navy, Church, and foreign affairs are expressly excluded from the purview of the

A MOTOR CYCLE CORPS ARMED WITH MACHINE GUNS.

Duma's decisions. General Polivanoff while Assistant-Minister during the Sukhomlinoff administration had differed with his chief on this same question. Whatever were the precise reasons of the resignation, it came happily at a time when General Polivanoff had already carried out far-reaching reforms in the preparation of the reserves and had thereby enormously strengthened the armies in the field. His successor, General Shuvaeff, formerly Chief of the Commissariat Service, was a specialist in matters of business organization, and one of his new assistants, Senator Garin, had been instrumental in disclosing abuses in connection with army contracts. It was hoped that the new appointments would help to free Russia from the corruption that unfortunately still existed in several of the departments of State.

One of the main strongholds of the old corrupt methods had been the railway administration. M. Rukhloff, Minister of Ways of Communication, had been compelled some months previously to hand in his resignation, and General Trepoff, an inexperienced but energetic and honest official, had taken his place.

At the commencement of 1914 the Tsar had announced his firm, unalterable will to eradicate the drink evil. A change of Ministers accompanied this pronouncement, M. Kokovtsoff's duties as Premier and Minister of Finance falling to M. Goremykin and M. Bark respectively. But although none could gainsay the benefits of temperance, many remained under the conviction that the abolition of the liquor revenue would hopelessly cripple the finances of the country without establishing a real reform. If, however, the loss of the revenue from drink was serious enough for the Treasury, its continuance meant ruin to many of the peasants. In his Rescript to M. Bark on the latter's appointment as Minister of Finance in February, 1914, the Tsar deplored "the mournful spectacle of wasted lives, domestic misery and decaying business resulting from intemperance," which he had had to contemplate during his recent tour through some of the finest provinces of his Empire, and announced that it was unseemly "to base the welfare of the Exchequer upon the moral and material ruin of his subjects." The Tsar's interest in the question brought an immediate response from the peasants. In many places they resolved to close the monopoly shops and petitioned accordingly. Then came the outbreak of war. All were agreed that the difference between the conduct of a great war with and without temperance would be that between certain and doubtful victory. During mobilization the liquor shops were closed and subsequently this temporary measure was made permanent. Probably no other country in the world could have secured the abolition of drunkenness at such a crisis. The Tsar had both the power and the will to do it. He spoke the word and 170 millions of his people obeyed it.

By suppressing the sale of intoxicating liquors the Tsar cut off nearly one-third of the

annual revenue. The vodka monopoly alone brought in about 650,000,000 roubles* net profit. Its removal affected almost every branch of national husbandry. The potato-grower, brandy distiller, bottle manufacturer, sealing-wax maker, carrier, dealer, restaurant keeper were bound to suffer more or less severely and claim relief or compensation. But the Great War itself introduced such sweeping changes in the internal economy of the State that an event so startling as the suppression of drink could be attempted without danger. To the Tsar's clear perception of these facts and to his high-minded and steadfast resolve Russia owed her greatest asset in the war—temperance.

The drink evil had ever been prominent in Russia. The chronicles of a thousand years earlier recorded the popular predilection for strong beverages. Drink played a fateful part in Russian history, being the direct cause or incentive to rioting and disorder. Normally the mildest of men, the Russian became violent and bloodthirsty under the stimulus of liquor. During the days of serfdom the rural masses could not indulge in unrestrained drunkenness. Afterwards the vice asserted its sway in growing measure as the peasant became independent

* The exchange value of the rouble in normal times is about 9.5 to the £. Roubles may, therefore, be approximately converted into pounds by dividing by 10.

WOMEN WORKING AT THE DOCKS.



M. STURMER,
Who succeeded M. Goremykin in January, 1916, as Premier.

and began to earn more money. The introduction of the vodka monopoly, far from discouraging drunkenness, only provided a cheaper and sounder liquor, which being purchased in bulk was consumed in larger quantities at a time and often in the home, inducing habits of intemperance in the family. Under the old system the women and children had been spared this ordeal. Money becoming more plentiful in the villages as the railways and manufacturing industries extended the field of labour, drink came to play a still larger part in the life of the people. Every domestic event, like a birth, death, or marriage had to be celebrated by an orgy of vodka. Money spent in drink and attendant expenditure must have run away with a third of the household budget.

Incalculable were the moral and material benefits of the change. The villages were unrecognizable. Perfect order and tranquillity prevailed in places where bedlam had reigned, where foul language and fouler acts had been the order of the day. Life and property became secure. Productive capacity increased by at least 30 per cent. Previously people had worked only three or four days a week, the remainder being given up to debauchery. Most, if not all, of the vast sums squandered in drink, which may be computed at anything over a thousand million

THE TSAR AND HIS MINISTERS.

Left to right: Prince Shcherbatoff, Minister of the Interior; Count Ignatieff; M. Sazonoff, Foreign Minister; M. Krivoschein; M. Bark, Minister of Finance; General Janushkevitch; General Polivanoff; Prince Tchakhovskoi; M. Rukhloff; The Grand Duke Nicholas; The Tsar; M. Goremykin; Count Frederics.

roubles per annum,* remained in the hands of peasants and went to swell the savings bank deposits. But adding 30 per cent. to the earnings of the family, in accordance with its increased productivity, another huge sum of something like two thousand million roubles would accrue. The temperance edict thereby assured to Russia an addition to her wealth that would compensate for almost any strain upon her financial resources and credit. But for the purpose immediately at hand—that is, for the victorious outcome of the war, the effect of the edict was such that words cannot describe it. Never had there been a mobilization on so large a scale, yet, excepting for one or two places where the reservists looted the liquor stores,unbroken order and tranquillity prevailed. Had it been possible to purchase vodka every village, every *izba* (hut) would have ruined itself to speed the parting warriors, and we should have had to contemplate an endless series of appalling scenes that would have deeply marred the patriotism and loyalty so sincerely evinced by the nation. The suppression of drink was largely accountable for the wonderful smoothness and rapidity of the Russian mobilization.

There had been a certain amount of temperance activity in Russia for many years, under the auspices partly of the brandy monopoly (a somewhat paradoxical combination) and partly of the Orthodox Church. The sectarians and Old Believers were all rigid teetotallers. They represented a fairly numerous contingent aggregating several millions, and to these should be added the Musulman inhabitants. It may be roughly figured that from twenty to thirty millions of people in Russia were proof against the wiles of strong drink. The temperance movement had therefore a very wide field, embracing much more than a hundred million people. From what has already been said about the extent and evils of drunkenness it is evident that the energies of this movement were far from fruitful. One of the main causes of this non-success must be sought in the unfavourable state of the Church. Its influence had been fast declining during the previous decade. The hierarchy, recruited entirely from the monastic or Black Clergy, had become a part of the bureaucratic machine; while the White, or parochial Clergy, scarce superior in culture to the peasants among whom they worked, found themselves unfitted and unable to cope with the larger requirements arising from the irresistible growth of the village.

But the Russians, in common with other Slav races, were so profoundly imbued with religious faith that, despite these very adverse features of clerical life, there was every indication of a religious revival as soon as the conditions became favourable. Certainly never had deeper religious fervour prevailed in the Russian armies than during the Great War.

It would necessitate a very exhaustive study to present a full account of all the deficiencies of the Russian Church organization. That reforms were necessary became evident as soon as the administration of the country had been placed upon a new basis by the introduction of representative government. One of the crying evils connected with the Church was the tolerance shown towards adventurers, who, under the guise of religion, exercised undue and sometimes dangerous influence in high quarters. One man in particular, a Siberian peasant named Gregory Rasputin, was commonly believed to have made and unmade Ministries and to have decided the fate of important measures. Whatever may have been the exact scope of his responsibility, there can be no doubt that his presence in the precincts of the court gave rise to unanimous disapprobation among all enlightened classes, including representatives of the Government, the whole of the bureaucracy, and officers of the Army and Navy.

In describing the conditions that prevailed in Russia during war time no attempt is made here to deal with military operations, which are fully covered in other chapters. But the record would be far from complete without some account of the manner in which the nation responded to the call to arms, how Russia's armies were prepared, and how they came into the field. Briefly stated, their "peace footing" consisted of 75 divisions, numbering about 1,300,000 men. It was necessary to call up something like half a million men to bring up these units to war strength. On mobilization a reserve division was formed out of parallel regiments for which the cadres had been provided by the active units: in other words the active divisions, numbering when brought to a war footing something like 2,000,000 men,

* The peasants paid much more for vodka than the amount received by the Treasury (about 1,000,000,000 roubles), the difference going to illicit dealers and in extravagant entertainment.

A RELIGIOUS SERVICE ON THE BATTLEFIELD.

were supported by an equal force of reserve formations. Thus, instead of 75 divisions, the Russian Army became composed of 150 or more. But the process of forming reserve regiments and divisions took some time. It was necessary at first to have a sufficient number of active and reserve units to cope with the situation on the Austrian and German frontiers. The task of mobilization involved the transfer, over distances more or less great, of something like 4,000,000 men in addition to the complex task of equipping reservists and providing the new formations with transport and artillery. Germany had a similar task to carry out, but she enjoyed an enormous advantage in her extensive and perfect railway system and her great industrial resources. Moreover, she had been nearly half a century preparing for this war and had chosen the moment most favourable to her in a military and political sense. It was less than 10 years since the war with Japan had almost completely exhausted the war stores that Russia had been a long time assembling along her western frontier.

The deficiencies had been made good during the administration of General Sukhomlinoff.

It may be inferred from certain indications that Russia succeeded in mobilizing the necessary forces within 16 days. Without the abolition of drink such a remarkable result could not have been attained; but, on the other hand, the singular rapidity with which men and units were equipped showed that the nation had responded like one man and that the necessary preparations had been made by the military authorities. It was a case of every man doing his best. A gain of five days on the schedule represented an enormous advantage for Russia. She was thereby enabled immediately to repulse the first advance of the Austrian armies and at the same time to hurl troops into East Prussia. This had an important effect upon the German offensive in France.

During the early stages of the Great War the Russian armies included an appreciable number of volunteers drawn from all classes, among them being many women and children. Thousands of young men belonging to the leisured classes joined the ranks. Public offices were almost deserted, and so were the senior classes of the public schools. In the rush and hurry of departure for the front many boys were smuggled into the trains going to the front, and in the Cossack villages many girls accompanied their brothers, or even acted as their substitutes. Later the authorities succeeded in excluding volunteers of too tender an age and sex, but meanwhile many heroic deeds had been accomplished by children and women.

Russia's practically inexhaustible resources of human material were never for an instant open to doubt; her potential strength in other directions was also fully recognized, but the capacity of her finances to respond to immediate calls upon them was less a matter of common knowledge. At the outbreak of hostilities the free balance of the State Treasury exceeded 500,000,000 roubles (£53,000,000), some of which was deposited in foreign banks, for the most part French and English. The gold reserve fund of the State Bank amounted to 1,744,000,000 roubles, with a paper currency aggregating 1,630,000,000 roubles. The revenue receipts for the first half of 1914 showed an increase of 155,000,000 roubles compared with the corresponding period of 1913. Russian financial experts have expressed the opinion that, on the basis of the above showing, Russia might have borne the burden of war for some time without recourse to increased taxation had it not been for the heroic decision to forego the drink revenue, whereby at a single stroke the Treasury was deprived of a net income exceeding 650,000,000 roubles per annum. Failing this souree of revenue, the Finance Department was forced to resort to an increase of existing taxes and the introduction of new taxes in order to balance the Budget. Almost all direct and indirect taxes were raised; customs and stamp duties, postal and telegraph rates were appreciably increased. An assessment per poud was levied on nearly all goods carried by rail and water; new taxes were imposed on telephones and raw cotton, and a personal income-tax was introduced. The liquor excise, in so far as the sale of intoxicants was permitted under certain restrictions, was also increased.

But the financial, as well as the military, task confronting Russia was so stupendous as to necessitate a series of extraordinary measures for the discovery of ways and means. A brief summary of the fiscal demands entailed by the war will help to explain and justify the subsequent course of M. Bark's policy in this regard. According to the figures submitted to the Duma by the Minister of Finance, from the commencement of the war till January 1, 1916, Russia expended on military needs approximately 10,588,000,000 roubles. At the beginning of the war the daily expenditure was 8,000.000 roubles, but by tho end of 1915 it had reached 31,000,000 roubles.

BLESSING A FIELD HOSPITAL AT PETROGRAD.
A priest blessing a British ambulance with holy water.

M. RODZIANKO.
President of the Duma.

To cover these unprecedented outlays was, of course, beyond the limits of ordinary State revenue and called for recourse to State credit. Russia, for the first time in her history, awoke to the enormous untapped resources of the domestic money market. By the end of 1915 the Government succeeded in raising within the country three long-term loans to the amount of 2,000,000,000 roubles, and one loan for ten years to the amount of 1,000,000,000 roubles; while in the spring of 1916 a further domestic loan for 2,000,000,000 roubles was issued. To the above sums, not counting the last-named issue, must be added the proceeds of Exchequer Bills circulated within the country to the amount of 708,400,000 roubles, and the discount of short-term bonds on the open market amounting to 1,006,000,000 roubles. Thus for a year and a half of war Russia managed to draw from the internal pecuniary resources of the country more than 4,500,000,000 roubles. leaving 6,000,000,000 accountable to other credit sources, including the sums obtained from her Allies.

An incidental but gratifying aspect of Russia's domestic loan policy was its educational value for the peasant masses. The financial authorities were well aware of the huge stores of wealth pent up in town, village, and hamlet throughout the length and breadth of the Empire. Striking proof of the capacity of the masses for a share in these national obligations was afforded by the growth of popular savings as shown by bank deposits. In nineteen months from the beginning of the war deposits in credit institutions increased by more than 3,500,000,000 roubles. indicating an average growth of 185,000,000 roubles monthly. In the State Bank the growth of deposits for 18 months amounted to 854,600,000 roubles; in private banks of short-term credit to 1,419,400,000 roubles; and in small credit institutions to more than 65,000,000 roubles. The rate of increase in the State savings banks was from 1,874,000 roubles for January, 1914, to 119,000,000 roubles for that month in 1916. The total deposits at the State savings banks on May 1, 1916, aggregated 3,714,000,000 roubles. The task before Russian statesmen was to turn this vast stream of wealth into the channel best calculated to lead to victory. Hence these domestic loan bonds, contrary to the previous practice, were issued for smaller denominations, which brought them well within the reach of the most modest purse. In addition, special means were adopted to facilitate subscription to the loan in the most remote and out-of-the-way country districts. This policy was abundantly vindicated by brilliant results, and through the travail of war was born a wider national consciousness of the individual citizen's duty to the State.

But besides loans in the strict sense of the word, Russia, like the other belligerents, was obliged to have recourse to the increased issue of paper money to cover war expenditure. On

the eve of the struggle the amount of credit notes in circulation was 1,630.000,000 roubles; by January 1, 1915, this figure had grown to 3,031,000,000 roubles; and by May 1, 1916, to 6,213,000,000 roubles. An analogous extraordinary measure evoked by the disappearance of silver and copper coins from circulation was the issue of stamps and paper notes for amounts up to 50 kopeks.

The outstanding feature of Russia's foreign financial relations was the adoption by the Allies of the same principle of mutual support as had been accepted in the purely military and political domain for the promotion of the common cause. Brief experience sufficed to show the difficulty under the abnormal conditions of exchange and settlement that had arisen, of effecting long-term loans on the foreign market, and, though Russia obtained accommodation in the form of short-term issues on the London market and other operations of a similar character, an agreement was eventually arrived at between Great Britain and France on the one hand, and Russia on the other, whereby the former Powers undertook to cover Russia's expenditures on account of foreign orders for war materials and her payments on account of State and municipal loans. Thus the entire complicated and confused system of foreign settlements, disturbed by the war, was replaced by a simple, clear, and mutually advantageous agreement. Russia, on her part, pledged herself in case of necessity to help the Allied Governments in the task of strengthening the rates of exchange with her gold, on the security of short-term bonds of the Allied States, on the understanding, however, that these demands should be restricted to the utmost. No small share of the credit for the successful conclusion of the above agreement was due to the Russian Minister of Finance, M. Bark, who made two trips abroad for the personal conduct of negotiations in this connexion.

One of the immediate consequences of the war peculiarly detrimental to Russia's economic position was the closing of the Baltic Sea route for foreign trade, followed later by the loss of the Black Sea outlet on the adhesion of Turkey to the Central Powers and the consequent closing of the Dardanelles. The influence

LAND AND SEA ROUTES TO NORTHERN RUSSIA.



THE IMPERIAL DUMA AT PETROGRAD.

exereised by the loss of these routes was not slow to manifest itself in a sharp deeline of the figures both for export and import. For the first nine months of 1915, as eompared with the eorresponding period of 1914, the falling-off under exports amounted to 639,061,000 roubles, and under imports to 367,472,000 roubles, while the exeess of imports over exports amounted to 271,589,000 roubles. In this emergeney the eyes of all Russia turned longingly towards the hitherto despised and negleeted Arctic, as the only praetieal oeean outlet available, with the exeeption of the distant Paeifie at Vladivostok, whieh also acquired immensely inereased importanee as the war proeeeded.

On the White Sea the nearest port, Arehangel, had hitherto failed to attract a large quantity of freight through a variety of drawbaeks, among whieh were laek of broad-gauge eonnexion with the main railway system of the Empire, the neeessity for transhipment of goods at Kotlas, owing to the freezing of the Northern Dvina and its unsuitability for navigation during a large part of the year; and radieal inherent defects in the equipment of Archangel itself for the needs of an up-to-date port. The only link eonneeting this port with the main railway network of the Empire was the narrow-gauge Vologda-Arehangel line, built in 1897-8. Somewhat to the east of it another line struek the bend of the Northern Dvina at the hamlet of Kotlas. This was the Perm-Kotlas Railway, designed to eonvey freight from the Urals to Arehangel.

The limitations of Arehangel had long been recognized, and as far back as 1895 the projeet was mooted of eonstrueting a line to an iee-free port on the shores of the Aretie Oeean in order to realize Russia's traditional dream of aceess to the open sea. Amid the swamps and virgin forests on the other side of the Polar Cirele, immersed for six months of the year in absolute darkness, lies Katherina Harbour, almost on the frontiers of Norway. Thanks to the benefieent influenee of the Gulf Stream, the waters of the bay never freeze, and for this reason Russian engineers finally deeided upon the town of Kola, situated on Katherina Bay, as the terminal point of a new line from Petrograd. The eonstruetion of the Murman Railway, as this line was ealled, was attended by stupendous diffieulties, both teehnieal and elimatie. At the same time the Government set about eonverting the Arehangel Railway

RUSSIA'S PARLIAMENT: A SITTING OF THE IMPERIAL DUMA.

MEMBERS OF THE RUSSIAN DUMA WHO VISITED ENGLAND IN 1916.
Left to right: M. V. T. Demchenko, M. Ichass, Count Olsufieff, M. A. Oznobishin, Dr. Andrew Shingareff, Colonel Bois Engelhardt, M. S. Skadovski, Professor A. Vassilieff, M. A. D. Protopopoff, Professor Paul Miliukoff, M. V. Gourko, M. A. Radkevitch.

into a broad-gauge road, the plan being to have the work completed by the end of 916.

The immense impulse given to import through Vladivostok as the result of the loss of the Baltic and Black Sea outlets will be seen from the following comparative figures: In 1914 the total value of imports at Vladivostok was only 29,144,000 roubles, whereas in 1915 it amounted to 301,094,000 roubles, of which Japan's share was 113,481,000 roubles, the United States' 106,070,000 roubles, Great Britain's 54,192,000 roubles, and China's 20,550,000 roubles.

The sharp dislocation in Russia's trade balance, involving a disproportionate increase of imports over exports and a correspondingly augmented demand for foreign currency, naturally had the effect of depreciating the rouble quotation, to remedy which an agreement was entered into with the Bank of England and the Banque de France whereby means were provided for the liquidation of the previous indebtedness of Russian trade and industry in England and France, while the credits opened for Russia on the Paris and London markets were utilized not only to meet the State's needs, but also as a method of satisfying the demands for means of payment on the part of Russian trade and industry. A special exchange chancery was established in the Ministry of Finance where for all legitimate purposes foreign currency could be procured at a minimum rate.

For purposes of private travel the war virtually reduced communication between Russia and Western Europe to the Scandinavian route through Norway and Sweden. For commercial purposes the exchange of goods between Russia and Scandinavia, formerly carried on by sea, during the war found a route *via* Karungi in Sweden and Karunki in Finland. A new line was built on the Finnish side of the river Tornea linking Tornea with Karunki, and a Swedish railway to connect Karungi with Haparanda.

For the first seven months of 1915 exports of food supplies to Finland rose to 39,400,000 roubles against 15,900,000 roubles for the same period in 1914, and exports of raw and semi-manufactured materials increased from 5,600,000 roubles to 21,600,000 roubles. The exports of cereals rose from 9 to 24 million roubles. Imports into Russia through Finland for the same term amounted to 106,000,000 roubles, or almost three times as much as the figures for the corresponding period of the previous year. In particular imports from England in 1915 showed scarcely any decline, amounting to 85,000,000 roubles through the European customs as against 105,000,000 roubles for the first seven months of 1914

while if imports through Vladivostok are added, the difference entirely disappears.

The extent to which Russia before the war had depended upon Germany and the German middleman for the satisfaction of the larger proportion of her material needs is referred to in some detail elsewhere. The abrupt stoppage of German imports, though it naturally gave rise to grave embarrassment at the outset, was after all a blessing in disguise, since inevitably it tended to throw the country back upon its own internal resources, when it did not lead to the greater stimulation of commercial intercourse with the allied and friendly States, more particularly Great Britain, Japan and the United States.

A marked impetus was given to the establishment of home industries for the manufacture of many staples which had previously come from Germany. In an article contributed to *The Times Russian Supplement* for January, 1915, Mr. A. J. Chambers, Assistant Superintendent of the Department of Industry, wrote:

By the end of August (1914) not only was no further diminution of production observable, but, on the contrary, with the declaration of war the mills again began to increase their activity, while the number of enterprises that had curtailed work up to October 14 represented only 12 per cent. and the suspended enterprises only 3·3 per cent. of the total number of mills and factories.

Shortage of labour in many cases was due to the calling up of reservists, but frequently this disadvantage was largely counterbalanced by the increased intensity of production arising from the influence of temperance, which minimized the number of idle days previously caused by drunkenness among workmen.

Incidentally it may be remarked that the mobilization of industry, originally inspired by the urgent military needs of the country, thanks to the valuable training it afforded in habits of order and organization, paved the way for greater economic efficiency after the war, and hence for vastly increased development of Russia's trade and manufactures.

A movement which played an important part in connexion with this economic mobilization was that of the cooperative societies. They succoured refugees, cared for the families of reservists, supplied the population and Army with food products, and provided clothing and munitions for the forces. The cooperative movement had now reached the village—the centre of all public life. Upon the societies the Zemstvo relied in its undertakings; to the societies the State appealed when it wished to summon the people to the task of State defence; and the societies in the villages were the most energetic vehicles of cultural enterprises.

WAR WORK AT A MONASTERY.
Russian nuns preparing bandages for the army.

Russia's great asset in the war was undoubtedly her inherently inexhaustible food production, which should properly have proved equal to any strain imposed upon it. Unfortunately, owing to want of organization and the more sinister manifestations of speculative activity among all classes of the population, this natural advantage was gravely discounted early in the struggle. The artificial demand for supplies of all descriptions created by the Army also served to stimulate the rise in prices. The country was less adversely affected by this phenomenon than the town; indeed, the peasantry were not slow to avail themselves of the opportunity thus afforded for extra profits, and frequently concealed vast quantities of grain and other agricultural products in order to command high prices. The congestion of the railways, due partly to military causes and partly to wholesale corruption prevalent among railway officials—who deliberately held up goods *en route* to suit their own purposes, exacting heavy bribes to expedite transport—led to sporadic shortages of many of the principal necessaries of life, including fuel.

"Crises" in almost every branch of the human dietary figured daily in the Press; and in Petrograd, Moscow, and other cities, such staples were doled out in small quantities, at fixed hours, to endless queues of men, women, and children, who, during the exceptionally severe winter of 1915–16, suffered no little hardship on this account. It was in vain that the prefectural authorities sought to regulate prices. Unscrupulous dealers, acting in collusion, had a very simple method of countering all such well-meant efforts. The moment the price of a particular commodity was fixed at a lower rate than that at which the dealers felt disposed to sell, it promptly disappeared from the market as if by magic, and the only means whereby its resurrection could be achieved was submission to private dictation on the part of the dealers. In several cases speculators and forestallers on a large scale were arrested, but the abuse clung tenaciously to life, and was responsible for

RUSSIAN RED CROSS NURSES,
Who tended the wounded Serbians at Nish.

WITH THE RUSSIAN ARMY.

An American doctor and his staff at a dressing station.

wholly unnecessary misery and privation, mainly among the urban masses. The average rise in prices since the spring of 1916 was officially reported to be 56·7 per cent., but in the case of many individual staples the increment was as high as a hundred and even two hundred per cent.

Though dishonesty and speculation accounted for no small part of the ills to which the country was subjected, a fundamentally serious situation was created by a decline in the cattle capital stock of the country amounting to some 25 per cent. as the result of military requirements, and a reduction in the area under tillage from 242,000,000 acres in 1913 to 216,000,000 acres in 1915, concurrently with which the crop of the principal cereals in 1915 showed a deficit of about 78,000,000 tons. On the other hand, according to M. Naumoff's statement to the Duma on March 3, 1915, almost the entire production of cereals destined for export since the outbreak of the war—about 11,000,000 tons—remained in the country. The annual demand of the Army and population was approximately 48.000,000 tons. Russia, he affirmed, possessed one-third of the annual demand in reserve to counterbalance the temporary reduction of the area under tillage. Enormous stocks of grain existed in Western Siberia ; in Akmolinsk, for example, there were stocks sufficient to provide European Russia with a two-years' supply, but improved railway transport was necessary before these resources could be rendered available. To meet the crisis arising from the reduction in the area under tillage the agricultural authorities proposed to make extensive use of prisoners of war, refugees, soldiers, and, within specified geographical limits, Korean and Chinese labour, while to remedy the meat crisis the Duma adopted a Bill providing for four fast days per week, on which no meat should be sold or served in restaurants, and on which all abattoirs should be closed.

The battle of the Dunajec was decided within the first week of May, 1915. On the 14th *The Times* Military Correspondent revealed the fact that the lack of success on the Western front had been due to the want of an unlimited supply of high explosives. These fateful words marked the

ONE OF RUSSIA'S MANY WOMEN SOLDIERS.

She is wearing the cross of St. George awarded for bravery.

starting-point of a new epoch in the war. To Great Britain they were a sad commentary upon the neglect of her unrivalled industrial resources which, had they been turned to proper account earlier, would have hastened victory. To Russia they meant much more. Industries in that country were still in an undeveloped state, and it was all the more necessary that they should have been prepared to bear the strain of modern warfare with its enormous expenditure of munitions.

The Russian nation had known nothing about the shortage of shells except from ominous references in the tales of the wounded to the silence of the Russian guns, a silence which was costing so many valuable lives. From London the cry of "more shells" was immediately re-echoed in Moscow. A representative gathering of manufacturers met in that city within a week of the appearance of *The Times* article, and the mobilization of all Russian industries for the war was thenceforth merely a matter of time. As the magnitude of the task became apparent, local committees, acting in concert with the central organization, quickly sprang into existence. These bodies all worked in connexion with the specially created committee on munitions which included representatives of all the ministries concerned.

When war broke out there were only two munition factories in Russia, each turning out 25,000 shells per month. Within a year the number of works had increased a hundredfold, and the output aggregated 1,250,000. Although cumbersome in some respects, and attended by waste of time and energy, the committee system gave satisfactory results on the whole, and it afforded an opportunity for public opinion to satisfy itself as to the progress of munition work.

A movement was eventually set on foot to include representatives of the working men on the public committees. M. Goremykin had been far from willing to permit representatives of the two Houses to sit on the committee. The admission of representatives of the workmen was categorically declined. Unhappily this question touched upon a sore point of Russian internal politics—namely, the police methods of dealing with the labour question. While the Department of Commerce and Industry had been for years devising ways and means to enable the working men to organize themselves on a non-political basis, and thereby to safeguard their interests from political adventurers and agitators, the police invariably defeated these ends by interfering with any and every labour organization, and arresting the men's delegates. It speaks well for the patriotism of the Russian working men that they stuck to their work and turned out the munitions plentifully. The cases of shrapnel and high explosive which reached the Front bearing inscriptions from the workers—"Don't spare them, there are plenty more," contributed much to raising the spirits of the Russian Army after the terrible ordeal of the great retreat.

Although the internal output had been so greatly increased, it was still far below the requirements of the Army. Huge orders were placed in France, England, and particularly the United States. The centralization and distribution of these orders necessitated the creation of an Anglo-Russian commission in London with branches in New York and Paris. Immense quantities of raw material had subsequently to be transported across the Pacific and Arctic Oceans to Vladivostok and Archangel respectively. This task was not the least important of the many duties that devolved upon the British Navy and merchant service,

and with a view to preventing any wasteful expenditure of tonnage, it was decided that all the available Russian merchant ships should be placed under the orders of the British Admiralty. This somewhat onerous measure was cheerfully submitted to in the hope that later on British mercantile enterprise would invigorate Russian shipping.

Japan had early in the war made offers to Russia to supply her with all the munitions that she could produce. The Russian military authorities were offered the benefit of all the Japanese experience obtained during the war with Russia. General Sukhomlinoff accepted these offers at a later period. Japan immediately mobilized all her industries and delivered all the munitions that she undertook to supply expeditiously and cheaply.

The extent of Russia's military requirements from abroad unhappily contributed to an unprecedented development of the "graft" system. Bribes, "commissions," and speculation in huge army contracts suddenly placed enormous sums of money in the hands of comparatively obscure persons. This fact was largely responsible for the unseemly dissipation and luxury that were so flauntingly displayed in Petrograd, Moscow, and other large cities during the Great War. Casual visitors were often misled by these appearances. The heart of Russia was sound. There was little in common between Petrograd and the provinces.

Geographical proximity from the first had favoured close intercourse between Russia and Germany. It was, therefore, in no sense surprising that, when searching for models and instructors in Western "culture," Russian reformers, from Peter the Great downward, should have looked to their next-door neighbour, whose material and intellectual achievements seemed to qualify her for the rôle of mentor. Nor is it any more astonishing that Germany should have eagerly responded to this appeal for guidance and direction, or that in return she should have sought concrete compensations in the form of commercial, industrial, and even agrarian privileges. Russia was speedily overrun by German commercial travellers, and largely settled by German colonists, wholesale and retail traders, who throve amazingly in their new habitat. Supported secretly by the Government and openly by a magnificently organized banking system, these "economic" emissaries were soon enabled

THE TSAR'S WINTER PALACE AS RED CROSS HOSPITAL.
Girls making respirators in the entrance hall of the Imperial Palace.

THE GREAT GATHERING OF PEOPLE IN FRONT OF THE KAZAN CATHEDRAL, PETROGRAD.
Offering up prayers for Russian victory.

to outdistance the majority of their competitors, both native and foreign, and to secure virtual monopolies, which finally reduced Russia to a position of economic dependence upon Germany.

This dependence assumed the form, first, of consumption of German products within the country, and, secondly, of recourse almost solely to the German intermediary in trade in products not of German origin. The Moscow Mercantile Association collected exhaustive data designed to demonstrate the extent of this economic dependence, from which it appeared that Germany before the war had vested interests in no fewer than 1,300 separate lines and staples. Germans held undisputed control over the chemical and pharmaceutical industry in various regions of Russia, wire nails, machinery, textiles, insurance, and transport, steamship and building enterprises, sawmills, cotton-mills, mines, universal stores, hotels, rubber manufacture, not to mention such essentially German activities as brewing and electrical engineering. Not infrequently German enterprises gained a foothold by masquerading in French or Belgian colours.

In addition to the natural effects of personal "push," capacity, and enterprise, and the maximum exploitation of the resources of "publicity," Germany was tremendously aided in her campaign of peaceful penetration by the large number of Germanic residents and colonists in Russia, who, thanks to the convenient German law of dual nationality, were German and Russian subjects at one and the same time, but whose congenital gravitation towards the Fatherland rendered them useful instruments for the promotion of German interests. The Baltic Provinces, settled by German Russians almost as far as the capital of the Empire, also formed a hotbed for the cultivation of German predominance, while the Jewish element, among whom the German language is widespread, possessing ties of kindred and business with German Jews, in its turn served as a link between the markets of the two countries.

Up to a certain point, no doubt, this exercise of Germanic influence was perfectly legitimate, nor would any fair-minded Russian publicist have stated that Russo-German intercourse had, from the first, been productive solely of evil for Russia. In both the material and intellectual spheres Germany could teach a great deal, and having regard to the unique advantages of her situation, it would have been manifestly unreasonable to expect her to abstain from persistent efforts to gain for herself a preferential position in a virgin field. It might not be easy to define the precise line of demarcation between the legitimate use and the abuse of a preferential position, but when the war broke out authentic revelations of the methods pursued by Teutonic agents for the furtherance of their political and economic aims in Russia were of such a character as to facilitate greatly the task of making such a definition. As M. Khvostoff, Minister of the Interior, showed before the Duma, the spirit of world domination which had permeated all classes of the German nation since the accession of William II. was, from the beginning, specially directed to this subjugation of Russia, which offered exceptional plastic raw material for the purpose.

As the sequel, moreover, proved, what at the outset was a perfectly lawful advantage accruing to superior ability and energy, was eventually prostituted to the nefarious objects of political intrigue and military espionage. The capture of Russian industrial and commercial concerns was ingeniously utilized by a powerful spy organization which, when the war broke out, diligently fomented strikes and labour troubles. The colonies of German settlers, originally perhaps purely agricultural undertakings, were so manipulated by German Government and military agents as to command strategic points, particularly near Russian fortresses. The lands of Russian peasants were purchased wholesale by German syndicates, which peopled them with Germans, and in some of the provinces thus colonized the Germans gained decisive influence over the Zemstvos. Many Russian firms were also compelled to sell their business to German syndicates which had chosen Russia as a field of operation, and were unified under the leadership of the Berlin Deutsche Bank. Thanks to the whip-hand thus gained, the Germans were able to achieve political and military aims through agreements entered into between these ostensible "Russian" firms and foreign and Russian shipbuilding works, pledging these latter not to accept contracts for Russian warships unless they could be sure of a profit of 100 per cent. Similar machinations were set on foot to control gun and munition factories, and so retard the execution of Russian Government orders.

A volume could be devoted, and more than one has been so devoted, to an account of the anomalous position of the Baltic Provinces Germans, more especially the so-called "barons" whose names bulk so largely in Russian official and diplomatic life. The subject has been thoroughly discussed in Chapter LXXXIII., Vol. V. Though constituting less than 7 per cent. of the total population of those provinces, and in the country districts scarcely 1 per cent., this German element, thanks to its hereditary privileges, often of a purely feudal nature, had acquired a wholly disproportionate influence in the direction of local affairs. The value of these privileges was estimated at many millions of roubles annually.

Action was at length taken, and the Government in March, 1915, appointed a special commission to draft a law for the abolition of special privileges enjoyed by the German barons in the Baltic Provinces. The repeal of privileges fundamentally at variance with the general legislation of the Empire was highly desirable, but these privileges were often so inextricably bound up with the rights of private contract protected by law, that the Government had to move cautiously before committing itself to a concrete measure.

Against avowedly enemy subjects prompt steps were taken. On the outbreak of hostilities all rights and privileges granted to subjects of enemy States by special conventions automatically lapsed, but the powers of legislation were further invoked to prohibit the acquisition and possession of immovable property, not only by individual enemy subjects, but by joint-stock companies and partnerships allowed to operate in Russia, and Russian partnerships if they included subjects of enemy States. Numerous restrictions were likewise imposed on their right to engage in trade and industry. Still more interesting, read in conjunction with what has been said about the baneful influence of German colonization, was a law discontinuing German and Austrian landownership in ex-urban regions of the twenty-five provinces adjacent to the Baltic, Black, and Azov Seas, where the disability extended to Germans naturalized as Russian subjects and their descendants who had acquired immovable property later than June 14, 1870, the date when, significantly enough, Germany promulgated her law of dual citizenship.

The map reproduced on page 223 originally appeared in the *St. Petersburger Zeitung* during 1906. It shows the density of German population and German colonization in Russia. From the Prussian frontier and Poland, German "peaceful penetration" eastward was proceeding "like an avalanche," and it will be seen that it was particularly powerful along the strategic lines to the north-east and south-east.

The war at length fully roused the Russian people to the perils lurking in German domination, and created a resolve to eradicate the canker at its roots. Nevertheless, by the irony of fate, the interest of many Germans in the Russian market was actually stimulated by the war. Thousands and tens of thousands of German prisoners, the bulk of whom were interned in Siberia, set themselves the task of learning Russian and of studying the country as a field for commercial and industrial activity

M. KRIVOSHEIN.
Former Minister of Agriculture.

M. GOREMYKIN.
Russian Premier until January, 1916.

PRINCE ALEXANDER OF OLDENBURG.
Head of the Russian Sanitary Department.



MAP SHOWING DENSITY OF GERMAN POPULATION IN RUSSIA.

after the war. So great was the demand for Russian text-books that local supplies were speedily exhausted and fresh consignments had to be imported from Leipzig. Many of these prisoners patiently awaited the end of the war in order to put the knowledge thus acquired to practical use and establish lasting business connexions with a land of unlimited opportunities.

Regarding the general position of war prisoners in Russia, the fact should not be overlooked that whereas in other countries prisoners were interned in concentration camps or fortresses, this method could not very well be adopted in Russia owing to the sparse population, and also because a very large proportion of the prisoners were Slavs by descent and had, in many cases, surrendered voluntarily. It would, therefore, have been at variance with the policy of the State and the wishes of the people that they should be treated with rigour. For these reasons German prisoners proper were sent to remote provinces, while the Austrian-Slavs remained in European Russia, distributed chiefly among the agricultural regions of the south, where they found lucrative employment. There was practically no difference established in the treatment of interned non-combatants and prisoners taken on the field of battle. The majority of these war prisoners were not compelled to live under conditions more onerous than those to which the local inhabitants were exposed.

When the war broke out the Russian military authorities at once recognized the importance of precautionary measures to safeguard military secrets from the ubiquitous curiosity of German agents who were strongly suspected to be numerous among the millions of Germans scattered over the country, and in no other country affected by the war was the censorship applied with so

A CAMP FOR PRISONERS OF WAR IN SIBERIA.

much rigour. Nevertheless, it was subsequently shown by overwhelming testimony that the Germans were frequently informed of all Russian military movements. Placards were often displayed in the German trenches notifying the Russians opposite that they were about to be moved elsewhere, and correctly defining the time and place of the contemplated change.

The German espionage system as practised in Russia bore a general family resemblance to the procedure adopted in other countries, notably France and England.

The presence of German agents in mills and factories, both before and since the war began, is a well-established fact, and their share in instigating strikes, fomenting discontent among the workmen, and retarding production generally, especially of munitions, also leaves little room for doubt. It has also been claimed that Russo-German managers of munition factories assisted the enemy by scrapping shells and other munition products for perfectly trivial, if not non-existent, defects, which could in no wise detract from their practical utility. Some, if not all, of the explosions that occurred in powder and munition works during the war were traced to German machinations. In May, 1915, the large powder mills at Okhta, a suburb of Petrograd, were the scene of a terrible explosion, which wrecked the buildings where nitro-glycerine was manufactured and killed several hundred workmen. This catastrophe was attributed to German hands, but the suspicion was never satisfactorily proved. Far greater anxiety was caused by explosions at several powder magazines at Kronstadt in April, 1916, as in these cases there was good reason to suspect that they were of sinister origin.

The gathering suspicion aroused by the size and influence of the German elements in Russia reacted very painfully against the Jews, especially in Poland, where the Russian troops undoubtedly found palpable evidence of treachery on the part of the Jews inhabiting the frontier districts, such as subterranean telephones connected with the enemy's positions. Soon, therefore, it came to be generally believed in the Army that the Jews were not to be trusted.

Suspicions of this kind completely vanished wherever the scene of operations shifted from the original borderlands. There was never any doubt about the loyalty of the Jewish population in the interior, and in spite of their well-known disinclination for military service many Jews made excellent soldiers. The eminently loyal behaviour of the Russian Jews at the outbreak of the war was bound to be recalled in after days and to help to solve the much-vexed Jewish question. The war itself by displacing old boundaries involved sweeping departures from the system which confined the legal right of residence for Jews to certain districts. Many Jewish refugees were sent far inland beyond the Pale. It was felt at the time that it would be impossible to compel them to return westward when the war was over.

It was not enough that the Russian civil and military authorities should have had to make headway against the formidable handicap imposed upon them by the intricate organization of alien espionage. That task was still

further complicated by the far more repulsive phenomenon of domestic treachery, which ultimately focussed into the celebrated Miasoyedoff affair. Before the war Colonel Miasoyedoff was in the gendarmerie corps and became well known to all travellers to Russia as an official in charge of the police arrangements at the frontier station of Wierzhbolowo. He fell into disgrace on account of some frauds against the Russian Customs, and was relieved from further active employment. Within a few months after the outbreak of hostilities he applied for leave to rejoin the Army. His application was granted, and he was attached to the staff of the Tenth Army then holding Eydtkuhnen, the scene of his previous labours. He discharged the duties of censor and intelligence officer, which, of course, gave him admirable opportunities for supplying information to the enemy. There is good reason to believe that the Germans owe to him some of their success in the drive which led to the second retreat of the Russian Army from East Prussia. Miasoyedoff was tried and, together with two of his accomplices, executed, while a number of others were sentenced to various terms of hard labour.

Repeated disclosures of German intrigue, the effect of which was not in any wise lessened by rumour and surmise, at length bore unpalatable fruit in the shape of outbreaks of mob violence, ostensibly directed against the German element, but not infrequently manipulated by underground forces against perfectly innocent persons. Popular excitement on a really serious scale began at Moscow on June 8, 1915, when crowds of women, for the most part wives of reservists, appeared before the Committee for the distribution of Government work and became unruly on the false pretext that a large contract had been given to a German firm. Wild reports were later circulated of wholesale mysterious gastric troubles among employees of the Prokhorovsky Mill, said to be due to the poisoning of artesian wells by the Germans, and in their wake mobs of workmen, women, and children visited the local factories with a demand for the summary discharge of all German officials and employees.

The first tragedy occurred at the premises of Emil Zindel and Co. In response to a demand for admission the manager of the mill, G. G. Karlsen, ordered the gates to be closed, whereupon the infuriated mob burst into the yard

PRISONERS OF WAR IN SIBERIA.
Austrian prisoners and their laundry outside a hut in the prison camp.

ADVERTISEMENT FOR THE 5½ PER CENT. WAR LOAN.

and lynched the unfortunate Karlsen. A similar tragedy was enacted at the Shrader mill. On the morning of June 10 the disturbances assumed a wholesale character, and mills and factories at Danilov, the Simeonovsky settlement, Zamoskvorechie, etc., suffered badly.

In due course the riots developed from a more or less coherent manifestation of anti-German sentiment into an orgy of lawlessness pure and simple, in no small degree stimulated by liquor, of which the crowd had gained possession. The more central quarters of the city became involved, and in the chaos that ensued not only Germans but numbers of Russians and subjects of friendly States were exposed to mob violence. Crowds assembled at the Borovitzkiya gate of the Kremlin, and being reinforced by contingents from the outskirts of the city, proceeded to wreck and loot shops and other commercial establishments in the neighbourhood. Towards nightfall fires began to break out, which continued throughout the following day and were with difficulty extinguished by evening on June 12.

A partial list of the damage sustained included 475 commercial undertakings wrecked: 207 flats and houses wrecked, looted, and burnt; and total financial losses amounting to more than 40,000,000 roubles, not including valuable paper securities. Among the personal casualties were 113 Austrian and German subjects; 489 Russians with foreign names and foreign subjects of friendly States; and 90 Russians with Russian names. Similar disturbances occurred at some other provincial towns, on a far less serious scale.

The riots had one good result. They led to the dismissal of the Home Secretary, M. Maklakoff (a reactionary brother of the Liberal Deputy), who had long been most unpopular on account of his opposition to the Duma.

In addition to the inevitable evils inseparable from the conduct of even the most successful war, Russia, as the result of the forced evacuation of Poland, Lithuania, the Baltic Provinces, and Galicia, was called upon to shoulder unforeseen burdens which the other allied belligerents, with the exception of Belgium and Serbia, were happily spared, or experienced upon a small scale.

The problem of succouring the vast mob of hungry fugitives, old men, women, and children, gravely embarrassed the Russian authorities at a time when it was vital that all efforts should be concentrated on the work of beating the enemy in the field. The number of refugees for whose destiny the Russian Government had to assume responsibility is variously estimated at from 2,600,000 to 3,000,000, the latter figure being the estimate of M. Naumoff, the Minister of Agriculture. This veritable exodus of nations before the then irresistible advance of the Teuton legions entailed sufferings more terrible in their way than those to which actual combatants were subjected, because the victims for the most part were the old and the weak, incapable of offering the smallest resistance to a ruthless foe.

Russian and foreign writers have not been lacking who have attempted to tell the story of this world tragedy—of the harrowing scenes witnessed along the main channels of civilian evacuation, where, amid the rigours of a northern autumn, hundreds and thousands must have perished from hunger and exposure. These conditions applied more especially to the refugees from Poland, Lithuania, and the Baltic Provinces. In the case of the evacuation of Jews and peasants from Galicia, the hardships endured, though serious enough, were less terrible, because there had been more leisure for organization, and the Russian

military and civilian authorities in occupation of the conquered Austrian territory were better able to cope with the undertaking. Thus these thousands of unfortunate fugitives, fleeing before the Austro-German advance, were passed along through the lines of the Russian Army with far greater semblance of order than had proved possible in the case of the abandonment of Poland, though it goes without saying that the gigantic supplementary labour thus imposed upon the Army on the Galician front taxed its resources to the utmost and aggravated the peril of a situation sufficiently grave at best.

In the stupendous labour of succouring these unfortunates, the members of the Imperial Family played a leading part, setting an example of devotion and self-sacrifice which was not lost upon the rank and file. Irrespective of measures adopted by the Government, as far back as September, 1914, the Tsar sanctioned the establishment of a special Committee for the extension of aid to war sufferers, of which the Grand Duchess Tatiana Nikolaevna was appointed Honorary President, and M. A. Neydhart, a member of the Imperial Council, was chosen President.

In connexion with the work of relief generally splendid service was rendered by Her Majesty, the Empress Marie, as the moving spirit of the great Russian Red Cross Association, and the Grand Duchess Olga Alexandrovna, sister of the Tsar, the Grand Duchesses Olga and Tatiana, daughters of the Tsar, the Grand Duchess Elizabeth Feodorovna, the young Empress's elder sister, and the Grand Duchess Marie Pavlovna, younger sister of the Grand Duke Dmitri Pavlovitch, all of whom volunteered as sisters of mercy. Among other official organizations of later date, that under the superintendence of S. I. Zubchaninov, member of the Imperial Council, did admirable service in helping refugees of the north-western front.

For dealing with alimentation, points were organized at regular intervals where a cold ration was provided to last for a week, and where medical help was furnished, while at other places camp kitchens supplied the population with hot food. The business of feeding the population near the front was attended by exceptional difficulty, because owing to the requisition of horses and the shortage of forage there was a dearth of the means of conveyance. Here the splendid Zemstvo and

EXHIBITION OF BRITISH RECRUITING POSTERS IN RUSSIA.

urban relief organizations rendered inestimable service.

Another undesirable outcome of these forced migrations was the large addition involved to the population of cities in the rear, notably Petrograd, Moscow, Kiev, Samara and Saratov. On the average this addition represented a proportion of about 8·82 per cent. of the regular population, though in some cases, of course, it was far more considerable. Naturally, this unforeseen influx had a great deal to do with

A WOMAN MUNITION WORKER.

the depletion of food and fuel supplies, the shortage of dwelling accommodation, and the consequent unprecedented rise in prices and rent.

As in the case of civilian refugees, so as regards sick and wounded soldiers and care for their dependants, the members of the Imperial Family were conspicuously active. At the head of the organization which undertook the care of soldiers' families was the Empress Alexandra Feodorovna, as President of the High Council formed specially for this purpose; at the head of the Red Cross was the Empress Marie Feodorovna, while other members of the Royal family took the lead in other relief organizations.

The organs of local self-government (Zemstvo and town councils) splendidly responded to the call of these newly-arisen necessities. Both these classes of organizations appropriated large sums for the requirements of soldiers' families. As far back as December, 1914, the amount disbursed by the Zemstvos for this purpose came to 976,000 roubles, and by the towns to 1,476,000 roubles. Moreover, the Zemstvos undertook the duty of harvesting the crops, sowing the fields, and threshing the corn for reservists' families and providing them with agricultural machinery and seed when necessary.

The outbreak of the war did not take the Russian Red Cross unawares. In accordance with the plan of mobilization drafted earlier in conformity with the instructions of the War Department, there were formed without delay and dispatched to the war theatre 48 hospitals, 37 stationary military hospitals (lazarets), 33 mobile hospitals, a total of 118 field medical institutions with 13,100 beds and equipment, permitting them to take in double the regulation number of sick and wounded, and in addition ten advanced detachments. Two months later there were in operation 69 hospitals, 71 stationary and 37 mobile hospitals, disposing of more than 35,000 beds, and 24 advanced detachments. Later still were organized six automobile detachments, one sanitary-surgical, six X-ray detachments, five sanitary-epidemic, seven sanitary-disinfectant, 65 fixed dressing and feeding stations, 17 mobile feeding detachments, and two sanitary or hospital trains. Simultaneously, for the equipment of these establishments with materials, there were set up three field depôts with complete equipment for 5,000 beds each, and for the advanced positions five branches of the field depôts, of which three were mobile. Turkey's accession to the Central Powers called for formation of four stationary hospitals, four advanced, and four feeding and dressing detachments, which were dispatched to the Caucasus.

Thanks to preparation in time of peace no shortage of men was experienced. The medico-sanitary institutions of the Society in the war theatre were served by a staff of more than 700 doctors, 500 students, 160 superintendents, 2,625 Sisters of Mercy, and about 10,000 stretcher-bearers (sanitars). Moreover, over 3,700 Sisters of Mercy were appointed by the Red Cross to serve the medico-sanitary institu-

tions of the War Department. Impressive as are the foregoing figures, they undoubtedly fell short of those obtaining at a later date, seeing that the work of the Red Cross grew daily and hourly in conformity with the demands conferred upon it.

Brief reference has already been made to the share of the towns and Zemstvos in the task of relief. The Red Cross gladly welcomed valuable cooperation extended by what was known as the All-Russian Zemstvo Union, with Prince G. E. Lvov at its head; the Urban Union, comprising 385 towns (chief delegate M. V. Chelnokov, Mayor of Moscow), the Nobility organization, and others. More particularly the Zemstvos and Urban Unions won for themselves an abiding place in the affections of the army, thanks to their philanthropy, guided by intimate first-hand knowledge of the ordinary peasant soldier and his needs.

Not the least of the many difficulties which Russia had to face in her conduct of the war were the supply of drugs and surgical instruments. The country's dependence upon Germany before the war for the bulk of such supplies was a matter of common knowledge, and it can therefore be understood that with the additional handicap of a war on her hands

ONE OF THE NEW SMALL DENOMINATIONAL NOTES.

One kopek is equivalent to a farthing.

Russia had to reconcile herself temporarily to the bitter anomaly of still purchasing many special articles from her principal enemy, and it was for that reason mainly that, despite the war, it was not found feasible wholly to suspend trade with Germany. Thus, the monthly statistical publication of the Council of Ministers regularly printed the figures for German imports, which in 1915 exceeded 20,000,000 roubles in value. Nevertheless, strenuous efforts were made to render Russia more self-supporting in this respect, and gratifying progress was achieved. The hospitals were able to replenish their stocks exclusively from home production. The manufacture of hygroscopic cotton wool was permanently established. Thanks to the

ROYALTY VISITS WOUNDED SOLDIERS.

The Dowager Empress of Russia in one of the wards in the Polytechnic Hospital, Petrograd.

discovery of rich contents of iodine in the seaweed of the Black Sea the manufacture of this product was organized upon an extensive scale, while the labours of Russian savants gave a start to the acquisition by the simplest means of various medically valuable alkaloids.

No account of war relief would be complete without some reference to Prince Alexander of Oldenburg, head of the Sanitary Department of War, for which post by training and temperament he was peculiarly fitted. Though 72 years of age, thanks largely to his wonderful energy and powers of organization and initiation the health of the Russian forces on the whole proved to be satisfactory during the war. He set a fine example of patriotism by devoting the greater part of his splendid palace on the banks of the Neva to the purposes of a military hospital with 150 beds. His promptitude in dealing with the poisonous gas emergency was characteristic. Within two or three days organizations employing thousands of hands were at work preparing masks, of which millions were ready within a week. Prince Alexander was greatly interested in the development of native spas, and one of the finest health resorts on the Black Sea (Gagry) owes its existence to his initiative In this connexion his invitation through the columns of *The Times* to wounded officers of the British Army to be his guests at the unrivalled hot baths and medicinal springs of the Caucasus will be recalled.

Valuable in itself, and doubly so as an evidence of British sympathy with Russia, was the Anglo-Russian Hospital, installed in 1916 in the handsome palace of the Grand Duke Dmitri Pavlovitch, situated at the corner of the Fontanka river and the Nevsky Prospekt. The work of adaptation was skilfully performed, and ample accommodation for 200 patients provided with operating rooms, a bandaging room (a special feature of all Russian military hospitals), an X-ray cabinet, laboratory and drug department. The senior Sisters of Mercy were Lady Muriel Paget and Lady Sybil Grey, and the senior physician Dr. Fleming. During the summer of 1916 the Hospital sent a well equipped Ambulance Detachment to the Front. British working men had subscribed for twenty beds for wounded Russian workmen. This gift was sent through the Anglo-Russian Hospital. Lady Georgiana Buchanan and Miss Muriel Buchanan worked devotedly in the cause of hospital and relief work.

While no doubt whatever could prevail among Russians at the outbreak of the war as to the stability of their alliance with France, which had already lasted upwards of twenty-three years, the position that Great Britain would take up in the struggle foreed upon these allies by Germany gave rise to heartfelt anxiety. Russians had ever felt respect for England's word, and this feeling had given place to growing warmth of sentiment. one may say friendship, ever since the mistakes of Russia's foreign

[*From the Vechernee Vremya.*

REFUGEES FROM POLAND; SCENES ON THE WAYSIDE.

[Waring & Gillow.

A PARTY OF RUSSIAN JOURNALISTS AND PUBLICISTS IN LONDON.
(1) Count Alexis Tolstoy. (2) *The Times* Correspondent. (3) M. Chukovsky. (4) M. Nemirovitch-Danchenko. (5) M. Aladyn. (6) M. Nabokoff. (7) M. Yegoroff. (8) M. Bashmakoff.

policy had been exposed by the war with Japan, and the country had come to realize that its interests nowhere clashed with those of Great Britain, while, on the other hand, the continuance of mistrust between them could only serve the ends of Germany. Russians instinctively realized that Germany wanted at all costs to undermine Russia's independence, and that perhaps one of the reasons why she had provoked the war was her arrogant displeasure at the spectacle of an Anglo-Russian *rapprochement*. Russians, high and low, appreciated the value of such an ally as Great Britain. Those were anxious days in Petrograd and throughout the Tsar's domains when Russia was waiting to learn which way England would decide. Later they came to know us well enough to realize that they should never have entertained any doubts on the subject. Reference has already been made to the remarkable outbursts of popular joy which were displayed all over Russia when the news came that England would not sit idle while Germany dealt one by one with the Allies. The readiness with which the Tsar's armies hurled themselves at the foe in order to divert his attention from the hard-pressed legions of France and the British Expeditionary Force was an expression of the national spirit as well as of sound strategical considerations.

As the war dragged on its uneven course, as defeats in the field of battle and the domain of diplomacy retarded the day of victory, as the magnitude of Russia's own losses became more and more fully realized, there was naturally a tendency to look more and more to relief from the Allies. On the other hand, it was difficult if not impossible for the lay mind to grasp the difficulties of the position on the Western front. Intercourse between Russia and her Allies was of such a restricted character, both in the form of travel and in the information produced by the Russian Press, that the country knew almost nothing of the extent of France's achievements and of the enormous burden that England had assumed in the naval, military, commercial, and financial domains. As the Russian armies retreated from Galicia the Russian nation wondered why there was no corresponding advance on the part of the Allies in France and Flanders. The pro-German elements in the country raised their heads, hoping that the lack of information in the Army and among the public would afford a favourable soil for the negotiation of a separate peace. But their hopes were shortlived. Thanks to the efforts of the Press, led by *The Times* and supported by the two Governments, the truth about their Allies soon came to be known among the Russians, and especially among the Russian Army. The visit

of Russian journalists and writers to England and France during the winter of 1915-1916, and later the Russian parliamentary visit, dispelled the remnants of any doubt that might have remained, and established a firm, unalterable confidence in the Allied Armies. At the same time the heroic, unprecedented defence of Verdun for ever put a stop to any further attempt on the part of the pro-German agitators to cast reflections upon the Allies of Russia.

It would be impossible to close this reference to Anglo-Russian relations without dwelling upon the auspicious influence that had been exerted during all the years of his term of office by the British Ambassador, Sir George Buchanan, who, thanks to his high qualities of heart and mind, had won the respect and affection of the Russian people. As a mark of the extraordinary esteem which all Russia felt towards him, the municipality of Moscow conferred upon him the freedom of the city, an honour which the Tsar was pleased to ratify.

That the policy of Russia had radically changed from the old suspicion of England to a new, sincere, and lasting spirit of confidence, amity, and alliance must be ascribed in a great degree to the friendly and eminently loyal direction of foreign affairs which characterized M. Sazonoff's administration from its very outset. The fruits of the new policy were bound to influence international relations long after the Great War.

AN OPEN-AIR RELIGIOUS SERVICE FOR INTERCESSION FOR THE ARMIES IN THE FIELD.

CHAPTER CXXX.

THE CONQUEST OF GERMAN SOUTH-WEST AFRICA.

German Acquisition of South-West Africa—South African and German Forces and Supplies—The Strategic Problem—Nature of the Country—Political Difficulties—Invasion by Germans—Occupation of Lüderitzbucht—Disaster at Sandfontein—Maritz in Rebellion—Rebuilding the Railway—Swakopmund Taken—General Botha Takes Command—The Southern Campaign—Battle of Gibeon—General Botha's Advance—Fall of Windhuk—The Northern Campaign—Surrender of the Germans.

WITH a little more wisdom and foresight on the part of British and Colonial statesmen, the campaign against German South-West Africa might never have been necessary. It was in South-West Africa that the colonial ambitions of Germany were first given rein, and her complete success there—first in hoodwinking the British and Cape Governments, and then in compelling them to face the alternative of accepting the accomplished fact of Germany in possession or of turning her out by force—undoubtedly encouraged her to pursue her ambitions in Africa by the use of the same twin weapons of deceit and bravado.

The story of Germany's acquisition of South-West Africa is not pleasant reading for Englishmen. Up to 1882 there was no question but that the whole territory was generally regarded as under British influence, if that influence did not extend far into the interior and was no very effective instrument of actual government. For some years before that German traders had been establishing themselves along the coast, and German missionaries had pushed into the interior, coming now and then into conflict with the natives and making vain appeals through their Government for the armed protection of Great Britain. As early as 1878 Sir Bartle Frere, then Governor of the Cape, saw where these conflicts between German missionaries and the natives might lead, and persuaded the Imperial Government to declare formally that Walfish Bay and the country round it for a radius of 15 miles was British territory. Otherwise, his fears were treated as the dreams of an alarmist, and both the Imperial and the Cape Governments proceeded on the easy assumption that Germany would never have colonial ambitions and that nothing was to be feared from her.

In 1880 all British officials were withdrawn from the territory, then usually known as Damaraland, and only Walfish Bay remained under the British flag. From that time the German Government began to be increasingly pertinacious in its inquiries about the facts of the position and in its demands that the German missionaries and traders should have some effective protection. By 1882 the "Colonial Party" had at last got the upper hand in Germany and had persuaded Bismarck that their projects were worth backing. Their first enterprise was the expedition of Herr Lüderitz.

He formed the project of a commercial settlement on the coast of South-West Africa, and, in the autumn of 1882, formally asked the German Foreign Office whether he could count on

DISCUSSING FUTURE ARRANGEMENTS.
General Botha and Lieutenant-Colonel Francke, the German Commander-in-Chief, after the surrender of the German Forces.

Imperial protection for any rights that he might secure. Bismarck, through his son Herbert, proceeded to sound the British Government. A factory, he told them, was going to be established on the coast of South-West Africa by a German merchant. The protection of the German Government had been asked in case of need. Did her Majesty's Government exercise any authority in that locality? If so, would they extend British protection to the German factory? If not, the German Government would "do their best to extend to it the same measure of protection which they give to their subjects in remote parts of the world, *but without having the least design to establish any footing in South Africa.*" The British Government sent a procrastinating reply. They did not know whether they could protect the factory unless they had more precise information about its position. When they got that information they would send it to the Cape Government "with instructions to report whether and to what extent their wishes could be met." This was enough for Bismarck. Lüderitz was told that if he could acquire any harbour to which no other nation had any just claim he could reckon on Imperial protection. His expedition was fitted out, and arrived at what was then known as the Bay of Angra Pequena, but was afterwards called Lüderitz Bay, on April 9, 1883. By the beginning of May a concession had been obtained from the local chief selling to Lüderitz about 215 square miles of land on the Bay of Angra Pequena, with full rights of sovereignty. The German flag was hoisted; the captain of a British warship, going from Cape Town to look into these strange proceedings, was told that he was in German territorial waters; and the Imperial and Cape Governments found themselves faced by an accomplished fact. By October a German gunboat was at Angra Pequena to protect German interests, and in November the German Ambassador in London was formally asking whether Great Britain laid any claim to the Angra Pequena district, and, if so, on what ground. The Imperial Government returned a doubtful reply, and the whole business was allowed to drag on till at last, in April, 1884, Germany was ready for the final step. The German Consul at the Cape then informed the Cape Government officially that Lüderitz and his possessions were

under German protection. Even then the Imperial Government clung to the belief that Germany had no sinister designs. They were not left much longer in doubt. In June Bismarck's son Herbert came to London to bring matters to a head, and on June 21 the Imperial Government decided to recognize the German protectorate over Angra Pequena. By the end of August the whole territory from the Orange river to the boundary of Portuguese Angola had been formally annexed by Germany with the exception of Walfish Bay and its immediate hinterland. At the end of the year Great Britain formally notified Germany that she would make no annexations west of the 20th parallel of longitude, which was thus definitely established as the eastern border of German South-West Africa.

On the map German South-West Africa seems an easy prey for a superior force invading it from South Africa. And General Botha was able to command a greatly superior force. Taking it all in all, he had from beginning to end of the campaign between forty and fifty thousand men engaged. Against this, the Germans had in the later stages of the campaign about 5,000 regulars and "reservists"—men who had been settled on farms in the German territory, but who had done their period of military training in Germany and were available at the order of the German commander. But it is certain that this number did not comprise his whole force, for many "reservists" were sent back to their farms when the campaign began to go against the Germans. These "reservists," on the testimony of those who were engaged in the campaign on the British side, were for the most part far superior from the military point of view to the ordinary farmer, as we understand that classification. They were young, able-bodied men—good military material, and requiring little additional training to make them valuable soldiers.

The Germans had, too, abundance of arms, munitions, guns, machine-guns, stores, and all other kinds of material. Again and again the South African troops, entering towns or positions on the heels of the retreating enemy,

THE CAPITAL OF THE GERMAN COLONY.
General Botha's column awaiting the order to enter Windhuk.

were amazed at the abundance of the arms and munitions which they found, in spite of hasty attempts that had been made to destroy them before they came. Tsumeb was the most conspicuous instance. The way in which it came to be taken by the South African troops while the Germans were actually holding its defences, will be explained later. As it was, Tsumeb amazed the South Africans by the profuse abundance of its military resources. It was a huge arsenal. Piles of rifles and ammunition were found, sufficient, on the testimony of an eye-witness, to equip a force of from 20,000 to 25,000 men. Such estimates must necessarily be rough. But it should be remembered that the capture of Tsumeb came at the very end of the campaign, only a few days before the final surrender of the Germans. That there should still have been in one town, at that late date, so enormous a quantity of military stores, is a very remarkable fact. The truth seems to have been that German South-West Africa had long been regarded by the German authorities as a base for military operations against South Africa. Everything goes to confirm the justice of this deduction. The mere geographical appearance of the territory on the map—where it seems to lie open to easy invasion by the South African forces coming by land, and equally exposed to numerous landings of sea-borne troops—is delusive.

Invasion was, in fact, a problem of real military difficulty. The territory of what was German South-West Africa lies in a long strip along the west coast of Africa. Its southern border is the Orange river, which divides it from Namaqualand, that western district of the old Cape Colony which is now a part of the Cape Province of the Union of South Africa. On the east and for the most part on the north, the boundaries of German South-West Africa are purely artificial. For almost two-thirds of its length, the eastern frontier follows without deviation the twentieth parallel of longitude, turning abruptly then at right angles to the east for about 60 miles, and thence going dead straight again to the north. At its north-eastern corner it throws out a long and narrow strip that reaches across Central Africa to the Zambesi. On the north the boundary is that of the Portuguese territory of Angola, again an artificial line for a great part of its length, though on the west it follows from the coast the line of the river Kunene till that river turns definitely northward, and on the east the line of another river, the Okavango.

The artificiality of the whole eastern frontier line, the long stretch of the western coast, would seem to expose German South-West to the attack of the Power which commands the sea routes, supported by the allegiance and military help of the Government of South Africa. But here, as in so many other cases, the superficial appearance of the map tells nothing of the actual difficulties of the country. Nature, in fact, had provided for this German territory the most formidable defences. The long line of coast is barren of harbours, swept by violent winds, studded with shifting sand-banks and lined with small islands, hardly rising from the sea-level and often shrouded in banks of heavy fog. The dangers of navigation in this region are well known to seamen, who, passing to and fro on the voyage to the Cape, give that inhospitable and treacherous shore a wide berth. Even so, it has an ill reputation among them, for the currents are strong and variable, and the surge of the Atlantic sweeps across from the shore of South America without meeting any intervening land, yet southward enough to be troubled continually by the storms and icy currents of the Antarctic. The only safe harbour on all this coast is Walfish Bay. There a long spit of sandy beach juts out almost due north into the ocean, and inside this natural barrier there is a large calm lagoon—safe anchorage for many ships. This port Great Britain, when she yielded the rest of the territory to the Germans, kept for herself, though she left the Cape Government to administer it. General Botha, when he sent his northern force against Swakopmund, made full use of its advantages, as we shall see. But, apart from it, the prospects of a landing on any part of the German coast-line, with all its difficulties for the maintenance of an invading force that would have to be supplied with every necessity of life—even water—were not attractive. And, as though this frowning and storm-swept coast-line was not enough defence for the German territory from the sea, Nature had buttressed it with all the resources at her command. The coast itself, for many miles inland, is a wilderness of waste sand. Rain falls there only at intervals of years. The sun smites down on a region that gives no sign of life. It is sand, and sand, and sand again, along the

Photo by African Film Reproductions, Ltd., Johannesburg.

GENERAL JAN CHRISTIAN SMUTS (on left).
Commanded Union Force in Southern field of operations.

whole length of the coast. Such rivers as come from the interior to the sea lose themselves long before they reach the coast-line, in that eternity of sand. The only signs that they are rivers are their dry beds, hollowed out of the surrounding desert. No water appears in these river beds. They are dry as the country all round them, except when—once in perhaps a dozen years—there have been exceptional rains in the interior. Then a spate of water shows that the river does exist and that the line of its course is not mere delusion. At other times the water that struggles to the sea has to percolate through the sand. In the centre of these river beds there is always a small belt of stunted vegetation, showing where the water is trickling through underground. Here, by boring, water can be found.

TRANSPORT DIFFICULTIES.
Clearing away sand from the railway lines.

even in the driest years. But even these poor rivers are rare, and the prospect for an invading army of having to subsist on the supply that could be drawn from them would be sufficient to dismay the most adventurous.

Such is the great sand-belt that, after the frowning and treacherous coast, is the second line of defence of German South-West Africa against invasion from the sea. But there is yet a third line of defence in a broad strip of rock country, bare also of any vegetation, also waterless, and even more torrid than the sand-belt. Here, by some action of earthquake or of water in the remote past, the rock has been split and hollowed into fantastic gorges and valleys. Unearthly shapes of rock formation frown down upon the traveller as he passes through them. The hot and metallic ground scorches his feet. The valleys are swept by burning winds, the infernal cousins of the sandstorms that blow continually over the dunes nearer to the coast. Thus for some seventy miles from the sea the whole coast-line of German South-West Africa is little else than desert, forming, with all these defences of a hostile Nature, about as formidable a barrier against invasion from the sea as can be found anywhere in the world. Nor was the prospect of invasion by land any more favourable for the South African forces. Here, too, the desert covered the Germans. South was the wide and rapid Orange river, with few fords that were practicable for a hostile force, and those defended by the rocky passes through which they had to be approached. Even to get to these fords the desert had to be crossed. The nearest rail-head to this southern frontier was at O'okiep, the chief town in Cape Namaqua-land, though Steinkopf, a town on the line, was actually nearer to the river. From either it was a long and waterless ride to the Orange river. A force enduring that ride would find itself at the end of it, with the thirst-belt behind it, committed to an attack on a "drift" over the river which could be defended by a small number of hostile troops well posted, and with all the terrors of a retreat through that dreadful country to be faced if it should be defeated. On the east, again, the broad, almost waterless, and trackless desert defended German South-West. If the South Africans aimed at invasion from this side they would have to make for Rietfon-tein. Rietfontein had long been a police post

maintained by the Cape Government—the most remote of all the far posts in that country of great distances. Men would go in the days of peace to fill Government positions at Rietfontein—of magistrate, or police commandant, or postal official—as though they were going to exile in some unexplored region of the globe. It was five days' journey from Kuruman, not bad country for those who like the life of the desert, with fairly frequent waterholes, and abundant game to be had for the shooting; but remote, infinitely remote, from civilization.

But all these difficulties counted for little with the South African Government when war broke out. It was far less the strategical than the political problem that was serious for them. Representing the Dutch people of South Africa, they knew well that a considerable section of that people would be opposed to any aggressive action against the neighbouring German colony. The objection of this section—which notoriously included some of the most devoted personal followers of General Botha and General Smuts—was not principally due to any sympathy with Germany or to any friendly feeling for the Germans of South-West Africa. When the Boer war ended, many of the Boers refused to settle down under the British flag and "trekked" to South-West Africa. They soon found that the little finger of the German was thicker than the loin of the British official in the Transvaal or the Free State, even though the German had every reason for treating the Boer well and the British official represented a victorious people. The truth is that the ideas of the Boer—his personal independence, his impatience of restraint, his naturally empirical methods of life—are incurably opposed to German logic, and submission to discipline, and inherited subservience to the least reasonable whims of official or officer. The Boers who went to live among the Germans, in short, found that the life was intolerable. Most of them came back to South Africa as soon as they could, and they came back in open hatred of and contempt for the German. There was, of course, a small number of Boers who, designing treason against Great Britain and their own Government, had found it natural to look to Germany for aid. But these men were a very small minority. Most of the Boers objected to hostile action against German South-West Africa not at all because they loved the Germans but because they believed that South Africa had no real concern with European quarrels, should keep herself aloof from them, and was under no obligation of honour to help Great Britain except by providing for her own land defence. There was, too, the usual touch

A RUNNING FIGHT IN THE DESERT SAND.

of self-interest in their attitude. They argued, as the Germans themselves still argue, that the fate of the German colonies would be decided by the event of the war in Europe. If the Allies won, South Africa would naturally get German South-West. If they lost, the fact that South Africa had taken no aggressive part against her neighbour would be some protection against hostile ideas on the part of the victor. Such calculations of profit and loss naturally caused immense resentment among the British people in South Africa—hot with loyalty, and burning to do everything possible, even to the extreme of adventure and self-sacrifice, to help the Mother Country. Yet they were not at all unnatural in a people that had always been remote from international ambitions and were convinced of their ability to defend South Africa against the worst that Germany could do. If unacknowledged reliance on the invincibility of the British fleet had a good deal to do with this confidence, that was not uncharacteristic of the Boer and need not be counted too heavily against him.

All the more credit to General Botha and his colleagues that they did not allow any such calculations to influence them for a moment. To representations from the Imperial Government that it would be very advantageous to Great Britain if the wireless stations established by the Germans in their territory could be put out of action, they returned an unhesitating and unqualified assurance that they would do what was required. Parliament, hastily summoned to ratify this decision, supported the Ministry by a large majority. Meanwhile the Germans had themselves cut the ground from under the feet of their supporters in South Africa by invading the territory of the Union. This they did opposite a police post of theirs at Nakob, on the extreme south-east corner of their frontier. The South African Government, too, had a police post at this point, just on the other side of the frontier, and this also was marked on some maps as Nakob—a not unnatural duplication of names in a waste country with very few inhabitants. The confusion of the names gave the opponents of General Botha a chance of arguing that it was the German post which had been attacked by South African, not the South African by German troops. But this disingenuous, if characteristic, attempt to whitewash the enemy was easily disposed of by the Government. They had the unimpeachable evidence of reputable witnesses that the Germans had crossed the frontier in aggression. The incident was given a good deal more importance than it really deserved. The Government had no need to justify in-



GERMAN TROOPS AT WINDHUK.
Riding down the main street.



"LOUIS BOTHA" AT LÜDERITZ BAY.
One of the guns at Shark Island.

vasion of German South-West Africa by the plea that the Germans had attacked first. Their right as Ministers of the King to attack his enemies wherever they were and without themselves waiting to be attacked was unquestionable. But some allowance must be made for the difficulties of their position, and it was natural that they should make their case as strong as possible, even by the use of irrelevant arguments, for the benefit of the more doubtful among their habitual supporters.

Their first task was naturally to decide the strategy of the campaign; their next to see that it was undertaken with an adequate force, properly supplied. The second was infinitely the more difficult of the two. The military forces of the Union were organized on the basis of a defensive army composed mainly of men who were essentially volunteers, though their numbers were fixed by an Act of Parliament which also gave the Government the right of compulsion through the ballot in any district that failed to supply the complement of men which the Act required. But the organization of these forces did not contemplate any expedition outside the Union. There was a small body of "permanent" troops—really mounted and armed police—but this was quite insufficient for the invasion of a country like German South-West Africa. More, the organization of the Union forces, even on a defensive basis, was hardly complete, for the Act had only begun to take effect a bare two years before. All these difficulties had to be overcome But even in this the Government had many compensating advantages. South Africa was full of men, British as well as Dutch, who had had long experience of war. Many could still remember the part they had played in the last of the native wars, and of course the Boer War itself was so recent that a very large proportion of the male population had taken part in it, on one side or the other. Thus the material was abundant. Again, the people of the towns, British for the most part, had supported the volunteer movement with great enthusiasm before the Defence Act came into existence. This admirable and experienced infantry was ready to the hand of the Government, and bore most of the burden and heat of the campaign, as General Botha himself acknowledged again and again, though the Burgher mounted men had the privilege of most of the spectacular work of riding round the flanks of the enemy in the later part. To say this is not in the least to disparage the value of the Burghers as a fighting force. As mounted infantry they were incomparable. They could make forced marches, carrying their own scanty supplies with them,



BOMBS EXPLODING IN A CAMP OF THE UNION FORCES.

Photographed by a German airman making the attack. The airman fell into the hands of General Botha's army, together with machine and his camera.

into parts where the chances of finding water depended almost wholly on their instinct for "country." In every engagement they showed that dash and caution in combination which had been their great characteristic during the Boer War. They did not take spectacular risks. The Boer is never spectacular. But they were all the better soldiers for that; and when the enemy had to be attacked, his retreat harassed, his flanks turned, they were always adequate for the task, moving with a rapidity that amazed him, showing an instinctive knowledge of the best positions for their purpose, and subsisting on a minimum of food eked out with much less than a bare minimum of water—reckoned by the standard of what is required for ordinary troops. Yet theirs was the romance and the delight of the campaign. They rode by night, and off-saddled when the sun grew hot. They were always on the heels of the enemy, or actually behind him, riding round in a wide circle to take him by surprise, threaten his communications, and compel him to evacuate his well-prepared positions. For them there were the compensations of constant movement, frequent brushes with the Germans, repeated journeys of exploration into new country. The infantry had none of this. They toiled behind in the heat and dust of that sun-smitten land. On the march their kit, even their uniform, was intolerably heavy upon them. And when they were not marching they had the monotonous and tiresome duty of guarding lines of communication, or, still worse, of waiting for months in dreary, sandy, almost waterless camps for the advance to begin. General Botha, in his messages to his men, never forgot to say that the infantry—standing and waiting—had done and were doing most valuable work. His sympathy with them was another proof of his kindliness and his gift of imaginative sympathy. Those who think that in these qualities lies the secret of his greatness are not far wrong.

With these troops at his command—and it would have been difficult to find anywhere in the world men better suited for such a campaign—General Botha, in consultation with General Smuts and his technical advisers, had to decide how they should be used. The physical relation of German South-West Africa to the Union decided, through those characteristics which have been described already, the main outlines of the strategical plan. From the sea there were two towns of the German territory that had to be attacked—Lüderitzbucht in the south, Swakopmund in the north. Swakopmund was not far from Walfish Bay, where there was a harbour which would make the landing of troops and their supplies easy. Lüderitzbucht was a more difficult proposition from the point of view of landing facilities, yet not impossible. From these two ports railways went almost due east in each case into the interior. They joined—the northern line at Karibib, the southern at Seeheim—the main line running almost due north and south through the centre of the territory. From each end of the main line spurs of railway went north and south. The south spur plunged into the desert, came almost to the Cape frontier and there expired—a monument either to the mental aberration or to the sound military prevision of those who built it. There is no doubt at all that it owed its existence, not to any kind of madness on the part of the rulers of German South-West Africa, but to their appreciation of strategic possibilities. As a non-military railway it was the undertaking of a lunatic. As a strategic line, based on the same idea as inspired the lines that ran to the Belgian frontier, and there stopped, it had sound justification. Almost at its extremity was Kalkfontein, a fort and arsenal in one. Placed there on the fringe of the desert, it frowned towards the day when the Boers should rise against British rule, when the arsenal should pour rifles and ammunition to their aid over the frontier that was not many miles away, and when all the troops that Germany had in the territory should be hurried down the line and thus be hurled swiftly against the South African enemy. The north spur, in contrast to the south, was purely commercial. It served the mineral workings at Otavi, Tsumeb, and Grootfontein, and had no military significance, except, perhaps, towards the day when the Germans might find themselves strong enough to attempt the subjugation of the natives in the northern parts of the territory. That day was not yet. And on the main central line, placed with true German method almost in the exact geographical dead-centre of the whole Colony, was Windhuk, the capital. Unimportant in itself, it held the gigantic wireless station that the Germans had built—powerful enough to receive messages direct from Berlin, and in daily communication with Togoland.

It is easy to see that from a strategical point of view, in a country where water was so

A VIEW OF LÜDERITZBUCHT.

searee that an army of invasion would have to take even a large part of its drinking supply with it, the railway was the one important faetor. Thus the nature of the railway system in German South-West Afriea imposed the broad features of General Botha's strategy. Descend by sea upon Lüderitzbueht and Swakopmund. Capture there the two termini of the lines running inland from the eoast. Work up them to the interior, thus providing an avenue of supply for the troops. That was the first and most obvious feature of any strategie plan. But the eonformation of the railway system must also have suggested another line of attack. If the southern railway spur to Ukamas was made for invasion from the German side, it was also eminently suited, onee it eould be taken, to supply an army

SWAKOPMUND, SHOWING UNION JACK FLYING.
Occupied by Union Forces, January 14, 1915.

coming overland from the south against the Germans. But there was one grave defect in this conception—the distance of the German rail-head in the south from the nearest rail-heads in South African territory. These were at O'okiep and at Prieska. The intervening country was in both cases difficult, dry, with no real roads—a very formidable obstacle to the transport of any considerable force. The route to O'okiep or Steinkopf from the German border was worse than it was to Prieska But the Prieska road was quite bad enough, and one of the most remarkable achievements of the whole invasion was that of the engineers, who, having Steinkopf for its base; was to cross the thirst-belt to the Orange river; and was to force the passage of the river at Raman's Drift. The other was to move from Prieska and Upington against the other main ford over the river at Schuit Drift. Both would then join hands and dispose of the German positions in the south. The whole plan was sound, as later experience showed. But incalculable events ruined the land adventure and led the South African troops that marched from Namaqualand into the most disastrous check that the Germans were able to inflict upon the invading forces during the whole campaign.

BRITISH BLOCKHOUSE IN GERMAN SOUTH-WEST AFRICA.

while General Smuts advanced from the south in the second half of the campaign, built behind him at an extraordinarily rapid pace and with wonderful efficiency the railway that now links the Union system at Prieska to the German-built system at Kalkfontein.

This, then, was the first design for the campaign—to strike by sea at Lüderitzbucht and Swakopmund, and to combine with that stroke a two-fold advance overland against German territory. Both these land forces were to make for the German stronghold at Kalkfontein. One was to start from Cape Namaqualand,

Before this happened, however, South African troops had set foot on German territory. The force destined for Lüderitzbucht sailed from Cape Town in the middle of September, 1914. It was commanded by Colonel Beves, of the South African permanent force, and comprised two infantry regiments, a squadron of the Imperial Light Horse, a battery of the Citizen Artillery, and a section of the Cape Garrison Artillery with two guns—about 2,000 men in all, on the authority of the correspondent employed by Reuter's Agency, who accompanied the expedition as the sole accredited Press



THE RETREATING GERMANS DESTROY A RAILWAY.

Rearguard of an army placing charges of dynamite on the railway line. Bottom picture: The explosion of the charge.

correspondent. The expedition was transported in four ships, and was escorted by H.M.S. Astræa. One of the ships, the Monarch, took over 750,000 gallons of fresh water from the Cape Town reservoirs. With a wise prevision, the organizers of the campaign realized from the first that the supply of water would be one of their most formidable difficulties. The ships reached Lüderitz Bay on September 18. Plans which had been made for a landing of a part of the force south of the town, the cutting of the rail behind it, and the hemming in of the garrison, were found to be impossible owing to the difficulty of landing men and their supplies on that inhospitable shore, exposed to the full weight of the Atlantic swell. Fortunately, perhaps, a storm sprang up which forbade even the attempt, and though a few scouts did get on shore and actually rode into the town, which they found completely deserted by troops, long before the formal landing was made, the rest of the expedition was compelled to make straight for Lüderitz Bay. They reached it at night and anchored off the town. Next morning the surrender of the place was formally made by the Burgomaster, the troops were landed, and the British flag was hoisted over the Town Hall. The number of civil inhabitants left in the town was found to be about 750. They gave a good deal of trouble, were found at last to be communicating with their troops outside the South African lines, and were then rounded up and sent away to the Union for internment. For a week the troops made no move from Lüderitzbucht. The Germans had retired to Kolmanskuppe, about ten miles away, blowing up the railway ; then to Grasplatz, and then again to Rothkuppe, about ten miles farther on. An advanced post which they left at Grasplatz was cut up by Union troops, who made another similar raid a few days later. But meanwhile rebellion had broken out in South Africa, disaster had overtaken another South African column of invasion at Sandfontein, and it was decided to attempt nothing more, but to hold Lüderitzbucht as a base until the rebellion had been crushed and General Botha could again devote all his energies to the campaign. The force under Sir Duncan McKenzie, which had sailed for Swakopmund, was therefore diverted to Lüderitzbucht, and the two columns held that desolate and thirsty town, with its immediate outskirts, until the time came to resume the general advance.

The Sandfontein disaster occurred a week after the occupation of Lüderitzbucht. Brigadier-General Lukin had left Cape Town on September 2 and had landed his men at Port Nolloth, the port of Cape Namaqualand. From there a narrow gauge railway, built by the copper-mining companies and chiefly used for their needs in normal times, goes to O'okiep. On the way is the station of Steinkopf, and here General Lukin established his base. The plan was to invade German territory over Raman's Drift. Between Steinkopf and the river is the thirst-belt—terrible, sandy country, with only one water-hole in its forty-five miles, and that eight miles away from the most direct route across. Lukin's force was chiefly mounted men—five regiments of the South African Mounted Rifles—but he had with him also the Witwatersrand Rifles, and three batteries of the Transvaal Horse Artillery. The first step was to seize Raman's Drift. Two regiments of the S.A.M.R. were sent forward to do this. They struggled with difficulty through the thirst-belt, drove out the Germans posted at the drift, captured an officer who refused to join the flight of his men, followed up the enemy, routed them in a brief skirmish, and pursued them to their camp at Sandfontein, twenty-five miles north-east of the drift and about half-way to Warmbad. The Germans seemed to have evacuated completely all that country of sand hills and waste spaces. They had poisoned the water and destroyed the pumps at Sandfontein. The place was held lightly, after patrols had scoured the country and had found no enemy troops. The main body of the South African troops reached the river, where there was water for them, on September 24. The next day the patrol which was holding Sandfontein was attacked by the enemy. Reinforcements were sent up to them—another squadron of the 1st S.A.M.R., with two guns and about thirty men of the Transvaal Horse Artillery, the whole under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Grant. They reached Sandfontein on the morning of September 26. Hardly had they off-saddled when the Germans, who had concentrated all the troops they had in the neighbourhood, attacked them in force, columns moving against them from all sides. The enemy had a number of guns, an ample supply of machine-guns, and mustered in all, on the testimony of credible witnesses, not less than 1,500 men. Colonel Grant's retreat towards the river was cut off. His surprise was singu-



HOW THE GERMANS TRIED TO HAMPER THE BRITISH ADVANCE.
After blowing up a railway bridge, the enemy rushed at full speed three engines, which, on reaching the bridge, overturned and choked up the gap caused hy the explosion.

larly eomplete. It is diffieult to resist the conelusion that the seouting was bad, and that the belief that the country had been thoroughly cleared of the enemy had lulled him into a false sense of security. Be that as it may, he found himself heavily outnumbered both in men and guns.

The German attaek was skilfully eonducted. It seems that the German Commander-in-Chief, Colonel von Heydebreek, was himself in charge of the enterprise. His cordon onee drawn round the South African force, he did not expose his men needlessly, but made full use of his much greater weight of artillery. The two guns of the Transvaal Artillery were gallantly served. They replied with effect to the enemy's fire and for some hours held him at a respectful distanee. But the only real hope for Colonel Grant was that reinforcements from the Orange River would be able to break the cirele that von Heydebreck had drawn round him. The attempt was made, but made without success. Here again the South African command had been caught napping. All that was available at the moment was two squadrons of the 4th S.A.M.R. The aetion had begun about nine o'clock in the morning. By noon the enemy's artillery had asserted itself. One of the South African guns was out of action. The other was being served by only two unwounded men. Just then the small relieving force tried to break through. Colonel Grant's men heard the sound of their firing in the distance. It soon faded away, and with it went their last hope. Colonel Grant himself was wounded. His guns were now out of action. The enemy began to close in. An attempt to rush the South African position with eavalry was driven baek. But this momentary repulse could not affeet the inevitable result. For two hours longer the South Africans fought on. Then they sent a flag to the German commander and surrendered without conditions. Thus in a few hours the first real attempt of the Union commanders to establish themselves well within German territory ended in a mortifying defeat and surrender. To all appearanee, it might have been avoided by a little foresight in the preparation of the advance, or, even when the worst threatened, by some greater promptitude of the main South African force and a sterner resolution in Colonel Grant and his men. But eritieism after the event is easy, and it is best to leave the disaster with the verdiet that over-eonfidenee in attaeking an enemy so determined and resolute as the German had its natural, if unfortunate, result.

So much for the action of Sandfontein itself. But there is more to be said about the train of causes whieh made it possible for the German eommander to fight it under such favourable conditions of surprise and superior foree. At the moment when Colonel Grant reached Sandfontein, von Heydebreek should also have had on his hands another South African column advaneing against him over the Orange River by way of Sehuit Drift, about 100 miles east of Raman's Drift. The advance of this column, its cooperation with General Lukin's force

moving from Namaqualand, was, as we have seen, an essential part of the plan of campaign. It was to move from Upington, having established a base there, and was designed to join hands with the Namaqualand column in German territory. This column was to be commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Maritz, a District Staff Officer of the "permanent" South African Force. But Maritz failed the South African Government. Instead of leading his men against the Germans, he made a treaty with them, induced his men to go into rebellion—compelling the loyalists among them to submit—and advanced to overrun the very South African districts of which he had been given supreme command by a too-trusting Government. The "defection" of Maritz is no real part of the story of the South African invasion of South-West Africa. But its effect—followed as it was by the rebellion of Beyers and of de Wet—was to make General Botha concentrate all his strength against the rebels at home and to suspend for months his operations against the German colony. Its immediate result was without doubt the disaster of Sandfontein. If the commander of the Namaqualand column cannot be entirely acquitted of rashness and of failure to take the proper precautions in sending his advance guard to Sandfontein, it should also be remembered in extenuation of this obvious fault that he had every reason to rely upon the cooperation of Maritz, that the defection of that adventurer took the Headquarters Staff at Cape Town itself utterly by surprise, and that von Heydebreck was thus given an opportunity which he should never have had of making prompt use of his chance of inflicting a shattering reverse upon the Namaqualand column.

During the long halt in the operations against South-West Africa the force under General Sir Duncan McKenzie held its ground at Lüderitzbucht. It was for the most part inactive. Nevertheless, preparations for the ultimate advance went on continually and good work was done, especially in the vital matter of railway reconstruction, during those long months of waiting which tried so severely the patience of the troops. The real advance against the Germans only began on March 28, when McKenzie moved his headquarters forward from Lüderitzbucht to Garub, and sent his column out to drive the enemy from the positions which he had prepared at Aus. The intervening months had been spent in almost complete inactivity by the fighting men. There were a few unimportant skirmishes, the enemy always falling back as soon as he was seriously threatened. Thus on October 15 and 16 McKenzie made a drive to the south of the town. It was pushed as far as Elizabeth Bay, but did not come into touch with the enemy. A week later McKenzie again moved out against the Germans, who were on the railway at Rothkuppe, about 23 miles east of Lüderitzbucht. Only mounted troops were used, and a cordon was drawn round the German patrol. There was a sharp but unimportant skirmish. Most of the enemy were taken prisoners uninjured. By these prosaic methods the task of pushing into the interior, which depended entirely upon the possession and reconstruction of the railway, was carried farther and farther.

This railway construction work was under the charge of Sir George Farrar, who lost his life in the performance of his duty owing to a railway accident, a few weeks after McKenzie's column

BIG BRITISH GUNS IN GERMAN SOUTH-WEST AFRICA.

had crowned these long months of preparation by decisive victory at Gibeon. Farrar had by his own ability and energy won for himself the position of one of the principal leaders of the mining industry of the Transvaal. His services to McKenzie, by the testimony of all who knew what he had done, were most valuable. He had in a high degree the gift of organization. He knew how to get on with men, and was unrivalled in getting work out of them. He was punctual, energetic, determined. Absolutely devoid of "side," he was the comrade of his men, without forfeiting for one moment their respect and confidence. The value of a man of this metal at moments when progress seemed to be at a standstill, when the task ahead showed intolerably great, and when doubt and discouragement were everywhere, cannot easily be estimated. Farrar never gave way to pessimism. He had volunteered for his task; he was determined to see it through; and he did so. It meant for him constant travelling up and down a railway which had been dynamited by the enemy and had only been hastily repaired by his construction gangs. He faced these risks with the careless courage that he had shown many times before, especially during the South African War. And when at last he met his fate—his motor trolly colliding in a mist of rain with a light engine—he had the consolation of knowing that the most formidable undertaking of a life full of risk and adventure had been gallantly and most efficiently accomplished.

With Farrar and his construction gangs there went of course a guard of troops. But for the most part McKenzie's men were kept for some weeks in or near Lüderitzbucht itself. He had under his command quite a considerable force. Two infantry brigades and a section of mounted and general units, made up a total—again on the authority of Reuter's correspondent, who was with the column—of about 6,000 men. There is no need to dwell long on the conditions under which they lived. They were practically a garrison in occupation of Lüderitzbucht. Their work lay in front of them, and they waited with natural impatience for the day when General Botha should have rounded up the rebels in their own country and should be free to lead them against the Germans. Meanwhile Farrar with his railway gangs and his guard of troops worked continually at the rebuilding of the railway. On November 8 the way was clear for an advance to Tschaukaib, just over 40 miles up the line from Lüderitzbucht. The enemy retired another 20 miles or so to Garub, and at Tschaukaib McKenzie's main camp was established. But this was not until December 13. The rebellion in South Africa was still engaging the whole attention of the Government, and McKenzie, no doubt, had his orders to do nothing until the time came for those concerted movements of converging columns which, when the day for the advance did come at last, made such short work of the German resistance. He waited, therefore, with sublime caution, after driving the enemy from Tschaukaib, until every possible preparation had been made for setting up a permanent camp at that place. On December 13 his infantry marched up to Tschaukaib and there were encamped for another nine weeks. Meanwhile his mounted men raided towards Garub. There they narrowly escaped being ambushed by the enemy,

DIGGING FOR WATER.

AT A WATER-HOLE.

and after a smart action with him, finding that he had reinforcements at hand, retired with one man killed and two wounded, and leaving two of their number prisoners in German hands. The Germans after this skirmish immediately retired towards Aus, evacuating Garub. But McKenzie, acting beyond doubt on instructions from Cape Town—for he was a veteran fighter, proved in the native wars that the men of Natal had fought, and a leader of known enterprise and energy—did not pursue them, being content to consolidate his position at Tschaukaib.

Here his troops were encamped in a dry and sandy plain. They were visited day after day by blinding dust storms, and had to endure all those other minor annoyances which are a torment to civilized men engaged in desert warfare. The heat was very great. The wind continually blew down their tents and left them without shelter. The sand was everywhere. It penetrated clothes, equipment, food. Otherwise the conditions were not unbearable. Food was abundant. Water, scanty at first, became more plentiful as the efficiency of the transport arrangements improved. The worst thing for the men to bear was their inactivity, unrelieved by the drill and route-marches through which they were put. They had come out to fight the Germans, and here they were kept waiting about in the desert while their own countrymen, back in the Union, fought an internecine warfare with rebellion. There was, however, no help for it, and, on the whole, the men bore the long waiting with patience, though these delays had their effect in leading a number of them, who had enlisted for a period of six months, to insist on their discharge when their time was up. The monotony of existence at Tschaukaib was relieved, if not too pleasantly, by frequent attacks from the air. The enemy had at least three aeroplanes which he could use against them, and he visited the camp some dozen times, dropping bombs, and, as was found later on, taking photographs of the camp. These visits did little damage, for it was soon found that the hostile airmen could fly only in the early morning, before the sun was hot, so that the men were moved out of the camp in these early hours, which were also

ANGOLA
(PORTUGUESE)
Kunene River
Okavango River
Luiana R.
CAPRIVIZIPFEL
Andara (Libibe)
Majachi
Okavango Marsh
Okwa
Kalahari
ALAND
GERMAN
SOUTH-WEST
WINDHUK
Swakopmund
WALFISH BAY
Walfish B.
Pelican Pt.
Sandwich Bay
Cape Cross
Farillia Pt.
Palgrave Pt.
Fort Rock Pt.
ATLANTIC
Swakop R.
Omaruru
Karibib
Okahandya
Omaruru
Okombahe
Kalkveldo
Waterberg
Otjiwarongo
Otyo
Otyimbingue
Franzfontein
Otyitambi
Zesfontein
Gauko Otavi
Rehoboth
Olukonda
Omaudonga
Onkango
Otabengo Vlie
Omarubu
Osia
Etosha Pan
Okaukueyo
Okandeko
Namutoni (Namub)
Sandub
Arikas
Tsumeb
Gaub
GROOTFONTEIN
Otavi
Nutsas
Omambonde
Omaruramba a Omatako
Goas
Mangib
Blockfontein
Sanukanu
Leuwpan
Karakuvisa
Khoantsas
Naitzas
Sogoavu
Gaizau
Gani
Kunobis
Epata
Ewaruse
Epukiro
Otsarango
Richardsputz
Kehoro
Gobabis
Okamukaru
Otyituesu
Gr. Witvlei
Kaukurus
Oas
Ukhanas
Kovas
Kunamis
Haris
Usib
Kos
Kubes
Hoaseb
Swartmodder
Tagus
Rehoboth
Hoornkrans
Kara Kama
Naramas Mine
Ururas
Husab
Riet
Jackalswater
Tsakhalahaibis
Dorstriviermund
Otyiseva
Gr. Barmen
Fahtwater
Okamaya
Ossiamongombe
Ongoati
Ameil
Spitzkopjes
Hoesob
Trekkopjes
Palgrave Mine
Anikhamab
Ausib
Kokoms
Kount
Valushik
Ugabmund
Komasarab
Atsavis
Cheias
Goabis
Mudorib
Hoanib Uitdrai
Oakhab
Ogams
Ovatyimda
Otyomuhana
Onyaizai
Ombombo
Otyityikua
Otyitutuna
Onbrika
Otyovaandu
Arukhab
Otyomungundi
Tsumamas
Eketoveni Farm
Haiyas Farm
Iquira
Ondyiva
Karanga Kamuka
Kabanga
Ovahilla's Kraal
Kvamuto R.

GERMAN SOUTH-WEST AFRICA.

THE UNION FORCES IN NAMAQUALAND.
General Botha's bodyguard trekking through the sand-dunes.

the most suitable for exercising them. At Tschaukaib, then, McKenzie's column rested till mid-February. By that time the rebellion in South Africa had been thoroughly scotched, if not wholly quelled. On February 8 General Botha was able to come north, and visited the camp. He watched the men march past, and spoke to them in warm praise of their physical condition and bearing. He told them of that which they all knew, but had perhaps been inclined to reckon too lightly—the work that he had done in crushing the rebellion. He assured them that "the British Empire is grateful to you for the work you have done." And—most welcome of all—he gave them a broad hint that they would not have to sit still much longer. "We in South Africa have undertaken this task, and we are going to carry it through with all possible determination. Your loyalty and your ability are going a long way towards achieving it. I am now going to discuss the whole situation with General McKenzie, and I hope you will soon get the order to go forward. I wish you all possible success. God bless you." On February 19 McKenzie moved forward to Garub, and there halted for another five weeks.

But, though to McKenzie's troops this long delay at Garub seemed the last strain on their impatience, the moment had actually come when the campaign of invasion had begun to gather itself for its decisive movements. Swakopmund, the northern German seaport town, had been occupied by South African troops some time before. The expedition which carried out this task was under the command of Colonel Skinner, but it was known that General Botha would take command of it himself as soon as the serious business of the campaign began. Skinner had with him the 3rd and 4th Infantry Brigades, the 1st Imperial Light Horse, Grobelaar's Scouts a Heavy Artillery Brigade, and a machine-gun section. He sailed from Cape Town on December 21 and reached Walfish Bay on Christmas Day. Walfish Bay had been in German hands, but Skinner's landing was not opposed, though a small German mounted outpost came into collision with the South African troops soon after their landing, when the morning mists were still heavy. They retired after firing a few shots, leaving one of their number wounded and a prisoner. Walfish Bay was the natural base for operations against Swakopmund, some thirteen miles north on the coast. Skinner's first task was to ensure the safety of his force, to arrange for sufficient water, and to organise the elaborate supply service which would be essential during the advance from Swakopmund into the interior. This done, he moved out of Walfish Bay with a small body of men on January 13. His intention was to reconnoitre the enemy at Swakopmund, to find out whether the town was held in strength, and then to prepare his advance against it. But he met with no resistance at any part of his march. Just on the hither side of Swakopmund from Walfish Bay a long spit of sand runs out into the sea, forming an obstacle in the path

of anyone coming along the coast which must be avoided by skirting its end close to the beach. Here the Germans had prepared their reception for the South African troops. As Skinner's advance guard rode past the end of this sandy promontory, a mine exploded under their feet. That explosion was followed by another, and then by two more. Two South African troopers were blown to bits, with their horses. The rest escaped practically untouched. Skinner rode on into the town; found it deserted, not only by the enemy's troops, but also by the whole civilian population; and decided there and then to convert what had been meant to be merely a reconnaissance in force into a permanent occupation. Here, too, the Germans had poisoned the water supply, and experience of their methods made it certain that the outskirts of the town and the railway track leading into the interior would be heavily mined. Both anticipations were found to be correct. But the South African engineers were expert by now at circumventing these infernal devices of an inhuman enemy. Whenever a new place of water was reached, their first task was to pump out the wells. In the detection of contact mines they became so skilful that singularly little damage was done by them. The misfortune of Skinner's column on its march to Swakopmund, slight as the real loss was, was exceptional. The mines there laid by the Germans were not the ordinary contact mines. They were connected by wire with a dug-out skilfully constructed in the sand hills near by, and were exploded by a German concealed there, at a moment when he thought that the whole of Skinner's force was at his mercy. The man escaped, and afterwards published in the Windhuk paper, *Sud-West*, a highly coloured description of the havoc he had wrought among the South African troops. His dug-out was found later by the South Africans, carefully concealed among the sand-hills and connected by telephone with one of the outposts to which the Germans had retired from Swakopmund. But even the ordinary contact mine was not easy to detect, for all the care of the engineers. All that could be seen above the ground was a small iron rod, showing where the detonator was hidden. This, of course, was covered with



THE UNION FORCES AT WALFISH BAY.

Condensers constructed to replace those destroyed by the Germans.



THE BRITISH ATTACK AT GIBEON.
The German forces defeated on the railway line, April 25, 1915.

sand or small stones, and was exceedingly difficult to find. It often marked the hidden presence of tons of dynamite, sufficient to cause wholesale destruction among marching troops. Luck, the care of the engineers, the assistance of natives—who throughout the campaign were eager to aid the South Africans against the Germans—and, in some cases, the discovery of plans made by the enemy, showing the places where they had laid mines, combined to save the invading armies from any considerable loss. Of these safeguards luck was perhaps the most efficacious. There were some marvellous escapes. Men who went through the campaign tell astonishing tales of these adventures with contact mines. They attribute the comparative immunity of the columns chiefly to good fortune—for it was impossible to be sure that all mines were found before the troops had to pass, whatever the care taken; but also to the fact that the explosives of which the mines were made were probably not too fresh when they were first used and deteriorated rapidly when laid in the ground. As to the poisoning of wells, this barbarous method of resisting invasion was used systematically by the Germans. General Botha, when he reached Swakopmund, protested against it in messages sent to the German Commander-in-Chief, Colonel Francke, who had by then succeeded Colonel von Heydebreck, killed by the accidental explosion of bombs with which he was experimenting. Francke replied that it was legitimate to poison the water-supply of places abandoned, provided that notices were left giving warning of what had been done. He contended that such notices were always left by his men. This was false in almost every case, and Botha at last sent Francke a stern message telling him that he would be held personally responsible for these outrages against the rules of civilized warfare. This had a good effect, though the practice was never wholly abandoned by the enemy.

But this is to anticipate. Skinner, finding Swakopmund abandoned, proceeded to prepare for its permanent occupation. The work took some time. The water supply had to be purified and restored to its proper working. Transport from Walfish Bay was not easy. Landing of supplies at Swakopmund itself was impossible on any considerable scale, for the roadstead lay open to the sea, and the frequent gales prevented much use being made of the small jetty, which, besides, had been damaged by shell-fire from a British auxiliary cruiser some time before. On January 16, nevertheless, Skinner was able to proclaim the formal occupation of Swakopmund. The British flag was hoisted at the signal station, and lines of defence were drawn round the town. The enemy had retired to Nonidas, only a few miles away on the dry bed of the Swakop River. The outposts of the two forces were close to each other, and men who went through these early days of the northern campaign seem to believe that more might have been done at once to push the Germans back. The purely defensive tactics which Skinner adopted, however, certainly served their purpose, and he may well have thought that any forward move had better be left till General Botha himself came north to take command. A few days before that happened, Skinner did make a reconnaissance. This was on February 7, when he moved out at dawn with his mounted troops and guns. Curiously enough, the Germans were at that very moment marching to attack him. The two forces came into contact, and a few men were lost on each side, but there was no serious action. The Germans retired promptly, refusing battle to the South African troops. On February 11 General Botha, after visiting McKenzie's troops at Lüderitzbucht and Tschaukaib, reached Swakopmund, and took over command from Colonel Skinner. Four days later, on February 15, the Swakop River came down in flood — an almost unprecedented event. It washed away the rails which the engineers had laid in its dry bed, and did a good deal of other damage. But the flood was a blessing in disguise. It meant that water would be found quite close to the surface, even after the surface flood had dried up, along the whole bed of the Swakop River. Thus, if it did not completely solve the problem of water for an advance up the river, it made it very much less menacing than it would have been otherwise. Botha had now completed his plans for the northern campaign. A few days after he reached Swakopmund large numbers of Burgher troopers began to arrive. Their numbers made it clear that they were to bear the brunt of the advance. Many think that, but for the flooding of the Swakop River, Botha would not have ventured to use mounted men on such a large scale. That may be so, and the knowledge that there would be at least a sufficiency of water in the interior must have

made a difference to his plans. But Botha had only been eleven days at Swakopmund when he sent out his first cloud of mounted men to test the strength of the Germans. During those days mounted Burghers had been pouring into Swakopmund. The Swakop flood only came on February 15, four days after Botha had arrived. He must therefore have the credit of having designed, long before the flooding of the river came to increase his prospects of success, the operations which the Burghers were to carry through with such dash and vigour.

The supply of the large force of men and horses now concentrated at Walfish Bay and Swakopmund became increasingly difficult. At Walfish the water was very bad, even for horses. Pumped from wells four miles away, it was "brak"—so tinged with salt that no horse would drink it until he had got used to that bitter taste. They had to be inured to the use of this water, and that took time, which was also necessary in order to get them into condition after their sea journey. Those who have seen horses transported by sea know how quickly they lose condition, and the transports that brought them from Cape Town met very rough weather. All the more need for them to have rest. Yet it was only February 22 when General Botha was on the move out of Swakopmund. He used for this skirmish—it was nothing more—the same tactics that he afterwards employed with unfailing success throughout the campaign. The mounted men were sent out on either wing, riding in a wide circle, in this case at night, so as to get behind the enemy's main position. That position was believed to be at Goanikontes, on the Swakop River. He was known to have retired from Nonidas, which General Botha, commanding the central force, reached early in the morning without opposition. The sound of what seemed like heavy firing in the distance encouraged the hope that the flanking columns had hemmed the enemy in. But this time, as always afterwards till the very end, he succeeded in slipping through before the circle of mounted Burghers closed behind him. What had seemed to be the sound of firing was in reality the explosion of large quantities of small-arm ammunition, burnt by the Germans before they retired. But, though the enemy escaped, the occupation of Goanikontes was a useful operation. The place had an excellent supply of fresh water, and its fields of lucerne provided welcome fodder for the horses. Nor were the Germans left undisturbed in their retreat. Patrols followed them up the gorges through which the bed of the Swakop River runs. They were pushed back to Riet, beyond Husab. At Husab, too, good water was found, and this became Botha's front-post until his next move was made almost a month later. From February 22, then, to March 19, General Botha was occupied at Swakopmund with preparations for his advance. McKenzie, with his headquarters still at Lüderitzbucht, had just moved the bulk of his force from Tschaukaib to Garub, where they halted for five weeks before advancing on Aus.

Meanwhile the invasion of South-West Africa from the south, beginning much later—if we except the disastrous Sandfontein enter-

'With Motor in the Field." *Moore Ritchie.*

PARADE OF GERMAN TROOPS IN SOUTH-WEST AFRICA.

"With Motor in the Field." Moore Ritchie.

GERMAN PRISONERS.

Smaller picture: Drawing water from a well.

prise—than either of the two movements from the sea, was being pushed forward with such energy that it threatened to outpace both The main advance from the south was commanded by Colonel van Deventer. He moved forward in three columns. One, under Colonel Bouwer, came by way of Raman's Drift. Van Deventer himself advanced on Schuit Drift, detaching also a column which marched on Nakob, the point where the Germans had first invaded South African territory. This southern advance began to get under way towards the end of February and in the early days of March. About the same time another development of the South African plan of campaign began to unfold itself. A column under Colonel Berrangé left Kuruman and struck across the desert for Rietfontein—that farthest north-eastern post on the South African frontier which has already been described. Thus from the south van Deventer in three columns was threatening the Germans, while from the south-east Berrangé, if he could carry his column successfully across the desert, would strike them on the flank at a moment when they might be expected to be giving most of their attention to van Deventer.

Both van Deventer and Berrangé had, at least as far as the surface appearance of affairs on the border went, a good deal of lee-way to make up. On all that southern and south-eastern frontier, the Germans—victorious at Sandfontein and aided by the rebels Maritz and Kemp—maintained the semblance of permanent success from the end of September, 1914, till the middle of February, 1915. After Sandfontein, Lukin had had to withdraw even his outposts from Raman's Drift. It was reoccupied by the Germans. They held Schuit Drift, too, and with it the whole frontier formed by the Orange River between these two points, and beyond Schuit Drift to its south-eastern corner. From that corner north to Rietfontein and beyond, the whole eastern

frontier was also in their hands. During all the last months of 1914, the South African force in Prieska and Kenhardt and Upington and Kuruman—outposts of the South African Union dotted here and there in the dry wilderness of these vast spaces—were far too busy with Maritz and Kemp and their German backers to bother much about who held the frontier. The Germans, covered always by their rebel allies, came boldly south and east into South African territory. On December 2 they tried to surround the garrison of Nous, a post near water about 17 miles due south of Schuit Drift. Nous was garrisoned by close on 500 men drawn from the north-western commandos—from Britstown and Kakamas and Kenhardt, and other north-western towns of the Cape Province; not very reliable material and closely akin to those who had gone into rebellion with Maritz. Major Breedt of the Britstown Commando was in command. Rebels and Germans, 800 strong, with four guns and as many machine guns, attacked him at dawn. Some of the commandos fled at the first shot. The rest he rallied, and with them retired in good order to Kakamas, 44 miles away, fighting through the whole of the retreat to prevent the enemy surrounding and compelling him to surrender. The fate of Nous was the fate of many other border posts. Meanwhile the rebels under Maritz and Kemp grew bold and attacked Upington. This was on January 23. There van Deventer was in command, and gave them much more than they bargained for. Their summons to Upington to surrender was contemptuously refused, and when they came to the attack they found themselves no match for the South African Artillery. Routed at last, they broke and fled, with van Deventer in pursuit for 15 miles. Soon after this ill-fated attack, in which he lost at least 18 men killed—the South African officers who fought in the engagement put his casualties much higher—Kemp surrendered to van Deventer at Upington. With him 40 officers and 517 men of his commando laid down their arms, and of Maritz's commando 4 officers and 46 men. The rest of Maritz's commando, it was understood, were to surrender in the various places in which they were scattered. But while this was being done the Germans attacked Kakamas, where a hot engagement took place. The enemy was driven off, and admitted afterwards the loss of 5 officers and 7 men killed. The South African troops lost 1 officer killed and 2 men wounded. Maritz—seemingly as the result of this fight—did not surrender, but escaped through German South-West Africa to Angola, where he was captured months later by the Portuguese.

This unhappy adventure against Kakamas was undertaken by the Germans on February 3. It was about the last time that they had any chance of meeting South African troops outside their own border. In just over three weeks van Deventer was on the move against them. His western column had taken back Raman's Drift some time before, on January 12. Still earlier, at Schuit Drift, the Germans had had none the better of an action with South African troops under Major Vermaas, who attacked them and drove them from the Drift, which they abandoned after destroying the pontoon and all the boats. The South African troops, however, were clearly not strong enough to hold Schuit Drift at that time, and the Germans reoccupied it when they withdrew. It was not till February 26 that van Deventer was ready to begin his advance against them. His first stroke was on his right, where Nakob was rushed on that day, though the German garrison of the post escaped. On March 6 he came again—and this time with complete and stable success—against Schuit Drift. The Drift was taken and with it 10 officers and men of the enemy. About the same time fell Vellor Drift, between Schuit Drift and Raman's Drift. So that, by the end of the first week of March, van Deventer had in his hands the whole line of the Orange River and was pushing on into German territory. His left wing, under Colonel Bouwer, was advancing from Raman's Drift. He himself moved against Nabas, where the enemy was strongly entrenched. On March 7 the place fell to the storm of the South African troops—the prize of five hours' fighting. The Germans managed to escape once again. But with Nabas they lost all the south-eastern corner of their territory as well as the end of the southern spur of the railway, and Ukamas, a strong military post and the head of the spear of aggression that the Germans, when they built that line, had levelled against South Africa.

The enemy was now threatened, too, from the east. On March 6, the same day as van Deventer carried Schuit Drift, Berrangé started on his march from Kuruman to Rietfontein. It was a hazardous enterprise. To strike thus across the desert with a considerable body of men was to take the risk of a complete break-

CONQUEST OF GERMAN SOUTH-WEST AFRICA.

The Burgomaster of Windhuk yields to General Botha. Windhuk was occupied by the Union Forces, May 12, 1915.

down of his transport. If that had happened, Berrangé could hardly have avoided disaster. Water—as always in this campaign, where Nature was the most formidable enemy—was the chief difficulty. Berrangé had to cover 600 miles of waste country before he made Rietfontein. Water holes were scarce and far apart—110 miles separated them at one part of the march. The column was thus compelled to take water with it. Only motor transport made this possible. Berrangé had with him in all about 2,000 men, with guns and machine guns. His troops were the 5th South African Mounted Rifles, the Kalahari Horse,

Cullinan's Horse and the Beehuanaland Rifles.* Kuruman left behind on March 6, the difficulties of the march began almost at once. They were successfully surmounted—an achievement which reflects great credit on those who managed the motor transport service. By March 31 Berrangé, who had thrown back an enemy patrol in a skirmish at Schaapkolk on March 19, was over the border and had occupied without opposition Hasuur, a German police post, 15 miles north-west of Rietfontein. The whole of the southern and eastern frontier of South-West Africa, as far north as Rietfontein, was thus in the hands of the South African troops.

Van Deventer meanwhile was moving up from the south. His objective was Kalkfontein, where the Germans were known to have a stronghold for troops, and ample supplies of war material. But, even if Kalkfontein fell into his hands, he would still have to surmount the most formidable obstacle to his invading troops in all that southern country. Between Kalkfontein and Keetmanshoop the railway runs between two great ranges of mountains—the Great and the Little Karas. An officer who fought with van Deventer's left wing is quoted by Reuter's correspondent as his authority for a striking description of this mountainous and difficult region. Noaeheb, the pass between the two ranges, he says, "is a regular Gibraltar. . . . Fifty men with machine guns entrenched on those slopes could have kept a thousand men at bay for a month at least." Van Deventer well knew what he had to expect there. It was no use for him to hurry on to Kalkfontein so long as his further progress to Keetmanshoop was barred by the enemy, holding so strong a natural position. Faced by this tactical problem, he adopted the usual plan of Dutch South African commanders. He had taken Nabas on March 7, but his left wing under Colonel Bouwer was not yet up parallel with him from Raman's Drift. Warmbad lay in Bouwer's path—a town of some importance, which the enemy might well attempt to hold in strength. Everything, therefore, was in favour of a strategic scheme, which would enable van Deventer to take his time about his further advance, would allow Bouwer to come up with him, would enable him to assist Bouwer if he should meet with strong resistance at Warmbad, and would compel the enemy to evacuate the pass between the Karas ranges without being driven out at a heavy cost to the South African troops. Van Deventer

* The authority for the names of troops composing this column is, as in other cases, Reuter's correspondent.

THE ADVANCE TO WINDHUK.
South African Irish troops resting.



DR. SEITZ, IMPERIAL GERMAN GOVERNOR OF SOUTH-WEST AFRICA,
Being greeted by General Botha at Kilometre 500.

knew that Berrangé had marched from Kuruman for Rietfontein the day before he himself had taken Nabas. If all went well with Berrangé he might be expected to be in German territory by the end of the month, as, in fact, he was. Once there, he would have turned the German position at Noacheb, between the Karas ranges, and the only question would be whether his threat to their line of retreat was powerful enough to compel them to abandon the position. Van Deventer determined to make certain of this. He sent his brother, Colonel-Commandant Dirk van Deventer, to ride round the eastern spurs of the Great Karas range, to join hands with Berrangé west of Rietfontein, and to fall upon the rear of the enemy if he persisted in clinging to the natural stronghold of Noacheb. Dirk van Deventer had with him the 4th Mounted Brigade. All went well with his enterprise. On March 22 he occupied Davignab, a German police post on the eastern frontier. At Plattbeen, a day or so later, he fell in with a party of the enemy, holding an entrenched camp. Their position was taken by storm, and Dirk van Deventer went on his way. At Geitsaub, on April 2, the enemy again opposed his advance, but was again defeated. Van Deventer lost no men in this action. The enemy had two men killed and one wounded, while sixteen were taken prisoners. He was now almost in touch with Berrangé, who from Hasuur had sent a detachment of his mounted men 60 miles to the north-west. At Koes this detachment had a brush with the Germans and retired, having captured large numbers of cattle, which it succeeded in bringing off in spite of an attempt by the Germans to recapture them. Berrangé himself was striking meanwhile straight to the west, taking a line which, if he could follow it to his objective, would bring him to the railway near Keetmanshoop, thus cutting the communications of the enemy at Noacheb. He had, too, with great enterprise, already detached a force of mounted men to ride straight for the railway north of Keetsmanshoop, and to try to cut it—an ambitious plan which came very near success, and must have alarmed the Germans to the south considerably. At Kiriis West, on April 14, Berrangé was joined by Dirk van Deventer, while the men that he had sent against the railway rejoined him there, having had a heavy engagement with the enemy, who were driven off with the loss of two officers and two men killed and several wounded and captured.

While Berrangé and Dirk van Deventer were thus cutting at the German communications, van Deventer's columns were coming up rapidly from the south. Van Deventer himself reached Kalkfontein on April 5, and entered it without opposition, pushing an advance guard at once to the north, which entered Kanus, fifteen miles away, on the same day, also without opposition. At Kalkfontein van Deventer had his headquarters for some days. Bouwer, on his left, was not yet up with him, and he

WAITING FOR THE SURRENDER.
General Botha and his staff at Kilometre 500 on the Otavi line.

could hardly have known by then how Berrangé and his brother Dirk had fared on their flanking movement to the east. Two days later, on April 7, Bouwer reached Kalkfontein with his mounted column of about 900 men—the 17th Mounted Rifles and Hartigan's Horse. Bouwer had occupied Warmbad on his way, a well-known health resort of the Germans with natural hot springs, but not a place of any great military importance. Four days later, on April 11, General Smuts himself reached Kalkfontein. The strategical plan for the southern campaign had reached the point of effective coordination, and Smuts—who had done a giant's work in the preparation and equipment of all the southern columns—now came to take personal command of the operations which they were to conduct with such rapid efficiency and complete success.

The position of the armies when Smuts took command was such that a great semicircle had already been drawn round the Germans in the south. McKenzie had moved out of Garub on March 30 and had occupied Aus. To his force we shall have to return in a moment. They were to strike the decisive blow against the Germans in the south. Van Deventer, now joined by Bouwer, was at Kalkfontein. His brother, Dirk van Deventer, was already far to the north-east, working round the outer spurs of the Great Karas range, and almost on the point of effecting his junction with Berrangé. So far the southern campaign, resumed after so long and irritating a delay, had gone marvellously well for the South African troops. They had had hardly any serious fighting, and the principle of using their greatly superior force to outflank strong German positions and compel a bloodless victory had proved unfailingly successful. It was for Smuts to apply the same principle on a larger scale; and he lost no time about it. Within three days of his arrival at Kalkfontein his columns were moving from the west, from the south, and from the east—as though along the ribs of a vast fan—all converging against the central line of railway up which the enemy—outnumbered and outgeneralled—must make his escape, if he could, to the north. It fell, as we have said already, to McKenzie to deliver the decisive stroke—a piece of good fortune which his men well deserved for their long patience under the weary delays of the campaign. We left him at Garub, to which he had just advanced his main camp on February 19 after a delay of nine weeks at Tschaukaib. At Garub he stayed, or rather his camp stayed, for his headquarters were still back at Lüderitzbucht, for another five weeks. Meanwhile the enemy, with ostentatious energy, pursued the work of fortifying the heights almost within sight of the camp.

Garub is on the inner verge of the lower country, just before the hills lift to the central plateau of South-West Africa. In the "nek," or pass, through the hills that lies between Garub and Aus the enemy was given ample time to prepare a formidable position of defence. There were, of course, ways round it, and McKenzie was perhaps wise to refuse to waste men in an attack on fortifications which, as the event showed, were certain to be abandoned by the enemy without bloodshed when the hour was ripe for the real advance. But his men naturally chafed under this new delay. Again a visit from General Botha, who hurried round from Swakopmund, was the sign of another move. He came on March 26, and two days afterwards McKenzie's headquarters were moved forward to Garub. Another two days, and the advance began in earnest, not to stop this time until the enemy had been finally routed at Gibeon. The Germans did not contest it at any point. Aus occupied, the work of concentrating the mounted men and the supplies for a dash across country, to attempt to cut off the Germans retiring before Smuts in the centre, was hastily pushed on. McKenzie finally moved out of Aus on April 15 with a column of mounted troops. He was to strike north-east across country, through Bethany and Beersheba, for Gibeon; and the hope was that he would arrive there in time to get astride the railway in strong force before the main body of the retiring German army could get past. He just failed. That fortnight's halt at Aus, while the supplies for his mounted men were being collected, was fatal to his complete success. But, once started, he did very well. He was in Bethany on April 17; in Beersheba on April 20. There he was compelled to halt for another four days to get his transport up. He left Beersheba on the night of April 24, and, pushing on with all speed, came within sight of Gibeon the next evening. An attempt made by night to break the railway line behind the enemy came into contact with powerful hostile forces and failed badly. McKenzie's troops suffered a rather costly reverse, and lost a number of men killed

THE SURRENDER.

The German Commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Francke (at back), reading the terms of surrender. The other figures in the group are: (1) Colonel Collyer; (2) Ober-Leutnant Trvnor; (3) Governor Seitz; (4) Major Bok; (5) General Botha.

wounded, and captured. But he redeemed this check amply next day, when he fell on the German rearguard in sufficient strength and with the necessary vigour. Hurriedly repairing the mistakes of the night attack, he encircled the enemy on three sides and sent his columns to close in on the hostile position at dawn on April 26. His guns were well served, and his men—so long balked of a fight with the Germans—went into the business with splendid dash. The German commander, who no doubt never intended to do more than fight a retiring action to cover the retreat of the main body, succeeded in getting most of his troops away. The South Africans were in no condition for a long chase. Their dash across country had left men and horses on the border of exhaustion. So that the Battle of Gibeon, though the most considerable of the whole southern campaign, failed of being the complete victory for MeKenzie that it might have been. Nevertheless it was decisive. The enemy's losses were 8 killed, 30 wounded, and 166 prisoners left behind; with 2 guns, 4 machine guns, and much ammunition and material. But its results were far more serious for the enemy than these comparatively slight losses might imply. The southern campaign was over. The Germans who just escaped McKenzie were the last that were left in all the southern parts of South-West Africa. Smuts, marching with van Deventer's columns, had entered Keetmanshoop on April 20. The flank movement of Berrangé and Dirk van Deventer, if it seems to have been rather barren of really decisive results, had certainly begun the whole German retirement from the southern positions. Smuts lost no time. By April 27 he was at Aus. There he issued a proclamation announcing the conquest of the whole southern territory, and on April 29 had already started for Swakopmund to confer with Botha.

The ideal ending of the campaign would have been for General Botha to seize the railway north of Windhuk at the same moment as the southern armies were driving the enemy to the north. The Germans must then have been caught somewhere on the central line between Seeheim and Karibib and have either been brought to battle under those disadvantageous conditions or have surrendered out of hand. But campaigns are in the way of not working out exactly as they are planned and no experienced soldier will blame Botha or Smuts for having failed to achieve such a miracle of "timing," especially in a country where every possible natural obstacle fought against their columns. It is even doubtful whether Botha and Smuts, when they designed the plan of campaign, intended to try to cut off the enemy from his retreat to the north. They may have thought that if he was caught between two South African armies in the neighbourhood of his capital there would be nothing for him to do but to fight in a forlorn hope of saving it; whereas if Windhuk fell first, and he escaped north, he would then be able to say that he had done everything possible and might surrender as one in the last extremity. However that may be, men who rode with the Burgher columns of Botha's force tell strange tales of reaching positions on the railway north of Windhuk where they could have held up many German troops in their retreat, and then of being halted for two days while the enemy, with horses and guns and supplies, rolled safely by. It is perhaps safest on the whole not to be too credulous of such tales. Men who ride on the separate columns of an army are almost as prone to misunderstand the reason for the orders which they have to obey as armchair critics are inclined to find fault with column commanders for not getting from one point to another in the time that the distance on the map suggests as ample. The end is what the Commander-in-Chief has to think of, and he has a right to be judged by his success in attaining it, not by the details of his measures at any one moment. We left General Botha a little way out of Swakopmund. On February 22 he had occupied Goanikontes, had secured a good water supply, and had pushed his outposts as far as Husab. It was not till March 19 that he was in a position to do anything more. Then he moved out against the enemy, attacked him at Pforte, Jackalswater and Riet, and drove him from all three places. This engagement—fought, as so many of General Botha's engagements have been fought, by two flanking columns and a central force—gave General Botha the chance of striking straight for the junction at Karibib and of cutting the railway in the north while the operations in the south were still developing. He is said to have been eager to march at once, but found that his transport could not possibly be ready for another month, and was compelled to wait before beginning his final advance. It should be said of the engagements at Pforte, Jackalswater and

AT THE SIGNING OF THE SURRENDER.

General Botha (on right) sitting opposite Lieutenant-Colonel Francke (on extreme left).

Riet that they were very gallantly fought by all the three South African columns. The force which attacked Riet made skilful use of its big guns, the enemy retiring without waiting for infantry attack. The Burgher column under Colonel Alberts which attacked Pforte had a better chance, and took full advantage of it. These mounted troops rode the defence down, taking the slow Germans by surprise by riding in upon them at a gallop and firing from the saddle. So successful were these tactics that they captured 210 prisoners, two guns and two machine-guns. The column which attacked Jackalswater also had some stiff fighting, finding the enemy strongly posted there and not being strong enough to storm his position. The result of the South African successes at Pforte and Riet was, of course, the evacuation by the enemy of Jackalswater also.

Botha's position now was that he had tested the strength of the enemy opposed to him and had proved his own strength to be ample. His problem was the finding of food and water for his men. The railway had been broken up by the enemy as he retired, and could only be repaired slowly. As it was, a water tram went every day from Swakopmund to the farthest construction post and back, to keep the troops and working gangs supplied. It was obvious that an advance, if it was to be in time to cut off the enemy from their retreat to the north, would have to be rapid, and that the re-building of the railway could not possibly keep pace with it. The actions at Riet and Pforte were fought on March 20. It will be remembered that by April 11 the Southern campaign had reached the point when General Smuts could take command of the converging columns, finishing the whole business off in less than three weeks. General Botha knew, of course, how near the final movement in the south was getting. He must have seen that it would be impossible for him to be up in time. The alternative would have been to delay the operations in the south till he was ready to strike for the northern railway. But he saw, no doubt, that it was far more important to keep the enemy on the run, and that any delay in the southern operations would leave the columns of Berrangé and Dirk van Deventer "in the air" and would expose them to the danger of being attacked by an overwhelming concentration of German troops. Botha was too old a commander to take the risk of another

Sandfontein. He wisely decided to let the southern operations take their course, and went himself to Lüderitzbucht to visit McKenzie's column two days before the march on Gibeon began. It was not till April 26 that he was ready for his forward move, and then he boldly abandoned the line of the railway and struck straight up the course of the Swakop river, where he had already pushed the enemy back far beyond Riet. At the same time Skinner with a mounted squadron was directed to reconnoitre the line of the railway beyond Trekkopjes, where his main body stood. He moved out on the night of April 25 and ran right into a body of the enemy, which was moving to take him by night surprise at Trekkopjes—the second time that Skinner and the Germans had collided in the night, each trying to surprise the other. Skinner withdrew on Trekkopjes, where the Germans attacked him in the morning, using their heavy guns to shell his camp. He himself had no guns, as his had been withdrawn for the general advance by the other route. But his infantry held their positions under a heavy fire, and a Naval armoured car detachment attacked the Germans and did considerable execution with machine guns. The action was hot for about four hours. Then the Germans drew off, having lost three officers and 6 men killed, and two officers and 12 men wounded.

Botha, meanwhile, had begun his advance up the course of the Swakop river. On the same day as the Germans were driven off at Trekkopjes, he moved out from Husab and Riet with a large force of mounted Burghers—three brigades under Brigadier-Generals Brits, Myburgh, and Manie Botha—and advanced straight up the dry bed of the river. He moved, not in one compact body, but, after the Boer fashion, in a number of columns, each in touch with the other, but spread over a wide tract of country. Between these spreading lines of his advance Botha himself went continually in a motor-car with a small body-guard. An enterprising enemy might have had abundant chances of intercepting him, but the Germans in this campaign showed an astonishing lack of initiative. It is true that they were heavily out-numbered, but so were the Boers in the South African War. Yet the Boers harassed the British communications continually, and were always descending unexpectedly upon isolated columns. Such tactics, if the Germans had used them, might have delayed Botha's advance, if they could not have stopped it. As it was, he was singularly immune from any kind of attack. By this



GOVERNMENT HOUSE, WINDHUK,
Showing the Union Jack flying.

ENTRY OF THE UNION FORCES INTO WINDHUK.
General Botha addressing his troops.

time, of course, the Battle of Gibeon had been fought and won; the southern campaign was over; and the enemy was thinking of little but getting away to the north before Botha could cut off his retreat. By April 30 Botha was at Dorstriviermund. A day or so later he halted for two or three days, while he sent Myburgh and Manie Botha north to cut the railway between Karibib and Windhuk. At this camp General Smuts, who had left Aus three days after the Battle of Gibeon, came to confer with him, travelling across country in a motor-car and catching up Botha's column during its halt. Then on May 5, hearing that Myburgh and Manie Botha had successfully performed their mission, Botha moved straight across country for Karibib, the junction of the railway from the west and south and the point where the northern spur of line that goes to Tsumeb and Grootfontein begins. From the camp to Karibib was a march of 40 miles, over waterless country, and with the chance of a stiff action at the end of it. The risk was obvious, but Botha took it. He marched through the cool morning hours of darkness, and was in sight of Karibib early in the afternoon—to find the place ready to surrender. It was occupied at once. Important from the railway point of view, it had also a good supply of water. But food was scarce for some time, until the engineers, working at high pressure, relaid the railway. In a few days the infantry, which had followed the line of the railway—that followed a double route—arrived at Karibib. There the force halted for a time, while General Botha himself, with a mobile column, dashed forward to receive the surrender of Windhuk.

The Burgher Brigades, a battery of artillery, and a machine-gun section had gone on in advance. Before he started, on May 11, Botha had already been in conversation on the telephone with the German authorities left in Windhuk, and had heard from them that they were ready to surrender the capital. He himself and his personal staff travelled in motor-cars. The track was difficult and tangled, and the motors made heavy going. Two nights were spent in the bush, and on the morning of the third day Windhuk came in sight. The Burgher Brigades had arrived, and were drawn up outside the town to await the ceremony of surrender. General Botha then entered the German capital. The British flag was hoisted, Colonel Mentz was placed in command of the town, and a proclamation was read declaring martial law. The chief importance of the occupation of Windhuk was that it put the wireless station out of action. This, it will be remembered, had been the main reason for the request of the Imperial Government that General Botha and his Cabinet should undertake the invasion of South-West Africa. Other-

SHIPPING GENERAL BOTHA'S GUNS.

Big guns, used in German South-West Africa, being transported for use in another part of Africa.

wise, the most memorable feature of this portion of the campaign was its extreme rapidity. In 16 days General Botha had struck from the fringe to the very midst of the enemy's country. He had pushed, with his Burghers, far ahead of his supplies. He had brought his infantry—who surpassed themselves, then and later on, by their heroic marching through great heat, with too little water, and in awful dust—up to occupy critical points and to hold his lines of communication. His reward was the bloodless occupation of Windhuk, and an impression made on the mind of the enemy which must have gone far to dispose him to his ultimate surrender.

Almost at once, indeed, a message from the German commander came to Botha that he was prepared to discuss terms of surrender. Botha returned, again by motor, to Karibib; arranged an armistice of 48 hours from mid-day on May 20; and at Giftkop, 30 miles north of Karibib, met Seitz, the German Governor and Francke, the Commander-in-chief. The German terms would have been insolent, if they had not had every appearance of being put forward in all seriousness. They proposed that hostilities should be suspended, and that each army should continue to hold the country it occupied at the moment until the end of the war in Europe. Botha, of course, would have nothing to do with such proposals, and refused to prolong the armistice. It remained to prepare the final advance against the enemy, who had retired north along the railway. The organization of the troops holding the line of communications had first to be recast. They were reinforced by regiments which had been fighting in the south and were now brought round to Swakopmund. By the middle of June the work of organization and preparation was complete, and on June 18 Botha moved out of Karibib to begin the last stage of the campaign.

Again he adopted his favourite formation. Myburgh, with one Burgher column, rode far out on the right flank; Brits, with another, did the same on the left. Botha in the centre, had with him two mounted brigades, an infantry brigade under Brigadier-General Beves, and some heavy artillery. These dispositions

brought their normal success. In just three weeks from his first move out of Karibib Botha had received the surrender of the whole German force, and the campaign was at an end. He himself marched with great rapidity, sparing himself and his staff as little as his men. On June 20 he entered Omaruru. Forty miles to the north was a strong German position at Kalkveld. They did not hold it, but again retired north, with Botha's column hot on their heels. In less than a week Botha had covered more than 120 miles, and was at Otjiwarongo. But he did not stop long there. He left Otjiwarongo on June 27, and by the evening of June 30 his advance guard was only six miles from Otavi. There the enemy put up some show of resistance; but his bolt was nearly shot, and though he had mined all the approaches to Otavi, the South African troops marched into the town without any loss on the first day of July. About 10 miles north, on the railway line to Tsumeb, the enemy's main body was now concentrated. At Otavi, Botha halted a while to allow his dispositions to develop. His infantry marched into the town three days after the mounted troops had reached it. They had covered more than 250 miles of that hot and thirsty country. The last 80 miles they had done in four days, and the last 45 in 36 hours—great marching, even in ordinary country; and in the circumstances of their case a wonderful performance, fully justifying the praise of their commander, General Beves. "Under the conditions of this country," he told them, "where water is difficult to obtain, heavy dust is the rule, and not the exception, and difficulties of transport necessitated your receiving half, and for six days, quarter rations, I look on the performance as one that reflects the greatest credit on all who have taken part." When they reached Otavi they found a local armistice in force. The Germans were given till the morning of July 9 to surrender.

Myburgh on the right, in the meantime, and Brits on the left had completely encompassed the enemy. Their Burgher columns went with their usual speed, carrying with them the scanty food that they needed to supplement the meat with which their rifles provided them from the abundant game of the country, and taking their chance of finding enough water for themselves and their beasts. Myburgh made a bold sweep on the right flank. By July 4 he had crossed the railway that goes north-east from Otavi to Grootfontein, and had routed a small enemy force in an engagement at Gaub. Following hard on the heels of the Germans, he came the same day to Tsumeb, where his advance guard was met by a flag of truce. During the parley the German guns suddenly opened fire from their positions round the town. The Burghers—enraged at this ap-

AFTER THE CONQUEST OF THE GERMAN COLONY.
At the Thanksgiving Service at the Wanderers' Club, August 3, 1915. Left to right General Smuts (1); Mrs. Botha (2); General Botha (3); Mr. Louis Botha, junior (4).

parent treachery—leapt to their horses, and rode straight at the town. In a few minutes they had charged through the streets, had scattered the enemy from their positions, and were in possession of the whole circle of defences. Thereupon the Germans protested that the firing had been a mistake, and pleaded the armistice at Otavi as a reason for demanding that Myburgh should give up again what his men had won. They little knew their Boer. Myburgh demanded to speak to Botha on the telephone. The Germans admitted that they could put him through to Otavi. A brief conversation served to confirm Myburgh's suspicions. He learned that the armistice at Otavi was local and no concern of his. Thereupon he insisted upon the surrender of Tsumeb, and had his way, thus possessing himself of all its vast stores of arms and military equipment without allowing the enemy any chance of destroying them. There he released, too, a large number of prisoners held by the Germans.

Brits, too, was doing to the German position on the left what Myburgh had done to it on the right. The circle that he drew round it was even wider than Myburgh's. On July 6 he suddenly appeared at Namutoni, about 40 miles north-west of Tsumeb. There he received, without any fighting, the surrender of the German commander with 170 officers and men and huge quantities of transport and ammunition. The cordon had this time been drawn tight round the enemy, who must have known that his time had come.

Yet Seitz and Franeke prolonged to the very last moment their surrender to General Botha. It was not till the time allotted had all but expired that their messenger came into Otavi to announce their acceptance of the terms that had been offered. For an enemy who had fought the campaign with every foul device that a malign ingenuity could invent, had poisoned wells, and had treated prisoners with infamous and deliberate brutality, those terms were, in the opinion of many South Africans, generous to a fault. The officers retained their arms, gave their parole, and were to be allowed to live in any place that they selected. The non-commissioned officers and men kept their rifles but no ammunition, and were to be interned within South-West Africa at any place chosen by the South African Government. The "reservists" were allowed to return to their farms on parole, and were given back their rifles. This, if they were to be allowed to stay in the country at all, was inevitable, for it was necessary that they should have the means of self-protection against the natives. There has naturally been much criticism of these terms of surrender. General Botha, however, was on the spot, and knew what his position was. An attack in force on the Germans at bay would have been costly in men, and could hardly have been delivered until a much larger body of infantry had been brought up. Each day's delay meant a great expenditure of money, and the South African Government, with so many hostile critics who were eager to make all the capital they could out of the cost of the campaign, were naturally anxious to see the end of it as soon as possible. When all is said and done, political considerations will enter into the decision of such matters, and General Botha carried through the whole campaign with such rapidity and efficiency that criticism of his acceptance of the German surrender on such terms must be very well founded to justify itself.

Thus ended the campaign. It had been a triumph of organization rather over the difficulties of nature than over a worthy enemy—for the Germans, outnumbered though they were and in a hopeless case, showed themselves throughout to be contemptible opponents. General Botha or any other of the Boer commanders, given the chances which Franeke had, would certainly have made very effective use of them. This German did little but conduct a not very efficient retirement, till the moment when he allowed himself to be hemmed in. The real credit of the campaign rests with the South African troops, who were splendidly adequate to every demand that was made upon them. General Botha amply recognized this in the General Order that he issued to his army. "The commander-in-chief," he said, "finds in the magnificent work which has been performed so uncomplainingly and resolutely an indication of what may be expected of the citizens of the Union, who place their duty before personal feelings and interests." That may well serve as the summing up of the campaign. Its justice was soon to be proved both in East Africa and on the battlefields of Europe.

CHAPTER CXXXI.

THE CONQUEST OF CAMEROON AND TOGOLAND.

Eighteen Months of West African Warfare—The Germans in Togoland—German Proposals for "Neutrality" in Africa—Franco-British Co-operation—Surrender of Togoland—History of Cameroon—German Ambitions in the Congo—More "Neutrality" Intrigues—Cameroon Operations Analysed—Plan of Campaign—Surrender of Duala—General Dobell's First Operations—The Campaign of 1915—The French Operations—Joint Advance—Fall of Yaunde—Surrender of Mora in February, 1916—Review of the Campaign.

GERMANY lost Togoland, the smallest of her African possessions, in the first month of the war. French troops entered Togoland from Dahomey on August 6; on August 7 Lome, the capital, and a strip of territory extending seventy-five miles north from the coast was surrendered to a British officer sent from the Gold Coast. The Germans made an effort to defend Kamina, farther inland, where they had a powerful wireless telegraphy station. On August 22 they were engaged at the Chra river, south of Kamina, by an Anglo-Freneh force under Lieut.-Col. Bryant. On the night of August 24 the Germans destroyed their wireless station at Kamina, and on August 26 Major von Döring, the Acting Governor, unconditionally surrendered to Col. Bryant. Northern Togoland was at the same time occupied, with scarcely any opposition, by French and British troops.

The campaign in Cameroon lasted eighteen months. It was attacked on the north-east, east and south-east by French troops from the Chad Territory and the Congo region; on the west by British troops from Nigeria, and from the sea by an Anglo-French force under Gen. Sir Charles Dobell The first attacks, made in August, 1914, from the Chad Territory and Nigeria, had not been successful. An attempt by a British column to seize Garua failed with heavy loss. But on September 21 Gen. Largeau, at the seeond attempt, captured Kusseri, the German post near Lake Chad, thereafter sending a column under Lieut.-Col. Brisset to cooperate with the British forces in Nigeria, the combined columns being placed under Brigadier-General Cunliffe, who took command in February, 1915. It was not till June, 1915, that, by the capture of Garua and Ngaundere, the northern columns aehieved their first important successes.

Meanwhile the Freneh eolumns advaneing from the south and south-east, under Gen. Aymerich—who had the help of a detachment from the Belgian Congo—failed to make the progress expeeted. Gen. Dobell oeeupied Duala, the ehief port of the colony, on September 27, and in November took Buea, on the slopes of the Cameroon mountain and the administrative capital of the eolony. The governor, Herr Ebermaier, and the commander of the troops, Col. Zimmermann, with the bulk of the forees had, however, withdrawn, after the surrender of Duala, to Yaunde, in the centre of the southern part of the colony A French officer, Col. Mayer, took eommand of the forces sent by Gen. Dobell towards Yaunde, and on Oetober 26, 1914, Edea, 32 miles in a

A SQUAD OF THE ROYAL MARINE LIGHT INFANTRY.

direct line east of Duala, was occupied. In January, 1915, the Germans made the only considerable offensive movement undertaken by them during the campaign; they tried, unsuccessfully, to dislodge Col. Mayer from Edea. In March a combined movement on Yaunde by the troops of Generals Aymerich and Dobell was planned, but did not succeed. Gen. Aymerich's troops failed to make progress, and Col. Mayer, after advancing some distance, was compelled to fall back on Edea (June, 1915).

A new combined movement was begun towards the close of September, in which the forces of Generals Dobell, Cunliffe, and Aymerich all took part. The Germans at first resisted firmly, but by the close of December their opposition had been overcome. Yaunde was occupied by one of Gen. Dobell's columns on January 1, 1916. A few days previously that place had been abandoned by the Germans, who, despite the efforts made to cut them off, succeeded in escaping into Spanish Guinea, where they were interned, being subsequently removed to Spain. Those Germans who found refuge on neutral territory numbered over 800, and included the Governor and the commander of the troops.

The last place to fly the German flag in Cameroon was Mora. Its garrison, under Hauptmann von Raben, occupied a practically impregnable position on an isolated mountain. All attempts to capture it failed, but on February 18, 1916, Hauptmann von Raben, seeing the hopelessness of his position, capitulated. Independent operations undertaken by the French had earlier in the war cleared the Germans out of that part of their colony lying south of Spanish Guinea. The conquest of Cameroon was complete.

Togoland and Cameroon were acquired by Germany in 1884, being among the first fruits of the partition of Africa among European Powers—a partition which resulted from H. M. Stanley's discovery of the course of the Congo and his revelation of the abundant richness of the interior of the equatorial regions of the continent. Togoland, part of the old Slave Coast of West Africa, has only 32 miles of seaboard, and though its hinterland widens its total area is less than 34,000 square miles;

it is a trifle larger than Ireland. When the Germans entered into the scramble for Africa, Togo was the sole patch of coast in Upper Guinea not appropriated by other European States, and it was hemmed in, save seawards by French and British territory—Dahomey on the east, the Gold Coast on the west, and the Upper Senegal and Niger colony on the north. Differing in no essential respect in physical features from the adjacent districts of the West Coast, Togoland is rich in sylvan products, and its resources had been greatly developed by the Germans. Lome, the capital and chief port, a creation of the Germans, lies near the Gold Coast border. In the interior, and connected with Lome by railway, is Kamina, where just before the war began the Germans had, as has been seen, completed a very powerful wireless telegraphy station. It communicated direct with Nauen, near Berlin, and with the wireless stations in Cameroon and German South-West Africa. Though only 38 miles from the Dahomey border, the wireless station at Kamina had

[Speaight.

MAJOR-GENERAL SIR CHAS. DOBELL.
Commanded Allied Forces in Cameroon.

[Bassano.

COL. E. H. GORGES, C.B., D.S.O.

been erected with such secrecy that the French authorities were not aware of its existence. Baron Codelli, the designer of the station, was still in Togoland, and on August 16 was taken prisoner by the British.

When the European situation became threatening in July, 1914. Major von Döring, Acting Governor and commander of the troops in Togoland, made preparations to attack the French in Dahomey, on the assumption that Great Britain would not enter into the war. When he found out his error he abandoned his design. Acting on instructions from Berlin, in telegrams dated August 4 and 5, addressed to M. William Ponty, Governor-General of French West Africa, to the Lieut.-Governor of Dahomey and to the Governor of the Gold Coast, he proposed that Togoland and the neighbouring French and British colonies should remain neutral. The German Government shortly afterwards came to have wider conceptions of neutrality in Equatorial Africa, conceptions to which reference is made later on, but the Togo proposal was a distinct move, and though reasons of humanity and the supposed need of the white races to present a solid front to the blacks were urged by Major von Döring, the real object of the Germans in wishing to keep Togoland neutral was to preserve for their use the Kamina wireless station. Both the French and the British authorities refused to entertain the proposal. The Lieut.-Governor of Dahomey, M. Ch. Noufflard, who did not even answer Major von Döring's telegram, directed Commandant

Maroix, the senior military officer in Dahomey, to open hostilities. On August 6, French colonial troops crossed the Togoland border near the coast. They met with no opposition; Little Popo (Anecho) was seized, and on the evening of August 8 the town of Togo was occupied.

On their side the Gold Coast authorities had not been idle. Mr. W. C. F. Robertson, Acting Governor, in the absence of Sir Hugh Clifford, and Capt. F. C. Bryant, R.A., senior officer on the Gold Coast station, took prompt and energetic measures. European volunteers at Accra, Sekondi and Kumasi were enrolled and every necessary step was taken, both for defence and offence. On August 6 Capt. Barker was sent to Lome under a flag of truce to demand the surrender of Togoland, and was told to point out to Major von Döring that, as strong columns were ready to invade the colony from west, east and north, his position was hopeless. A twenty-four hours' armistice was granted. When Capt. Barker returned to Lome at 6 p.m. on August 7 he found that the German troops had evacuated the town and that the District Commissioner left behind by Major von Döring had instructions to surrender the colony as far as a line drawn 120 kilometres (74.57 miles) north of Lome. Major von Döring, the German troops, and many German civilians had retired up the railway, the Acting Governor having received imperative instructions to defend the wireless station at Kamina.*

Up to this time the French and British authorities had worked independently, but on August 8 arrangements were made between Mr. Robertson and M. Noufflard for their co-operation. Capt. Bryant, who was granted the temporary rank of Lieut.-Col., was in chief command of the Allied forces. Capt. Castaing, of the French Colonial Infantry, commanded the French column (eight Europeans and 150 Senegalese Tirailleurs), which, having completed the occupation of south-east Togoland, joined Col. Bryant's troops on August 18. Col. Bryant had landed at Lome on August 12 with two companies of the Gold Coast Regiment, machine guns, medical transport, and supply staffs. The total strength of the British

* In the diary of a Protestant pastor, J. Spieth, who took part in the defence of Kamina, is the entry, under date August 18, that Major von Döring had received the message, four times repeated, to defend Kamina.

BRITISH MACHINE-GUN SECTION.
Ready to advance.



BRITISH MACHINE-GUN SECTION.
Smaller picture: British Field Gun.

force was 57 Europeans and 535 natives, with 2,000 carriers and labourers. Pushing up the railway towards Kamina, the main body came into contact with the enemy on August 15. On the same day Capt. Potter, with the "I" company of the Gold Coast Regiment, very neatly trapped a much stronger column of the enemy, operating on the railway at Agbelafoe, by getting between it and von Döring's force. By August 20 Col. Bryant's column had marched to Nuatja, and on the 22nd there was a stiff fight at the village of Chra. The enemy, whose force consisted of 60 Europeans, 400 native soldiers, and three machine guns, held a very strong entrenched position north of the river, the railway bridge over which had been blown up. The bush here was very dense, and the attacking columns were unable to keep touch with one another. After attacking all day the Allies failed to dislodge the enemy. At nightfall they entrenched themselves, prepared to renew the attack at dawn, but during the night the Germans evacuated their position. Major von Döring had learned that another force, a French column under Commandant Maroix, advancing from the east, was within two days' march of Kamina, and he was unwilling to risk depletion of the garrison available for its defence.

At the Chra river fight the Germans suffered little loss, but the Anglo-French casualties were 73 (including 23 killed), or 17 per cent. of the force engaged. The hottest fighting fell to the French column, which attacked the enemy's left, but after getting to within fifty yards of the trenches was obliged to retire. Here Lieut. Guillemart, of the French Colonial Infantry, and Lieut. C. M. Thompson (Royal Scots, attached G.C. Regiment) were killed. Lieut. Thompson had been placed in command of a company of Senegalese Tirailleurs; after the fight he was found surrounded by the bodies of a Gold Coast native N.C.O. and the sergeant, two corporals, and nine privates of the Senegalese, who had died in his defence. They were buried on the spot, Thompson's grave in the centre.

On the night of August 24–25 loud explosions were heard at Col. Bryant's camp in the direction of Kamina, and in the morning the masts of the wireless station, which had been clearly visible from the Allies' advanced post, were seen to have disappeared. The wireless station had, in fact, been destroyed by the enemy. There had been a good deal of dissension among the 200 Germans, military and civilian, gathered at Kamina, and Major von Döring, though amply supplied with arms and ammunition,

NIGERIAN ARTILLERY DURING AN ATTACK ON MOUNTAIN HILL CAMP.

abandoned his intention of resisting to the last. On August 25 he sent Major von Röben, his second in command, to Col. Bryant, offering to surrender on terms, but von Röben was told that the surrender must be unconditional. To this von Döring agreed on the 26th, and on the next day Col. Bryant took possession of Kamina. He had brought to a rapid conclusion a little campaign which, mishandled, might easily have been prolonged, and its success was very largely due to his initiative and promptitude. For his services he was promoted to the substantive rank of Major, and received the C.M.G. Credit was also due to the excellent work of Dr. W. W. Claridge, best known, perhaps, as author of a history of the Gold Coast, and the other members of the West African Medical Staff connected with the expedition.

While Col. Bryant's campaign was in progress British and French columns occupied Northern Togoland. The rapidity of the movements of the Allies completely surprised the Germans, who offered but a feeble resistance. Acting on instructions from Capt. C. H. Armitage, Chief Commissioner of the Northern Territories, Major Marlow with a force of eight men only occupied Yendi, the German Commissioner being misled by spies into thinking that a large force was being brought against him. The rest of Northern Togoland was seized by French forces numbering 630 rifles all told under Capt. Bouchez, of the 2nd Regiment Senegalese Tirailleurs. Traversing an inundated region, crossed by numerous unfordable rivers and under continuous rain, the French columns covered 310 miles in twenty days. The German troops at Sansanne Mango, over 400 strong, fled before them, and on the second day of their retreat 180 of the German native soldiers deserted to the French. This was typical of the attitude of the natives of Togoland to their German masters, by whom they were harshly treated. Equally typical was the eagerness of the natives of the French and British colonies to help in crushing the Germans. A picturesque feature of Capt. Bouchez's force was a body of Mossi warriors, inhabitants of a kingdom in the Niger Bend under French protection. They volunteered their services, each chieftain coming in feudal fashion to the rendezvous with his retainers. Col. Bryant employed no partisans, but the chiefs and peoples of the Gold Coast and Ashanti were lavish in help. Besides much other financial assistance, they defrayed the whole cost, £60,000, incurred in the British military operations, and also the cost of subsequent administration—£3,000 a month.

A grave charge fully proved, that of using explosive bullets, was brought against Major von Döring and Dr. Gruner (Commissioner of the Misahöhe district). Some 200,000 rounds of soft-nosed bullets of large calibre issued by the German Government were captured. Major von Döring also armed natives over whom he had no control and hundreds of them were let



MAP OF TOGOLAND.

loose in the bush. The vast majority of the natives gave, however, no trouble, and in a few weeks the economic life of the country was being carried on as smoothly as if there had been no interruption to it whatever.

The conquest of Togoland was a comparatively simple task, though had they had good leadership the Germans could have made a much stronger defence. It was otherwise in Cameroon. In the first place the size of the colony must be borne in mind. It had an area of 292,000 square miles, being equal to the area of Germany and Great Britain combined. Then the character of the country should be remem-

bered. Extending from the Gulf of Guinea north to Lake Chad, west to the Benue, and east and south to the Congo basin, it naturally presents many varying types of land. In a broad generalization it may be said that the northern third of the colony is flat and open, save on the western border, where are the Mandara Hills. The central region is a broken plateau, mostly covered with long grass and mountainous in its western section. The southern third, also mountainous in the west, is largely covered with primeval forest which in the east grows thinner, becomes park-like, and finally gives place to the low and marshy valley of the Sanga. The climate in general is unhealthy, and the weather, save in some of the higher districts, is always hot, night and day, in the rains and in the dries; malaria is very prevalent. Moreover, Southern Cameroon is one of the wettest regions in the tropics. The country gets its name from a broad and deep estuary called by its Portuguese discoverers Rio dos Camarões.* Immediately north of the estuary the great volcanic mass of Cameroon Mountain rises abruptly from the sea, its summit 13,700 feet high. The only lofty mountain on the coast of Africa, with smoke and vapour ever issuing from its many craters, it is a magnificent and unforgettable landmark. But it was the fine harbourage presented by the estuary which proved the attraction to the West Coast trader, and since the seventeenth century Europeans have trafficked with the natives living on its banks, a very shrewd negro people called Duala. From the beginning till towards the close of the nineteenth century the Duala were under British influence, and generally regarded the nearest British consul as their overlord. To Baptist missionaries—notably Alfred Saker and George Grenfell—the Duala owed their early training both in civilization and Christianity.

The treaty on which Germany based her claims to Cameroon was concluded on July 15, 1884, with an ebon and bulky figure long familiar to traders on the West Coast—King Bell, of Bell Town (now Duala), in the Cameroon estuary. King Bell (his real name was Mbeli), a veritable merchant prince, had long sought British protection, and had been fobbed off by a Colonial Office over

* Rio dos Camarões means River of Prawns, and the estuary was so named from the abundance of prawns found in it. In its English form the term Cameroons was applied to the whole district. When the Germans established their authority they gave the name, in its Teutonic form, Kamerun, to the whole of the territory they acquired

["Times" Photographs.

FOUND ON GERMAN NATIVE TROOPS.

Saw-edge bayonet, belt and scabbard, caps and eagle. Smaller picture: Identification discs



["Times" Photograph.

BULLETS USED AGAINST THE BRITISH TROOPS.
German dum-dum bullets of various patterns, used by the Germans in Cameroon.

anxious to avoid responsibility. Too late Downing Street awoke to the designs of Germany, and Consul Hewett was on his way from the Oil Rivers (the Niger Delta) to conclude the overdue treaty with King Bell when Dr. Gustav Naehtigal, a famous explorer of Inner Africa whom Bismarek had turned into a diplomatic agent, put into the estuary on the gunboat Möwe, having ten days before induced the King of Togo to cede his country to Germany. King Bell had waited long and in vain for his friends the English—whose tongue in the quaint pidgen dialect of the West Coast he spoke fluently—and he was persuaded by Dr. Naehtigal to sign a treaty with him. When, five days later, Mr. Hewett arrived it was only to find that King Bell, having parted with his birthright, could only lament that he had nothing left to give the Great White Queen but his blessing. Bell and his neighbours soon found that in the Teuton they had a master not to their liking, and certain unpleasant incidents induced the Germans to send a squadron, under Rear-Admiral Knorr, to the Cameroon coast. It was on board the Bismarek, a vessel of this squadron, that Admiral von Scheer, who commanded the German Fleet at the Battle of Horn Reef (May 31, 1916), made his début as a naval officer.

Of the later history of Cameroon, save as it affected Franco-German relations, it is not necessary to say much. For years it exhibited all the worst forms of German colonial methods. In 1906, after some rather unsavoury scandals, the Governor, Herr von Puttkamer, had to be recalled, his successor being the Dr. Seitz who afterwards, as governor of South-West Africa, was fated to surrender that colony to General Botha. In consequence of the harshness with which the Germans treated the Duala and other negro tribes of Southern Cameroon, those natives were never reconciled to German rule, and their very doubtful attitude towards the government before and after the declaration of war in 1914 was given by the German colonial officials as one reason why they abandoned the coast region so readily. In Northern Cameroon, where many of the inhabitants are Moslems and the Fula (a non-negro people) are the leading caste, the Germans adopted in part the wiser plan of ruling through the native chiefs, and they had rallied to their cause certain Fula sultans, to whom they had left a considerable measure of autonomy. One of these sultans in the early days of the war took the field with a train of mounted warriors on the side of the Germans.

Along the whole of its western frontier Cameroon was bordered by the British Protectorate of Nigeria. This frontier remained constant, but on the east and south, where Cameroon bordered French Equatorial Africa,* there were important changes subsequent to the early agreements between France and Germany respecting the limits of their respective powers of influence. Internal communications in Central Africa being largely by river, each State endeavoured to secure navigable waterway for its possessions, and the boundaries of Cameroon were so fixed that the Germans obtained in the north-east access to the Shari, the greatest feeder of Lake Chad,

* Formerly officially, and still often popularly called French Congo.

and in the south-east part of the Upper Sanga, a navigable tributary of the Congo. A modification of the frontier was made in 1908 on mutually satisfactory lines, Germany giving up part of the Shari region, and gaining a better position in the Sanga district.

Then followed the Agadir crisis, arising out of the extension of French authority in Morocco. Into that question it is not necessary to enter here save as it affected West Africa. At first Germany demanded in return for her recognition of a French Protectorate in Morocco the cession to her of the major part of French Equatorial Africa, including the whole of the seaboard. Her ambition was to extend German territory from Cameroon across the Congo basin to join up with German East Africa, and thus create a vast trans-continental empire stretching from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean. France strenuously resisted these demands, but in the end, by the agreement of November, 1911, she sacrificed a considerable part of her equatorial possessions. The eastern border of Cameroon was greatly enlarged. But this was not all; Germany also secured two tongues of land which gave her direct access to the Congo River and its great northern tributary, the Ubangi. One of these antennæ was the valley of the Lower Sanga to its confluence with the Congo; the other the valley of the Lobaye to its confluence with the Ubangi. As they touched the rivers these strips of territory were only a few miles wide, but they sufficed Germany for the moment. Her fingers touched the coveted land, and at a later period she intended to extend her grasp. For the French the sacrifice they had been called upon to make was unpleasant. The German antennæ cut the means of communication between the various colonies included in French Equatorial Africa save by river, and their colony of Middle Congo was reduced to a fragment.

Another territorial concession which the French felt obliged to make revealed clearly Germany's African ambitions. When the scramble for Africa was in progress Spain had made good a claim to a squarish block of country on the coast between French Congo and Cameroon. It was known variously as Spanish Guinea or (from its chief estuary) Muni. Up to 1911 Spanish Guinea was bounded east and south by French territory and only on the north by Cameroon, while Spain had given to France the right of pre-emption in case of the sale of her colony. But by the 1911 agreement Spanish Guinea became an enclave of Cameroon, the German frontier being drawn 20 miles south of its southern border. The Germans thus obtained the southern shores of the Muni estuary and part of Mondah Bay, and their frontier was only a few miles north of Libreville, the chief seaport of French Equatorial Africa. In area alone the Germans by the 1911 agreement added 107,270 square miles to Cameroon, the only return—apart

BRITISH OFFICERS TRAINING NATIVES.

from Morocco—being the cession to France of 6,450 square miles in the Shari region, the German frontier there being drawn in to the Logone river as far as its confluence with the Shari.

If to France as a nation the sacrifices made in Equatorial Africa were painful, in spite of the immense advantages involved in the settlement of the Morocco question, the Colonial Party, in particular, felt them to be grievous. Most of the ceded area had been discovered by de Brazza and his associates, and through French capital and by French enterprise flourishing stations and plantations had been established in it. The French of Equatorial Africa regarded New Cameroon as, in the words of M. Merlin, the Governor-General, "our Alsace-Lorraine." Thus when the war began their first object was to recover the ceded territory and so prompt and so successful were their measures that by August 7 the German posts at the Sanga-Congo confluence and on the Ubangi were in French possession. The war in Cameroon began with a French success, and on the Congo side that success was, at the outset, rapidly followed up.

It was at this juncture—on August 23—that the German Government made a singular *démarche*. It was the day after the fight at Chra, in Togoland, and the eve of the destruction of the wireless telegraphy installation at Kamina. Germany saw herself being cut off from communication with her other African colonies, and knew already that the German navy could not afford them any protection. She bethought herself of a declaration of the Berlin Conference of 1884–85 in favour of the neutrality of the conventional basin of the Congo and invoked it to preserve, as far as possible, her possessions in Equatorial Africa. By the Berlin Act the basin of the Congo was conventionally extended so that it included not only the Belgian Congo, but about half of French Equatorial Africa, a third of Cameroon, all German East Africa, all British East Africa, all Uganda, all Nyasaland, the northern part of Portuguese West Africa, and a small part of Northern Rhodesia.

In a note addressed by Herr Zimmerman, Under-Secretary of State in the German Foreign Office, to Mr. Gerard, American Ambassador at Berlin, the aid of the United States Government was asked to procure the neutralization of all this region. In a subsequent communi-

OUTPOSTS.

Men of the Nigerian Regiment in the trenches.

cation, dated September 15, 1914, to Mr. Gerard, Herr Zimmerman stated that Germany's object in making the proposal was "to prevent an aggravation of the state of war which could serve no purpose, while prejudicial to the community of culture of the white race." This was so far from being the truth that the Germans had made elaborate preparations to attack French Equatorial Africa; Berlin simply sought a way of escape from a position which left it without means of succouring its colonies. The German proposals met with no encouragement at Washington, the State Department contenting itself with forwarding —without any observations—the German proposal to the Governments concerned. And the Governments concerned refused to entertain Berlin's overtures.

German diplomacy tried hard to prove that it was the Allied Powers which "violated the neutrality" of the Congo basin. As to that the text of the Berlin Act to which they appealed left the declaration of neutrality in the Congo basin facultative, not obligatory, and the only State affected by the Berlin Act whose African territory had been declared neutral was Belgium. At its foundation the Congo Free State proclaimed its perpetual neutrality, and when that State became a Belgian colony the obligation of neutrality

BEES IN BATTLE.

A swarm of bees attack troops during a skirmish with the enemy.



BABOONS IN BATTLE.

Cameroon patrol hears strange footsteps approaching.

was taken over. And Belgium had loyally endeavoured to preserve neutrality on the Congo, even after the violation by Germany of Belgium's own neutrality, accompanied by acts of such infamy that they could not have been exceeded in brutality by the cannibal tribes of the Congo. On August 7, 1914, M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who had instructed the Governor-General of Belgian Congo to observe a strictly defensive attitude, addressed a note to the British and French Governments asking if it was their intention to proclaim the neutrality of their territories in the conventional basin of the Congo. On the 9th the Belgian Minister at Paris assured M. Davignon that the French Government was "very disposed" to proclaim neutrality. This attitude was soon modified in view of the hostilities actually begun in Central Africa, and on August 17 Comte de Lalaing, Belgian Minister in London, informed M. Davignon that neither Great Britain nor France could adopt his suggestion. The action of Germany both in the Congo and in East Africa had shown her true intentions. There was the further difficulty that in West Africa large parts, both of Cameroon and of French Equatorial Africa, were outside the conventional basin of the Congo, which —had neutrality been proclaimed—would have left the Germans free to attack Nigeria and Gabun without serious risk of being themselves attacked in rear. It was not until a full week after the failure of the Belgian proposal that Germany—in view of her unfavourable situation in Africa—made her own proposals for neutrality. Belgium, however, for some time, still endeavoured to preserve the Belgian Congo neutral; it was not until August 28, when the movements of German columns towards the Ubangi and the Middle Congo constituted a direct menace to Belgian territory —which, moreover, had already been attacked by Germans in the Tanganyika region—that the Governor-General of the Congo, M. Fuchs, was given permission to help the French in their campaign in Cameroon. This help M. Merlin, the Governor-General of French Equatorial Africa, asked for, and on September 30 Belgian forces were placed at his disposition. The German allegation that the Belgians began hostilities by seizing the post of Zinga on the Ubangi on August 7 was false; the first act of war in Belgian Congo was committed by the Germans when their steamer Hedwig von Wissmann,* on August 22, bombarded the Belgian port of Lukuga (Albertville) on Lake Tanganyika.

The first efforts of the French, as of the British, were directed to purely local objectives; with the forces immediately available each struck at the enemy where he found him. But when towards the end of September, 1914, an Anglo-French Expeditionary Force, under Gen. Dobell, secured Duala, it became possible to consider plans of cooperation. The strength of the enemy could only be estimated. According to official statistics the military force in Cameroon consisted of some 200 Germans and 2,000 natives, supplemented by an armed police force of 40 Germans and 1,250 natives. In reality the native soldiers employed by the Germans were about 20,000, and fully 3,000 Germans were under arms. This number was reached by calling up all Germans of military age in the colony, including the crews of the merchantmen which, on the eve of war, sought refuge in the Cameroon estuary. Not all the Germans hastily enrolled at the last moment possessed military ardour, as was shown by 400 of them staying behind in Duala on its occupation by the Anglo-French force. This apart, the enemy forces were well trained, well armed, and well led, and they were plentifully supplied with machine guns. The Police Force (*Polizeitruppen*) were armed with a carbine firing a soft-nosed bullet, but the Schutztruppen were armed with the regulation rifle. The defence had further the advantage of possessing nearly thirty fortified posts, all placed with a good eye to military requirements. Col. Zimmermann, the commander of the troops, proved an able and resolute soldier.

When the Expeditionary Force landed at Duala, French columns under Gen. Aymerich were advancing, from the south-east and east, up the tongues of land which the Germans had acquired in 1911. On the Nigerian border the British columns which had invaded Cameroon had met with serious reverses, and all but one were acting on the defensive. On the Lake Chad side Gen. Largeau had captured Kusseri, and was preparing to send a column south. Warships had made various demonstrations, notably at Victoria, the port at the foot of Mount Cameroon founded by the Baptist

* There was another German armed steamer, the Hermann von Wissmann, on Lake Nyasa. This had been captured by the British Government steamer Gwendolen on August 13.

missionaries, and named by them in honour of Queen Victoria Herr Ebermaier, the Governor of Cameroon, whose administrative centre was Buea, a hill station beautifully situated on the southern slopes of Mount Cameroon, had instructed Col. Zimmermann to prepare defensive measures. The diary of Lieut. Nothnagal, who was stationed at Duala, afterwards fell into the possession of a British officer, and it gives a graphic picture of life in that town in the two months preceding its capture by the Allies. Col. Zimmermann arrived at Duala on August 4, followed the next day by the Governor and his staff. On August 6 proposals were made for laying mines in the estuary. A significant entry in the diary under date August 8 reads :

In the afternoon Rudolph Bell [a member of the royal family of the Duala] and Negro Din hanged before the prison for high treason. Great outcry among the populace all night. The Dualas leaving the town in crowds.

With this entry may be coupled another entry in the diary, under date September 8 :

The British were led at Victoria by two Duala rascals. A reward of 1,000 marks has been put on each of their heads. All canoe traffic in the creeks is stopped. No less than 48 Dualas have been captured by the patrols and brought up for judgment ; eight are to be hanged. No Duala native may cross the road after dark.

By their wireless communications the Germans were kept cognisant of the movements of the enemy at sea, and on August 8 Lieut. Nothnagal notes "Two English cruisers were yesterday at Teneriffe." It was not till August 30 that danger came near. On that day a British cruiser was reported at Fernando Po and the German boats at Duala were anchored farther up stream. The estuary had by this time been mined about 12 miles below Duala and several small steamers had been sunk in the fairway. The British ships which now appeared off the coast were the Cumberland, Capt. Cyril Fuller, R.N., a cruiser of 9,800 tons, mounting 14 6-in. guns, the branch boats Walrus and Vampire, the gunboat Dwarf, the Nigerian Government's armed yacht Ivy, and other craft from the Nigeria Marine—craft suited for work in the creeks. On September 3 a British detachment was landed at Victoria without opposition, but the next day "Capt. Gaisser ordered them to leave the place at once or he would throw them out." They did leave, but as soon as they got aboard ship Victoria was bombarded, and all food stores were destroyed by gunfire. By September 9 the British ships were anchored off the mouth of the estuary. That Lieut. Nothnagal had a true appreciation of the situation is shown by his entry on September 10 :

At the barrier the gunboat Dwarf is anchored and seems to be working at its removal. We may be sure the enemy means business. If he is sharp it won't go well with us. The Dwarf has been this side of the barrier already. A light pinnace has been sighted at Malimba ; it almost looks as if they wished to cut off our retreat. In the evening we pack up everything at the Post Office and load it into the train, which is ready standing waiting. To-morrow we expect an attack.

GERMAN MISSIONARIES IN CAMEROON,
On their way to Nigeria.

BRITISH 12-POUNDER IN ACTION NEAR YAUNDE.

The attack did not come the next day, but the Dwarf continued her activities at the barrier, and on September 11 came under fire from the shore battery. The Germans now fitted out small petrol-driven launches with infernal machines—home-made torpedoes—and sent them under cover of darkness to the barrier in efforts to blow up the Dwarf (Commander Fredk. Strong, R.N.), a 701-ton vessel armed with 2 4-in. and 4 3-in. (12 pounders) guns. One of these attempts nearly succeeded. On September 14 a boat carrying a "torpedo" was towed by a man in a rowing boat close to the Dwarf, the infernal machine just missing the gunboat. The man in the row-boat sprang overboard, but was captured among the shipping the next day.*

On the arrival of the transports with the Expeditionary Force a passage through the obstructions in the estuary was forced by the light cruiser Challenger (5,880 tons), which mounted 11 6-in. guns. She was accompanied by the plucky little Dwarf, which had met with many adventures and misadventures, and under hot fire found and destroyed over 30 mines. On September 25 the Challenger took up a position 7,000 yards from Duala, and General Dobell sent an officer in a launch to summon the Commandant to surrender the whole colony. This being refused, Duala was bombarded early on September 26, a land demonstration being made by way of a neighbouring creek.

As soon as the bombardment began Col. Zimmermann left Duala by train; the Governor had already gone, and Lieut. Nothnagal became commandant. His diary for that day reads:

26.9—At six o'clock the first shot. The Commandant goes to Edea. Slow bombardment, various buildings destroyed, but no loss of life. At noon news that large bodies of troops are landing. One thousand men advancing from Gori, Pitti, and Japoma. I am now Commandant of Duala.

Out at five a.m. under full protection as the bombardment may be expected at once. At 7.30 instructions from Captain Haedicke that the companies are to retire. I am still keeping up telephonic communications with the commander, and receive the definite order to give up the useless opposition, march off the coloured troops with arms, make all war material useless, and hoist the white flag.

Acting on his instructions, Lieut. Nothnagal surrendered Duala the next morning and with it all the shipping in the estuary. Nine liners—eight belonging to the Hamburg house of Woermann—with a total tonnage of 30,915 were the chief prizes. They included some of the newest and best boats engaged in the West African trade. Many other boats were captured as well as the Governor's yacht.

Major-Gen. Sir Charles M. Dobell, K.C.B., the officer chosen to command the Expeditionary Force, was, when the war began, Inspec-

* This individual proved to be a missionary, and when interrogated declared, "I am a soldier first and a missionary second." The German Colonial Office, pained by certain comments made on this incident in England, explained, with a wealth of corroborative detail, that the man was only a lay brother, was of military age and had been called to the colours.

tor-General of the West African Frontier Force —a force composed entirely of natives of the West Coast, under officers seconded from their British regiments. It now furnished the British contingent which served under Gen. Dobell. The French on their part also made up their expeditionary force of West Africans —the famous Senegalese Tirailleurs. Composed of an equal number of French and British troops, the total force placed at the disposal of Gen. Dobell at the beginning of the campaign was 4,300. This was not nearly strong enough, nor was it adequately supplied with heavy artillery. The power and resistance of the enemy had been under-estimated.

Gen. Dobell was in London in August, 1914, and having completed his plans he sailed for Dakar, where the French contingent under Col. Mayer, of the French Colonial Infantry, embarked. Here the Bruix, the principal French unit in the convoying squadron, joined the Cumberland, which had gone to Las Palmas to meet Gen. Dobell, who, it is interesting to note, was travelling in the Appam, which later on was captured by a disguised German auxiliary cruiser and taken to an American port as a prize. The British troops were embarked at Sierra Leone and other ports on the West Coast, although owing to the reverses sustained in their frontier conflicts, the Nigerian authorities were not able to send Gen. Dobell all the men they had originally promised. The expedition reached Duala without incident. The surrender of Duala was accompanied by the surrender also of the town of Bonaberi, on the opposite side of the Cameroon estuary. Bonaberi's importance lies chiefly in the fact that it is the sea terminus of a railway running north—in the direction of Nigeria—and that it gives access to the cultivated regions on the eastern slopes of Mount Cameroon. Duala, besides being the chief port of the colony, is the starting-point of another railway, a line running eastward in the direction of the Congo. Duala and Bonaberi afforded Gen. Dobell safe and convenient bases for further operations.

The loss of Duala had gravely compromised the prestige of the Germans among the natives of the coast region, and Herr Ebermaier felt it necessary to make some counter-stroke. In a circular letter to the officials concerned the Governor wrote that, as the loss of Duala could not be concealed and as "damaging perversions and exaggerations" would be the result if the circulation of the news was left to native gossip, he authorized the district authorities to announce the fact in a form "suited to the circumstances of each district." Lest they should be in doubt as to the suitable form Herr Ebermaier added that the publication was to be made on "the following lines":—

At home the Kaiser has first taken the country which

IN THE CAMEROON ESTUARY.
The plant on the Wuri River.

CAPTAIN FULLER.
Of H.M.S. "Cumberland."

inflicted horrors on the natives—namely Belgium, to which the Congo belongs. . . . The Kaiser has captured General Kitschener, whom the English regarded as their best commander, together with 10,000 soldiers. . . . As our enemies at home cannot do anything to us they are now trying to rob us and our natives in Africa. Africa is further from Germany than from France and England so that their ships can be here sooner than we can. The English were not strong enough to take Duala, but had to call in the help of the French. We have, moreover, only surrendered Duala because there were so many white women and children there to whom, according to the law of the whites, nothing can happen if no fighting takes place in a town.

Till now things have gone as follows in Cameroon :—We have allowed the English and French a short distance into the country. As soon as they were within it we, with our brave black soldiers and with the help of our natives, drove them out and killed many whites among the enemy. . . . At Duala the same will occur.

Herr Ebermaier ended his instructions to his subordinates in the art of lying by an injunction which revealed a condition of affairs which seemed strange to many of the British officers making their first acquaintance with West Africa. The natives of Duala and the whole coast region of Cameroon speak pidgen English—thirty years of resolute rule had not taught them to appreciate the beauties of the German tongue, and the *lingua franca* of the West Coast is English. But on this occasion Herr Ebermaier forbade its use. "In announcements the English language (he wrote) is, under all circumstances, to be avoided"; and he added the difficult injunction, "Local language to be used as far as possible"—and the number of distinct languages spoken by Cameroon negroes is perplexingly large.

While on the one hand the Germans endeavoured to deceive the coast natives in the way described, in Northern Cameroon, where a large number of the inhabitants are Moslems, they endeavoured to stir up a *jihad*, and backed these endeavours by propaganda among the Moslems of Nigeria, a propaganda which did not meet with success. A proclamation in Arabic addressed to the Chief of Marua stated that the great Caliph, the Sultan of Turkey, was the friend of the Germans, and that war had come because the British wished to take Constantinople and give it to the Pagans. When they found that these appeals were useless the Germans adopted a policy of persecution, and on the pretext that they were disloyal several chiefs and Moslem religious leaders were killed. Wherever they had the power, and felt the least suspicion of any lack of devotion on the part of the natives to their cause, the Germans treated them with characteristic brutality. In the north the Hausa settlers from Nigeria—generally the chief traders and business men—were the especial object of persecution. The result was that the natives retaliated whenever they had the chance; some Germans were killed and much German property looted.

CAPTAIN BUTLER, V.C.

THE "DWARF."

While Gen. Dobell had not to fear the hostility of the natives, he had to overcome not only the Germans but manifold natural obstacles to easy campaigning. Writing of the region in which most of his operations were carried out, he said: "All the coast line, and for some 150 miles inland, one meets the same monotonous, impenetrable African forest, fringed on the coast by an area of mangrove swamp in varying depth." To those who know the West Coast this brief sentence is pregnant with meaning. Nothing at once more witching or more forbidding can be imagined than a mangrove swamp in West Africa, where in some places for fifty miles from the coast there is not a foot of solid land. A phrase or two from letters written by officers may help to convey an idea of what campaigning in these swamps was like "The mangrove swamps are awful," wrote one young officer, adding thoughtfully, "the crocodiles don't look inviting." "We made a reconnaissance up to our knees in mud," said another; and a third, "Nearly every night there is a tornado, and the rain comes down in buckets." "Always wet and hot: temperature 104° F." "Hundreds and hundreds of creeks, 200 to 300 yards wide: all the islands soft mud in which alligators wallow"

As to the forest its solitude and gloom and apparently limitless extent are its most oppressive features. Native clearings with cultivated patches of ground are very few and the forest yields no food supplies save a little game. Moreover the Cameroon forest is gorilla and elephant country; herds of elephants more than once routed the troops.*

This everlasting forest (wrote one officer). You go marching along in single file, never knowing when you are going to be shot at. The enemy may be only a few yards away, but you cannot see them. It is a bit nerve-racking when suddenly a shot rings out in the wonderful stillness—very often a signal for all your carriers (500 or more) to stampede with their loads. There is an eternal twilight in these forests, the trees meeting overhead and interlaced by creepers. It is a fine sight to see the column on the march; it covers two to three miles of road, taking nearly an hour to pass a given spot, and it is a serious matter to defend this long line. And the heat!

After having occupied the country in the neighbourhood of Duala, General Dobell organized columns to follow up the enemy eastward to Edea. In their retreat the enemy had wrecked the railway, breaking in two places the bridge, 900 yards long, by which the Dibamba creek is spanned at Japoma. The enemy held the farther side of the creek, the

* One officer wrote home, "We were having a hot scrap with the Germans when suddenly an angry elephant appeared between us, and darted first one way and then the other. Before you could cough both sides had done a bunk." Other small parties had similar experiences, and one large camp was completely overrun by a herd of elephants. Insect pests were an equal terror.

passage of which was forced by the French tirailleurs under a galling rifle and machine-gun fire. In this operation the Navy and Royal Marine L.I. gave material aid.

General Dobell sent three columns to Edea, two going by land on a line north of the railway, the third ascending the Sanaga River, on which Edea is situated. The Sanaga (which must not be confounded with the Sanga in the extreme south-east of Cameroon) is the largest of the rivers which rise in the central highlands of Cameroon and flow direct to the Atlantic.* It enters the ocean just south of the Cameroon estuary. The Sanaga has a bar at its mouth and sandbanks obstruct its passage all the way to Edea. Nevertheless, Commander L. W. Braithwaite, R.N., brought an armed flotilla up to Edea, which was occupied on October 26. The column advancing on a line parallel to the railway had met with strong opposition, but Col. Zimmermann retired before the converging movement, and the Allies were not strong enough to pursue him. The force stationed at Edea consisted of French troops, under Col. Mayer. They looked eastward, in the direction where were the columns under Gen. Aymerich; but something like 400 miles separated them from their comrades. And between them was Col. Zimmermann, with the largest section of the German forces. Col. Zimmermann had taken up his headquarters at Yaunde, 100 miles east of Edea. Thither also had gone Herr Ebermaier, and at Yaunde the seat of the German administration remained until the end of the campaign. It was a place well chosen. It was on the tableland, beyond the edge of the primeval forest, between the Sanaga and the Njong, and in a position where communication could be maintained with the German forces in the north and in the east. The enemy garrisons left in the region of Mt. Cameroon were, however, cut off from help, though they were able, if they chose, to retire northward. They did well in their first engagement. General Dobell sent troops up to attack Jabassi, a place on the Wuri, a river entering the Cameroon estuary from the north. This was an amphibious fight in which armed river craft co-operated. The attack, delivered on October 8, was a failure, partly because the native troops, for the first time, came under machine-gun fire. The force was

* Next in importance of the rivers running direct to the Atlantic is the Njong, which has a course south of and roughly parallel to that of the Sanaga.



A 12-POUNDER ON BOARD A BRITISH BOAT.



MAP OF CAMEROON.

reorganized, renewed its attack on October 14, and this time captured Jabassi Lieut.-Col. A. H. Haywood, R.A., an officer known to travellers as the only Englishman who, in recent years, had crossed the Sahara, took charge at the beginning of October of a column which started to advance up the northern railway. The enemy, who had the use of an armoured train, was vigorously pursued. Gen. Dobell also sent a naval force to make a demonstration at Victoria, while two columns, one under Col. E. H. Gorges, D.S.O., who had had considerable experience of warfare in East Africa, and the other, under Lieut.-Col. Rose (Gold Coast Regiment), advanced overland and occupied Buea on November 15. In it were 60 white men with 20 white women and children. It was for gallant conduct during Lieut.-Col. Rose's later operations that Capt. J. F. Butler, K.R.R., won the Victoria Cross.

General Dobell now decided to clear the whole line of the northern railway of the enemy, and Lieut.-Col. Haywood was reinforced by a strong column under Col. Gorges. This column gradually pushed its way northward, and captured railhead, Nkongsamba,

on December 10. Among the spoils were two "steamers for sky," as the natives called the aeroplanes. These machines were the first that had ever arrived in West Africa, and the Germans had not even unpacked them. Col. Gorges pushed north to Dchang, 55 miles beyond railhead, and destroyed the fort there (January 3, 1915), retiring to Nkongsamba and its outpost Bare. This withdrawal was unfortunate, for Dchang lay near the region where the Cross River column sent from Nigeria in August had been practically annihilated.

The net result of three months' operations was that Gen. Dobell held the country for 50 miles east and 70 miles north of Duala, a mere fragment of Cameroon. In addition the whole coast line as far as the guns of the ships could carry had been evacuated by the enemy, and small forces were stationed at the three ports south of the Cameroon estuary—Kribi, Campo and Coco Beach. Gen. Dobell realized that his original force was too weak for the task assigned it, and he asked for reinforcements. Col. Zimmermann had shown that he had good reason for not surrendering Cameroon without a struggle; indeed, at this juncture—January, 1915—he took the offensive.

Col. Zimmermann had been preparing a blow at the French column under Col. Mayer at Edea for some time, but had not been able to keep his intentions secret. Consequently Col. Mayer's outpost at Kopongo, a few miles east of Edea, had been strengthened on January 4 by 90 men sent from Edea, and when on January 5 it was assailed by 150 Germans the attack was easily beaten off. Almost at the same time a German column 800 strong and with several machine guns attacked Col. Mayer's main force at Edea. The buildings at Edea are scattered, they lie close to dense forest, and the ground is much broken up. These factors favoured the attack, but Col. Mayer had very skilfully constructed his defences and the marksmanship of the tirailleurs was so accurate that after sustaining severe losses the enemy retired—and never again attempted an offensive movement on a considerable scale. The Germans left on the ground 23 dead Europeans, of whom six were officers, 88 native soldiers killed and 102 wounded; their casualties were thus 25 per cent. of the force engaged. They also left behind a machine gun, a quantity of ammunition and many rifles. The French losses were one European N.C.O. and three tirailleurs killed and 11 tirailleurs wounded. Notwithstanding this success Col. Mayer was unable to take the offensive. From various causes, chiefly lack of men and heavy guns, the operations were at a standstill. This was the case also with the British and French forces in the north and General Aymerich's columns in the south-east.

It was essential to strengthen, reorganize and co-o dinate the efforts of the forces at the disposal of the Allies. The French and British West African colonies were appealed to for additional men and the reinforcements asked for arrived at Duala in February. Meantime Brigadier-Gen. Cunliffe had been selected to take over the command of the French and British troops in Northern Cameroon, and in January he went to Duala to consult with Gen. Dobell, the result being a decision to prosecute the northern campaign with more vigour. The enemy forces were showing considerable boldness at this time in the direction of the northern railhead, and in two engagements in February the British had 120 casualties among the native soldiers, chiefly among the Sierra Leone Battalion of the W.A.F.F.'s. An attack made by the

MEN OF THE WEST AFRICAN FIELD FORCE.

British (March 4) in this region on the points known as Stoebel's and Harmann's Farms failed, among the killed being two white officers (Lt.-Col. G. P. Newstead, commanding the Sierra Leone Battalion; and Captain C. H. Dinnen, Staff Captain). The enemy had, however, suffered severely, and he evacuated the positions, retiring north.

M. Fourneau, Lieut.-Governor of Middle Congo, arrived at Duala in March and asked Gen. Dobell to co-operate with Gen. Aymerich in an immediate advance on Yaunde. Gen. Dobell was very doubtful as to the wisdom of such a move, as is obvious from his statement in his despatch concerning the operations. He wrote :—

> I fully realized the political and strategic importance of Yaunde, but demurred embarking on such an operation at that moment. It was late in the season and the rains were already beginning, besides which the troops I was able to employ were insufficient to ensure success in the absence of effective co-operation, in the immediate vicinity of Yaunde, by the troops under General Aymerich. Owing to the difficulty of communication it was quite unsafe to count on this.

However, in view of the great advantage which would follow an early occupation of Yaunde, General Dobell consented to co-operate with all his available strength. The result was not favourable. Colonel Haywood, who was sent east to make a methodical advance in co-operation with Colonel Mayer's force at Edea, met with strong opposition, Colonel Zimmermann withdrawing troops from distant posts to help in stemming the advance on Yaunde. By May 1, however, Colonel Haywood had reached a point which enabled Colonel Mayer to advance. The British and French columns moved forward on parallel lines. The French column followed the line of the railway east—the line itself had been torn up by the enemy—and Commandant Mechet, who conducted the advance, occupied Eseka, Colonel Mayer's immediate objective, and the terminus of the railway, on May 11. The British column followed a route north of the railway, and on May 3 came up to a formidable entrenched position which the enemy occupied on the left (farther) bank of the Mbila river—a tributary of the Sanaga, at Wum Biagas. The enemy's position extended over a front of some three miles, and hundreds of natives had been employed for many months in digging the trenches. After an action lasting 18 hours Col. Haywood stormed this position on May 4, but not without serious loss both in Europeans and native ranks. After the capture of Wum Biagas Commandant Mechet moved from Eseka to that place, and Col. Mayer came from Edea to take personal command of the combined force in its further advance on Yaunde. Supplies and stores were hurried forward, also a naval 12-pounder gun to reinforce the lighter pieces.

It was at this point—May 11—that General Dobell learned from M. Merlin, the Governor-General of French Equatorial Africa, that as Dume and Lomie, respectively 140 miles

DIFFICULT FIGHTING GROUND IN CAMEROON.

THE GERMAN BLOCK-HOUSE AT YOKO.
Captured by the French under Colonel Brisset (×), December 1, 1915.

N.N.E. and 150 miles S.S.E. of Yaunde, the immediate objectives of General Aymerich's columns, had not been captured, no definite date could be given for the advance of the French from those places on Yaunde. Nevertheless General Dobell decided not to abandon his operations, and in accordance with his instructions Colonel Mayer left Wum Biagas on May 25. His total force numbered about 2,000 men, of whom 300 had been brought from Edea and had not taken part in the fatigues of the first part of the advance. He had machine guns, and beside the naval 12-pounder a number of 80 mm. guns. The decision to send the column forward, as was quickly apparent, was founded on an insufficient estimate of the obstacles to be overcome. General Dobell himself set out those obstacles with commendable frankness:

I regret (he wrote) that supply difficulties soon made themselves evident, the country was barren, and with all available carriers and the few motor vehicles at my disposal, at that time only three, I was unable to transport food for Europeans and natives with sufficient rapidity. Handicapped by the almost impenetrable bush and a terrain which afforded many defensive positions, the advance became exceedingly slow. At every turn of the road the advance was met by machine-gun fire, so that during the 25th and 26th May only five miles was made good. The enemy evidently had received reinforcements and commenced to interfere with our line of communication, which was peculiarly susceptible to attack, while the long convoys of carriers were singularly prone to panic. I received an appeal from Colonel Mayer for reinforcements, as, in addition to other disabilities, dysentery had broken out in his force. I sent forward such troops as were available and

took measures to obtain more carriers from the West African Colonies.

By "dense bush" the reader should understand a forest so dense that often an advance could only be made by felling the trees—Colonel Mayer had in grim fact to hack his way through the forest. To add to the horrors of the situation the ground was a morass, and at almost every step the risk was run of sinking in the swamp. On June 5 Colonel Mayer had covered only twelve miles from Wum Biagas; the rate of progress was exactly a mile a day. Yaunde was still 40 miles distant; sickness was rife, the enemy was stubborn, and the situation such that Col. Mayer informed Gen. Dobell that in his opinion any further advance on Yaunde was impracticable. M. Merlin having telegraphed (May 7) that there was no further news from Gen. Aymerich, Col. Mayer's column was ordered to withdraw. Col. Mayer having lost part of his food supplies through a raid by the enemy on a convoy of 500 carriers, began his retreat at once, his rearguards being constantly harassed, but never broken. Gen. Dobell hurried forward the last available men to the succour of Col. Mayer. These troops made a wonderful march in tropical rain and reached Col. Mayer at an opportune moment, for his rearguard was being heavily attacked. By June 28 Col. Mayer had taken up new strong positions, and the pursuit by the enemy ceased. In this ill-fated advance the casualties reached 25 per cent. of the force engaged. Yet neither the Senegalese nor the W.A.F.F.'s lost their discipline, courage, and inextinguishable gaiety. The failure of the advance was in no respect due to Colonel Mayer. "I fully recognize," wrote General Dobell, "that Colonel Mayer was not in a position to undertake, single handed, an advance on Yaunde, but I had hoped that the pressure which was being brought on the hostile forces in the Southern Cameroons would have had the effect of preventing a concentration against us."



A GERMAN BLOCK-HOUSE AT GARUA.
Destroyed by the Allied Artillery.



A WRECKED WIRELESS STATION, CAMEROON.

After this episode there was a prolonged pause in Gen. Dobell's operations. In the area in which his forces were engaged the heavy rains rendered the renewal of active campaigning impossible until September or October.

The unsuccessful advance on Yaunde coincided with brilliant successes achieved by the Anglo-French forces in Northern Cameroon, though the scene of operations there was too distant to affect Col. Mayer's fortunes. The campaign in the north began with Gen. Largeau's attack on Kusseri. Gen. Largeau was one of the most distinguished of that brilliant band of French officers who made their fame in Africa. He had been one of Marchand's comrades at Fashoda, had played a major part in bringing the central Sudan under French rule, and in 1913 he had crowned his efforts by the defeat of the Senussi. He now organized the French forces which invaded Cameroon from the north-east and remained in command until October, 1915, when the end of the campaign being near, he returned to France. Given a brigade of infantry at Verdun in February, 1916, he was killed there on March 26, aged 47.

Gen. Largeau led in person the battalion which in the first week of the war endeavoured to carry Kusseri by assault. Situated just above the junction of the Logone with the river Shari, with a water front, strongly fortified and strongly garrisoned, Kusseri proved too strong for the force brought against it, and Gen. Largeau was obliged to retire. The Germans on their side took the offensive, captured a small French post and induced Karnak, Sultan of Logone, to raise his levies against the French. On August 28 the French met and defeated these levies, Sultan Karnak being killed. This was the only instance in Cameroon of a native chieftain allying himself with the Germans; and the fate of Karnak may have served as a warning to others. On September 21 Gen. Largeau again attacked Kusseri; this time with success. After a stout resistance the German troops gave way before a bayonet charge of the Senegalese. In a panic flight they abandoned everything—guns, ammunition, horses and baggage. With Kusseri in his possession Gen. Largeau organized a column to go south and join with the British forces from Nigeria.

Col. Brisset, to whom the command of this column was given, left Kusseri on October 4.

SENEGALESE TROOPS DEFEATING A GERMAN FORCE AT EDEA.

taking a south-west route towards the Mandara mountains. His force was largely composed of young recruits from Mossi, the country north of Ashanti which had raised a levy to help in the conquest of Togoland. Capturing three or four small German posts en route, Col. Brisset on October 14 joined a British column camped south of Mora, a fortified post on a commanding eminence in a very rugged and difficult country, in parts inaccessible. Mora was abundantly provisioned and almost impregnable. Its commandant was Hauptmann von Raben.

On the instructions of Sir Fredk. Lugard, Governor-General of Nigeria, three columns drawn from the Nigerian Regiment of the West African Frontier Force were, as soon as the war began, concentrated at points close to the Cameroon frontier. A larger movement was designed, but the demands on the military strength of the protectorate by Sir Charles Dobell reduced the rôle of the frontier columns, for the time being, to that of "local activity." All the columns crossed the German frontier on the same day—August 25. For forces destined simply for "local activity," they acted ambitiously. The most northerly column, starting from Maidugari under Capt. R. W. Fox, tried to carry Mora by assault, and failed. It was still watching Mora when it was joined by the French under Col. Brisset. The French in their turn tried to capture Mora, and they likewise failed. Col. Brisset's men carried several positions in night attacks, from which, however, they were driven by counter-attacks. The fighting was so severe that the Germans sought an armistice to bury their dead. It was then decided that Capt. Fox's column should remain to blockade Mora, while Col. Brisset marched south towards Marua, a considerable Moslem town. He drove back a German force sent from that place to the relief of Mora and later on attacked Marua itself. The conflict appeared to be indecisive, but under cover of darkness the German commandant evacuated the town, retiring to Garua. This was on December 12, and thus, with the exception of Mora, the extreme northern end of Cameroon passed from the possession of the Germans.

It may be added here that the situation at Mora remained unchanged till the end of the war. Up to August, 1915, the British were content to maintain a blockade. Between August 23 and September 15 Brig.-Gen. Cunliffe in person made unavailing efforts to storm the fortress. In one desperate attack a foothold was gained on the summit, and part of the 1st Nigerian Regiment attempted to carry an outer work with the bayonet, but was stopped within sixty yards of the enemy defences. These gallant fellows held on to the position they had gained for forty-eight hours without food or water, but after every effort to supply them had failed Gen. Cunliffe was compelled to order their withdrawal. From September 17 onward to the end no further assaults on Mora were made, the blockade being resumed.

Of the other columns which in August, 1914, entered Cameroon from Nigeria, one,

HERR EBERMAIER.
German Governor of Cameroon.

under Lieut.-Col. P. Maclear (Dublin Fusiliers) starting from Yola, attacked Garua on the night of August 30. One fort was captured, but at dawn the following day the enemy counter-attacked in force and compelled the British to retreat. In this fighting Col. Maclear and three other officers were killed, three were wounded (one of whom died), and two doctors of the W.A. Medical Staff were captured while attending to the wounded. The losses in the native ranks were heavy, and the column was compelled to fall back on Yola. Later in the year the Yola column was placed under Lieut.-Col. Webb-Bowen, and a force was again sent towards Garua. It was joined by the French column under Col. Brisset, who had received reinforcements from Gen. Largeau. The Webb-Bowen-Brisset

columns made no attempt to take Garua, the situation there remaining unchanged until the middle of April, 1915.

While the Maidugari column had not achieved much, and the Yola column had suffered a serious reverse, it fared still worse with the column which invaded Cameroon in August, 1914, from Ikom, in the Cross River district. This column, under Lieut.-Col. G. T. Mair, seized Nsanakang, just within the German border. On September 6 the garrison left at Nsanakang was surprised by a largely superior force brought from Duala, and in spite of the most gallant resistance was practically annihilated. Only two officers and 90 native soldiers escaped by forcing a way through the enemy with the bayonet. The British losses were two officers, one European N.C.O., and 95 native rank and file killed, one officer and 16 natives wounded, and three officers, one European N.C.O., and 49 natives taken prisoner—a total of 168 casualties. The German losses in personnel were even heavier than those of the British, but the effect of their victory was marked.

THE RAILWAY BRIDGE, JAPOMA.
Blown up by the enemy.

A medical officer serving with the Nigerian forces who visited Nsanakang a few days later, describing his experiences, wrote:

> It was only when the trenches were piled up with dead and the position was hopeless that Milne-Howe gave the order to charge, and they went through the enemy and escaped into the bush. There they mostly managed to evade the Germans, and after days of starvation got back to Ikom. On the following Friday (September 11) I visited Nsanakang with the marine transport officer. We went on a launch flying the white flag and the Red Cross flag, and took with us medical stores for the wounded and personal stores for the prisoners. The German officers were very good fellows, and we and they and the prisoners (who were on parole) sat round a big table and smoked cigarettes and drank sweet champagne.
>
> On our way up stream we discovered two fugitives, who had been six days in the bush without food. You never saw two such bedraggled specimens of British officers. They were wet, dirty, and torn, but they had smiles on their worn faces and loaded revolvers in their belts. They had evaded the enemy where they could, shot him where they could not, slept in the dense bush, cut their way at the rate of eight miles a day, swum a river, and finally brought up on British territory and saw our launch approaching. We took them on board, gave them food, put them in the dinghy with some more and sent them down to Ikom. The following day, as we were coming back, we found a whole section who had been with Rodwell and refused to follow him over the river; they had made a handrail for those who could not swim. They had been a week without food.

Col. Mair later on reoccupied Nsanakang, and advanced to and seized Ossidinge. Between December 25, 1914, and January 8, 1915, he made a further advance in face of strong opposition, but a little later drew back to Ossidinge.

The position in the north in February, 1915,

MBO FORT.

when Brig.-Gen. F. J. Cunliffe, commandant of the Nigerian Regiment, took over the command both of the French and British forces on that front, was one approaching stalemate. Gen. Cunliffe in consultation with Gen. Dobell had agreed to take energetic action. He had for Chief of Staff Col. W. D. Wright, V.C., who had up to then been on Gen. Dobell's staff. Foreseeing the need of "big guns"—the term is relative—he obtained the loan of a 12-pounder from the Challenger, while from Dakar Col. Brisset was supplied with a 95 mm. gun. These two guns played an important part in the subsequent defeat of the Germans, although the gunners suffered from the same disability as their comrades in Europe—a shortage of ammunition.

The reduction of Garua was the first imperative step in the northern campaign. Gen. Cunliffe was not, however, able to invest the place until the middle of April. His force at Garua consisted of 11 companies of infantry (8 British, 3 French), one company of mounted infantry (British), and one squadron of cavalry (French). The Challenger's naval gun was with the force; the French 95 mm. did not arrive till May 28. Hauptmann von Crailsheim, commandant of Garua, had a force of about 40 Europeans and 400 natives His defensive strength was, however, great. Garua lies

MBO FORT.

on the Benue, which protects it on the south, in hilly country, and it had been turned into an entrenched camp which would have done credit to the engineers on the front in France. Without the aid of the two big guns its reduction would have been almost impossible. In the early days of the investment Hauptmann von Crailsheim distinguished himself by a daring manœuvre. With a few Europeans, 100 mounted men and 170 infantry he broke out of Garua and was joined by some four European and 50 native soldiers from Ngaundere. He then attacked a British outpost, but failed to capture it, and next, to quote Gen. Cunliffe's words:

> by avoiding all roads and making a wonderful march of 28 hours without a halt, succeeded in avoiding the troops I had sent to intercept him, and made his way safely back to Garua.

By the night of May 30 the bulk of the troops were entrenched from 3,000 to 3,500 yards from

NLOHE STATION.

the fort upon which Gen. Cunliffe had decided that the assault should be made. This was called Fort A, and was on the summit of a spur at the northern end of the defences. By advancing and entrenching under cover of darkness, the Allies had by June 10 a line of trenches with 400 yards frontage within 1,000 yards of the fort. Part of the difficulties the force had to meet may be gathered from the fact that water had to be carried to the front trenches in pots over a distance of two miles. On the night of June 9 the enemy had made two attempts to break out to the south across the river; but they were met by a hot fire, and the majority were driven back. The Benue was in flood, and numbers were drowned in trying to cross it—the British recovered 70 bodies. About 45 native soldiers only made good their escape.

On June 10 Gen. Cunliffe was preparing to assault Fort A, when at 3.30 p.m. the white flag was hoisted. The German native soldiers had got out of hand, and had refused to fight any longer. It appeared that the fire of the two heavy guns, which had been bombarding Garua since May 28, had wrought much damage, and had had a terrifying effect on the natives, who had never before had such an experience. Hauptmann von Crailsheim at first asked for terms; he was told that failing unconditional surrender in two hours the attack would begin again. At the last minute of the second hour a German officer bearing a white flag issued from the fort, and surrendered Garua unconditionally. The personnel of the fort was 37 Europeans and 212 native ranks. Five guns and ten maxims and a good deal of ammunition was also taken.

Immediately after the fall of Garua Gen. Cunliffe sent troops south to seize the edge of the plateau on which Ngaundere stands, and thus prevent an enemy concentration on a valuable strategic line. "On June 28 German outposts, holding the steep paths leading up to the edge of the plateau, were, in the midst of a terrific tornado, completely surprised and defeated by the advance guard of Col. Webb-Bowen's column, and Ngaundere itself was occupied the same evening." In the night the enemy counter-attacked, was repulsed and retired on Tibati.

At this point, Gen. Dobell's attempt to capture Yaunde having failed, Gen. Cunliffe decided to be content to hold the line Ngaundere - Kontscha - Gashaka until Gen. Dobell and Gen. Aymerich were ready to resume their offensive. Meantime he made the effort to capture Mora, which we have already chronicled.

Gen. Aymerich, the officer in command of the troops in French Equatorial Africa, had made it his first duty to secure his lines of communication, threatened by the German posts at Bonga, on the Sanga, at its confluence with the Congo, and at Zinga, on the Ubangi. Inspector Leprince embarked at Brazzaville with a small force as soon as war was declared, ascended the Congo, and on August 6 surprised Bonga and captured its garrison. Descending the Ubangi from Bangui, 60 miles above Zinga, with a single company of Senegalese, Capt. Béon surprised and captured that place on August 7. Documents found in the captured positions showed that the Germans had instructions to

THE ADVANCE ON YAUNDE.
The British Forces attacking a fort.



YAUNDE FORT.
Occupied by British Force under Colonel Gorges, January 1, 1916.

invade French territory, a sufficient commentary on the German proposals for neutralization. Gen. Aymerich then organized two columns: one, under Col. Hutin, was to advance north up the Sanga valley; the other, under Col. Morisson, was to advance west along the Lobaye, which joins the Ubangi near Zinga. The Lobaye column did much good work completely out of the limelight. By October Col. Morisson had occupied Carnot, over 200 miles from his starting-point, and farther south, Bania, where he got into touch with Col. Hutin's column. Pushing still westward Col. Morisson found that the Germans retreating before him and Col. Hutin had concentrated at Baturi, on the road to Dume and Yaunde. On December 9 Col. Morisson reached Baturi, which is in the dense forest area. The Germans, who had hastily evacuated Baturi during the night of the 8th, retired to Bertua, 33 miles farther west, whither Col. Morisson pursued them. After a sharp fight on December 28 the Germans again evacuated their position in the night. So far Col. Morisson's advance had been rapid, and he pushed on to the neighbourhood of Dume; but as the Germans fell back and the garrisons of various posts united, they became stronger. Col. Morisson's progress was not only checked, he was forced to give up Bertua, and the Germans established themselves solidly at Moopa, 25 miles south of Baturi.

The Sanga column under Col. Hutin also made good progress at the beginning. It was a combined river and land expedition. At the outset a number of French planters and traders in the Upper Sanga district had made their escape to Wesso, a French border town at the junction of the N'Goko with the Sanga, and had with the help of a few native troops seized a neighbouring German post. There they had been surprised by the enemy, and all the Frenchmen save one killed. The survivor fled to Wesso, which was hastily evacuated by its small garrison. The Germans took possession and began to loot, but, in their turn, hastily fled before Col. Hutin. By October 18 Col. Hutin had secured the important and fortified post of Nola, on the Sanga over 300 miles from Bonga. Several German officers and N.C.O.'s, together with a small cannon, four machine guns, and a large quantity of ammunition were captured. But a German force coming from Molundu on the N'Goko cut his line of communication by seizing the post of N'Zimu, midway between Bonga and Nola. Gen. Aymerich himself took command of a force which hurried from Bonga to retake N'Zimu. It was at this juncture that the Belgians came to the aid of the French, placing their river steamers and their artillery at the disposal of Gen. Aymerich. They also sent 180 tirailleurs with the force which attacked N'Zimu, their boat, the Luxembourg, conveying part of the troops The Belgian contingent was later increased to 580 rifles, besides supply trains, carriers, etc. At N'Zimu, which was retaken on October 29, after three days' obstinate fighting, the Belgian native soldiers, as in subsequent engagements,

behaved with the utmost gallantry. The Luxembourg was steered under heavy fire to within 150 yards of the German position, and its small guns had a good deal to do with the victory. M. Fourneau, Lieut.-Governor of Middle Congo, who was on board the boat, was seriously wounded, but recovered.

The N'Zimu incident showed the danger to which the Sanga column was exposed on its left, and Col. Hutin had to devote much time to clearing the Germans from the N'Goko region. It was not until December 21 that, after very hard fighting, Molundu was occupied by the French. Col. Hutin then from his main body—his total effectives, including the Belgian contingent, were at that time under 2,000—formed two divisions to advance west towards Lomie, on the road to Yaunde.

It was about this period that M. Fourneau went to Duala to propose the joint advance on Yaunde. Gen. Aymerich had, however, overestimated the ability of the comparatively weak Hutin and Morisson columns to make good Dume and Lomie, whence the advance on Yaunde was planned to be made. As soon as they lost the advantage of river transport they had to face all the difficulties presented by forest and swamp which hindered Gen. Dobell's advance. It was not until June 25, 1915, that Col. Hutin captured Lomie—three weeks after Col. Mayer's column had been compelled to give up its advance. Col. Hutin had had many engagements and had taken prisoner several Europeans and some hundreds of German native soldiers; he was also joined by over 300 German native troops who had deserted, while the natives in the region south of Yaunde were in open revolt.

Col. Morisson had not been able to advance anew until May, 1915. He attacked Moopa (June 3–7) but failed to break through the defences, which were cleverly constructed. Another attack was made on June 23, the assailants being now provided with a mountain gun of 80 mm. Six hours' bombardment was followed by a bayonet charge, and Moopa was captured. On July 22 Bertua was again occupied, and on July 25 Col. Morisson entered Dume, which the Germans set on fire in their retreat.

French forces, whose activities had not hitherto had any effect on the general situation, now began to threaten Col. Zimmermann's position from the south-west. In



AT BANYO FORT.

Signaller with heliograph communicating with the troops attacking Banyo Hill. Smaller picture: A view of the fort.



DETAIL MAP OF CAMEROON.

the first week of the war the German armed boats Rohlfs and Itolo had made demonstrations on the Gabun coast. The French replied by sending some 600 Senegalese, convoyed by the gunboat Surprise, to Coeo Beaeh, at the entranee to the Rio Muni, and tho eapital of German Muni. After a very stiff fight, in which the Rohlfs and Itolo were sunk, Coco Beaeh, whieh the Germans had renamed Ukoko, was eaptured on September 21, 1914. Thereafter Freneh troops, under Col. Miquelard, cleared the enemy entirely from German Muni, and a eolumn under Col. le Meillour advanced north, parallel to the eastern frontier of Spanish Guinea. Col. le Meillour took successively Oyem and Bitam, the last-named station, near the north-east corner of Spanish Guinea, being carried by assault on July 17, 1915. A French force also advanced from the port of Campo, parallel to the northern Spanish frontier, the intention being to eut off the Germans should they attempt to escape into neutral territory. This objeet was not attained- the Campo force and that of Col. le Meillour not being able to join hands in time, while closely to guard a frontier 130 miles long was an undertaking beyond the power of the force available.

By the end of July Gen. Aymerich's forees were ready for the final advanee on Yaunde, and Gen. Cunliffe's forees were but waiting for the signal to sweep south. Further eonsultations between the various eommanders took plaee; the combined movements were planned and as soon as the rains permitted Gen. Dobell again took the offensive. His eommand had been strengthened by the arrival of the 5th Light Infantry of the Indian Army, and in November, 1915, his foree reached its maximum strength of 9,700. The new advance on Yaunde had by that time made good progress. It began on September 22. This time the Freneh and British columns under Gen. Dobell moved eastward separately. Col. Mayer's force went forward from its base near Edea along the railway, reoccupied Eseka on October 30, and was directed to make good the road leading from Yaunde to Kribe. The British eolumn, operating somewhat to the north of Col. Mayer, found its passage most stubbornly disputed until the end of November, when Ngung was taken. By this time the British had worked their way almost through the primeval forest, and on Deeember 17 they seized Dchang Mangas, whieh stands in more open and eultivated



FRENCH TIRAILLEURS AT JAPOMA.

country. On December 21 the French column, which had been very heavily engaged and had suffered serious loss, had broken down the enemy resistance, and Col. Mayer's tenacity of purpose had its reward in the capture of Mangeles on December 21.

Both Gen. Aymerich's forces and those of Gen. Cunliffe were also now closing in on Yaunde. The northern forces, which at this time numbered between 3,000 and 4,000, were set in motion in October, Gen. Cunliffe's first movements being directed to the line Tibati, Banyo, and Bamenda, which forms a rough semicircle in north-central Cameroon. The French column under Col. Brisset together with Col. Webb-Bowen's column entered Tibati on November 3. Bamenda was occupied, after a brisk fight, by the Cross River column, now under Major Crookenden, on October 22. In the Cross River sector, where the Nsanakang disaster had happened, Gen. Dobell cooperated by sending the 5th Light Infantry of the Indian Army and other troops under Lieut.-Col. Cotton forward from the northern railway. This column had a great deal of hard marching and several minor encounters with the enemy, who retreated north. Col. Cotton reoccupied

TRANSPORT DIFFICULTIES IN CAMEROON.

Dchang on November 6, and going on to Bagam, there joined Major Crookenden. Meantime, Mbo had been seized.

The capture of Banyo, which lies between Bamenda and Tibati, was an operation of more difficulty. The European settlement at Banyo was occupied on October 24, but the garrison were entrenched on an isolated mountain rising steeply 1,200 feet from the surrounding country. It had very strong defences, was amply provisioned, the garrison was well armed, and every German in Cameroon believed that it would hold out till the end of the war. By November 2 Gen. Cunliffe, who personally directed the operations, had five companies of infantry on the under-features of the mountain, with his mounted infantry in a wide circle on the plain—rolling grass land, uninhabited—to give notice of any attempt of the garrison to break out. Three 2.95-inch guns supported the attack.

From Banyo the enemy's position on the mountain looked grim and stupendous (wrote an officer in a letter to Sir Fredk. Lugard), huge rocky boulders standing out prominently right up to the very top, and the sides of the mountain bristling with strongly built "sangars." We began our attack early on the morning of November 4. The infantry, covered by the fire from our three guns, worked their way up slowly and doggedly foot by foot, climbing over rocks and tearing their way through the thorny scrub and long grass, under a heavy rifle and maxim-gun fire from the enemy's "sangars" and concealed snipers among the rocks. By the evening most of the companies had managed to struggle half-way up the hill, there getting what shelter they could from the incessant fire of the enemy, aided by the light of fireballs and rockets. Officers and men, exhausted and drenched with rain, hung on determinedly to the ground gained. [Under cover of the fog Capt. Bowyer-Smijth had led his company right up to the summit. There it came under a hot cross fire, and Capt. Bowyer-Smijth having been killed, the company was forced back to the foot of the mountain.]

At dawn on the morning of the 5th they started climbing once more. Our troops having got directly under the first line of "sangars," the enemy, in addition to rifle and maxim-gun fire, started rolling down rocks and throwing dynamite bombs. All that day our men gradually worked their way up, capturing a small stone redoubt and "sangar" here and there. Owing to the paucity of gun ammunition, the covering artillery fire could not afford the infantry the assistance so imperatively necessary on these occasions. Fortunately a convoy arrived on the afternoon of the 5th bringing with it 200 more rounds of gun ammunition which, hurriedly sent out, enabled the guns to fire



AT JAPOMA.
Tirailleurs resting. Circle picture: A house at Japoma.

BRITISH TROOPS ON THE ROAD TO YAUNDE.

somewhat more rapidly till the upward advance of the infantry rendered it too dangerous to continue their fire.

Darkness set in early that evening—at 5 p.m. An hour or two later a terrific thunderstorm burst over the mountain. Heavy firing and the explosion of bombs and fireballs continued. A misty morning prevented our seeing what was happening as dawn broke on the 6th, but as the mist dispersed a white flag could be seen on the top of the hill and our men silhouetted against the sky-line.

The enemy, completely demoralized by the determined advance of our men despite heavy losses, had during the night of the 5th–6th broken into small scattered parties. Owing to the darkness of the night, the noise of rain and thunder, and their knowledge of the country, the majority of the enemy parties had managed to worm their way down the hill without being intercepted, only, however, to run up against the detached posts of our mounted infantry guarding all roads in the vicinity. These enemy parties then fired a few wild shots and scattered into the long grass [10 ft. high] where it was difficult to follow them.

"This action," wrote Gen. Cunliffe, and not without reason, "may, I think, be justly described as one of the most arduous ever fought by native African troops."

After the fall of Banyo Gen. Cunliffe's columns struck towards Yaunde, the enemy still offering steady resistance and destroying the bridges over the rivers in his retreat. Yoko was seized by Col. Brisset on December 1, Fumban by Col. Cotton and Major Uniacke on December 2, and by January 1, 1916, Gen. Cunliffe had concentrated his striking force on the line Ngila-Ndenge and was ready for the final advance. Col. Brisset, who was sent forward to secure the crossing of the Sanaga river at Nachtigal Falls, soon came into touch with Gen. Aymerich's columns, which were pouring eastward on Yaunde. By January 8 Gen. Cunliffe's advanced troops were within forty miles of that place. It was only on that day that the general learned that Yaunde had already fallen.

When the British column from Wum Biagas had fought its way through the forest and reached the open tableland at Mangas, Gen. Dobell directed it to push forward to Yaunde, without waiting for the French column under Col. Mayer. For a few days the enemy still offered resistance, but from December 22 onward strongly entrenched positions were



MAJOR-GENERAL DOBELL (on left) WITH COLONEL GORGES.



THE ENTRY OF THE FRANCO-BRITISH

found to be abandoned. On January 1, 1916, the British column under Col. Gorges marched into Yaunde unopposed. Herr Ebermaier, Col. Zimmermann and over 800 Germans, with native troops and several thousands of carriers, had evacuated the place some days previously, making south-west for Spanish Guinea, the nearest point of neutral territory being 125 miles distant.

The enemy had had a good start, and though columns went in pursuit they failed to overtake the main body. After a rearguard action on January 8 at Koimaka on the Njong river, Col. Haywood, however, released seventeen British and seven French civilians, and seven British and three French officers and N.C.O.'s who had been held prisoners by the Germans. (These prisoners, among whom were some ladies, had been very fairly treated during their captivity.)

By January 18 Herr Ebermaier and Col. Zimmermann had retreated beyond Ebelowa. A strong French force under Col. Morisson followed them up, the French column working west from Campo cooperating. They did not bring the enemy to a stand, but, in Gen. Dobell's phrase, they "succeeded in driving the German force across the Campo river into neutral territory."

The first German refugees entered Spanish territory on February 4, and a few days later Herr Ebermaier was permitted to send an open telegram in French to Dr. Solf, the Colonial Minister at Berlin, announcing that "want of munitions compels me to leave the Protectorate together with all troops and staff." Herr Ebermaier and Col. Zimmermann surrendered to the Spanish authorities, and a little later on the Germans, who numbered 825, were transported to Spain, where they were interned.

A British officer, Col. Gorges, and his column were, as stated, the first of the Allied troops to enter Yaunde; next to arrive was the French column from the north under Col. Brisset. It had been on active campaign over fifteen months, and had marched and fought over 1,000 miles of territory. On Col. Brisset's heels the French troops from the east poured in, and Gen. Aymerich took command of the Allied forces at Yaunde. A little later, on January 28, the Belgian contingent marched into Yaunde, and the flags of Britain, France and Belgium were hoisted on the fort.

The few places which remained in the hands of the Germans were abandoned by them by the end of January. Hauptmann von Raben on his mountain fastness of Mora in the far north alone held out. To take the stronghold by force would be a costly proceeding, and

FORCES INTO GARUA, JUNE 11, 1915.

Gen. Cunliffe decided first to offer terms to the gallant garrison—that the officers should retain their swords, that all Europeans should be interned in England,* and that the native ranks should be released and given safe passages to their homes. Von Raben accepted this offer, and on February 18 Mora was surrendered.

Cameroon was conquered. Apart from the very valuable help given by British and French warships and marines, some 7,000 British, 11,000 French, and 600 Belgian troops had been employed, the rank and file, save for the Indian 5th Light Infantry, being all natives of West or Central Africa.† They had beaten an enemy fully as numerous and in whose ranks were some 3,000 Europeans. Mistakes had been made, as we have indicated, but the operations as a whole were well conceived and brilliantly executed. Generals Dobell, Aymerich and Cunliffe worked in perfect harmony, and the coordination of the final advance on Yaunde was a triumph of organization. The lines of communication, both of Gen. Aymerich and Gen. Cunliffe, were over 400 miles long; those of Gen. Dobell fully 200 miles. Yet it is to the officers and men that the chief tribute is due. There is no finer fighting material in the world than the West African native, and when led by officers in whom he has confidence "no day appears to be too long, no task too difficult." The attachment of the Senegalese to their officers is common knowledge, and it would be impossible to praise too highly the devotion and loyalty to their British officers of the native ranks of the West African Frontier Force. Several of the native soldiers received the Distinguished Conduct Medal for rescuing, or attempting to rescue, exhausted officers. Among other valuable lessons, the Cameroon campaign proved beyond question that in West Africa Great Britain and France possessed reservoirs whence could be drawn great and invaluable additions to their fighting forces; soldiers not unworthy to take rank with the best European troops.

Throughout the campaign the Germans—with some honourable exceptions in the case of officers—treated the native population with great severity. In the words of a report by a Nigerian official published by the British Colonial Office the conduct of the enemy "created a reign of terror in the neighbourhood of any German garrison." Food supplies and cattle were taken without payment, and many natives were deliberately murdered.

* The Germans had a great dread of being interned in Africa.

† Perhaps another exception should be made, as part of the West India Regiment served under Gen. Dobell. This regiment, however, is composed of negroes, though recruited in the West Indies.

A SECTION OF THE GOLD COAST BATTALION, W.A.F.F.

The policy of the authorities was exemplified in a memorandum written by a German eaptain which fell into the hands of General Dobell. The German officer wrote :—

> I have ordered the destruction of all Duala villages. All Dualas met on the roads carrying weapons (matchets, bows and arrows, spears, and also rifles) are to be shot. Prisoners will only be made when they are caught red-handed and can be legally tried and condemned to death.

While this offieer's orders refleeted the general attitude of the Germans, they did not, in some eases could not, restrain their own native troops from outrages. In the early months of the war the establishments of the French traders in New Cameroon were looted, and this, among other offences, led Gen. Aymerich to lodge a formal complaint with Herr Ebermaier. The Governor's answer was characteristic. He would, he said, do what he could to prevent outrages, but as France and England, as European *kultur* nations, had chosen to bring war into Africa they must take the consequences. On their side the Germans complained of ill-treatment by the French and British of German colonists—complaints either entirely untrue or frivolous. Sueh damage as was suffered by German residents was inflicted by natives. Duala and others, in retaliation for injuries inflicted upon them. As was naïvely stated by some of the Germans themselves, their overthrow was hailed with such joy by the inhabitants of Cameroon that "the sky rang again with an indeseribable shout of seorn and rejoicing." The British, wrote Gen. Dobell, were received by the people as their deliverers, and similar testimony was borne by the French authorities. The disappearance of the German flag from West Africa opened up for its native races a future bright with hope.

CHAPTER CXXXII.

THE CHURCHES AND THE ARMIES.

The Army Chaplains' Department—Organization for War—The Chaplain-General—Selection of Chaplains and their Work—The Clergy and Combatant Service—Church of England Chaplains in the Field—Rev. E. N. Mellish, V.C.—War and Religion—The Presbyterians and their Work—The Roman Catholics—Organization under Cardinal Bourne—The "Free Churches"—The Wesleyans—Other Denominations—The Jews—Common Work of the Churches.

IN practically every dispatch sent home by British Commanders, and in practically every bestowal of honours and distinctions, reference was made to the great services rendered by Army Chaplains in the special sphere allotted to them, and, in not a few instances, to the performance of deeds of bravery outside the scope of their ordinary duties. Indeed the spirit which everywhere manifested itself among the chaplains, not of one denomination only but of all who went to the war, was a spirit which prompted them to do and dare and die if only they could promote the welfare of the men committed to their charge. The Army Chaplain held military rank, and he was no feather-bed officer. Again and again, in France, in Egypt, in Gallipoli and in the other theatres of operations, he proved his readiness to endure the hardships and to identify himself with the life of the men.

A Chaplains' Department had been an essential part of the organization of the War Office for many years before the war. The office of Chaplain-General was first established in 1796. It was, however, suspended in 1829, but restored in 1846. In peace time and for the regular army the provision made was ample; the organization of the Chaplains' Department was well equipped and everything worked smoothly and well. But with the outbreak of war in August, 1914, came a new experience, and a great and very difficult problem had to be faced. New armies were called into being. Recruits came forward in hundreds of thousands, and the problem was how could the work of the Chaplains' Department be developed so as to meet the new need. In those early days of the war, clergy and ministers of all denominations rose splendidly to the occasion. In hamlet and village and town, wherever troops came or were quartered, religious leaders did everything that was possible for the social, moral and spiritual welfare of the men. It is not surprising that in those early days the extreme and unexpected pressure produced in many districts a state of chaos; and although organization soon yielded a more orderly state of things it should be remembered that it was the prompt action of clergy and ministers, with the cooperation of devoted helpers, which saved the situation.

Nor did the connexion between the Churches and the armies ever really close, for in town after town and parish after parish the religious leaders made the welfare of the troops in billet or camp their chief care. If in some districts, after the first few months, the novelty wore off and the enthusiasm seemed to flag, what was it but an indication that the arrangements hastily improvised had given place to more settled plans and more adequate organization? Clergy and ministers did not grow weary in this well-doing, nor were they ever likely to do so as long as there were men who needed their help. Many were appointed Chaplains to the Forces for Home or Foreign service; while others were chosen by the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief as Officiating Clergy or Ministers on either daily pay or capitation allowance. Their churches continued to be used for Parade

CHURCH SERVICE IN A FRENCH CASINO.
A British Army Chaplain preparing for Holy Communion.

Services, their Parish Halls were given up to social work among the men, and in a hundred-and-one different ways they devoted themselves with truly noble self-sacrifice to the best and highest interests of the troops. Much was done also by voluntary organizations such as the Young Men's Christian Association, the Church Army, and the Church of England Men's Society, but the debt the nation owed to the hundreds of clergy and ministers who in their individual parishes or districts worked among the troops quietly and unobtrusively and with splendid results deserved the warmest and heartiest recognition. And among those who thus helped none were more devoted or more enthusiastic than the country clergy.

The problem of providing for the spiritual needs of the troops was a complex one. It might, perhaps, have been more easy of solution if the men had been all of one faith and all members of one Church. The King's Regulations were most clear and emphatic about respect for religious liberty. The soldier, like the civilian, was free to profess his own religion, and, as far as possible, the State provided him with the ministrations of his own religious denomination. Some limitations, of course, were necessary. It would obviously have been impossible to give representation to each and all of the many sects which exist in England, but within the bounds of reasonableness ample security was offered that men's religious conscienees should be respected. Thus chaplains were provided representing (according to the order in the Army List): (1) The Church of England, (2) the Presbyterians, (3) the Roman Catholics, (4) the Wesleyans, (5) the United Board (embracing other Nonconformist bodies), (6) the Welsh Calvinistic Methodists, and (7) the Jews, and a survey of their work must now be attempted.

To begin with the Church of England. The responsibility for making full and adequate provision for the spiritual care of Church of England troops rested entirely with the Chaplain-General, subject, of course, to the requirements and limitations imposed upon him by the military authorities. This condition was not always borne in mind, with the result that criticisms were made which were seen to be

without foundation when the real facts were known.

The appointment of the Chaplain-General rests, of course, with the Crown, on the recommendation of the Secretary of State for War. The office at the outbreak of war was held by a bishop, but this, while advantageous, was not necessary; indeed, the previous Chaplain-General, the Rev. J. C. Edghill, D.D., who was in office at the time of the South African War, was in priest's Orders.

The Chaplain-General, the Right Reverend John Taylor Smith, D.D., C.V.O., was appointed in 1901, after a wide and varied experience. In earlier life he was Canon-Missioner in Sierra Leone. During the Ashanti Expedition he acted as Chaplain to the Forces, and it fell to him to attend the late Prince Henry of Battenberg in his last hours. He succeeded to the Bishopric of Sierra Leone in 1897, and four years later came home to take up his Army appointment. He had many special qualifications which fitted him for the post. He knew the needs of the Army thoroughly in all its sections. He was a capable organizer, and his administrative qualities were great. He had, too, remarkable influence over men. As a Churchman he had his own distinctive views, but his appointments were by no means all of one ecclesiastical colour. He sought to make them thoroughly representative of all sections of the Church of England.

Even in peace times the Chaplain-General's Department was sufficiently burdened; on the outbreak of war its resources were taxed to the utmost, and the strain remained considerable. As time went on there were considerable developments in the organization of the department, but in the earliest days of the war the Chaplain-General had to bear the burden alone.

The immediate need was the provision of extra chaplains. As with the Regular Army so with the new armies, 70 per cent., and sometimes more, registered themselves as belonging to the Church of England. It will, therefore, readily be understood how large a number of additional chaplains was required to make the necessary provision for their spiritual welfare. There was no lack of candidates from among the clergy. It has been stated, indeed, that upwards of 4,000 applications were received. The number may have been exaggerated, but it is certain that very many more applied than could possibly be appointed. Large numbers were for various reasons quite obviously unfit, and were rejected. The task of selection was in the hands of the Chaplain-General, and he discharged it with resolution and thoroughness, interviewing personally every likely candidate. The standard was necessarily a high one, and not a few of the men failed to answer to the test. The extremely important character

A DRUMHEAD SERVICE IN CAMP.
The Archbishop of Armagh preaching to the troops.

"Alfieri"] [Specially taken for "The Times."

BISHOP TAYLOR SMITH, D.D., C.V.O.
The Chaplain-General.

and the high responsibility of the work which the chaplains were called on to do, whether serving in camps at home or on the battlefields abroad, were kept steadily in view, and the one pre-eminent qualification insisted upon was that the chaplains appointed must be men of special character. All other qualifications were subordinated to this. A candidate might excel in many other things, but if this qualification were wanting or deficient he was not accepted. From this standard there was no deviation, with the result that the Church of England was represented in the Army by some of the very best of the clergy, men of unquestioned devotion, men of large vision, men who were determined to give of their best and to do their utmost for the welfare of the British soldier.

In the early days of the war everything had to be done at top speed. The Rev. F. H. Gillingham, the well-known Essex cricketer, Rector of Bermondsey, who offered himself for service abroad on the day on which war was declared, and was accepted, gave a vivid account of his experiences abroad, prefacing it with a reference to his hurried departure for the front. The following passage from his article * gives an idea of the business-like precision with which the chaplains were sent to France:

I was ordered to get ready to go at ten days' notice. Arrangements then were by no means so cut and dried as they are to-day, and I am afraid the Chaplains' Department had a sudden strain put upon it for which it was not fully prepared. Getting my kit, settling up my parish for 12 months, and saying a few necessary good-byes (no one dreamed of leave in those days) took up most of the intervening days, and on August 28 I caught the 5 o'clock train for Southampton. Fortunately I was not quite alone, another chaplain got into the same carriage, and thus we helped each other to brush aside thoughts that will arise whenever such partings occur.

In the same compartment travelled a General, and he evidently overheard our misgivings as to what we should do at Southampton, for on arriving there he told us to follow him, as he was the Chief Embarkation Officer. It was my first experience of a Staff Officer, and thus early I learned what all through my 12 months I never had cause to unlearn, viz., the unfailing kindness and courtesy I always met with from Staff Officers; and provided that the Padre is blessed with common sense and does not obtrude at inconvenient moments, I am sure that my experience is the general experience of all chaplains.

He told us at what hotel to put up, and gave us papers to report ourselves on board the Italian Prince next morning at 6 a.m.

We were up betimes, and urged our broken-down cabby to urge his broken-down horse (one that, for obvious reasons, had not been commandeered by the military authorities) to get us to the landing stage in time.

We eventually managed to arrive about five minutes before 6, only to find (as on many occasions subsequently) that being ordered to appear at a certain time does not necessarily mean that that is the time for starting. It

* *Southwark Diocesan Chronicle.*

was long past noon when we finally said good-bye to England. We were a cosmopolitan crowd on board: 500 loaders and labourers, details of many regiments, and seven Padres.

The Chaplain-General had interviews with the new chaplains before they left for the front. He addressed to each one a moving and impressive letter, not concerned with official details or instructions, but dealing rather with the message he desired them to give to the men, and throughout he sought to keep in close touch with all the chaplains.

Bishop Taylor Smith also issued (through the generosity of friends) 200,000 copies of a Prayer Card, specially designed for soldiers, and of a size that they could slip inside their hats. He made, through *The Times*, a direct appeal to the nation, asking all people, "when the fingers of the clock pointed heavenward at noon," to offer a prayer on behalf of our sailors and soldiers. This appeal met with a wide response. The noon-day prayer quickly became a recognized institution, and the knowledge of it spread to the trenches and proved a source of inspiration and strength to many.

But, of course, the Chaplain-General's main work was that of selecting the chaplains, and generous testimony was borne to the splendid body of men he got together. The Bishop of Oxford spoke most warmly about it. "It is a tremendous task," he said, "suddenly to be called upon to equip in spiritual things such a gigantic host, and I do not doubt that there have been many failures and mistakes in spiritual things as there have been in material matters. Nevertheless, I wish to bear my witness thus: I have had nothing to do with choosing the Army or Navy chaplains from this diocese. But if I had had the chance of choosing 30 men—and that is the number that have gone from this diocese—I feel sure I could not have picked 30 better men than those who have been chosen." From another point of view the Bishop of Chelmsford, when speaking from his place in Convocation, was equally eulogistic, and on the same occasion the Bishop of Winchester spoke of the justness and scrupulous fairness the Chaplain-General had shown to Churchmen of different kinds in receiving and choosing men.

The work of the chaplain was, of course, of a distinctly ministerial nature. The question was soon raised whether clergy of military age ought not to join the forces for combatant service. Many of the younger men were anxious to do so, but quite early in the war the Archbishop of Canterbury addressed a letter to the bishops, in which he said he had given the question much consideration, and "by every line of thought which I have pursued I am led to the conclusion that I have been right in maintaining from the first that the position of an actual combatant in our Army is incompatible with the position of one who has sought and received Holy Orders. The whole idea which underlies and surrounds ordination implies this. We have a calling of our own of a quite specific kind, and throughout the whole history of the Church authoritative expression has been given to the paramount

ON THE WESTERN FRONT.
Australian Transport Drivers at Church Parade.

A "PADRE" HOLDING A NIGHT SERVICE ON THE FIELD, WITH A PACKING CASE AS ALTAR AND A TIN MUG AS CHALICE.

obligation of that calling. Under this obligation those who have been ordained to the Ministry of Word and Sacrament ought, even in time of actual warfare, to regard that ministry, whether at home or in the field, as their special contribution to the country's service."

For the moment the Archbishop's very decisive words set the question at rest. But in February, 1915, it came up again, and a long correspondence upon it ensued in the columns of *The Times*. It reeurred later in the year under Lord Derby's recruiting scheme, and the Archbishop of Canterbury wrote to Lord Derby (October 28, 1915) saying that clergy in many parts of England were perplexed by reeeiving a letter calling upon them to volunteer for combatant service, and asking "whether I am right in believing that the circular was sent to the clergy, not with any intention of bidding them ignore or override direction or counsel whieh the Bishops had given, but merely because they were men within the military ages whose names had not been 'starred' by the local offieers." Lord Derby replied the next day that the Archbishop's assumption was quite right, and added, "I recognize to the full the great extra demands that are made upon the services of elergy of all denominations, partly due to the fact that many are serving abroad as chaplains and partly due to the demands of hospitals both abroad and at home for their ministrations, and personally I am strongly of opinion that ministers of all denominations, however much they may wish to enlist, equally do their duty when obeying the directions of those who are set in authority over them." Lord Derby's letter settled the question so far as the home clergy were eoncerned, and comparatively few of these enlisted.

But in the Colonies it was different, and *The Times*, within a few days of Lord Derby's letter, announced that "in consequence of the large number of elergymen who had applied to join the 85th Nova Seotia Battalion, the Commanding Officer of the battalion had authorized the formation of a section or, if sufficient numbers are available, a platoon which would be entirely composed of clergymen." Two well-known Australian clergymen also joined the combatant forces—the Rev. F. E. B. Hulton-Sams, Rector of Winton in the diocese of Roekhampton (educated at Harrow and Trinity, Cambridge), who, being unable to obtain an Army Chaplainey, enlisted and afterwards received a commission; and the Rev. Edward Digges La Touche, Litt.D. (gold medalist and Donnellan Lecturer, Trinity College, Dublin), who had gone to Australia for his health, volunteered for the Australian contingent. Both of these men were killed in action, Mr. Hulton-Sams in Flanders and Dr. Digges La Touehe in Gallipoli. Canada was also represented among combatant elergy. The Rev. Hugh Speke, formerly Vicar of Curry Rivel, Somerset, was in Western Canada in connexion with the Archbishops' Mission when the war broke out, and he joined up, "determined," as he wrote, "to see this thing through to the bitter end." He also fell in Flanders.

The splendid response to the eall of the Empire made by the manhood of the Dominions found its counterpart in the readiness with whieh the Churches in those lands took their part in the great conflict. Their clergy did much to aid the cause of recruiting, the pulpits everywhere resounding with the spirit of patriotism. When the time eame for the various contingents to leave for one or other of the various theatres of war the Churehes were ready with a supply of Chaplains to accompany them. They were appointed by the respective Governments, and clergy and ministers of all denominations, including the Salvation Army, offered in very large numbers. Some of the best work in the War was done by these Chaplains, and, as illustrating the devotion with which they applied themselves to their ministerial duties, it should be added that a British Chaplain plaeed it on record that it was the eustom of the original Chaplains who came from Australia to go into the firing line with their troops, instead of staying at the rest billets behind the line and visiting the trenches, as was the more general plan. But to return to the position at home.

Not a few persons were anxious about the position of clergy under any measure of compulsion, but all doubts were set at rest by the introduction of a clause into the Military Service Act excepting ministers of religion from liability to serve. Questions also arose regarding the position of theologieal students, and regulations were issued giving exemption to those who were preparing for "immediate" ordination. There was not absolute uniformity among the Tribunals concerning the meaning of the word "immediate," but Church of England authorities asked only for exemption for those to be ordained on the Trinity Sunday then ensuing, and thus no

[Speaight. THE ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY.

[Elliot & Fry. BISHOP GWYNNE. Deputy Chaplain-General.

[Russell. ARCHDEACON E. H. PEARCE. Assistant Chaplain-General.

real difficulty was experieneed. Of other theologieal students a very large number joined the King's forees voluntarily.

As time went on it became elear that the organization of the Chaplain-General's Department needed strengthening, and that further supervision was needed at the front. In July, 1915, the Convoeation of Canterbury diseussed this and kindred questions, and resolved to seek a private conference between the War Office authorities and certain representative bishops "upon the whole question of religious ministrations to the Army at the present time, both at home and abroad, with a view to securing the best help available, both from chaplains and from the parish elergy at home." The passing of sueh a resolution no doubt lent mueh support to the position of the Chaplain-General, and in the course of time important developments were announeed

One of the first of these was the appointment of Bishop Gwynne, of Khartoum, who was already serving as a chaplain, to represent the Chaplain-General at the front "and to be his deputy there for all purposes eonnected with the Church of England ehaplains and Chureh of England troops." The appointment was one that was most fitting in every way. The new Deputy Chaplain-General was known to be a personal friend of Bishop Taylor Smith, and it was reeognized in the terms of the appointment that the supreme control of the Chaplain-General was not in any way to be interfered with. The Deputy Chaplain-General was given the rank of Major-General. Unfortunately this eaused a little frietion, inasmueh as the Principal Chaplain to the Forees, who was a Presbyterian, held a lower rank, but the difficulty was surmounted by promoting the Prineipal Chaplain, and both he and Bishop Gwynne were then of equal rank.

Nor was this the only change sueeessfully earried through. An Advisory Committee was brought into being, which must have proved an immense relief to the Chaplain-General, who for the first 12 months of the war was almost overwhelmed with work. The names of the members of the Advisory Counеil were not published at the time, nor was the composition of the Counеil at all generally known. It may be stated here, however, that the members ineluded the Marquis of Salisbury, Lord Grenfell, Lord Midleton, the Bishop of Winehester, the Bishop of Ripon, and Sir Reginald Brade. To secure the cooperation of men so distinguished for their service to the State and the Church, and so anxious to promote the spiritual well-being of the Army, was a great step in advanee.

It was elear, also, that the Chaplain-General needed help in carrying through the very heavy daily work of his department, which had grown to enormous proportions, and early in 1916 the appointment of an Assistant Chaplain-General was announeed, the Rev. E. H. Pearce, Canon of Westminster, who acted in an honorary eapaeity.* Again the seleetion was an admirable one. Canon Pearee had had a long experience as a Territorial Chaplain, his great eapacity as a man of affairs was well reeognized, and he had very elear ideas upon what was needed to bring the Church into true relation with the Army.

One more development must be noticed—the appointment of Assistant Chaplains-General for the Home Commands, which ineluded the London Distriet, the Eastern

* Canon Pearce was subsequently, in June, 1916, appointed Archdeacon of Westminster.

Command and Central Force, the Southern Command (Salisbury), the Aldershot Command, the Western Command (Chester), the Northern Command (York), and the Irish Command (Dublin). The Chaplains of Armies and bases at the front were also made Assistant Chaplains-General.

Thus it will be seen that the organization of the Chaplain-General's Department was as nearly perfect as it could be made. This elaboration of the machinery, it should be added, was found to be absolutely necessary owing to the overwhelming preponderance of Church of England chaplains. It was estimated that during the first two years of the war, no fewer than 1,460 additional chaplains were appointed. These were divided between the Home Camps and the different fronts.

The official duties of a chaplain were laid down in the Army Regulations, but a footnote to these best expressed the spirit in which the work was to be done. This ran as follows: "It is, of course, to be understood that chaplains will not regard their duties as being necessarily restricted to those prescribed by regulations, but that they will take advantage of every available opportunity for advancing the spiritual and moral welfare of the men under their charge." How liberally and generously this "note" was interpreted during the war by chaplains at home and at the front was well known. They displayed the utmost self-forgetfulness, and devoted themselves to the interests of the men with a zeal and an enthusiasm which knew no bounds.

Before proceeding to give some account of their work, it may be convenient to quote the following orders and recommendations which were issued for the guidance of Church of England Army Chaplains:

I. At all services, whether in church or on parade, chaplains must be vested in black cassock, surplice,



AFTER ONE YEAR OF WAR.

Intercession Service in Victoria Square, Birmingham. Smaller picture: The Bishop of Birmingham (on left) addressing the gathering.

A SOUVENIR.

An autographed portrait presented by General de Casteinau to the Bishop of Birmingham during his visit to France.

hood of their degree (if any) and scarf, with college cap. At the administration of the Holy Sacraments it is permitted that the chaplain officiating or celebrating may wear a stole in addition to his scarf, if he so desires, but this does not apply to the chaplains who may be assisting.

PARADE SERVICES.

II. Parade Services are to be held by chaplains at such time and place as the General Officer Commanding may select. The form of prayer appointed for Parade Services consists of a hymn, a sentence, the General Confession, the Absolution, the Lord's Prayer, versicles and responses, the *Venite*, a psalm or psalms, a lesson, a canticle, the Apostles' Creed, collects (and special prayers), a hymn, the address, a hymn, the National Anthem, the Blessing. Chaplains should select suitable hymns, and the aim should be to make the service distinctly congregational; hence elaborate music in which the men cannot join should be discouraged. It is a useful plan to gather out a choir of men with good voices and to arrange that they should practise the selected hymns, and also the chants for the canticles, if such are used. Where Parade Services follow one another in succession the Form of Prayer given above may be varied by selecting any parts of "The Order for Morning Prayer" in the Prayer Book, provided that the above elements are represented in due proportion.

No service in the open air, or wherever the men have to stand, should exceed forty minutes in length.

THE HOLY COMMUNION.

III. The Holy Communion should be administered every Sunday and on Holy Days at such hours in the early morning and after the Parade Service, or at other times, as will enable all to communicate who desire to do so. The custom in the Army is to have two candles on the Holy Table; and to light them at early celebrations, but not at mid-day (or later) celebrations, unless required for the purpose of giving additional light. It is usual for the celebrant to take the Eastward Position. Chaplains should try to keep a list of officers and men who are communicants, and should arrange, if possible, for periodical meetings or services of preparation for Holy Communion. Whenever a celebration of the Holy Communion follows the Parade Service a sufficient pause should be made before the exhortation, "Ye that do truly and earnestly," &c., &c., in order that any who desire to do so may then withdraw, and the celebration be continued for them "that come to receive the Holy Communion."

PERSONAL DEALINGS WITH MEN.

IV. Any chaplain who is asked to hear a confession is bound to do so in accordance with the invitation contained in the first Exhortation of the Communion office, and especially with these words: "And because it is requisite that no man should come to the Holy Communion but with a full trust in God's mercy, and with a quiet conscience; therefore if there be any of you, who by this means cannot quiet his own conscience herein, but requireth further comfort or counsel, let him come to me, or to some other discreet and learned Minister of God's Word, and open his grief; that by the Ministry of God's Holy Word he may receive the benefit of absolution, together with ghostly counsel and advice, to the quieting of his conscience, and avoiding of all scruple and doubtfulness." It is not necessary, but it is often convenient, that this should take place in a church, church-hut, or chaplain's room attached. The Prayer Book does not advise any set or system of questions to be addressed to the penitent, nor does it (except in the case of the sick) lay down the lines to be followed by the questioner; nor (with the same exception) does it prescribe any form of words in which the penitent "may receive the benefit of absolution." A chaplain is thus allowed a large liberty in this matter, the only restriction being that, in accordance with such liberty, he must neither teach, nor act upon the presumption, that confession to the chaplain is necessary before Confirmation or Holy Communion or in any circumstances except those described in the extract given above.

Those recommendations were useful as far as they went, but, of course, they gave no indication of the variety of the work which fell to the lot of a chaplain at the front. "Those who think that a chaplain's work is 'an easy job,'" wrote the Bishop of London in his Foreword to the Rev. Douglas P. Winnifrith's interesting work "The Church in the Fighting Line," "will find their mistake; but, on the other hand, they will find that it is a glorious bit of work to be called upon to do. . . . What the chaplains feel is that nothing too much can be done, and no sacrifice too great can be offered to stand by the glorious men who are fighting the greatest war in the world's history." General Sir H. L. Smith-Dorrien, who contributed the Preface to Mr. Winnifrith's work, also paid tribute to the "splendid services" of the Army Chaplains who "were always near at hand, and showed such devoted indifference to danger and hardship

THE WONDER OF NOTRE DAME BREBIÈRES.

The remarkable effect of a German shell which struck the summit of the church of Notre Dame Brebières at Albert. The German gunners smashed the framework that held in place the pedestal of the statue of the Virgin surmounting the Tower, with the result that it fell partly over and remained suspended in mid-air.

in their ministrations to the sick and wounded as to place them on the highest level of those heroes who are fighting that our Empire may prevent all that counts for Truth, Righteousness, and Honour from being ground in the dust." To this Lord French's own magnificent tribute may well be added. In his fifth dispatch he wrote. "I cannot speak too highly of the devoted manner in which all chaplains, whether with the troops in the trenches or in attendance on the sick and wounded in casualty clearing stations and hospitals on the line of communications, have worked throughout the campaign."

Those were official testimonials—and most valuable. Was the gratitude of the men in any way less cordially expressed? A soldier from the front, writing in November, 1915—his letter was quoted in the *Spectator*—said, "We have a chaplain who comes up into the front line every day, no matter how dangerous and rough things may be; in fact he always makes for the most dangerous place on prineiple. One day, during a particularly hot bombardment, instead of leaving the trenehes, 'the padre' as he is ealled strode up and down the line eheering and helping. . . . All the men worship him. I shall try to find out his name, but at present he is 'the padre'—the simplest, finest gentleman I have ever met, and he has stood the test."

Of Parade Services many aeeounts were given. Mr. Winnifrith, in the volume above referred to, mentioned one he held during the battle of the Aisne. The first time that he was able to get his brigade together for a Parade Service was on September 27, 1914. "It was a novel experience for me," he wrote, "to see my congregation with rifles as well as side-arms. I have never heard the hymns 'Jesu, Lover of my soul,' 'Oft in Danger,' and

SERVICES IN THE NAVY.

The Archbishop of York visits Admiral Jellicoe on board the "Iron Duke." Top picture: A service on board a troopship.

A CHAPEL ON A BRITISH BATTLESHIP.
A Roman Catholic Service in a troopship.

'O God our help in ages past' sung more heartily. On the hill, not half a mile from us, the Germans were bursting their shrapnel with disastrous results." But the services which impressed him as much as any were those conducted for the men in the billets. "They would crowd in and sit upon the floor, and one was able to give them a straight heart-to-heart talk in a way that is not possible at a more formal service. It was then that the men would unburden themselves, produce from their pockets a New Testament, or some small book of devotions from which they said they had derived much comfort and help, and speak of their Sunday school and choir-boy days, and of the old church at home." Mr. Winnifrith's experience went to show that while the soldier might have a rough exterior, "his heart is a heart of gold," and he found few upon whom religion had not taken a strong hold, "though, ordinarily, they do not speak of it."

The testimony of chaplains was practically unanimous to the high character of the men. The Rev. C. M. Chavasse, son of the Bishop of Liverpool, when home from France on a short furlough, in February, 1915, said that while war was a very grim and a very bitter thing, the wonder of it all was the cheeriness, doggedness, and gallantry of the British soldier. "True, he did not look very much like a hero when he crawled from the trenches covered with mud and blood, and limped back to hospital to a tune played on a mouth organ." The officers, Mr. Chavasse declared, were deeply religious men, and every morning left the trenches to attend Holy Communion. The men also loved to receive Testaments, which they read in the trenches. One man, a lance-corporal, had brought in a sergeant from the barbed-wire entanglements. While doing so he was shot through the head, but was still able to carry his man back to the trenches. In his dying moments he cried, "I brought him in, I brought him in."

Sunday, of course, was always a busy day with chaplains at the front. Here is the time-table of one of them:—8 a.m., Holy Communion; 10 a.m., Morning Service at the camp; 11 a.m., Morning Service at some barracks; 3 p.m., service at the hospital; 3.45 p.m., service in another hospital; 5.30 p.m., Evening Service in another camp; 6.30 p.m., Evening Service at the Soldiers' Room; 7.15 to 8 p.m., hymn sing-song at the Soldiers' Room. The chaplain wrote of the Sunday evening service that it was quite popular, and that it was quite pathetic to notice, out of the corner of one's eye, how many of the men had to blow their noses while they were singing "Holy Father, in Thy mercy, hear our anxious prayer."

Again and again testimony was borne to the great work the chaplains accomplished in ministering to the wounded and sick. Not less valuable was their work at casualty clearing stations, although chaplains themselves were often conscious of the little they were able to do when first the men were brought in. Mr. Gillingham wrote of one such station where he stayed six weeks: "Everything was rush and hurry; convoys of wounded would arrive, be 'dressed' and fed, and would be removed by train to a General Hospital, all in the space of 24 hours, consequently the Padre's work is again very difficult: the men are tired, want to sleep, or are suffering acutely, and beyond asking you to write a postcard home, they wish in many cases to be left alone. Over urgent cases one lingers, but the ignorance is sometimes appalling, and in so short a time it is difficult to awaken any spiritual appetite in a man who has starved himself for 20 or 25 years." Probably the chaplains' work even during the rush at the casualty clearing stations was more effectual than many of them thought.

One of the saddest duties which fell to the chaplains' lot was the burial of the dead. Mr. Winnifrith in vivid language described the scene at one funeral. "The eldest officer walks by my side, the six stretchers, each carried by two men, follow, and, as we wend our way through the farmyard between wagons and machinery, there fall upon the stillness of the night the glorious words, 'I am the Resurrection and the Life, saith the Lord.' Having groped our way to the graves the bearers reverently lift the lifeless forms from the stretchers and at once lower them into the ground. Then the prayer of committal and the rest of the Church's beautiful form of service for the burial of the dead are recited from memory. What a multitude of thoughts rushed through our minds as we stood a while beside the open graves! On the morrow loving hands would place above them wooden crosses, and successive regiments will keep the mounds green."

It was while proceeding to the trenches to take some funerals that another chaplain, the Rev. C. E. Doudney, Vicar of St. Luke's, Bath, was killed. He was about to come home on leave; he had his pass actually in his pocket. He went out with cheery face and smiling lips into the shell-fire zone at about 10 p.m. He was sitting in the front of the ambulance car when a shell burst close by and he was hit. He was removed to the clearing station and operated upon, but complications ensued and he died. This was in October, 1915, and his death was a painful reminder that, although non-combatants, chaplains were exposed to very real danger.

Yet their heroism was magnificent. Many of them received honours and decorations in recognition of distinguished services in the field, and one of them, the Rev. Edward Noel Mellish, Curate of St. Paul's, Deptford, received the much-coveted honour of the Victoria Cross. The announcement in the *Gazette* of April 20, 1916, stated that it had been conferred "for most conspicuous bravery," his heroic deeds being thus described: "During heavy fighting on three consecutive days he repeatedly went backwards and forwards, under continuous and heavy shell and machine-gun fire, between our original trenches and those captured from the enemy, in order to tend and rescue wounded men. He brought in ten badly wounded men on the first day from ground swept by machine-gun fire, and three were actually killed while he was dressing their wounds. The battalion to which he was attached was relieved on the second day, but he went back and brought in 12 more wounded men. On the night of the third day he took charge of a party of volunteers and once more returned to the trenches to rescue the remaining wounded. This splendid work was quite voluntary on his part and outside the scope of his ordinary duties." Only once before had the V.C. been bestowed upon a clergyman—the late Rev. J. W. Adams. The distinctions and honours conferred upon chaplains were numerous. As an example of the deeds of heroism which were thus recognized reference may be made to the experiences of

SOLACE FOR BELGIAN REFUGEES IN ENGLAND.

Mass being celebrated in a private house near Tonbridge, where Belgian refugees were tended under the Red Cross.

the Rev. A. G. Parham, Temporary Chaplain, 4th Class (Precentor of Christ Church, Oxford), who received the Military Cross. The story of his gallantry was thus given in the *Church Times*:—"His brigade was in the attack on the Turkish position at Suvla on August 21, when the shrubs on the Anafarta Plain caught fire. With the help of his servant he rescued many wounded men and carried them to a place of safety beyond reach of the flames, and the following day, obtaining a large number of volunteers from his own brigade to act as stretcher-bearers, he was chiefly instrumental in evacuating the wounded from Chocolate Hill. After the battle he remained with the brigade in the trenches for 10

weeks under constant fire, ministering to the wounded and burying the dead. He regularly celebrated the Holy Communion early each morning, some days at two or more positions in the trenches, and during the period mentioned administered the Blessed Sacrament to over 1,000 communicants. Subsequently he accompanied the brigade in the campaign against the Senussi on the western frontier of Egypt."

The chaplains were not left to bear their burdens alone. From time to time they were visited by distinguished Churchmen, who, while cheering and heartening the chaplains, also ministered to the men. The Bishop of London visited the front at Easter, 1915, and had a great reception. He described in *The Times* of

REV. F. H. GILLINGHAM,
Rector of Bermondsey.

April 13, 1915, some of his experiences. (The article is quoted in Vol. V., p. 47.)

Another episcopal visitor to the Front was the Bishop of Birmingham, who went across more than once, and he recorded his impressions of one visit in a little volume entitled "A Fortnight at the Front." The bishop was full of praise of the chaplains who "have to be business men as well as clergy."

The Archbishop of Armagh in January, 1916, also spent what he called "a never-to-be-forgotten fortnight" at the front visiting, more particularly, the Irish troops. In an account of his experiences it was recorded that on the first Sunday he addressed the men at open-air Church Parade at 9 a.m. At 10 he addressed over 2,000 men at an open-air parade at headquarters. At 11, several miles off, the next service was held in a large field, in which a covered platform had been erected. Here 2,000 men were assembled. The last parade service was some 12 miles from this, and, like the others, was in the open air. Here over 1,500 attended. In the afternoon the Irish Primate visited the sick and addressed them in cheering and encouraging words. That evening, at 6.30, he administered the rite of Confirmation to 30 soldiers at a most impressive service crowded to overflowing. All the week through he was kept busy, and on one occasion he experienced the shelling by the enemy, a shell bursting within 25 yards of him. On the following Sunday he held four services, and visited the hospitals. The devotion of the chaplains and the cheeriness and gallantry of the men made a deep impression upon him.

Yet another episcopal visitor to the war area was Bishop Bury, who had perhaps a sort of natural right to be there, seeing that he occupied the position (under the Bishop of London) of Bishop for Northern and Central Europe. His experiences were of a most varied character. At one time he was with the Naval Division interned in Holland, for the men of which he held, as he said, "one very inspiring Confirmation"; at another he was with the troops after Neuve Chapelle; he was permitted to visit the trenches and the firing line; he attended the sick and wounded at the clearing stations and in the hospitals. He afterwards bore ungrudging testimony to the way the troops were helped by the clergy. "I have lost my leg here," said one man to the bishop as he left a hospital, "but I have found God." The witness of a young subaltern was still stronger: "You know, bishop, I have had among my men here the hottest crowd I have ever seen. I think they must have been up to all kinds of crime and mischief. In fact, they were regular young devils. But now they are all changed men."

The change—moral and spiritual change—wrought in the men by their experiences at the war was vouched for also by the Archbishop of Canterbury, who, in May, 1916, visited the whole British Front. His Grace had some exciting experiences. First his motor-car broke down; then as he was proceeding to a certain spot he was escorted by an enemy aeroplane which dropped bombs, and finally, when he was visiting the trenches, he suddenly found himself in the midst of a heavy bombardment. But none of these things disconcerted him, and he went about his

(1) Rev. A. G. Parham, awarded the Military Cross ; (2) Captain Adjutant Greene, of the Salvation Army, awarded the Military Cross ; (3) Rev. M. T. W. Conran, awarded the Military Cross ; (4) Rev. B. P. Plumptre, of Bermondsey Old Parish Church, London, awarded the Military Cross ; (5) Rev. Noel Mellish, Curate of St. Paul's, Deptford, awarded the Victoria Cross ; (6) Rev. Cyril A. Walton, of St. Peter's, Clapham, London, killed in the naval battle of Jutland, May 31, 1916 ; (7) Father Anthony, a Roman Catholic Chaplain, burnt in saving two sailors during the Battle of Jutland ; (8) Rev. John Cocker, Curate of St. George's Church, Hulme, served as a private in the Sportsman's Battalion, killed.

THE BISHOP OF LONDON VISITS AN EAST ANGLIAN AERODROME.

work quite unperturbed. The Primate's visit took a form somewhat different from that of other episcopal tours. It was more in the nature of a visitation. He met a large number of generals in an informal conference; he discussed the position with the Church of England chaplains, and afterwards held a reception for chaplains of all denominations; he held a special service of intercession, at which he gave an address, described by one who heard it as "simple, sane, searching, and strong"; and confirmed a large number of men. No official account of the visit was published, but the archbishop discussed the position at a private meeting of bishops, held at Lambeth Palace the day after his return. The Bishop of Worcester, speaking at his Diocesan Conference, summed up the position in these words:

> The Archbishop told me that he came back full of thanksgiving and hope. He drew a remarkable contrast between the state of religion among the soldiers a year ago and now. He attributed the change, under God, to the strong value attached to religious influence by most of the higher officers, and to the work of the chaplains organized under Bishop Gwynne. These clergy were at one time severely kept at the base, now they are at the front. He pictured the chaplains as having risen magnificently to the occasion, and having themselves grown extraordinarily, and he described the increasing relation of religious life to the ordinary life of the soldiers, and observed that now it was not only the hour on parade which was attended, but that the voluntary services were crowded. Of course, there are careless men and evil men still in sad abundance, but the better sort are manifestly increasing.

Another aspect of Church of England work at the front ought not to be overlooked. It was felt that it would strengthen men who had been influenced religiously if they could be united in some form of fellowship or brotherhood. There was no opportunity of forming, even if it had been desirable, a new organization, and to meet the need the Executive of the Church of England Men's Society decided that soldiers might be admitted as temporary members for the duration of the war. Each man so admitted was given a card on which was inscribed the society's simple "Rule of Life"—viz., "To pray to God every day, and to do something to help forward the work of the Church." The names of these temporary members were transmitted to the headquarters of the society in London, and, after registration, were forwarded to the Secretary of the Branch, or the incumbent of the parish in which the men lived, with a request that a letter of welcome might be sent to them. Thus a strong link was formed between the home parish and the men at the front, and temporary members were urged that after the war they should take their place in the Branch where they happened to find themselves. This extension of the work of the Church of England Men's Society greatly strengthened the hands of the chaplains, created a fine sense of fellowship among the men, and prepared the way for retaining in full Church membership the men of the armies as they came home from the war.

An effort in a similar direction, although not exclusively associated with the Church of England, was the formation of "The League of the Spiritual War," which was founded by

the Rev. E. A. Burroughs, Fellow of Hertford College, Oxford, whose letters to *The Times* in the earlier days of the war, dealing with the religious aspects of the great conflict, excited wide attention. It was formed for the purpose of collecting the names of men in the King's Forces who had been influenced, keeping in touch with them during the war, and linking them up with their own Home Churches on their return. Mr. Burroughs was Honorary Secretary, and Canon Scott Holland Chairman, and the Principal of Mansfield College Vice-Chairman of the Committee.

It should be added that the work of the chaplains both at the front and among the troops at home was greatly helped by the ample supply of Bibles, Testaments, Gospels, Portions, Service Books, Books of Devotion, tracts and similar literature which was granted to them by religious organizations, such as the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, the Religious Tract Society, the British and Foreign Bible Society, the Scripture Gift Mission, the Pocket Testament League, the Trinitarian Bible Society, and kindred societies.

Thus it will be seen that the Church of England made every effort to provide for the spiritual needs of the troops. It took them in hand, as it were, from the moment the men



At the dedication of motor ambulances at Bryanston Square, London. Circle picture: The Bishop with Rev. Wilson Carlile, of the Church Army, drinking tea at an automobile bar-car. Top picture: The Bishop wearing his medals.

THE BISHOP OF LONDON.

joined up ; it ministered to them socially and religiously while they were in the camps at home ; it sent hundreds of chaplains to follow them up when they went to the front ; it made provision for receiving them on their return from the war and linking them up in the great fellowship of the Church. The war cast a heavy responsibility upon the National Church ; it rose to the occasion splendidly, and its work earned the gratitude of all concerned for the moral and spiritual welfare of the British soldier.

The Scottish regiments were, of course, ministered to by chaplains of the Presbyterian Churches, due provision being made for Episcopalians. The Presbyterians had long had official recognition at the War Office. They were not, however, represented in the organization of the War Office in the same way as the Church of England was by the Chaplain-General, but Lord Balfour of Burleigh, one of the Church of Scotland's most distinguished sons, was Chairman of the War Office Advisory Committee.

The Presbyterian churches providing chaplains for the troops were the Church of Scotland, the United Free Church, the Irish Presbyterian Church, the English Presbyterian Church, the Scottish Synod in England, the Free Church of Scotland, and the Free Presbyterian Church. The Church of Scotland had also a temporary chaplain on the Indian Ecclesiastical Establishment. On the outbreak of the war regular and acting Presbyterian chaplains numbered only eighteen, of whom nine were of the Church of Scotland, four of the United Free Church, three of the Irish Presbyterian Church, and two of the English Presbyterian Church. With the recruiting of the new Armies the problem of making provision for the religious needs of the men became as acute in Scotland as it was in



COLONIAL TROOPS IN LONDON.

Canadians marching into St. Margaret's Church, Westminster. Smaller picture: Australian and New Zealand troops entering the church.



CHURCH PARADE AT THE CITADEL, CAIRO.

England, for the flower of Scotland's manhood rallied to the Colours. Indeed, the relation of the Scottish Presbyterian Churches to the war was shown in the extraordinary response made by the sons of Scottish ministers. In 33 Presbyteries of the United Free Church of Scotland within three months of the outbreak of war every son of military age, physically fit, joined the Colours; and before the end of 1914 about 92 per cent. of the sons of the Manse had volunteered.

The Churches recognized the claim the new Armies made upon their help, and responded generously to the call for chaplains. The eighteen chaplains of pre-war days increased within the first two years of the war to 184, and there were in addition a large number of Presbyterian Territorial Force chaplains mobilized locally for service in Scotland. Of those 184 chaplains the largest number—83—belonged to the Church of Scotland; the United Free Church came next with 60; then the English Presbyterian Church with 18, and the Irish Presbyterian Church with 15; the Free Church of Scotland supplied three, the Scottish Synod in England and the Free Presbyterian Church two each; and there was also the one Church of Scotland chaplain on the Indian Establishment. These Churches would have been ready to find many more chaplains if the opportunity had been afforded them, and it was made a matter of complaint that the War Office had been too "grudging" in the matter. The dissatisfaction increased when an addition of two Church of England chaplains was granted to each of the English Divisions in France, and the feeling found expression at the sittings of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland in May, 1916, when it was announced that the Army and Navy Committee were pressing for a similar addition to the number of Presbyterian chaplains in each Scottish Division, in concert with the Committee of the United Free Church and with the support of the Moderators of the two General Assemblies. Another matter which engaged the attention of the Church of Scotland Assembly was the question of promotion, regret being expressed that an arrangement had been sanctioned by the Army Council under which Church of England chaplains were promoted to a higher rank than they would otherwise be entitled to,

for the purpose of enabling them to discharge the duties of Senior Chaplains. During the debate Lord Balfour of Burleigh said he did not like the idea of rank among chaplains at all. It was wrong in principle, and the creation of extra rank for one denomination was undoubtedly unfair to others. But, he added, he hoped the matter would not be made a point of attack against the Church of England.

The position of "Principal Chaplain" on the Western Front was held by the Rev. Dr. Simms, a Senior Chaplain belonging to the Presbyterian Church of Ireland. He was given the rank of Brigadier-General, but on the appointment of Bishop Gwynne as Deputy-Chaplain-General with the rank of Major-General, Dr. Simms was promoted to equal rank, and he still retained the position of Principal Chaplain. It must not be assumed, however, that questions of rank and precedence, which loomed largely at home, were any sort of hindrance at the front to the closest co-operation among chaplains of the various Churches. The Bishop of London left it on record that during his mission he received much help from Dr. Simms, whom he described as a man who had served all over the world, and was universally loved and respected. His fairness and impartiality were everywhere spoken of; and he and the bishop had much spiritual talk and prayer together, Dr. Simms asking the bishop for his blessing before he left.

In the Presbyterian Churches the rule against ministers serving as combatants did not apply, and it was stated at the Church of Scotland Assembly that 85 parish ministers and assistants were serving in the combatant ranks of the Army. No doubt they exercised their ministry among their comrades as far as their military duties would permit, but it was naturally the regular work of the official chaplains which had the greatest religious influence. The chaplains had excellent material to work upon. It was said that there never had been a war in which chaplains had a better chance of making their influence felt upon the soldiers, because it was a war in which the soul and the conscience were involved, and certainly the Presbyterian chaplains were as eager as any others.

The work of a chaplain was sufficiently varied, whether at home or abroad. Parade services, voluntary services, visiting in billet and hospital, burying the dead, organizing clubs, concerts, etc., helping the men in their correspondence, and answering inquiries from home—these and a hundred-and-one other things were undertaken cheerfully and ungrudgingly for the benefit of "Jock."

Not even at home could services always be held in church, the dining halls of different regiments or the Y.M.C.A. hut often having to be requisitioned for the purpose. Abroad the places used for worship were still more remote from the conventional kirk. A hall shattered by shells, a bullet-riddled room, a barn, a cow-shed—these were the places in which solemn and inspiring services were held. Often the church parade took place in the open, care being taken when necessary to seek a place sheltered by trees from the enemy's aeroplanes.

It was not in France only that rough and ready provision had to be made for such gatherings. A chaplain with the Salonika Force held his first service on the hillside, and a picturesque and impressive account he gave of the experience. "The novelty of the situation," he wrote, "and the historic scene around us, Mount Olympus in front, the country of Alexander the Great around us, and Salonika of Pauline memories at our feet, put us in the right frame of mind for worship. And as we looked on the mountains of Greece and thought of the Bens of Bonnie Scotland so far away, we sang with the fervour of our race, 'I to the hills will lift mine eyes.' Probably for the first time in history the hills of Greece re-echoed the grand old refrain of the Scottish Psalm, and, though we were on the threshold of unknown events, as our lips uttered the words, our hearts felt the assurance 'My safety cometh from the Lord, Who heaven and earth hath made.'" The first Communion service was held in an old stable built of mud-bricks dried in the sun, with roof neither sun-proof nor rain-proof. But such experiences were only temporary, for the village priest, when once he was convinced of the orthodoxy of the new-comers, offered them the use of his church—a building decorated with pictures, crosses, and images. In these surroundings—so different from the kirks of the Highlands of Scotland—the chaplain conducted service for his men. There were no seats in the church, but stalls for standing in were all around the church, and also formed a large square in the centre. The native service began at 5 a.m. and ended about 9.30 a.m. At 10 a.m. the first, and at 11 a.m. the second service for the troops took place.



The exterior view of a travelling altar, dedicated to Saint Elisabeth, which was presented to the Queen of the Belgians by M. Colstermans-Henrichs, of Antwerp. The interior view (bottom picture) shows the altar prepared for mass.

AN ALTAR IN AN AUTOMOBILE.

[Russell.

MAJ.-GEN. J. M. SIMMS.



[Russell.

LORD BALFOUR OF BURLEIGH.

For many Sundays could be seen the unwonted sight of the native congregation, arrayed in the most brilliant colours and costumes, streaming out, while the kilted Highlanders marched up to worship in the same place. The chaplain who gave this account added that "it was altogether most stimulating to our services," and he moralized upon it thus: "It was good to feel that Christians so widely apart as Presbyterian Scots and orthodox Greeks could so truly strike the note of Christian brotherhood, that with perfect goodwill each could worship God in his own way in the same church. How much sweeter would religious life at home become if those who worship the same Lord would agree to differ in this way!"

The good behaviour of the troops no doubt facilitated the granting of such courtesies. Another chaplain, writing from Macedonia, told how in certain villages the Greek Church building was offered and accepted for the worship of several Scottish regiments. The villagers had seen many wars, and Balkan combatants would sometimes help themselves to sheep and lambs without payment. Soldiers were not welcome when the Scottish troops arrived, but they quickly earned a good name. It was frankly acknowledged that "they do not steal, they pay what they promise, they are kind to the children."

The visitation of the men, getting into close personal touch with them, was always regarded as of primary importance. This was done not only in billets, but also in the trenches, which offered, as the senior Presbyterian chaplain pointed out, unique opportunities for the chaplain's ministrations:

> In rest billets (he wrote) men are constantly taken for various duties at all hours of the day and night, consequently it is difficult for chaplains, who limit their visiting to rest billets, to know their men as they should. The fire and support trenches offer chaplains golden opportunities. With the exception of the sentries on duty, all the men are either resting in dug-outs and shelters, or repairing their own portion of the trench. Having ample time for conversation, they eagerly welcome and appreciate the chaplain's visits. It is perhaps no exaggeration to say that the surest way for a chaplain to become popular with both officers and men is to be frequently with them in the firing line. These visits are not paid without incurring personal risk, but the "standing" gained by so doing is well worth the venture.

Ministering to the sick, the wounded, and the dying, the Presbyterians, like other chaplains, did their utmost to comfort, cheer and sympathize, and their visits were always greatly valued by the men. Perhaps one of the most trying duties which fell to the lot of the chaplains was the burial of the dead. A Church of Scotland chaplain in France has told of the deep impression one such service made upon him. Four men had been killed by an aerial torpedo, and he had to bury them. When the first body had been lowered into the grave he asked for the other three. A soldier handed him a small sack; it contained all that remained of three brave men! The service proceeded amid the rattle of machine-guns and the spit, spit of bullets overhead.

At home, at the various depôts and camps the chaplains and ministers of the Presbyterian Churches were particularly active in seeking to guide, counsel, and uplift the troops with whom they were brought in contact.

In regard to social service, the Church of Scotland Guild had been at work since 1904, when the first tent was pitched at Stobs Camp, near Hawick. Later a Joint Committee, consisting of representatives of the Church of Scotland Guild, the United Free Church Guild, and the Y.M.C.A., was appointed to confer as to centres of work and so to avoid overlapping. The work went on harmoniously, and when, in August, 1914, war was declared strenuous efforts were made to meet the new need. The Committee appealed for funds and upwards of £6,000 was subscribed during the first 15 months of the war. Large institutes were built and tents pitched in different places, and schools, church halls and other buildings were utilized, over 50 centres in all receiving attention. Early in 1916 the Committee, acting on urgent appeals from chaplains and officers in France, determined to cross the Channel and offer the Scottish lads there the help afforded to them in Scotland. Two great "Scottish Churches' Huts" were erected as a start, and afforded the greatest satisfaction to the men. In this work the Church of Scotland and the United Free Church of Scotland co-operated most happily.

Both at home and abroad the services of the chaplains were most highly appreciated by the men, who admired their fearless courage. Officers bore equally emphatic testimony, and in Lord French's generous tribute to the value he placed upon the work of the chaplains of all denominations, those of the Presbyterian Churches must inevitably have occupied a large place in his mind. It should be added that, among distinctions, no fewer than seven ministers of the Church of Scotland had special honours conferred upon them in the first two years of war. The Rev. W. S. Jaffray, the Rev. A. R. Yeoman, and the Rev. A. M. Maclean were admitted to the most Distinguished Order of St. Michael and St. George; the Rev. D. A. Cameron Reid, the Rev. J. McGibbon, the Rev. O. B. Milligan, and the Rev. A. S. G. Gilchrist received the Military Cross, while several others had their names mentioned in dispatches. Ministers of the United Free Church of Scotland also received distinctions, the Rev. J. MacK. McNaughton being among those who received the Military Cross.

The first Roman Catholic Commissioned Chaplains to the Forces were appointed to the Army in the Crimea. Except for a temporary increase during the years of the Boer War, they averaged, in later years, 16 to 18 in number, and were scattered in military stations throughout the world. A certain number of



CARDINAL BOURNE,
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Westminster.

"Acting Chaplains to the Forces," who were not commissioned, also gave their whole time to the troops, receiving the same pay (but not the allowances) as the Fourth Class Commissioned Chaplains. A larger body of "Officiating Clergymen," remunerated on a capitation basis, gave part of their time to the troops stationed in or near their parishes.

Thus, at the outbreak of the European War, it happened that there were but 15 Roman Catholic Commissioned Chaplains attached to the British Army. Of these, two, stationed in South Africa, were unable to join the Army in the field until later; one was transferred to the Royal Navy, and one, in ill-health, was precluded from active service. The remaining 11, with one retired chaplain who rejoined, accompanied the British Expeditionary Force overseas.

The creation of the New Armies, the large number of Irish and other Catholics who joined

PRAYER BEFORE BATTLE.
Irish Guards making supplication before going into action.

the Colours, above all, the new conditions of a deadly war, rendered absolutely imperative an augmentation of the Chaplain Service. In peace time one chaplain might do duty for considerable bodies of troops concentrated in military stations or in barracks ; in time of war the same number of men are scattered, whether at home or on the battlefield, over large areas. Furthermore, the realities of war bring home to the soldier the truths of religion. In face of death the indifferent become serious, the good more fervent. Where regular attendance to religious duties at stated intervals had sufficed in peace even for the best, facilities for frequent reception of the sacraments were demanded by those who now, in danger, felt their need. The need of chaplains cannot be fully understood unless it be remembered that the personal attention of priest to man is the essential part of the work of a Roman Catholic Chaplain. One chaplain may hold a service for some thousands of men. No one priest can give to as many soldiers in a short space of time the attention required by the Roman Catholic who wishes to die well.

To meet the need of an increased establishment of clergy of all denominations, the War Office evolved an excellent scheme of Temporary Commissioned Chaplains. The Acting Chaplains were given commissioned rank, and thus enabled to proceed overseas. As a class, indeed, they disappeared, with few exceptions. This was the case of two or three priests who, belonging to allied or neutral nations, were unable to hold the King's commission, and who, nevertheless, were able to do excellent work for the troops at home. Meanwhile, throughout the country, the Officiating Clergymen and a great number of local and unremunerated priests, many of whom afterwards received this status, worked hard for the men in training.

The new volunteer Regular Chaplains received the title of Fourth Class Chaplains to the Forces, with the equivalent rank of captains. They contracted to serve for three years or for the duration of the war, whichever period should first expire. This was later changed to a promise not to quit the service until the expiration of 12 months from the date of leaving England. Except in the case of those compelled to resign because of ill-health, hardly any failed to renew the contract at the end of their year's experience of the horrors of the battlefield.

The Roman Catholic Chaplains, both at home and in the field, except when detailed for hospital, hospital ship, or training centre duty, were appointed in the ratio of one to a division. This was found quite inadequate and the War Office increased the establishment to a standard of one to a brigade, *i.e.*, three to a division.

This scheme, definite and yet elastic, bade fair to render efficient the establishment, were the priests forthcoming. This, throughout the whole war, remained the chief difficulty. Numberless hospitals grew up in town and country : Belgian refugees came in their thousands : attention to religious duties became more keen : parochial work had to be carried on often with depleted staffs : the local priest had frequently to assist, or even replace, the military chaplain : despite the generous Government allowances, with the rise in prices poverty remained much the same. Yet from the same small body of priests (with

assistance from Ireland) had to be raised this large number of chaplains. The older priests cheerfully undertook double duty that the younger might volunteer. Those who were debarred physically, or by special work, took the place of others who were free to don the King's uniform. Monks came forth from the cloister, scholars laid aside their books, schools reduced their staffs, preachers of eminence gave themselves to the care of the soldier.

So much for the recruiting of the chaplains. As to their appointment, the special organization of the Roman Catholic clergy must first be noted. Every priest is either a "secular" appointed by his immediate superior, the bishop, to parochial, administrative or educational work in the diocese; or a "regular," that is, one living a monastic life, owing entire obedience to his provincial, abbot or prior, according to the constitution of the Religious Order or Congregation, Benedictine, Dominican, Jesuit, etc., of which he is a member. Volunteers for naval or military chaplaincies had therefore first to seek the permission and approbation of their bishop or of their Religious Superior. Again, the Roman Catholic Priest, acting as a Military Chaplain, is in a very different position to the lay officer. In so far as he is a soldier, like the combatant officer, he derives his authority from the Government of which he is a servant. As a priest, however, the exercise of the sacred powers, received in his ordination, depends entirely from ecclesiastical authority. Thus if he was to do his work, the volunteer for the post of chaplain during the Great War was obliged to have (1) permission from his bishop or Religious Superior to offer his services; (2) ecclesiastical approbation and "faculties" to exercise his powers; and (3) due approbation and appointment by the War Office.

Fortunately no new organization was needed at the outbreak of the conflict in order to cope with this necessary dual control and allegiance. The relations of the Admiralty and War Office to the Roman Catholic Church and of both to the Roman Catholic Chaplain in respect of his status had long been settled. Cardinal Bourne, Roman Catholic Archbishop of Westminster, had been appointed by the Holy See years before its Delegate for military affairs, and, as such, had been recognized by the Admiralty and by the War Office as sole ecclesiastical superior of Roman Catholic Naval and Military Chaplains. Thus from the beginning of the war, bishops and Religious Superiors offered to the Cardinal Archbishop their volunteers. To him these became entirely subject ecclesiastically for the time of their service. From him they derived their "faculties." To the Cardinal the Government appealed for chaplains, and to him matters relative to priests who bore the King's com-

PRAYING BEFORE THE CRUCIFIX AT ANTWERP.

Soon after the first shells had fallen on Antwerp: refugees praying before the sacred shrine representing the Crucifixion.



WITH THE FRENCH ARMY.
A military chaplain returns to his quarters after a visit to the firing-line.

mission were referred. The local officiating clergymen, not being commissioned, were subject to their bishops, with whose consent they were appointed by the military authorities. The affairs of the Chaplain Service were administered by the Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster through the Naval and Military Chaplains' Department, Archbishop's House, Westminster, of which the Secretary was Monsignor Bidwell, the Assistant Secretary being the Rev. F. Kerr McClement.

The military side of the appointment of the Roman Catholic Chaplains was the concern of the War Office. Each member of the Army Council had a certain number of departments under his control. To the Secretary of the War Office, acting under the immediate supervision of the Secretary of State for War, fell the Chaplains' Department. While the Department for the Church of England was under the control of the Chaplain-General, that for other denominations came immediately under the Secretary of the War Office, acting under the supervision of the Secretary of State for War, to whom, therefore, the Roman Catholic Military Chaplains were subject directly. The Army Council, in the manner explained, acted in concurrence with the Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster. The latter nominated to the former alone and was consulted in the movements of chaplains. The only exception to this rule during the war existed in the case of the divisions of the New Armies raised in Ireland, for which it was arranged that Cardinal Logue, Roman Catholic Archbishop of Armagh and Primate of All Ireland, should nominate the chaplains. It may here be added that early in the war, Cardinal Logue also, by arrangement with Cardinal Bourne, nominated eight Irish chaplains to be attached to purely Irish Regiments (while acting for the brigades of which these regiments formed part, there being no regimental chaplains strictly). The Irish bishops and Religious Superiors were repeatedly appealed to for chaplains throughout the war, and all who volunteered (with the above exceptions) were appointed in the usual manner, through the Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster. Prior to the war there had been no Commissioned Chaplains in Ireland, where the parochial clergy did duty for the troops. Ireland and India, indeed, had formed exceptions to the system explained above. In India, chaplains were appointed by agreement of the Government and the Bishops of India.

At home the allocation of chaplains was simple. The military and ecclesiastical authorities appointed directly to brigades, training

centres and hospitals. The divisional chaplains remained as a rule with their brigades and accompanied them abroad. Those attached to training camps or hospitals, having gained some experience, were moved overseas to replace casualties or fill new needs, their places being taken by new volunteers or by convalescent chaplains.

In the field the arrangement was more complex and corresponded to the supreme control at home. For military purposes the chaplains came under the Adjutant-General, who was represented by the Principal Chaplain, resident at General Headquarters. The latter was the Senior Chaplain in the field, irrespective of denomination, and was assisted by an Assistant Principal Chaplain, who, similarly, might belong to any creed. All Chaplains at first were subject to the Principal Chaplain, but, later, in France the Church of England obtained a separate establishment.

For ecclesiastical purposes, the superior of the chaplains was the Senior Roman Catholic Chaplain in the area. He aided the Principal Chaplain in matters military—*e.g.*, the movement of chaplains, and was in frequent consultation with him. In France, at least, the Senior Roman Catholic Chaplain, Monsignor W. Lewis Keatinge, C.M.G., was stationed at General Headquarters. He also acted as representative of the Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster for all ecclesiastical matters. This arrangement obtained in all fields, and worked excellently. The Senior Roman Catholic Chaplain in each area was usually one of the pre-war regular Commissioned Chaplains.

The chaplains to hospital ships were appointed directly by the military and ecclesiastical authorities, and were often priests who, because of wounds, injuries, or illness, had become unfit for service in the field. On arrival at their ports, they became subject to the local Principal and Senior Chaplain, and could be moved ashore, or otherwise transferred. In Mesopotamia a peculiar situation arose owing to the triple control of the Admiralty, War Office and India Office, over the Naval, Mediterranean and Indian troops. Each of these Forces had its own Roman Catholic Chaplains.

In almost all fields local priests and missionaries gave great assistance, particularly in Egypt and East Africa, and in France where the French clergy gave considerable help to the British Chaplains.

The Colonial Contingents were accompanied by their own establishments of chaplains to the various areas where they were to assist the Imperial Forces. The Roman Catholic soldiers in the Indian Contingent in France and the Indian Expeditionary Force in Mesopotamia were under the care of chaplains appointed by the Government and Bishops of India. In the field they came under the authorities at General Headquarters in the same manner as the Imperial Chaplains. The Canadians brought over with each contingent a suitable number of chaplains, others joining at a later date.

WITH THE FRENCH ARMY.
Mass in the trenches.

Van Dyk.]

CARDINAL LOGUE.



FATHER FINN.
Killed at Sedd-ul-Bahr.



[*Elliot & Fry.*

RT. REV. MGR. BICKERSTAFFE-DREW.

They were for the most part bi-lingual, and were appointed by the Canadian Government in concert with the Apostolic Delegate and the Archbishops and Bishops of the Dominions. Their organization and disposition was controlled by the Canadian Chaplain Service Office in London, and in France they possessed their own independent establishment in necessary connexion with General Headquarters.

The Australian and New Zealand or Anzac Contingents arrived at Gallipoli with a full complement of Roman Catholic Chaplains, furnished with their first faculties by their own ecclesiastical authorities at home. In Gallipoli the Anzac Forces held a position more independent of the Imperial Forces than later in France, owing to the peculiar nature of the operations. Thus, while in the European battlefield their chaplains seem to have become more closely part of the Imperial Chaplain establishment, in the East they formed more an independent department for the contingent than a portion of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force establishment. They, however, acted in connexion with the General Headquarters of the latter, and in Egypt seem to have come under the ecclesiastical and military authority of the General Headquarters of the Egyptian Command and Egyptian Expeditionary Force.

The other and smaller overseas contingents brought with them a few European Chaplains speaking native languages when necessary.

Above all it was the ambition of the Roman Catholic Chaplain to be with the stricken soldier in time to hear his Confession, give him the Sacrament of Extreme Unction, and, if possible, Holy Communion in the form of Viaticum in preparation for his journey into Eternity. This, however, was often impossible when numbers of men were making their sacrifice simultaneously, and over a large area. Hence, every effort was made before departure from England, and at the Front in times of lesser activity and when the troops were in rest billets, to prepare each man for the death which might so soon overtake him. To this work was necessarily added that of a secondary nature which involved parade services, short sermons, etc., and other labour for spiritual and temporal benefit. Mass was celebrated in trench or ruined church and in huts, the men's Confessions heard and Holy Communion given them. Thus, at the close of many a battle, the chaplain was able proudly to say that every one of the fallen had received Absolution and Viaticum before his death. Before the Battle of Loos one chaplain gave over 1,600 Communions.

As it was recognized early in the war that, while a chaplain might, in the trenches, assist a few who would otherwise escape him, the streams of severely wounded would come to his hand from a far larger area were he to be stationed with the field ambulances or in the casualty clearing stations behind the line. As a rule, though a frequent visitor to the trenches in quieter times, the Roman Catholic priest in action was stationed at the latter posts.

Extraordinary privileges were granted by the Pope in the unusual circumstances of the Great War. Chaplains were endowed with powers ordinarily obtained only on application to a bishop: permissions rarely granted were conceded them: spiritual privileges seldom accorded were showered on them. Any and every priest approved could minister to soldiers irrespective of many of the usual

diocesan and parochial restrictions; military Chaplains could satisfy the religious needs of civilians as if appointed by the local bishop; the ordinary rules of the Liturgy were in certain ways simplified. Strangest of all, every soldier in the firing line, like one in danger of death by sickness, could receive Holy Communion non-fasting. In regard to the Sacrament of Penance, an entirely new permission was accorded by which soldiers going into the firing line and unable to make individual Confessions, because of their numbers or of lack of time for the chaplain to hear all of them, after making an act of contrition for their sins and an implied promise to go to Confession in the ordinary manner when possible, could receive absolution *en bloc* and be admitted to Holy Communion.

The lesser though important work of the chaplains requires little explanation. Needless to say they did all they could for the bodies of their men as for their souls. The Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster early in the war paid a visit to the Front. He made a prolonged tour of the camps on Salisbury Plain (where he gave eleven addresses to 3,000 soldiers, covering 350 miles by automobile in three days), and visited Aldershot, Warley, etc. Clubs and huts were opened in various places in England and at the Front—for instance, the flourishing "St. Patrick's Club for Soldiers" at Boulogne, and the Huts of the Catholic Women's League adjacent to Westminster Cathedral and at Fovant on Salisbury Plain. The Catholic Soldiers' Association and other organizations helped to send requisites, spiritual and other. And, let it be mentioned, much was due to the kindness of the authorities, at home and abroad, of the Young Men's Christian Association, who everywhere placed their huts at the service of Roman Catholic Chaplains and men for spiritual and recreative purposes.

The chaplains did excellent work, and found a high place in the honours lists. Before the end of the second year of war, of those attached to the Imperial Forces, four had gained the C.M.G. (one of these being also made "Officier" of the Legion of Honour), five the Military Cross, and some 30 had been mentioned in dispatches; two, indeed, three times, and two twice. An incomplete list gives to the Australian Chaplains one D.S.O. and one Military Cross, to two of the Canadians the latter decoration. The casualties included two killed—Father John Gwynn, an Irish Jesuit attached to the Irish Guards, laying down his life at Loos, and Father William Finn, whose heroic death at the awful landing of Sedd-ul-Bahr in Gallipoli was thus described by Reuter's correspondent:

Father Finn was one of the first to give his life in the landing at Sedd-ul-Bahr. In answer to the appeals

INSIDE AN ITALIAN HOSPITAL.
Wounded at prayer in the Hospital Chapel.

that were made to him not to leave the ship (the River Clyde), he replied, "A priest's place is beside the dying soldier," whereupon he stepped on to the gangway, immediately receiving a bullet through the chest. Undeterred, he made his way across the lighters, receiving another bullet in the thigh, and still another in the leg. By the time he reached the beach he was literally riddled with bullets, but in spite of the great pain he must have been suffering, he heroically went about his duties, giving consolation to the dying troops. It was while he was in the act of attending to the spiritual requirements of one of his men that the priest's head was shattered by shrapnel.

Five Imperial Chaplains and several Australians were wounded, several were injured, and a very large number, almost all those, in fact, who served in the Mediterranean in the earlier part of the War), succumbed temporarily to illness. One chaplain died of sickness, and Father Mullan, who accompanied the Indian Expeditionary Force in Mesopotamia, after being wounded and recommended for decoration, was captured at Kut.

A word might be said as to the numbers of volunteers from the various dioceses and religious orders, but statistics would be misleading, since the smaller, with fewer priests and sometimes greater work, gave proportionately to their powers as well as the larger. All contributed to the spiritual care of the soldier, to whom all owed so much: to all be equal credit.

Passing now to the work of what are known as "The Free Churches," it should be pointed out that before the war the Wesleyan Methodist Church was the one and only body of English Nonconformity which was officially recognized by the War Office. Recognition of others came later, as will presently appear, but at the first the Wesleyans held the field. The names of their ministers had appeared in the Army List for 11 years before 1914, and the good work done by these ministers, in home barracks and in garrisons abroad, was very generally acknowledged. Moreover, it is important and interesting to note, as a measure of their disinterestedness, that, while the War Office had been ready to grant Wesleyan ministers commissions in the Army, the Conference decided that these could not be accepted. The ministers who were thus serving the troops were therefore designated by authority as acting chaplains. The arrangement worked well enough in times of peace, but it was clear that under war conditions some fresh arrangement must be made.

Accordingly at the beginning of the war official intimation was received from Whitehall that the acting chaplains should be gazetted as chaplains to the Forces for the period of the war, in order that they might have their proper status in the Army as commissioned officers. Such a proposal was, of course, reasonable, and it was accepted by the Wesleyan authorities. At the moment the number thus gazetted was small—only fifteen, but it quickly increased. With the growth of the new armies, many more ministers came forward and offered themselves as chaplains, with the result that before the end of the second year of war the number had risen to between 150 and 160, distributed among the home garrisons and the Expeditionary forces. The chaplains were duly gazetted, their selection and nomination to the War Office being undertaken by the Army and Navy Board of the Wesleyan Methodist Church, of which the Rev. J. H. Bateson was the secretary.

But this provision of chaplains was only a part of the splendid contribution the Wesleyan Methodist Church made to religious work in the Army. Troops in training at home, whether billeted in houses in town or quartered in camps in the country, needed moral and spiritual supervision. This work was largely undertaken by "Officiating Clergymen," that is to say by ministers who, acting under the direct sanction of the War Office, performed the duties of chaplains whilst retaining their own pastoral charge. Of these Officiating Clergymen between 600 and 700 belonged to the Wesleyan Methodist Church. Moreover, some 300 other ministers were appointed for the special service of the sick and wounded.

In its scope and purpose the work of the Wesleyan Methodist Chaplain or Officiating Clergyman or Minister followed much the same lines as that of those belonging to other religious bodies. It was recognized that the call to arms afforded a unique opportunity for influencing for good the flower of Britain's young manhood which had heard and responded to the call, and in a Report prepared for the Representative Session of the Wesleyan Conference it was pointed out that whilst provision was made to meet the social needs of young men away from the restraints of home, living in a new environment and exposed to great perils, their spiritual and moral needs were not overlooked. On the distinctively religious side of the work the Report continued:

In the autumn open-air services were arranged in many of the great camps. During the winter efforts have everywhere been made to win them to Christ At Aldershot some remarkable scenes have been wit-



A CEREMONY IN THE MOUNTAINS.

A priest officiating in the mountainous district on the road to Pontebba. Italian troops kneeling before an altar constructed of rough boxes covered with an altar-cloth.

nessed, as many as fifty soldiers standing up before their comrades in token of their surrender to Christ. There have been conversions at parade, as well as at voluntary services. Wherever the soldiers have been camped or billeted there have been definite decisions for Christ. Similar results have followed the efforts of our chaplains and Church workers in the fighting line of France, Flanders, and the Dardanelles, and the great base camps.

It is hardly necessary to go further into detail, but the fact should be noted that the work of the chaplains at the Front was deeply valued by the military authorities. The name of the Senior Chaplain, the Rev. O. S. Watkins, was mentioned three times in the dispatches of Field-Marshal Viscount French, two chaplains received the C.M.G., and several others were awarded the Military Cross.

The work at home had several features of special interest which demand a word or two of

[Russell.

REV. J. H. BATESON
(Wesleyan).

[Russell.

REV. J. H. SHAKESPEARE
(Baptist).

notice, if only for the evidence they give of the thoroughness with which the Wesleyan Methodist Church rose to a sense of its responsibility in connexion with the war.

For several years before the war the Wesleyans had been providing at great expense Soldiers' and Sailors' Homes in all the great garrison towns and naval ports of the Empire. The capital cost of the buildings exceeded £150,000. In all, they numbered 39. They were always well used, but never, as the Report put it, had they rendered more effective service than during the war, and it will readily be understood how greatly they were appreciated by the men. Indeed, so urgent was the demand for further accommodation to meet the needs of the thousands of men who ever and anon swelled the ranks of the new armies, that 27 additional buildings were erected. It was generally recognized that this was a really wonderful achievement, and that the authorities of the Wesleyan Methodist Church were entitled to warm congratulations upon the fact that the cost of it was defrayed without making a single advertisement-appeal. During the war these Homes were patronized as never before; their hospitality helped countless men to avoid the temptations with which they were faced; and their social, moral and spiritual activities were of the greatest value to the troops in training as well as to the sailors of the Fleet when their ships were in port.

Further provision to meet the social needs of the troops in training was made in cities and towns and villages, by the opening of rooms attached to the local churches as Soldiers' Institutes. Such beneficent action was not peculiar to the Wesleyans; the Church of England, as has been already pointed out, and other religious bodies made similar provision, but that fact does not detract from the spirited action of the Wesleyans; it only goes to show that the Churches vied with each other in a wholesome rivalry to do everything they possibly could to promote the comfort and social well-being of the troops. It was stated that between 400 and 500 of these temporary Institutes were provided on Wesleyan Church premises, and that the men using them aggregated more than 35,000 nightly.

While providing for the well-being of men at home, the troops abroad were not overlooked. Every week from the early days of the war parcels of comforts were dispatched to commanding officers and chaplains for distribution among the men "with the Affectionate Greetings of the Wesleyan Methodist Church." These weekly parcels (some being sent to the Fleet, for the Wesleyans had strong work going on in the Navy as well as the Army) averaged about 3,000 lb. in weight. The whole of Methodism, it was said, shared in this service—service which was much appreciated by all ranks. The "Active Service" booklet was also circulated in large numbers, the desire being to supply a copy to every Methodist in the King's Forces.

The Wesleyans not only provided for the needs of the living; they did not forget to commemorate the gallant dead. Memorial services were held from time to time at the Central Hall, Westminster; a Roll of Honour was prepared containing the names—some thousands in all—of members or adherents of the Wesleyan Church who were killed in battle

or died of wounds; and a Memorial Service was held during the Representative Session of the Conference. Nor was this all. By the decision of the Conference a "Memorial Copy of the Roll of the Gallant Dead," signed by the President, was sent to every home therein represented. With the pamphlet containing the names was bound up the Memorial Service, with its hymns and addresses given in full; and this kind act of sympathy brought comfort and consolation to the hearts of the bereaved. The Wesleyan authorities sought also to provide information for all families whose relatives were reported missing, and to procure wherever possible photographs of soldiers' graves through the Graves Commission.

The number of Wesleyan officers and men serving in the King's Forces was estimated at the end of two years at 170,000, but whatever the exact proportion to the total strength, it must be admitted that their social, moral and spiritual interests were well provided for by the Wesleyan Methodist Church.

It was only to be expected, after Mr. Lloyd George's impassioned appeal at the City Temple in the early days of the war, that there would be a strong rally to the Colours of "the young men of the Nonconformist Churches," to whom he specially addressed himself. And so it proved to be. Months afterwards a distinguished representative of English Nonconformity said that "our churches are denuded of young men." This was said not complainingly but proudly, for it related to the period before conscription.

But with this large accession of Nonconformist young men to the Armies a serious question at once arose, "What provision can be made for their spiritual welfare?" The Wesleyans had been for years "recognized" by the War Office and acting chaplains appointed according to need, but Wesleyan Methodism is only one branch of Nonconformity. What of the Baptists? What of the Congregationalists? What of the other branches of Methodism? Before the war these had not received official recognition, and in the early days young men, members of these Churches, found on attestation that no provision was made to meet their religious needs on the lines of their own distinctive creeds. Could they not place themselves under the care of the Wesleyans or some other chaplains whose position was recognized? At first the War Office evidently thought their case could adequately be met in that way, for

SERBIAN TROOPS AT DIVINE SERVICE IN SALONIKA.

on August 17, 1914, a communication was received by the Secretary of the Baptist Union from the War Office expressing regret that "circumstances do not permit of the appointment of any Chaplains of the Baptist or Congregationalist Churches to accompany this force, but it may be possible for you to arrange with one or the other of the Churches named above [*i.e.*, the Church of England, the Roman Catholic, Presbyterian, or Wesleyan Churches] for the care of troops of your denomination in the field." The War Office, however, agreed to the appointment of "Officiating Clergymen" for ministering to Nonconformist troops in training at home.

Further negotiations with the War Office proceeded apace, and eventually it was agreed that the religious bodies in question might provide their own chaplains. There were four denominations more immediately concerned, and to deal with each one separately would naturally cause a great deal of extra work, which, with the constant pressure at the War Office, it was most desirable to avoid. The difficulty was arranged by the formation of one "United Navy and Army Board of the Four Denominations (the Baptist, Congregational, Primitive Methodist, and United Methodist Churches)," with the Rev. J. H. Shakespeare (Baptist) and the Rev. R. J. Wells (Congregationalist) as Joint Secretaries.

The War Office lost no time in making known the new arrangement. The following letter was issued to the General Officers Commanding-in-Chief Home Commands, Secretaries of Territorial Associations, etc. :

I am commanded by the Army Council to acquaint you that strong complaints have been made to them, from many parts of the country, to the effect that recruits joining, and men serving in, the Regular Army and the Territorial Force, who desire to be recorded as belonging to religious denominations other than the Church of England and the Roman Catholic Church, have experienced difficulty in obtaining accurate registration of this kind.

I am therefore to ask you to be so good as to call the attention of all officers and non-commissioned officers to the provisions of paragraph 919, King's Regulations, and to say that whenever—on attestation, for the marking of identity discs, or for any other purpose—it is necessary to obtain information as to a soldier's religion, his own statement on the point should be taken, without any attempt to influence him, and should be acted upon without question.

Soldiers should also be afforded facilities for attending Divine Service at churches of their own denomination, where this is possible, even though it may not be considered necessary to appoint an officiating clergyman of that denomination under Article 400 of the Pay Warrant.

I am to add that, in any cases in which men express a desire for the correction of an existing inaccurate record regarding their religious denomination, such correction should at once be carried out.

Paragraph 919 of the King's Regulations was as follows :

A soldier will be classified under one of the following denominations :

Church of England ; Presbyterian ; Wesleyan ; Baptist or Congregationalist ; other Protestant denomination (name of denomination to be noted) ; Roman Catholic ; Jew.

Even after the issue of this letter there still remained some cases in which difficulty was experienced locally until explanations were offered, but before long matters righted themselves and everything worked smoothly.

The Nonconformist Churches in question showed by the response they made to the call for chaplains that they were prepared to give of their best for service among troops who were fighting for King and country. The nomination of the chaplains was made by the secretary or other representative of the different denominations and forwarded by the United Board to the War Office for appointment. About 120 chaplains were so appointed, and among them were many of the best known and most highly valued of the ministers. In addition to these, there were upwards of 600 officiating clergymen appointed for home service.

In the new establishment of chaplains sanctioned by the War Office one Free Church chaplain was attached for duty to each of the three brigades forming a Division, and he had to be responsible for all Free Churchmen, irrespective of their particular denomination, in that Brigade. An arrangement of this kind naturally tended to break down denominational partitions and to promote unity, but the one really unifying force was the war itself. The Rev. F. C. Spurr, in his volume, "Some Chaplains in Khaki," mentioned a little group of six chaplains who met at a central rendezvous for the purpose of talking over certain phases of their common work. "Those six men," he said, "represented several denominations, yet no stranger suddenly appearing in their midst could have determined, by any outward and visible sign, the denomination to which each belonged. Anglican, Presbyterian, United Board, Wesleyan and Catholic—they are dressed alike ; for the most part they hold common rank ; they confer together, they pray together, they work together. They respect each other, although some of them profoundly differ from each other." Mr. Spurr added that when the war was over, and khaki was discarded in favour of the ordinary clerical costume, they

A VILLAGE THANKSGIVING: RUSSIA.

might, and probably would, unless a miracle occurred, renew their differences quite openly. But he hazarded the opinion that never again could they be quite the same men as they were before the war. The experiences of chaplains in the field supplied many instances of close fellowship and comradeship among the chaplains, each ready and willing to assist the other in his work. Two striking illustrations may be quoted to represent this spirit. A Free Church chaplain was inquiring about some of his boys:

> A Roman Catholic priest, fresh complexioned and hearty, came forward and in lovely Irish brogue said: "Can I be of service to ye to show ye where your boys are? I know lots of Baptists and Congregationalists and others." Away he went, and from that day I have not wanted a friend. In the hospital, as we look at the men's discs, the padre will say, "Bray, here's one of yours." He came over a distance of five miles to tell me a Baptist boy had been killed by a shell, and would I come and bury him.

This story of a Roman Catholic priest helping

RUSSIAN SERVICE IN THE FIELD.
The Gospel resting on cross bayonets.

a Free Church minister was matched by one of a Free Church minister acting for a Roman Catholic priest. It was known as one of the great glories of the war, and related to a Roman Catholic lad dying on the field of battle:

He asked to see his priest, who however was not available at the time. One of the Free Church chaplains went to the dying man and said to him: "Can I help you? I am a Free Churchman, a Protestant, but you are passing, lad, let me pray with you," and taking the boy's crucifix which hung around his neck he pressed it to the dying lips of the lad, and spoke to him of the great Priest who forgives human sin, and in His Name assured the Catholic lad of absolution.

The chaplains of the United Board were second to none in their self-sacrificing devotion to the interests of the troops. At home they and the officiating clergymen ministered to the needs of their men in training, holding parade and other services, visiting hospitals, providing recreation rooms and erecting institutes—one of the largest of these latter being dedicated to the memory of Mr. Percy Illingworth in recognition of his interest in and services to the work of the United Board. At the Front the work of the Free Church chaplains was wonderfully varied, but in whatever they did for and among the men they never lost sight of their one aim, the spiritual uplifting of those to whom they ministered.

RUSSIAN DEDICATION SERVICE IN PETROGRAD.
At a British convalescent home for wounded soldiers.

And the work of the chaplains, whether at the Front or in the camps at home, was strongly supported by members of the Free Churches. Emergency Committees of the Baptist and Congregational Women's Leagues were formed in the early days of the war for war service, and all through they maintained a steady and continuous supply of parcels of comforts, etc., needed by the men. A close watch was kept on the columns of *The Times*, and whenever a new need was mentioned or a fresh appeal made these women workers made warm response.

Thus were the needs of the Free Churchmen in the Army most carefully supplied, and it is not too much to say that the work done by the United Board throughout the war will remain one of the brightest and happiest in the history of English Nonconformity.

The Welsh Calvinistic Methodists were represented by a chaplain of their own denomination, for the Welsh Division, who also received official recognition from the War Office.

One of the most noteworthy features of the recruiting campaign was the patriotism displayed by the Jews. It was fostered and encouraged by the Chief Rabbi and other

Jewish leaders, and thousands of Jews joined the Army. It became necessary to make provision for their spiritual needs, and there were not wanting the necessary number of Jewish clergymen to act in the capacity of Army chaplains. A careful and elaborate organization was set on foot. A War Service Committee worked in conjunction with the Office of the Jewish Chaplain, and by means of co-ordination and centralization progress was made in every direction. Among other things, a register was compiled of all the men of the Jewish faith who were known to be in the Army. This at first was not an easy matter, as not all Jews who had joined had so described themselves. But when the machinery of the Chaplains' Office was set to work additions to the register came pouring in, and an up-to-date record was kept, as far as possible, of every man. The value of such registration was proved again and again. It facilitated hospital visitation, and a monthly return was furnished by the visitor of the men sick or wounded.

The number of Jewish chaplains and officiating clergymen, excluding those not working under military rule, was roughly about 25. The Rev. S. Lipson, C.F., was in charge of the Chaplains' Department for the whole of the United Kingdom. The country was mapped out into areas, for which officiating clergymen and assistant chaplains were appointed. In this and

[Dinham.

REV. S. LIPSON.
Jewish Chaplain to the Forces.

[Elliot & Fry.

DR. MICHAEL ADLER,
The Jewish Chaplain.

in many other matters the Secretary of the United Synagogue rendered the chaplain in charge most valuable assistance and advice. The work of Jewish chaplains in England was not dissimilar from that of the chaplains of other denominations. They held services for the men—the generous hospitality of the Y.M.C.A. in placing their huts at the disposal of the chaplains for the purpose often made this easy when it might otherwise have been almost impossible; they distributed to the men the Jewish Military Prayer Book supplied by the War Office—an interesting compilation containing not only the ordinary daily prayers, but also prayers for the Jewish Festivals, as well as the Jewish Calendar, a copy of the letter from Earl Kitchener and the King's message to his troops; they visited the hospitals, having in this work the valuable cooperation of the Union of Jewish Women; and generally provided for the social and religious needs of those under their charge. In addition to these ordinary ministrations it devolved upon Jewish chaplains to attend to all questions incidental to the special requirements of the soldiers of the Jewish faith.

Of the work abroad it should be said that

ON THE WESTERN FRONT.
Welcome guests of a chaplain.

the Rev. Michael Adler took charge of all arrangements in France, and there were with him also as chaplains the Rev. V. Simmons and the Rev. A. Barnett. Mr. Adler was the first Jewish chaplain to accompany a British force in the field, and in *The Times* of March 13, 1915, he thus describes some of his earlier experiences:

> I found (he said) that I had considerably underestimated the number of Jews who are with the British forces. I have compiled a list of many thousands, and everywhere I went I found Jewish officers and men of whom I had no previous record. Wherever possible I held services and organized the officers and men so that they might hold services for themselves. What gave me much pleasure was the way in which Jews would tramp for miles along the worst of roads in order to join with us in prayer.
>
> On my field cap I wear a badge which is unique in the Army—the interlaced triangles, the shield of David—and everywhere Jewish soldiers recognized it and made themselves known to me. I held services everywhere, consecrated burial grounds, and ministered to the wounded and the dying. Whenever I met a Jewish soldier I made a point of writing to his people at home.

In *The Times* article Mr. Adler was described as "the shepherd of a flock which is scattered over the five continents and the seven seas," which was only another way of indicating that the Chaplains' Department was in touch with Jewish soldiers in all parts of the Empire, and in all the theatres of the war.

Nor was the social side of the work forgotten. The formation of the Jewish Naval and Military Association was a notable step in advance, and the opening of a Jewish Soldiers' and Sailors' Club at 113A Tottenham Court Road, as "an auxiliary to the Y.M.C.A.," was an indication of the growth and development of a spirit of broad-mindedness and charity.

And upon this note we conclude, for one of the greatest of the outstanding impressions which a survey of the work of the Churches in connexion with the Armies must have produced upon the mind was that the war had exercised a wonderfully unifying influence upon the various religious bodies of this country. Distinctive principles were not interfered with, but common work for a common purpose produced a common unity which before that memorable fourth day of August, 1914, would have been deemed unthinkable.

BLACK SEA
TURKEY
Armenia
Kurdistan
Mesopotamia
Syria
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
Trebizond
Erzerum
Erzingan
Sivas
Kharput
Diarbekr
Bitlis
Mush
Marash
Aleppo
Alexandretta
Adana
Urfa
Mardin
Hama
Homs
Tripoli
Beirut
Damascus
Deir ez Zor
Tadmur (Palmyra)
Lake
HISTO
TURK
MES
ARMEN
ROUTES TO INDIA
English Miles
0 100 200 300 400 500
Railways open and
In construction or projected
Steamer Routes
RUSSIA
Constantinople
TURKISH EMPIRE
PERSIA
ARABIA
AFGHANISTAN
INDIA
EGYPT
ABYSSINIA
ERITREA
Baghdad
Teheran
Baku
Tabriz
Karachi
Bombay
Cairo
Aden
INDIAN OCEAN
RED SEA
CASPIAN SEA
Persian Gulf
G. of Oman
G. of Aden

The Times
HISTRY OF THE WAR.

Map of
EASTERN
URKEY IN ASIA
including
MESOPOTAMIA,
ARMENIA, and part of PERSIA

Scale of English Miles
0 20 40 60 80 100
Railways — Roads & Tracks
" — In construction or projected

REFERENCE
Feet
6000
3000
1000
500
100
Sea Level
600 100 Fathoms Below Sea Level

The London Geographical Institute

CHAPTER CXXXIII.

THE EXTERMINATION OF THE ARMENIANS.

THE ARMENIANS AND THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE TURKS—THE SIX VILAYETS—DESCRIPTION OF THE COUNTRY—ARMENIAN CHARACTER—FORMER TURKISH ATROCITIES—THE YOUNG TURKS AND THEIR POLICY—MILITARY REVERSES AND ARMENIAN PERSECUTIONS—THE SCHEME OF DISARMAMENT—TURKISH TORTURES—THE "PAN-TURANIAN IDEA" MADE IN GERMANY—"DEPORTATION"—HISTORY OF THE ATROCITIES IN 1915—ZEITOUN—CILICIA—VAN—URMIA—DJEVDET BEY'S MASSACRES—HEROISM OF AMERICAN MISSIONARIES—SASSOUN—THE HORRORS OF FLIGHT—TREATMENT OF ARMENIAN WOMEN—EXTENT OF THE ATROCITIES—DELIBERATE POLICY OF EXTERMINATION—GERMAN RESPONSIBILITY.

AT the beginning of the year 1915 there were upwards of two million Armenians in the Ottoman Empire. By the end of the year, two-thirds of them had either been massacred in their native towns and villages or uprooted from their homes, while of those "deported" (as the latter process was officially styled) less than 50 per cent. ever reached their allotted destinations. The rest perished by outrage or exhaustion on the way, and even those who reached their journey's end died off rapidly after their arrival, through famine, exposure and disease. "Deportation," in fact, was simply a method of gradual massacre, more effectual in dealing with numbers, and, above all, more cruel to the individual, than instant massacre by bullet or bayonet.

When one reads the story of these atrocities (and there is abundant testimony from neutral eye-witnesses who escaped from Turkey and made depositions about the scenes they saw), one almost imagines oneself back in the eighth century B.C., hearing tidings of how the children of Israel were "carried into captivity" by the Assyrians. This method of destroying a nation has indeed been practised in the Near East since the days of the earliest Oriental empires. Sargon and Nebuchadnezzar and Darius set the precedent which was followed by the Young Turks, but the latter had means at their command which their predecessors never possessed. There was a uniformity, an efficiency, a thoroughness in their work which betrayed the Prussian connexion. The deportation of the Armenians in 1915 was organized from the Ministries of the Interior and of War at Constantinople by telegraph and telephone; the exiles were in many cases conveyed by rail; the recalcitrants were overawed or shot down by quick-firing mountain batteries and machine-guns (the artillery being actually directed, in certain instances, by German officers); and all these modern appliances added immeasurably to the horror of the crime. The scenes in the crowded cattle-trucks and at the junctions and rail-heads of the Anatolian and Baghdad lines were almost more terrible than those on the mountain-tracks and in the gorges of the Euphrates.

To explain this frenzy of frightfulness which swept over the Near East in the year 1915, we

REFUGEES IN CAMP AT PORT SAID.

must describe very briefly who the Armenians were and what were their relations with the Turks.

The Armenians were one of the scattered, submerged nationalities of the Near East. They were a Christian nation, held together by their national church,* with its Bible and liturgy in the native language, but there has been no united kingdom of Armenia since 387 A.D. The Katholikos or ecclesiastical primate of All the Armenians, who resides at the Monastery of Etchmiadzin in Russian Caucasia, is the only surviving representative of this ancient Armenian State. Not even a fragment of the Armenian nation has enjoyed political independence since 1375, when the refugee principality of Lesser Armenia in the Cilician hills, which had been a stalwart ally of the Crusaders and had taken to itself a French dynasty of kings, succumbed to the surrounding Mohammedan Powers. During all the intervening centuries the Armenian people has been subject to foreign, and for the most part unfriendly, rulers; yet, like the Jews, they seem actually to have found a stimulus in adversity. By the year 1915, they had spread themselves over the world, from Calcutta and Singapore to New York and California, and, wherever they settled, they made their way and made themselves at home. The vast majority of the nation, however, was still to be found within the frontiers of the Turkish and Russian Empires.

The original home of the Armenian race, and the seat of the ancient Armenian kingdom, is a plateau of upland pastures, buttressed with huge mountain barriers and intersected by the deep ravines of rivers, which interposes itself between the Caspian, the Black Sea, the Mediterranean, and the Persian Gulf, and feeds the waters that flow into all four. This plateau is intersected, from north-west to south-east, by the Russo-Turkish frontier established in 1878, and the great advance of the Grand Duke's armies in the early months of 1916 brought practically the whole of it within the Russian lines. But in 1915 the Armenian population in Turkey was not confined to the plateau. The provinces which were considered specifically Armenian and which were known to Near Eastern diplomatists as the "Six Vilayets," extended west of the Euphrates far into the Anatolian Peninsula; Cilicia—the region facing Cyprus at the north-eastern corner of the Mediterranean, which had been the seat of that last Armenian principality which fell in 1375—was still sown thick

* Called the "Gregorian Church" after St. Gregory the Illuminator, who converted Armenia to Christianity towards the end of the third century A.D.

with Armenian towns and villages; and there was a very strong Armenian element in the neighbourhood of Constantinople—about 150,000 Armenians in the population of the city itself, and perhaps almost as many again in the Asiatic districts along the eastern and southern coasts of the Sea of Marmora. The Armenians were thus very widely distributed in Turkey, but, as has been said, they were a scattered and submerged race. No territory was in their exclusive possession. Even their native plateau was tenanted in part by the Kurdish shepherd tribes, who pastured their flocks on the alps and down-lands, confining the Armenian cultivators to the valleys and plains. In the towns and countryside of the Anatolian Peninsula they were mingled with the Turkish townsfolk and peasantry. They shared Constantinople with all the nations of the Near East. It was only in the mountains of Cilicia and in the basin of Lake Van—the north-easternmost province of Turkey towards the Russian and Persian frontiers—that there was anything like a pure, homogeneous Armenian population.

Thus, in 1915, the Armenians amounted numerically to no more than 10 per cent. of the population of the Ottoman Empire—2,000,000 out of 20,000,000 in all; but their social and economic importance was far in excess of their numbers. They were a keen-witted, business-like people, gifted with a remarkable energy,



LANDING REFUGEES FROM A FRENCH CRUISER.
Smaller picture: A French sailor carrying a small Armenian.

and with an industry which made the most of what their energy achieved. They had inherited an ancient and deep-rooted civilization, and they had been invigorated during the last century by missionary influences from the West. The coming of the Jesuit and American missionaries to Armenia, and the counter-movements of Armenian emigrants to Venice and Lemberg, Marseilles and London and New York, brought the Armenian people into living contact with Western Europe, and raised them in civilization altogether above their Moslem neighbours and fellow-citizens.

The result was that, by 1915, the Armenians had risen to extreme social and economic importance in Turkey. In all parts of the Empire, except the Arabic provinces of the south-east, they had taken on themselves the functions of a middle or professional class. The big import merchants and wholesale dealers at Constantinople were recruited from their ranks; they were the bankers and shop-keepers of the provincial cities; and skilled work, whether of brain or hand, was so entirely dependent on Armenian practitioners, that it literally came to a standstill when the Armenian population of any given locality was massacred or carried into exile. "Now that the Armenians are gone," write several witnesses from different centres, in almost identical words, "there are no doctors, chemists, lawyers, smiths, potters, tanners, weavers left in this place"—and so on, through the whole catalogue of trades. So far as the Ottoman Empire kept abreast with the intellectual and technical progress of the modern world, it did so through the enterprise and intelligence of its Armenian citizens.

But the position which the Armenians had won for themselves in the country by their natural capacities did not at all correspond to the position assigned to them under the traditional constitution of the Ottoman State. The Ottoman State, like the Hapsburg and Hohenzollern States with which it entered into alliance, is based on the antithesis of democracy—on the forcible domination of one race, or rather one caste, over a subject population, and in Turkey this domination took on an even cruder form than in Central Europe. The Moslem conquerors were a chosen people; the conquered Christians were "Rayah"—cattle—who were hardly regarded as integral members of the State. But such extreme injustice had provoked rebellion, and in the course of the nineteenth century the Ottoman Empire was cut short by the breaking away of one Christian nationality after another. The process culminated in the Balkan War of 1912, which almost ejected the Turks from Europe, and left their former Christian subjects on the European continent organized in independent national States. The war of 1912 practically confined the problem of the subject nationalities to the single problem of the Armenians.

Unlike their fellow-subjects in Europe, the Armenians had never played for political independence. When Turkey was beaten by Russia in 1878 and many Balkan populations obtained their freedom from Turkish rule, the Armenians merely asked for a reform of administration in the six north-eastern provinces of Turkey in Asia (thereafter known as the "Six Vilayets"), and they limited themselves to the same demand when Turkey was prostrate once more in 1913. This moderate policy was dictated by obvious national interests. Scattered as they were through the length and breadth of Asiatic Turkey, the whole Empire was their potential economic heritage, while no part of it was sufficiently their own in population to make of it a politically independent Armenian State. They had therefore everything to gain from the maintenance of Turkish integrity, if only the injustice of their present status in Turkey were reformed; and the Turks, in turn, had every interest (if they were wise enough to see it) in giving the Armenians reasonable civil rights and a free hand in the economic sphere; for the Armenians were the only native element which could regenerate the country and keep it in line with modern developments from within. If the Armenians were hindered from doing this, it was clear to any observer that it would be done by some covetous and high-handed Power from outside, and this is precisely what happened. By eliminating the Armenians in 1915, the Turks merely opened a wider door to the German interloper.

Ever since 1878, the year in which Turkey had to cede to Russia the north-eastern part of the Armenian plateau and the Ottoman Armenians first asked for administrative reforms, the Armenian people had been singled out by the Ottoman Government for repression. The Sultan Abd-ul-Hamid (1876–1908) conceived the idea of re-arming the Kurdish tribes (who had been disarmed with infinite pains by his predecessor Mahmud, fifty years before), and giving them *carte blanche*, as "Hamidia"



THE DEFENCE OF VAN: ARMENIANS IN THE TRENCHES.

(Irregular Gendarmerie), to rob the goods and rape the women of their defeneeless Armenian neighbours. This poliey provoked an Armenian revolutionary movement, and within five years of the arming of the Kurds racial feeling was so envenomed on both sides that Abd-ul-Hamid was able to organize a series of Armenian massacres (1894–6) in the ehief Armenian eentres of the Empire, eulminating in an open butehery in the streets of Constantinople. The Powers were paralyzed by mutual jealousy, and were as little able to stop the slaughter in 1894–6 as they had been to impose the administrative reforms stipulated at Berlin in 1878. In these massaeres about 100,000 people perished (the figure is dwarfed by the statisties of 1915) and the Armenian population in Turkey was further thinned by the aeeelerated eurrent of emigration.

Abd-ul-Hamid's work in 1894-6 was erowned and completed in 1915 by the Young Turks, and yet, when the Young Turkish Revolutionaries overthrew the Sultan in 1908, the Armenians imagined (and not without justifiea-tion) that a better day had dawned. The Young Turks had drunk in all the politieal ideas of Western Europe. They preaehed the "Liberty, Equality and Fraternity" of the Freneh Revolution; they set up a parliamentary eonstitution, and the Armenian revolutionary societies joyfully transformed themselves into parliamentary parties. But there was another aspeet of the Young Turkish programme. There was an "equality before the law," for instanee, whieh prineipally deelared itself in the extension to Christian eitizens of compulsory military serviee, whieh formerly had been obligatory on Moslems alone. And there was a doctrine of "Ottomanization" (that is, of assimilating all other peoples in the Empire to the dominant Turkish raee), whieh quiekly drove the Armenian members of parliament to the opposition benehes, where they voted side by side with the Arabs against sueh ominous proposals as the compulsory use of

YOUTH AND AGE.

A wedding in the refugees' camp. Circle picture: The oldest refugee in camp.

RECREATIONS IN CAMP.
Children at play after school hours.

the Turkish language in all secondary schools. The Young Turks, in fact, had imbibed the chauvinism as well as the liberalism of their West-European ensamples. To the religious fanaticism of the Old Turk they had added the new-fangled fanaticism of language and race, and it was simply a question which of their two incompatible ideals would ultimately prevail. The years 1908 to 1914 were the critical period. In the summer of 1908 the Young Turkish *régime* began with a veritable Golden Age; but in six weeks that had passed, and, under the influence of failures and misfortunes, chauvinism steadily gained the upper hand, while the power of the party became concentrated in the hands of a gang of unscrupulous adventurers. Within a year of the constitution came the new outbreak of massacre at Adana, but the Armenians were not alienated even by that. It was represented at the time as a device of Abd-ul-Hamid's adherents for discrediting the new *régime*, and the actual guilt of the Young Turks themselves was not disclosed till later on. In 1912, when the Balkan War broke out and the Armenians were called upon, under the new law, to serve the Ottoman State in arms, they acquitted themselves so well in doing battle for the common fatherland of Armenian and Turk, that they extorted the commendation of their Turkish officers. In 1913 the Young Turks accepted (with modifications) the new reform scheme for the "Six Vilayets." It seemed that the breach might still be averted, and the liberal tendency prevail; but all hope was lost when the Young Turkish Government deliberately involved the country in the European War.

The Young Turks entered the war from thoroughly Prussian motives. Their object was to restore Young Turkish prestige—their international prestige by territorial conquests at the expense of Russia and Persia and Great Britain which would eclipse the territorial losses of the Balkan War, and their prestige at home by a drastic process of Ottomanization and the solution of other problems which had not yielded to negotiation and parliamentary procedure. In fact, the Gordian knot in which they had entangled themselves during their half-dozen years of power was to be hacked through by the sword. Their first bid was for military success, but when the offensives launched successively on the Caucasian, Persian and Egyptian fronts had successively come to grief, they threw themselves all the more savagely into the project of Ottomanization at home, which meant, in effect, the extermination of the Armenian race.

An almost exact correspondence can be traced in the Young Turkish Government's policy between their reverses at the front and their persecution of the Armenians in the

THE RUSSIAN ARMIES IN ARMENIA.

The Russians bringing up ammunition and guns through the snowdrifts for the forces attacking the Turks before Erzerum.

interior. The sufferings of the Armenians began indeed with the declaration of war, for all male Ottoman eitizens between the ages of twenty and forty-five, and soon between those of eighteen and fifty, were mobilized without distinction of religion or privilege, and Armenians who had passed the age of training before the ratifieation of the new military serviee law of 1908, and were therefore legally exempt so long as they paid their annual eommutation-tax, were thus called up in violation of their rights. There was also a wholesale requisitioning of private property for military use, which hit the Armenians more heavily than other sections of the community, because they were the prineipal merehants and dealers and shopkeepers of the country.

But all these measures were *prima facie* military rather than political in intention, and might be aseribed to the pressure of war as plausibly as to the discrimination of the Government. Young Turkish cireles were in an optimistie mood, and they hoped that the confidently expeeted successes at the front would solve all their problems for them at one stroke. When the Young Turkish Government deelared war on the Allies in the latter part of October, 1914, the "Dashnaktzoutian Party"—the ehief Armenian parliamentary group in the Ottoman Empire—happened to be holding its annual party eonvention at Erzerum, and the Young Turks sent emissaries to lay proposals before this congress. They proposed that the Armenians, as a nation, should make common cause with the Ottoman Government in prosecuting the war. They suggested that the Dashnaktzoutian leaders should raise bands of Armenian volunteers to join in the coming invasion of Russian Caucasia; and, as a reward, they sketched a project for breaking up a large zone of Russian territory into autonomous national states under Ottoman suzerainty. The most substantial of these protectorates was to be the Armenian one, and the Young Turkish emissaries even hinted at the possibility of ineorporating with it part, at least, of the Ottoman provinces of Bitlis and Van—all this on condition that the Armenians cooperated with them heart and soul in the war. These ambitious overtures were met by the Dashnaktzoutian Conference with a deeided refusal. They had no quarrel with Russia; they doubted the power of the Turkish Government to eonquer the territory it was so complacently partitioning on the map; and they doubted still more whether it would fulfil its engagements if it were really to gain sueh an overwhelming success; they eould not forget that the Turks had treated them as aliens and almost as outlaws in the past, and the appeal for an Armeno-Turkish entente was crossed in 1914 by the shadow of the Adana massaeres and the massaeres of Abd-ul-Hamid. The Armenians affirmed their intention of doing their duty as Ottoman subjects, but declined the proposal that they should do more, and here matters rested for the moment, while everybody's attention was concentrated upon the winter offensive.

The course of these military operations has already been deseribed in detail.* The main enveloping movement in Caucasia, which looked so promising in the last week of December, 1914, turned to disaster in the first days of January, 1915; the subsidiary advance further east, which had brought most of the Persian province of Azerbaijan under Turkish occupation, ebbed again in the course of the same month in conformity with events in the principal theatre; in February Djemal Pasha's much-advertised expedition against Egypt ridieulously missed fire. The Turkish offensive was over and done with. The Turkish armies had fallen back ignominiously upon their own frontiers, with the prospect of facing a counter-invasion in the coming spring. Under these circumstances the swollen hopes of the Young Turkish Government gave way to a feverish pessimism, and the Armenian nation was the inevitable scapegoat of their renewed disappointment and their irreparably damaged prestige.

Several factors combined to sharpen their fear and hate. The danger of invasion was much more imminent on the Russian front than on the others. The next campaign in this quarter was almost eertain to be fought on Ottoman territory—on the Ottoman portion of the Armenian plateau with its strong Armenian popula tion, whieh had been hopelessly alienated from the Ottoman Government by the previous policy of the Young Turks themselves, and was likely to give a cordial reception to the invaders. The friendly feeling towards Russia whieh was cherished by the Armenian nation as a whole had indeed been brought home to the Turks in the course of the winter campaign. The

* See Vol. III., Chapter LI., and Vol. IV., Chapter LXXIII.

MOSUL.

Russian Armenians had done of their own accord what the Ottoman Armenians had refused, when appealed to, to do. They had raised bands of volunteers for their Government's service, and had contributed valiantly to the discomfiture of the Turkish armies at Ardahan and Sarikamish. Of course the Turks had no proper ground for resentment in this. These Armenian volunteers were lawful Russian subjects, doing battle for the State to which their allegiance was legally due. If the Ottoman Armenians had not been moved to do likewise, that was a serious reflection on the behaviour of Turkey towards her Armenian subjects as compared with the behaviour of Russia. But the Young Turks were in no condition to consider the cold truth. Their armies had been disastrously beaten; there had been Armenians in the enemy's ranks, some of whom had come all the way from New York in their eagerness to beat the Turks. Well, they would take their revenge on those other Armenians who still remained in their power. It was in this spirit that, at some time during the course of February, 1915, the Young Turks made up their minds to strike at the Armenians with all their might.

But before a comprehensive scheme could be set on foot the Armenians must be rendered powerless to resist, and so the first step taken was to deprive them of their arms. Enver Pasha, at the Ministry of War, undertook to deal with the Armenian soldiers. In the very month of February, 1915, he had praised the conduct of the Armenian troops in an interview with the Gregorian Bishop of Konia, and had even allowed the Bishop to communicate his words, fortified with his signature, to the Armenian and the Turkish Press. Yet within a few weeks of this the order came from the War Ministry that all Armenians in the Army were to be disarmed. They were drafted out of the service battalions and re-formed into labour battalions, to work behind the front at throwing up fortifications and building roads. At the same time, under instructions from the Ministry of the Interior, the provincial administrative authorities set about disarming the Armenian civil population. The Armenians had, in fact, possessed themselves individually of a certain number of arms since the year 1908—and this by the permission and even advice of the Young Turks themselves; for in their earlier and better days the Young Turks had been genuinely desirous of restoring individual liberty and creating an equilibrium between the different races of the Empire, and as it was beyond their power to undo Abd-ul-Hamid's work by disarming the Kurds, they attempted to restore the balance by sanctioning the acquisition of arms by the Armenians. The private bearing of arms for personal defence was an established

privilege of the Ottoman Moslem, and the Young Turks were only carrying out their avowed prineiples in extending the privileges as well as the duties of the Moslem to his Christian fellow-citizens. Now, however, this liberal policy was arbitrarily reversed. It was declared that the young Armenians of military age had been taken for the Army in a lesser proportion than the Turks, and that, in the eritieal military situation of the moment, their presence in the interior with arms at their command was a menace to the security of the state. Violent measures were enjoined by the Central Government to meet the alleged emergency. In every town a number of Armenian men, amounting in the larger plaees to as many as four or five hundred, were suddenly arrested and thrown into prison. It was announced by the local governor of whatever place it might be that a certain number of rifles were believed to be in the private possession of the Armenians of the district, and that that number must be delivered into the hands of the authorities by a certain date. If they were not fortheoming, the severest punishment would fall upon the hostages in prison, in the first instance. and, in a secondary degree, upon the Armenian community as a whole.

The Armenians were very unwilling to surrender their arms, for they realized that by doing so they would place themselves entirely in the Government's hands, and they remembered that the massacres of 1908 and 1894–6 had been preceded by a precisely similar demand. But the clergy and the political leaders (especially the leaders of the Dashnaktzoutian Party, who had once worked with the Young Turks in the Ottoman Parliament realized very strongly the importance of avoiding a breach and of giving the Government no pretext for putting the Armenians in the wrong. Generally a meeting of the local Armenian notables was eonvened to decide what action should be taken in view of the Government's decree. One neutral witness (a Danish sister serving with the German Red Cross in a certain Asiatic town) describes how, when the Armenian meeting was unable to arrive at a decision, it was resolved to invite the Turkish notables of the place to hold a joint conference with the Armenians. In this ease the Armenians were indueed to deliver up their weapons by a guarantee, on the part of their Turkish neighbours, that they, personally, would see to it that no harm eame to them through taking this step. Possibly these local Turks were sincere in their undertaking, but, in the instance in question, the Governor had the arms photo-

A CORNER OF THE TOWN OF VAN,
Showing the Castle Rock in the distance.

graphed as soon as they were brought in, and sent the photograph to Constantinople, submitting it as proof of an imminent Armenian rebellion, and asking what action the Government desired him to take. The Government telegraphed back that it gave him a free hand, and there followed in that place a succession of atrocities on the standard pattern that will be set forth in the sequel. In this instance the local governor and the central authorities were obviously in collusion. There were certain cases, it is true, in which the local administrators refused to carry out the atrocious instructions from Constantinople—such honourable officials were promptly relieved of their posts and replaced by more pliant tools—and there were instances of well-intentioned but weak-minded governors who were overborne by the head of the local branch of the Committee of Union and Progress (as at Trebizond) or even by a junior official in their own entourage (as, in a certain degree, at Kharput). But in the majority of cases there was evidently a complete understanding between the central and the local authorities. On the question of policy they saw eye to eye, and an excellent telegraph system kept them very effectively in touch. Apparent disagreements or discrepancies can nearly always be traced to a prudent intention of concealing the origins of the crime and obscuring the ultimate responsibility for it.

The Armenians, as has been said, were unwilling in the first instance to surrender their arms, but, as soon as they had decided to do so, they were painfully anxious to obtain arms to surrender. Even since they received permission to bear arms in 1908, they had not possessed themselves of sufficient to go round,



DINNER IN CAMP.

Refugees preparing a meal. Smaller picture: Carrying dinner to the camp.

FOOD FOR THE REFUGEES.
Carrying bread and stores to the store-house.
Circle picture: Serving out dinner.

and the local authorities were now demanding an arbitrary and excessive total. In many places horrible tortures were inflicted upon the hostages in prison. They were bastinadoed till their feet were reduced to a pulp (the process is described in detail in the deposition of a German missionary); their hair was plucked out; their nails were torn out by the roots. A blacksmith employed by an American college in a certain place was almost beaten to death on the charge of having "constructed a bomb"—the bomb in question was a solid iron shot which he had been forging for the competition of "putting the weight" at the forthcoming college sports. In the same place a real bomb was unearthed by the gendarmerie in the Armenian burial ground; but it was so rusty with age that it obviously dated from the Hamidian *régime* before 1908, when the Young Turks, like the Dashnakists, were themselves outlaws addicted to revolutionary methods. Yet the discovery of this bomb was made a pretext for aggravating the persecution. After experiencing these tortures the victims made frantic efforts to obtain for delivery the number of arms required of them. They bought them from any Armenian friend who was lucky enough to possess a surplus; they even bought them, naturally at exorbitant prices, from their Turkish neighbours, who still retained the privilege of bearing arms and of procuring new ones in place of those they sold to the Armenians at such handsome profit. These Turkish weapons were solemnly handed over to the authorities and photographed by them with the rest. A series of these photographs were collected in an album by the Ottoman Government and published by them as a justification for all the crimes against their Armenian subjects which they previously or subsequently committed. This tragi-comical procedure would be almost incredible, were it not described explicitly by trustworthy American witnesses from more than one locality.

By the beginning of the spring of 1915 this governmental campaign of torture and cajolery had done its work, and the Armenians throughout Turkey were effectively disarmed. The Government could now proceed without uneasiness to the execution of its ulterior scheme,

General view of the camp.

Refugees in camp

Sheiks in camp. Each man controls twenty-five tents.

The Camp Police Force.

IN THE ARMENIAN REFUGEE CAMP AT PORT SAID.

which it had thought out long beforehand, and for which it had already made extensive preparations. The Young Turks proposed to deport all the Armenian communities in the Empire from their homes. The scheme, as we remarked at the outset, was traditional in the Near East, but the Young Turks might not have remembered it had they not been reminded of it by Dr. Rohrbach of Berlin, the Central European expert in the geography of racial ascendancy and racial repression. Dr. Rohrbach had made a special study of Turkey ever since William II. had brought that country within the Prussian purview. In the course of contemplating the ethnological map of the Near East, he had noticed that the Armenians, established on their central plateau and stretching down from it to the Black Sea, on the one hand, at Trebizond, and the Mediterranean, on the other, in Cilicia, somewhat awkwardly severed the Osmanli Turks in the heart of the Anatolian Peninsula from the other Turkish-speaking populations in North-Western Persia and Russian Caucasia. If only this Armenian *barrage* could be displaced, Dr. Rohrbach would be able to make a map in which Germany's Osmanli allies formed a continuous *bloc* with their Turkish kinsmen in Azerbaijan and the basin of the River Aras. These latter were already in contact with still larger Turkish populations in the Russian Empire, stretching away into Central Asia and up the course of the Volga as far as Kazan; while in the other direction the Osmanlis of Anatolia were directly in touch with the Bulgars (a tribe reputed of Tatar origin) and through the Bulgars (if one counted on the forcible extinction of little Slavonic Serbia) with the "Ugro-Finnic" Magyars of Hungary—Germany's direct neighbours and closest allies. This scheme was christened the Pan-Turanian idea, on the theoretical ground that all the races in question spoke non-Indo-European languages of a "Turanian" character which were remotely allied to one another, and ought therefore to cultivate a common sentiment and practise political cooperation. The project was more plausible on the map than in reality, but any movement tending to detach Bulgaria from Russia and attract Russia's Turkish-speaking subjects towards the Ottoman Empire was worth promoting from the German point of view, and Dr. Rohrbach preached it vigorously. He is said to have expounded it first in a confidential lecture, behind closed doors, to high official circles at Berlin, and he treated it afterwards in published articles.

The immensity of the idea appealed to the crude nationalism of the Young Turkish doctrinaires, and its possibilities were seized upon by the Young Turkish politicians. Not the least ingenious part of Dr. Rohrbach's scheme was the provision he intended to make for the Armenians when he had evicted them from their native habitations. He proposed to deport them southward and settle them along the projected course of the Baghdad Railway, where it traverses the vast Mesopotamian steppes and descends to the alluvial lands of Irak. These regions are potentially the richest in the Turkish Empire, but they had lain neglected for a thousand years. The purpose of the Baghdad Railway was to open up their wealth, but the mere laying down of metals cannot revive a country without the cooperation of skilled and industrious hands. If, argued Dr. Rohrbach, the most promising human element in the Ottoman Empire were brought into contact with the most promising land, the Empire would be strengthened economically, the dividends of the German shareholders in the Baghdad Railway would be assured, and a number of delicate political problems would come to a desirable solution—all to the advantage of German World-Power.

This scheme for winnowing out the racial elements of the Near East was doubtless propounded by Dr. Rohrbach in all good faith—there is something characteristically German in the conception—but it took on a very different complexion in the hands of Enver Pasha and Talaat Bey. These Young Turkish militants had learnt from their confederates of the German General Staff the uses of the German professor as a "human screen" for the masking of "Frightfulness." Deportation, they decided, should be the word, and they adopted Dr. Rohrbach's valuable suggestion that the exiled Armenians should be replaced by Moslem refugees from the European provinces lost in the Balkan War of 1912. But they did not trouble themselves with the second chapter of his scheme. Probably they were better acquainted than Dr. Rohrbach with what lay between the exiles and their nominal goal—the rough, interminable mountain-tracks, the gorges of the Euphrates, the waterless stretches of the desert, the temper of the gendarmerie and the Kurds. Once the Armenians were on the road,

the ministries at Constantinople need trouble themselves about them no more; their doom would work itself out without their further intervention, and Enver and Talaat could affect a decent regret that justice had been carried to an excess. "The sad events that have occurred in Armenia," Talaat confided to a sympathetic correspondent of the *Berliner Tageblatt*, a year after the deportations had been put in train, "have prevented my sleeping well at night. We have been reproached for making no distinction between the innocent Armenians and the guilty; but that was utterly impossible, considering that those who were innocent to-day might be guilty to-morrow." The ringleaders at Constantinople took full advantage of the cover afforded by Dr. Rohrbach's ingenuity, but their subordinates in the provinces were less discreet. "If you deport the Armenians under these conditions," protested an American resident in Turkey to a local governor, "they will none of them reach their destination." "What do you imagine we are deporting them for?" the official bluntly replied.

THE KHAN OF KOTCHELI,
Who was reported to be connected with the massacres around Lake Urmia.

So the process of extermination was methodically put in train, and as soon as the disarming was over the deportation began. An atmosphere of horror, which breathes through all the eye-witnesses' accounts, had settled down over the provinces of the Empire. A ferocious censorship suspended communication with the outer world, not so much by excision as by terrorism, for the remotest allusion to political or military events was visited with arrest and imprisonment upon the writer, and even upon the recipient, of the letter. Constantinople was isolated from the provinces, and the provinces from each other. No Armenian might travel, or send a letter, or telegraph across the provincial boundaries. The foreboding aroused by the calling in of arms was increased by the continued retention of the hostages in prison after the arms had been delivered up. These hostages were not, for the most part, the young men who were alleged to be a danger to the State—the majority of these young men were already in the labour battalions. They were the elderly men—merchants, ecclesiastics and professors—and the Armenians realized that they had been deprived of their leaders at the moment of national crisis. Meanwhile, the Government's dispositions were swiftly and secretly going forward. The Moslem refugees from Europe—or Mouhadjirs, as they are called in Turkish—who had been stranded for the past two years on the western fringes of the Empire, along the Ægean and Marmora coasts, were collected and dispatched by the railway towards the east; the gendarmerie was reinforced by bad characters and by discredited men whose zeal was to retrieve their reputation—and this not only in the lower but in the higher ranks, for the chief director of the deportation at Adapazar, which was carried out with peculiar brutality, was a probationer of this class; and irregular bands of "chettis"—partly recruited from criminals released from prison and partly from outlaws at large, with whom the Government made its truce in return for their collaboration in its crimes—were commissioned to assist the gendarmerie in its task. By April all was ready, and the first convoy of exiles was led away, on April 8, from the town of Zeitoun.

Zeitoun was a mountain-community in Cilicia, which had valiantly maintained its autonomy under Ottoman overlordship since the fall of the last Armenian principality in 1375. During the massacres of 1894–6, Zeitoun had been besieged by a Turkish army, and its extermination was part of Abd-ul-Hamid's plan. But it resisted stoutly for six months, and finally made terms with the Government on the mediation of the Powers, retaining the

THE RUSSIANS IN ARMENIA.

A Cossack Camp on the plateau of Kargabazar.

ancient charter of liberties which exempted it from receiving a Turkish garrison and from furnishing a contingent of its own to the Turkish Army. Zeitoun stands in an almost impregnable position among the hills, and as soon as they heard the news of the calling in of arms, the Zeitounlis put themselves in posture of defence; but they did not act upon their first impulse. The Ottoman authorities intimated to them, through the Gregorian Katholikos of Cilicia, that, if they resisted, reprisals would be made upon their defenceless kinsmen in the plain; while, if they accepted a garrison and surrendered their arms, both they and the plainsmen would be left in peace. And the elders of Zeitoun themselves, like the Armenian leaders throughout the Empire, were determined to go almost any lengths in order to keep the peace. So the terms were accepted, and the Turkish troops began to arrive.

The soldiers were given good quarters and a friendly reception, and no provocation succeeded in deflecting the Armenian leaders from their policy. There was a ferocious search for arms, in which the bastinado was applied with shocking cruelty; Haidar Pasha, the Governor of Marash, arrived on the scene and went off again with a batch of Armenian notables under

arrest; Fakhri Pasha, with three German officers in his tram, came up from Aleppo to inspect proceedings; the young men of Zeitoun, in spite of their clear privilege, were rigorously conscribed and drafted away. At last 25 of these conscripts (25 young men out of 15,000 Armenians in Zeitoun and the surrounding villages) were stung into that resistance which the Turks intended to provoke. They deserted and entrenched themselves in a neighbouring monastery; the Turkish troops in Zeitoun—who now amounted to about 5,000 men, with artillery—attacked the position; they were repulsed with loss, and the recalcitrants decamped in the night. This was on April 7, and the next day, April 8, the first wholesale deportation was carried into effect. The Zeitounlis were marched away towards the south; the Mouhadjirs concentrated in readiness were hurried into their place; and the name of Zeitoun was changed to Suleimanlu. The exiles from Zeitoun were seen by many witnesses along the course of their route. There was a Swiss-teacher in a town on the Cilician plain, who saw company after company of them pass through. Even at this stage they were in a miserable condition—ragged and hungry (for they had had no time to prepare food or clothing for the journey), and exhausted by their descent from the mountains on foot. Old men and women were falling by the wayside; there were children almost naked and shivering with the cold; the gendarmes were driving them along under the lash; the Moslem population was apathetic, and made no attempt to mitigate their lot, and the local Armenians were hindered from doing so by the malevolence of the authorities. From the Cilician plain they were forwarded along the Baghdad Railway in either direction. Half of them were sent north-westward across Taurus to a desolate place called Sultania, in the heart of the great central salt desert of Anatolia. They arrived there destitute—with no food or shelter, and no able-bodied men in their company to remedy the situation by their labour and wits; many of them were the families of men taken for the Army, who had a claim on the Government for support; but the Government not only omitted to house and feed and clothe them, but actually prohibited any relief from being sent them by the Armenian community in the Konia Province.

ERZERUM.
Armenian traders.

ERZERUM.
Set on fire by the retreating Turks.

Worn out as they were, and transferred with such abruptness from their own temperate mountains to an unaccustomed and unhealthy climate, they died off in dozens every day. Later, more adequate provision was made for them on the representations of an Albanian officer appointed to the district, who was revolted by what he found, and finally they were all driven back again along the same weary road to join their fellow-townsmen in the deserts of the south-east. These other Zeitounli convoys, who had been sent from the beginning in a south-easterly direction, began to pass through Aleppo on April 19, and were forwarded from there to Der-el-Zor, the capital of a province down the course of the Euphrates, six days' journey by carriage from Aleppo itself.

This last and most dreadful stage in the Zeitounlis' journey has been described, in a German missionary journal, by Schwester Möhring, a German missionary, who, in the spring of 1915, was traversing this road in the opposite direction on her way to Aleppo from Baghdad. She first encountered the exiles at Der-el-Zor itself; the town was crowded with them, and they were lying about in the open, or dragging themselves along in the vain search for some untenanted patch of shade to shelter them from the intolerable heat. Between Der-el-Zor and Aleppo she met one convoy after another on the march. The track ran across a rocky, barren plateau, scored with ravines and reflecting the heat from every angle. The exiles were parched with thirst, and the Euphrates, winding away in a muddy ribbon several miles to their left, was too distant to afford them drink. One old man seized on an empty bottle dropped by one of Schwester Möhring's party at the midday meal, ran to fill it with tepid, discoloured water, and returned with tears in his eyes to thank them for the gift. This was the Young Turks' version of Dr. Rohrbach's project for colonizing the neighbourhood of the Baghdad Railway. Sultania was officially styled an "agricultural colony"; in reality, both Sultania and Der-el-Zor were vast mortuaries, where those who reached them alive were to die by sure degrees and leave their bones. The Zeitounlis whom Schwester Möhring saw had already been many weeks on this road to death, and they were only the vanguard of the vast procession that flowed towards Der-el-Zor from the north and north-west during the ensuing months of the year 1915.

The deportation of Zeitoun was followed at once by the deportation, without exception, of the surrounding mountain towns and villages:

but the process in Cilicia was in general distinctly milder than the methods practised in the provinces of the north and north-east, which must shortly be described. In these civilized Cilician highlands, Christian and Moslem lived together on friendly terms, and the orders sprung upon them by the authorities caused almost equal consternation to them both. An American lady, who was present in one of these hill-towns throughout the proceedings, describes how a Kurdish chief, who was in the habit of coming into town at intervals for market, wept when he heard that his best Armenian friend was to be

IN AN ARMENIAN TRENCH AT VAN.

deported, and declared that he would never again visit a place where such wickedness was done. The principal Moslem ecclesiastic of the town undertook to look after the property and interests of the leading Armenian Protestant during his absence (for the authorities always maintained the fiction that the deportation was only temporary, and that the exiles would return); the Moslem inhabitants of two neighbouring villages defied the gendarmes, and would not let their Armenian neighbours go, only yielding to pressure after they had shielded them for three months. In these mountain districts the Government's decree fell upon all alike as an inexplicable act of wickedness, a ruinous calamity; in the big towns of the Cilician plain, the fanatics of the Union and Progress Committee who were urging the Government to begin an outright massacre were still opposed by the respectable section of the Moslem community who wished to live with their Armenian fellow-citizens in peace and goodwill. But before the month of April was out, events had occurred on the north-eastern frontier which changed the situation immeasurably for the worse and accelerated the progress of the crime through the length and breadth of the Ottoman Empire.

It has been mentioned that, next to Cilicia, the principal centre of the Armenian population in Turkey was the province of Van. The city of Van itself, which is the capital of the province, and lies close to the eastern shore of the great inland lake of the same name, is full of the memories of Armenian history. Its striking citadel-rock, which rises abruptly from the plain, is carved with the cuneiform inscriptions of the Urartu (Ararat) kings, who ruled there before the Armenian language was spoken in the land, and fought on equal terms with the Assyrians. In the Middle Ages Van was the seat of independent Armenian princes, and battlemented medieval walls crown the citadel's summit, while the "Walled City" clings close to the foot of the rock. This "Walled City"—a maze of tall, huddled houses with blank walls facing the street, and narrow tortuous alleys and bazaars—is still the business quarter of Van, where Christian and Moslem, Armenian and Turk and Kurd, swarm and jostle and make their bargains; but in the course of the nineteenth century, when Sultan Mahmud had chastized the Kurds and Sultan Abd-ul-Hamid had not yet undone his work, the city spread out eastwards into the open plain. New residential quarters—some Turkish, some Armenian, and some tenanted by both nationalities—grew up along the high roads leading out of the town, scattered groups of houses set in spacious gardens, well watered and planted with trees. This was the "Garden City," or the "Vineyards" (Aikesdan), as it was called by the Armenians themselves, and every morning the Turkish and Armenian businessmen of Van came, riding or on foot, from their suburban houses and passed through the battlemented gate of the "Walled City," to do their work beneath the shadow of the citadel, and passed out again every evening to their garden homes. They were a peaceful, prosperous community; the only jarring features were the



RUSSIAN TROOPS ADVANCING IN THE CAUCASUS.

Ottoman guns on the citadel and the Ottoman barracks in the plain—solid buildings planted on several eminences on the outskirts of the Garden City, and holding it under their command. In the midst of the Armenian quarters in the Gardens stood the buildings of the American Protestant Mission, with their staff of American missionaries, doctors, teachers and their families who worked among the Armenians and were likewise on friendly terms with the Government authorities. These missionaries were present at Van through all the terrible events of 1915. They endured the siege, they fell victims to the typhus, and the survivors took part in the awful retreat. The narrative of one of them, Miss Grace Higley Knapp, which was published by her in the United States before the end of the year, and is practically a reprint of private letters written by her from Van at the time, is our chief, and completely trustworthy, source of information for the events that occurred.

In Van, as a border district, the tension was greater from the beginning than in Cilicia or the regions farther west. The province was placed in a state of siege from the moment Germany declared war on Russia in August, 1914, and when, two months later, Turkey intervened in the war herself, the registration of conscripts and the requisitioning of supplies were conducted here with special strictness. Yet here, as in other places, the Armenians

THE RUSSIANS ATTACKING THE TURKISH ARMIES AT ERZERUM.

did everything to maintain good relations with their Moslem neighbours; and the authorities, on their part, at first adopted a conciliatory attitude towards the local Dashnaktzoutian leaders (several of whom were members of the Ottoman Parliament), consulting them about the maintenance of public order, and making them their intermediaries in their dealings with the Armenian community. At the end of December, 1914, the Ottoman forces concentrated at Van began to move across the frontier into the Persian Province of Azerbaijan, which had been under Russian military occupation since the disorders consequent upon the Persian Revolution of 1906. The western part of Azerbaijan consists of the basin of Lake Urmia, a region of the same physiographical character as the basin of Van; and the country between Lake Urmia and the frontier is inhabited by the Nestorians, an ancient Christian nationality who differ in language and doctrine from the Armenians, but have always been their neighbours and have suffered the same vicissitudes of fate. The Urmia district was invaded by the Ottoman forces at two points. The Governor of Van himself—a brother-in-law of Enver Pasha, Djevdet Bey by name, whose father had been Governor before him—advanced upon Salmas at the north-western end of the lake, and Halil Bey, also a connexion of the same family, descended upon the town of Urmia farther south. The Russians had only left weak forces in Azerbaijan, and had concentrated their main strength in the decisive theatre of operations to the north-west; they retreated rapidly as the Turks advanced, Salmas and Urmia fell into the invaders' hands, and, sweeping round the southern end of the lake, they momentarily occupied Tabriz.*

The treatment of the Nestorians by the invading soldiery was of bad augury for their Armenian fellow Christians of Van, on the other side of the frontier. Many thousands of them, foreboding what was to come, had fled northwards in the wake of the retiring Russian army, making for Djoulfa, on the Russo-Persian frontier. It was an awful pilgrimage—seven days' struggle through morasses of mud, in bitter cold; children separated from their parents, old men and women dying by the way, and babies being born; every hovel crammed with refugees in the villages along the route, and those who could find no shelter lying outside without covering in the frozen slush. Yet these suffered less than those who had not the heart to go, for Djevdet and Halil, as they advanced, had raised the Kurdish tribes of the hills, who hated the Christian plainsmen and longed for plunder. Some Nestorian villages were overwhelmed before the people had time to flee, the men massacred, the women carried off; the remainder crowded for refuge within the walls of Urmia town. At Urmia there was a medical mission station of the American Presbyterian Church—a little colony of American men, women and children, perhaps a score in all, who in this crisis performed one of the most heroic achievements of the war. The town of Urmia is a conglomeration of yards or compounds, set wall to wall, and communicating separately with the street. The Americans immediately hired about 20 compounds adjoining theirs, broke passages through the party-walls, blocked up their street entrances, and left no way in or out of their enlarged domain except the single gateway into their original compound, above which floated the Stars and Stripes. No less than 17,000 refugees poured into this asylum, and the Americans at once undertook their keep, making contracts with the Moslem bakers of the town, and buying, transporting and distributing half a ton of bread a day. They paid the cost out of the money left in their keeping by the richer Nestorians who had fled, which they had accepted only on the understanding that they might borrow it for this purpose, and they trusted to the generosity of their countrymen in America to refund the loan. When these funds ran low, the bakers, who were hostile to the Christians and feared that, if the Russians returned, any debts outstanding to them would not be repaid, refused to deliver on credit, but the Americans took steps to organize another supply, and cajoled the bakers into a compromise.

The conditions in the crowded compounds were indescribable. Every cranny of the church, the school-rooms and the adjoining houses was choked with human beings, and one woman, who had been sitting for days at a school-room desk, leaning her baby against a post, declared that hers, by comparison, was "a very good place." The missionaries performed miracles in keeping the water supply undefiled and taking such sanitary measures as were possible, but many were sick before

* See Vol. III., Chapter LI.

they arrived, an epidemic of typhus broke out, and several dozen dead were carried out every day, the death-rate increasing with every added week of congestion; while such terror reigned beyond the mission walls that all preferred to face the plague within rather than the Turks and Kurds without. The Americans succumbed to the typhus one by one—there is a two-months gap in the diary of the lady who has recorded these extraordinary events, during which she sickened and recovered from the disease. The Nestorian teachers and Bible-women who nursed them went down with it, the native doctors went down, and the men they had taught to organize the sanitation and the distribution of bread—but still they carried on. They kept on good terms with the Persian civil governor (who, indeed, was as impotent under the Turkish as under the Russian administration), with the Turkish military command, and with the Kurdish chiefs, who were licensed by the Turks to do much as they pleased. Various alarming incidents were tided over, and all this time they held Praise Meetings and Communion Services, married those who were to be married, and said the proper offices over the dead. Engulfed as they were among their panic-stricken and nerveless *protégés*, their courage never gave way, and after 20 weeks of this unparalleled stress, during which their own tiny band was thinned as grievously by the typhus as if they had been on duty in the fire-zone at the front, they brought out the majority of the refugees alive. Meanwhile, the compounds at Urmia were cut off entirely from news of the outer world, but, though they did not know it, the tide had already turned. The battles of Ardahan and Sarikamish were decisive for the whole Russo-Turkish front. Before January, 1915, was out, the Russians had re-entered Tabriz, had driven Djevdet Bey out of Salmas, and were pressing once more upon the northern and eastern frontiers of Van.

The Armenians of Van were relieved to hear of their Governor's approaching return, for the heavy fighting beyond the frontier had reacted on the internal situation in a sinister way. Half elated by hope and half exasperated by suspense, the Moslem population had been showing a dangerous temper towards their Armenian neighbours, especially in the outlying districts, and the Vice-Governor had flouted the Dashnaktzoutian leaders when they proffered him advice. Djevdet, on the other hand, had written them complimentary letters announcing his victories and declaring his appreciation of the Dashnakists' service in keeping the peace at home. Everyone hoped that he would heal the breach; but his last deed before evacuating Salmas was the massacre of all the Armenian



THE ANCIENT MONASTERY OF VOSTAN.

Showing Lake Van in distance.

ARMENIANS AT THE TURCO-PERSIAN FRONTIER.

and Nestorian males in the place and a design against the women which was only frustrated by the prompt arrival of the Russian troops. He had been turned savage by his military discomfiture, and now vented his rage upon the Armenians under his rule. As far as it is possible to fix the guilt of what followed upon one man, the blood of the Armenians is upon Djevdet's head. Soon after his return to Van, there was a serious Moslem outbreak in the Shadakh district, towards the south of the Province, and Djevdet requested Ishkhan, one of the Dashnakist leaders in the city of Van, to go and mediate between the parties. Ishkhan consented, trusting to the Governor's former good will; but he was murdered with his companions on his journey through the mountains, almost avowedly at Djevdet's instigation. About the same time the gendarmerie massacred the young men of an outlying village where they had been sent to gather in the arms, and the young men of another village, hearing the news, fell upon another gendarmerie patrol that came up against them. A fanatical Moslem rabble set out from Bitlis, the capital of the next province, and marched on Van along the southern shore of the lake, and the Armenians of the city met them in a narrow place and drove them back. Meanwhile, the American missionaries, at the Armenians' desire, approached Djevdet and attempted to bring him to reason, but they found him impossible to deal with. The Russians were pushing on, and Djevdet's nerves were on edge. He could only bluster that he would first reduce Shadakh to obedience and then deal chastisement to Van. The first symptom of rebellion would be his signal, and he would leave not one Armenian house in Van standing, except the house where his father the Governor had lived. The Armenians found that he was drawing a cordon round the Garden City, and dominating it by military works; a council of notables was held, and it was resolved to place themselves in readiness for the worst that might occur. On April 20, 1915, the catastrophe came. At six o'clock in the morning some Armenian peasant women on their way into town were molested by a picket of Turkish soldiers; two young Armenians intervened, and were shot by the Turks; at the first sound of firing Djevdet loosed his artillery upon the Garden City, and the fighting had begun. There were about thirty thousand Armenians in the besieged area, two or three thousand of whom were armed fighting men. This community had to be defended, provisioned and administered in one moment, but the Armenians displayed remarkable powers of emergency organization. A provisional government was appointed, with committees of defence, supplies and relief. A line of loopholed houses, barricades and

trenches was made and held, and the defenders were assigned to the different sectors or to the central reserve. The population was furnished with bread-tickets and put on rations, and provision was made for the refugees who were allowed by Djevdet to flock in from the villages in the hope that they would hasten the starving-out of the town. Rifle ammunition was turned out in considerable quantities, and, under the direction of an Armenian professor, they actually constructed three cannon. Hospitals, doctors and orderlies were found for the Red Cross, and they organized a brass band, which always betook itself to the hottest part of the firing line and overtopped the noise of the artillery with its playing of the "Marseillaise" and Armenian national airs, to the rage of the Turco-German artillerymen—for there were German officers directing the fire of the Turkish guns; they were seen by Mr. Yarrow, one of the missionaries of the American station.

The American mission-station was in the heart of the besieged quarter, and Djevdet Bey, some days before he launched his attack, had proposed to instal there a guard of fifty Turkish soldiers. Their presence would, of course, have paralysed the defence, and the Armenians declared that they would oppose their entrance, but the Americans had managed to dissuade Djevdet from his purpose, and, when the siege began, they maintained their neutrality scrupulously throughout. They even refrained from doing Red Cross work for the Armenian wounded, and devoted themselves to the relief of the civil population, working at it night and day, for this task alone was almost beyond coping with. The fire of the assailants was on the whole ineffective. The Turco-German artillery had no Armenian guns to oppose it, and poured a rain of shells upon the Armenian quarter in the "Walled City" at the foot of the Castle Rock, upon the Garden City lines, and finally upon the American buildings themselves, in defiance of the American flag. But the shells produced little effect on the massive walls of sun-dried brick into which they sank. It seemed impossible, however, that the improvised defence should hold out much longer, when suddenly, in the second week of May, a flotilla of sailing-vessels was seen bearing away from the eastern shore of the Lake. The Turkish population was in retreat, and soon it was announced that one of the barracks in the plain had been evacuated; the Armenians sallied out from their lines and set it on fire. Indeed, deliverance was close at hand, for, on the news of the siege, a Russian relief column, headed by a strong contingent of Russian-Armenian volunteers, had started to march on Van by way of Bayazid. It was the knowledge of their coming that had roused Djevdet to deliver his last and most furious cannonade, but while the Turkish townspeople had been fleeing across the Lake, Djevdet had been withdrawing his troops southward over the hills, and on May 21, 1915, thirty-one days after the beginning of the siege, the Russo-Armenian forces entered Van unopposed, while four days later another Russian column entered Urmia, and liberated the Nestorian refugees. The Russian general confirmed the Armenian provisional government at Van in office, with Aram the Dashnakist as civil governor. The defence of the Garden City had been a brilliant success, and Djevdet's criminal outbreak had met its just reward. But the consequences of this armed collision between Armenian and Turk, unprovoked though it had been on the Armenians' part, were visited upon the whole Armenian population of the Ottoman Empire by the Young Turkish Government with unparalleled ferocity.

This general extermination of the Armenian people was carried through in different fashion in the different regions. From Van southward and south-west, the country threatened by the immediate Russian advance was cleared of its Christian population by outright massacre on the spot. In the region north-west of Van, extending to the Black Sea, which was close to the battlefields of Ardahan and Sarikamish, but where the Russians were not yet across the frontier, the method of deportation was nominally employed, but the exiles were murdered wholesale at the first convenient spot on their road. And, lastly, the Armenian population in the west of Anatolia, and in the immediate neighbourhood of Constantinople, was genuinely deported by rail along the Anatolian and Baghdad lines. It will be best to deal with these three regions separately, in succession.

Djevdet Bey began the south-eastern massacres on his retreat. Passing southwards from Van into the Bohtan valley, he joined forces with Halil, who was likewise retreating from Urmia, and fell upon the Armenians of Sairt, near the confluence of the Bohtan and the

Serving out blankets.

The flag that attracted the French Fleet and saved the Armenians.

Red Cross stores at the camp.

THE ARMENIAN REFUGEE CAMP AT PORT SAID.

COSSACKS ADVANCING

Tigris. This was before the end of May, and Djevdet hastened on to Bitlis, the capital of the next province to his own, occupied it before the Russians could reach it from Van, and massacred the Armenians here also on June 25. From Bitlis he descended upon the plain of Moush. Moush lies north of Bitlis—a depression in the heart of the Armenian plateau, walled off from Lake Van by the Nimrud Dagh volcano, and draining away into the valley of the Eastern (Murad) Euphrates. The town of Moush is surrounded by a girdle of lowland villages, inhabited by a peaceful, defenceless Armenian peasantry, and there was here much work for Djevdet Bey to do. How he did it is described by a German missionary in charge of an Armenian orphanage, who was present at Moush during all that occurred. The people were told that they were going to be deported *en masse*, and were given several days to register themselves at the Government Building; but before the days were out Djevdet's artillery opened fire upon the town, and his soldiery was let loose upon the villages of the plain. In the first week of July 20,000 reinforcements reached Djevdet from Kharput, and, after desperate street fighting, Moush was taken by storm. Roupen of Sassoun, an Armenian leader from a neighbouring part of the Bitlis province who subsequently escaped to the Russian lines, narrates that the non-combatant population of Moush (the men had received no quarter) were removed to concentration camps prepared in the hills, and there the women were burnt alive, while the soldiers threw their babies after them into the flames, calling out mockingly: "Here are your lions!" It is added that soldiers subsequently taken prisoner by the Russians confessed to their presence at these scenes, and declared themselves haunted by the impression of horror and the smell of the burning flesh. The fate of the villages was different. We know it from the narrative of a woman who staggered, with her baby, into the town of Tehemesh-Getzak in the Dersim country, on the northern side of the Eastern Euphrates. When the men had been killed, the Turks rounded up the village women and children, and drove them north-west. They came to the Eastern Euphrates and were joined by the exiles from a dozen other villages on the farther bank. Then they proceeded westwards along the bank of the river. One day, on the march, they were about to rest and break their fast when suddenly they saw the Kurds descending upon them from the hills, and the next thing the woman knew she was in the water with her baby in her arms, while her companions were drowning round her or being picked off by the bullets of the Kurds. She was a strong swimmer, and she managed to gain the opposite bank with her baby and escape. Her story

THROUGH THE SNOW.

was taken down by the man at Tchemesh-Getzak who sheltered her from her pursuers; but the baby died of exhaustion, and she herself was hunted down and killed.

The fresh troops that had made an end of Moush were now hurried southward to clear the district of Sassoun—the mountain block that lies between the plain of Moush and the valley of the Tigris at Diarbekr. Sassoun was a free federation of forty Armenian mountain villages, which, like Zeitoun in Cilicia, had preserved their autonomy from time immemorial, and led the same self-sufficient, cantonal life that the Scottish Highlanders led before 1745, laboriously terracing their mountain slopes and pasturing their sheep and goats among the rocks. Sassoun, in its independence and prosperity, was an eyesore to the Young Turkish nationalists as well as to the local Kurdish tribes. The Sassounlis had been attacked and massacred by Abd-ul-Hamid's orders in 1894-5, and in the spring of 1915, at the Young Turks' instigation, their Kurdish neighbours assaulted them again. The outlying villages in the lowlands towards Diarbekr were overrun in the latter part of May, but their inhabitants made good their escape into the hills, and the hillmen held their ground. During the whole of June the Kurds failed to make any impression against them, even when Ottoman cavalry came to their aid. But now the infantry and guns arrived from Moush; most of the Sassounli leaders, with the exception of Roupen, were killed by the explosion of a single shell, and the fighting men retired higher and higher into the mountains, covering the retreat of the non-combatants and the flocks. By the beginning of August they were surrounded in their last stronghold, the heights of Antok in the north-eastern extremity of Sassoun, almost overhanging the plain of Moush, and here, on August 5, they made their final stand. Men, women and children fought with desperation, rolling down boulders upon the Turks and Kurds, grappling with them hand to hand, and throwing themselves over the precipice when they could hold them back no more. But the enemy gained the summit, and Roupen himself was practically the only survivor who escaped to tell the fate of Bitlis, Moush and Sassoun. South-eastward of Van, again, in the Hakkiari district round the head-waters of the Greater Zab, there were a number of little Nestorian tribes who had preserved their independence, like the Armenians of Sassoun, against the surrounding Kurds. These, too, were attacked in June, and some of them were annihilated, while others fought their way out across the Persian frontier, reached the advancing Russian lines, and took refuge, in a destitute condition, with their hardly less sorely stricken brethren in the Salmas district.

But the crowning blow was the Turkish re-

occupation of Van. By the end of July the Turkish reinforcements had mounted up to 40,000 men; they took the offensive along the southern shore of the lake, and on the last day of the month the Russian commander decided to evacuate the city. It was a cruel end to the ten weeks of national self-government that the Armenians of Van had enjoyed. The whole civil population retreated with the troops, and there are terrible descriptions of their flight, both from the American missionaries who took part in it and from the Russian Armenians of the Caucasus, who came to receive the refugees at the frontier. This journey over the bare mountains in the heat of summer was as intolerable as the Nestorians' winter journey had been from Urmia to Djoulfa. They were spurred on by the fear of being intercepted by the enemy, and though the Cossacks and the Volunteers fought heroic rearguard actions to win them time, the straggling end of the procession was cut off by the Kurds in a mountain defile beyond the north-eastern corner of the lake. Agonizing incidents were witnessed by those on the road—a mother laying down her dead child by the wayside and hurrying on; another mother shaking off a child who could walk no farther and was clinging to her skirts, because she had already two smaller children in her arms, and could carry no more; a man gazing silently at a broken-down cart, overloaded with his household goods and with his wife and children, who were too weak to walk—knowing that the cart would carry them no farther, and that to tarry was death. The little children were the most pitiable of all. Many of them had become separated from their parents at the start, and most of these had perished early on the road; but others were lying exhausted in the mountains, and parties of horsemen went out from Igdir, the first village in Russian territory, to bring them in. A witness describes the unbearable poignancy of an improvised orphanage in the town of Etchmiadzin—a great room with hundreds of babies, naked, hungry and motherless, lying on the bare floor, and the sound of faint wailing filling his ears. But these orphanages in Caucasia were happier places than the so-called orphanages instituted by the Ottoman Government, which must be described later on.

The people of Van did right to choose the horrors of flight, for when the Turkish troops re-entered the city they massacred all the people that remained and burnt the houses to the ground, resolved that Van should lie as desolate as Bitlis, Moush and Sassoun. And they succeeded in their purpose. The Russians drove them out again before the end of the same month, and the Grand Duke's great advance in the late winter of 1915–16 carried the front forward to Bitlis and well away to the south-west; but the ruin was so complete that the work of repatriation proceeded very slowly.

While massacre undisguised was being perpetrated in the south-east, massacre under the cloak of deportation had been organized in scores of Armenian towns and villages towards the north. The detailed evidence from the different centres would cover several hundred printed pages, for there were neutral witnesses at almost every centre of importance who wrote accounts of the events at which they were present. But it is possible to give a general outline of the process, because it proceeded on a common plan, drawn up by the Young Turkish Government at Constantinople and carried out simultaneously, under their directions, by the local authorities, with unimportant, though often hideous, variations.

The process generally began, in whatever centre it might be, with a sudden summons to all male Armenians still at large to present themselves at the Government Building by a given hour. Sometimes the summons was conveyed by an official proclamation affixed to the walls, announcing the scheme of deportation and the Government's alleged reasons for ordering it, with assurances to the victims of the Government's benevolent intentions in their regard; sometimes the town-crier proclaimed it in the streets; sometimes the summons was by bugle-call. When the men were collected, they were straightway marched out of the town. They had had no opportunity to make preparations for the journey, to wind up their affairs or to bid farewell to their families, and they were butchered at the first lonely place on the road. The men of Kerasond were butchered, like the villagers of Moush, by being thrown into a stream at the midday halt and shot down in the water. At Trebizond they drove them on board sailing-vessels in batches—not only the men, in this case, but the women and children, by anticipation, as well—took them out into the Black Sea, cast them overboard, and clubbed or shot them as they drowned. At Angora, the



OUTSIDE A CHURCH IN ARMENIA.

Armenians, with their priest, who fled to their place of worship for refuge.

Moslem butchers and leather-workers were sent out in advance, with their axes and knives, to the village of Asi Yozgad on the eastern road, and hewed their Armenian fellow-townsmen in pieces by batches, as they arrived, the authorities here declaring themselves unwilling to waste rifle-ammunition on Armenian carcases. Near Angora, Marsovan, and other places, long, newly-filled trenches were pointed out to neutral travellers as the sepulchres of the Armenians disposed of in this way. When the men who were at large

had been thus expeditiously slaughtered, the men who had been in prison, now many months, since the time of the inquisition for arms, were led out in batches and dealt with in the same fashion, though more at leisure than the rest.

An insignificant number of skilled artisans were spared, with whose work the Government could not dispense. There were cases of this at Kharput and Erzerum ; but at Erzerum, at any rate, these exempted individuals were taken out and slaughtered with their families, as soon as the task on which they were engaged was completed, and while the civil authorities, under the direction of the Ministry of the Interior, were doing their part in this extermination, the Ministry of War was effecting the slaughter of the unarmed Armenian conscripts in the labour battalions behind the front. These defenceless Armenian servants of the Government were massacred *en masse*. One of their Turkish comrades testified to having been on fatigue duty, burying his Armenian comrades whom he had first worked with, and then shot down, by order of his military superiors, and two Danish hospital nurses, who had been dismissed from the service of the German Red Cross at Erzindjan for assisting the Armenian exiles, and were on their way from Erzindjan to Sivas, actually witnessed two such scenes of slaughter.

When the men had been disposed of in these various ways, it was the women's turn. In some places, as at Kerasond and Trebizond, they were marched off and drowned or cut down, like their sons and husbands and brothers; but the usual procedure was to offer them a choice—between conversion to Islam or deportation, and conversion was not the easy alternative it might seem. It could only be ratified by immediate entrance into a Moslem man's harem, and by the surrender of any children the woman might have had by her former, and now murdered, Armenian husband, to be brought up in a " Government orphanage " in the Mohammedan Faith. No such institutions had previously been known in the Ottoman Empire, and no one now knew what devilry might be cloaked under this new device. At Trebizond there was an attempt to set up an unofficial orphanage under the joint presidency of the Governor and the Greek Archbishop, but that was frustrated by the local Committee of Union and Progress. In some cases the children were abandoned to the Dervishes, communities of orgiastic religious votaries who lead a semi-monastic life, and there is a description of the

RUSSIAN SHARPSHOOTERS
In the Armenian mountain-peaks.

A CARAVAN OF ARMENIANS.
A party of refugees, consisting of 37 families, was murdered on this spot.

Armenian boys shrieking with terror as they were handed over to their wild guardians. The fate of some orphans was more terrible still. There was another Danish nurse in a different locality (we have quoted her testimony on another point above), who was invited by the local Governor to inspect his new "Orphanage" after the adult Armenians of his district had been deported. The Danish lady found about seven hundred Armenian children in a good building, apparently with plenty to eat and with an adequate staff of Armenian women in attendance. She went away reassured, but when she came back, a few days later, she found the orphans gone. There was a lake by the roadside, six hours' journey from the town, and they had been taken thither and drowned by night. Subsequently three hundred more children were collected in the "Orphanage," and their fate, the Danish lady believed, was the same.

These were the implications, for an Armenian widow and mother in 1915, of conversion to Islam, and this alternative of conversion was rendered more cruel still by the extreme latitude which, on questions of religion, was allowed to the local authorities' caprice. In most places no male converts were accepted; in others, they might apostatise, with their families, on payment of enormous bribes; in one centre converts were not admitted in batches of less than a hundred at a time, but in another town, where the authorities had freely encouraged conversion to fill their own pockets, and many had availed themselves of this supposed avenue of escape, it was subsequently decreed that converts should be deported like the rest. In this town, when the day for deportation came, women were seen cursing the Governor in the streets for having made them sell their souls in vain, and gabbling the Moslem prayers they had learnt to prove their claim to the privileges of Islam. There was the same shifty dealing in the case of the Catholic and Protestant Armenian communities. These were closely connected with foreign nations friendly or even allied to Turkey; the Austro-Hungarian and American Ambassadors made special representations at Constantinople on their behalf, and the Central Government published an injunction exempting them from the doom of their Gregorian kinsmen. There were cases, certainly, where this edict took effect. The Catholics, for instance, from the village of Istanos, near Angora, were sent back to their homes after they had started on their exile, and it is said that the Catholics of Angora itself were overtaken by a horseman with a reprieve, when they were on the point of being hewn in pieces at Asi Yozgad. But these latter, at any rate, were merely sent on into exile instead—the substitution of a

RESCUED ARMENIAN CHILDREN AT ALEXANDRIA.

lingering for a violent death—and in one Anatolian town, though the local American residents telegraphed to the Ministry at Constantinople on behalf of their Protestant Armenian clients, and received a telegram in answer confirming their reprieve, the local authorities stated that they had been given no official instructions to this effect, and deported the Protestants all the same—another instance of that collusion between the Central Government and their provincial subordinates by which they hoped to exterminate the Armenian nation without abandoning their affectation of decency towards the outer world. Thus, to be a Protestant or a Catholic or a convert to Islam was little protection to any Armenian in actual fact, and the second alternative of deportation was sooner or later imposed upon the vast majority.

The deportation of the women, in fact, was designed by the framers of the scheme as the complementary stage to the massacre of the men, and it was heralded, like the latter, by a further posting of placards or another proclamation by the town-crier in the streets. It was announced that all the remaining Armenians in each centre—the women, that is, and such sick men, old men and male children as had been passed over till now—were to start on a certain day for Der-el-Zor or Damascus or Mosul or some other place hundreds of miles and many weeks' journey away, at the opposite end of the Ottoman Empire. It was an appalling prospect, but the victims were given little time for anticipation. Sometimes they were driven straight out of their houses on to the road; at the village of Geben, in Cilicia, they were driven from the fountain where they were washing their clothes and had to march away without returning home to fetch their children or prepare themselves for the journey; but usually they were given a period of grace for preparation—occasionally a fortnight, but more often a week—and these days were among the most heart-breaking of all. They had to equip themselves with clothes and provisions, and with ready money to renew their supply, but the authorities placed an embargo on the realization of their possessions. Their property (such was the fiction) was to be held in trust for them against their assumed return, and they might only part with a strictly limited amount. But even when they were allowed to sell, they could make little by it, for their Moslem neighbours well understood their straits and beat them down to nominal prices. Cherished possessions like sewing machines sold for a few pence in the streets; and often, before they left, the exiles saw the other property which they had not been allowed to sell and which had been taken by the Government in trust—houses and fields and fruit-trees—given over into the possession of the newly-come Moslem mouhadjirs. At Trebizond the gendarmerie began to seal the houses and warehouse the goods, but they were followed round by a Moslem rabble, which rushed in after them and pillaged most of the movable property with their connivance. In some towns the Armenian quarters were burnt to the ground.

Such was the last sight the Armenian exiles had of their homes, on the day they started on their march. They were dispatched in convoys varying in size from four or five hundred individuals to four or five thousand, under the escort of detachments of gendarmes, and from the moment of starting their miseries began. They were mobbed by the Turkish peasants in the fields as they passed, and when they arrived at a village, they were put up on view in some public place, generally in front of the Government Building, that the Moslem villagers, rich and poor, might take their choice of the comeliest women, girls and boys. The villages along the exile route were filled with these Armenian slaves. They were seen by foreign travellers who traversed these roads in the opposite direction on their way out of Turkey, and a remnant of them were, happily, rescued by the Russian troops, in the districts liberated during the Grand Duke's great advance. They were happier than their companions who did not excite the peasants' lust, for these remained in the gendarmerie's hands. They were compelled by the gendarmes to sleep with them at night, and were reserved for the horrors that awaited the convoys in the later stages of their journey. Meanwhile, their numbers were being thinned by physical exhaustion, as well as by the brutality of the men at whose mercy they were. The Government professed to make provision for their transport, and in certain cases an ox-cart (or araba, as it is called in Turkish) was commandeered for each deported family. But the drivers (and owners) had no intention of making this pilgrimage of hundreds of miles. They could count on the good-will of their fellow-Moslems, the gendarmes, and when they refused to go further, as they invariably did after the first few stages on the road, the

gendarmes made no opposition and the Armenians had to proceed on foot. Where the Government did not offer even this illusory conveyance, the richer Armenians often hired carriages or pack-animals for themselves, at exorbitant prices, while families fortunate enough to possess a cart or a beast of their own started out with them on the journey. But these, too, were taken from them by the gendarmes at a longer or shorter distance from their starting place, sometimes from pure malice—as in the case of the villagers of Shar, in the Cilician highlands, who started out with their own mules and arabas on their journey to the plain, but were deliberately conducted off the wheel-road on to a mountain-track in order that they might

TALAAT BEY.

have to abandon them by the wayside—but more often from covetousness on the gendarmes' part. The gendarmes sold the Armenians' beasts and conveyances to the local Moslems along the route, and indeed they seized and sold all the Armenians' effects. There was one convoy that had to cross a tributary of the Euphrates on its way to Aleppo. The gendarmes ordered the women to strip and ford the stream, and they did so, holding each other by the hand, while the gendarmes, with the carts, the beasts and the clothes remained on the other bank. But when the women had crossed, the gendarmes refused to restore even their clothes to them, and they had to continue their journey naked. This literal stripping of the exiles was not uncommon, and many convoys reached Aleppo in this condition, sometimes marching on foot, the women bent double with shame, and sometimes crowded into railway carriages on the last stage of their route. The Moslem rabble of Aleppo gathered at the siding, and mocked the Armenian women as they were driven out naked from the trains.

But those who reached the journey's end were only a fraction of those that set out, for every further day they marched, more and more perished of exhaustion on the road. The majority of them were townspeople, unused to physical hardship, and many were people who had been in easy circumstances—the wives and daughters of skilled workers, tradesmen, merchants, lawyers, professors and doctors—women as delicately brought up and as refined in habit, in many cases, as the women of similar station in Europe and America. These women were being driven day after day, by long marches, through the roughest country, toiling on foot, heavily laden, over unmetalled mountain tracks, and bivouacking by night on the bare ground on the outskirts of unfriendly villages. It was the hot season of the year, and their thirst alone was an intolerable torture. There is the remembrance of this thirst in all the narratives of the victims. They would march for hours together without finding water, and when they passed some stream or spring, the gendarmes would amuse themselves by forbidding the column to halt, or would extort still more of the exiles' remaining possessions as the price of allowing them to rest themselves and drink. It was an ordeal that would have exhausted seasoned soldiers, and these Armenian women were in no condition to bear it at all. The most pitiable cases were those of the women with child—for, since whole communities had been uprooted without pity or discrimination, there were women in all stages of pregnancy in every convoy. These doomed mothers staggered along with the rest, fainting under their burden and driven to their feet again with the lash, till their hour came, perhaps at the halting place or perhaps on the march, and the child was born. When this happened, a guard was left behind with the woman, and, after a few hours' respite, she was urged on again to rejoin the column on the road. A case is reported of a merciful gendarme who saved his charge from the molestations of the Moslem country-folk, brought her water and found a beast to carry her; but most of the narratives

THE REFUGEES' CAMP.

Armenian Priest presenting Bibles to children. The representative of the London Bible Society (×).

describe a different scene—the child left to perish by the roadside or under a bush, and the woman struggling up under the blows, to die of hemorrhage a few yards from the place of her delivery or to collapse suddenly from shock an hour or two further on the way. There were neutral residents in one town through which many convoys passed, who used to go out to the place where the exiles encamped and try to save these mothers and their babes; but often they were kept at a distance by the gendarmes, and even when they succeeded in bringing mother and child to their hospital in the town, it was generally too late to preserve their lives.

The worst experiences were those of the latest convoys to leave any given town, for the roads they had to traverse were littered with the corpses of their fellow-exiles who had gone before—corpses that were generally unrecognizable, it is true, through corruption and the work of carrion beasts. The ghastliest tract of all was the road between Ourfa and Aleppo, the last stage on the journey of many convoys converging from the north. Several neutral and Armenian travellers described how this road was flanked with corpses from one end to the other the trunks lightly buried in the soil, the extremities protruding and gnawed away by dogs. These were in part the victims of exhaustion, hunger, thirst, and disease, but they were also the victims of human violence.

The cruelty of the Moslem peasants in the cultivated lands was as nothing compared to the cruelty of the Kurds and "chetti" bands in the mountains, and the gendarmes, whose duty it was to protect the exiles on the Government's behalf, always fraternized with the marauders and outdid their atrocities with worse excesses of their own. We have the narrative of an Armenian lady who marched in the third convoy of exiles from Baibourt—at Baibourt the proceedings opened with the hanging of the Bishop and seven other Armenian notables, and there was the usual massacre of adult males before the deportation began. This lady was a wealthy widow, and the Turkish commandant at Baibourt had been quartered in her house since the outbreak of war, and urged her to remain behind under his protection. But the lady refused to be separated from her people, and she started off with her old mother and her little daughter, eight years old, taking three pack-horses with them to carry provisions. Her narrative reads like some tale from hell. "We were only two hours out from home when bands of villagers and brigands surrounded us on the road and robbed us of all we had. The gendarmes took my horses and sold them to Turkish mouhadjirs. They took my money and the gold pieces from my daughter's neck, also all our food. After this, they singled out the men, one by one, and shot them all within six or seven days—every male above fifteen years old.

By my side were killed two priests, one of them over ninety years of age. The brigands took all the good-looking women and carried them off on their horses. Very many women and girls were thus carried off to the mountains, among them my sister, whose one-year-old baby they threw away—a Turk picked it up and carried it off, I know not where. My mother walked till she could walk no further, and dropped by the roadside on a mountain-top. We found on the road many of those who had been in the previous convoys from Baibourt. There were women among the killed, with their husbands and sons. We also came across old people and little infants, still alive but in a pitiable condition, having shouted their voices away." ("On the heights of the mountains and in the depths of the valleys numbers of old men and babies were lying on the ground," wrote another survivor of the same convoy.) "We were not allowed to sleep at night in the villages," the lady continues, "but lay down outside. Under cover of the night indescribable deeds were committed by the gendarmes, brigands and villagers. Many of us died of hunger and strokes of apoplexy. Others were left by the roadside too feeble to go on. . . .

"The worst and most unimaginable horrors were reserved for us at the banks of the Euphrates, in the Erzindjan plain. The mutilated bodies of women, girls and little children made everybody shudder. The brigands were doing all sorts of awful deeds to the women and girls who were with us, whose cries went up to heaven. At the Euphrates the brigands and gendarmes threw into the river all the remaining children under fifteen years old. Those that could swim were shot down as they struggled in the water. . . ."

Few exiles, indeed, who reached Erzindjan ever passed alive beyond that point or arrived, like this lady, at Kharput, for, just below Erzindjan, the Euphrates flows into the deep gorge of Kamakh Boghaz, a place marked out for their wholesale slaughter. The very crime for which the two Danish nurses were expelled from the German Red Cross hospital at Erzindjan was that of having befriended several

ARRIVAL OF ARMENIANS IN NEW YORK.
Refugees rescued by a French cruiser off the coast of Syria.

children belonging to a convoy from Baibourt which was on its way to this dreaded shambles. The women in this convoy, when the Danish nurses saw them, were frantic with terror. "Save us," they were crying. "We will become Moslems or Germans or anything you like—only save us. They are taking us to Kamakh Boghaz to cut our throats." A few days earlier, when the first convoy of exiles from Erzindjan itself had entered the gorge of Kamakh Boghaz, Kurdish tribesmen had suddenly fallen upon its flanks from the heights above on either side, and, when the panic-stricken crowd had turned and attempted to fly by the way they had come, they were shot down by the gendarmes who brought up their rear. The story of the massacre had been told by two Armenian school-mistresses, who survived it, to the Danish ladies, and the news of their destined fate had spread to the other convoys on the march. The Danish ladies were told that the usual procedure was to bind the victims' hands behind their backs and cast them into the river wholesale. "This method was employed when the multitudes were too great to be dispatched in any other fashion."

The sufferings of these exiles deported over the mountains on foot were unspeakable while they lasted, but it may be doubted whether the sum of their misery was greater than that of the equally great masses of exiles who were deported from the north-west by train. These were tradesmen and merchants from Constantinople and the neighbourhood—at Constantinople the Government made a register of Armenian inhabitants born in the city and those of provincial birth, and sent the latter into exile—seminarists of the Gregorian College at Armacha, business men from prosperous country-towns like Adapazar in the district of Ismid, and peasants from the villages of Isnik. Men, women and children, the new-born babies and the sick, they were packed in cattle-trucks and dispatched south-eastward along the Anatolian line. The railway became congested at once with the flow of these exiles from every quarter, and with the passage of troops in the opposite direction, returning from Syria for the defence of the Dardanelles. The exile-trains were held up for days at wayside stations, and at the larger halting places on the route—places like Afiun Kara Hissar, high up on the bleak Anatolian plateau, or Konia, under the inner edge of Taurus, on the sultry rim of the Anatolian desert—they were simply turned out into the open, without housing or bedding or shelter, to await for months their turn to proceed; and this in the more inclement season of the year, for these deportations from the north-west did not begin in June and July, like those in the east, but in August and September, and dragged on into the winter months. The worst miseries awaited these north-western exiles at the two gaps in the Baghdad line, where it was interrupted by the successive mountain-barriers of Taurus and Amanus, and the journey must be continued by carriage or on foot. There is a dreadful description of an exile-encampment in a bleak upland valley of Taurus, just beyond rail-head. The exiles were dying in their improvised tents of exposure and disease, while down the valley they could see all the way to Tarsus in the plain; but they were too destitute to hire conveyances, and too weak to walk. The conditions were even worse in the mountain-camps on Amanus—the second gap in the line—which were described by two Swiss residents at Adana who made their way to the scene to administer relief. The exiles had accumulated here in enormous numbers; the camps were deep in mud; there was no sanitation, and the exiles were living in inconceivable filth, and dying in numbers of disease. They had no spirit in them to struggle over the remaining stage of their journey to Aleppo, and even if they still had money to pay the hire, there were no carts to be had to carry them to the rail-head of the Aleppo line.

At Aleppo the two streams of exiles from the north-west and the north-east flowed into one, but, as has been stated, only an inconsiderable proportion of the victims ever reached their goal. There are no comprehensive statistics, but such figures as we possess are terrible in the inferences they suggest. A combined convoy, for instance, of exiles from the provinces of Mamouret-ul-Aziz and Sivas, which marched out of Malatia 18,000 strong, numbered 301 when it descended into the plains again at Viran Shehr, and 150 when it reached Aleppo. Another convoy, from Kharput, was reduced on the way to Aleppo from 5,000 to 213, and one from a village near Kharput from 2,500 to 600. Yet the number of the convoys was so great that even these fractions that survived filled Aleppo to overflowing, and they were sent on in batches to Damascus and Der-el-Zor. Yet many were fortunate enough to find rest at Aleppo during that brief respite before they were driven forth on their road again. An

American traveller who stayed some days in Aleppo in the autumn of 1915 describes how, every morning, the carts went round from door to door to carry away the dead.

These atrocities had as their deliberate object the extermination of the Armenian race, and it is not difficult to assess the guilt. The Kurds and Chettis, who did some of the most ghastly deeds, merely acted after their kind; the gendarmes who emulated them cannot be too vehemently condemned, and the Turkish peasants (who impressed their opponents so favourably as soldiers at the front) displayed an extreme barbarity towards their Armenian neighbours at home. But Kurds, Chettis, peasants and gendarmes would never have done what they did if they had not been licensed or incited from above. The guilt lay with the Young Turkish Government at Constantinople and with the local officials who acted in collusion with them. But there was a greater criminal even than the Young Turkish Government, for behind Turkey stood the country that was Turkey's ally and the dominant partner in the policy she pursued. There was a considerable variation in the conduct of individual Germans in Turkey. The German missionaries seem to have stood laudably by their principles, and the German Vice-Consul at Erzerum is said to have sent the exiles relief. But in the Aleppo province and Cilicia the German officials, both military and civil, threw themselves actively into the Young Turks' scheme; at Moush and Van German officers are believed to have participated directly in the slaughter, and at Erzerum they are reported to have taken their share of the Armenian girls.

Still worse than these isolated cases (for they were no more) of active participation is the condonation which both official and unofficial Germany extended to the crime. No protest was entered by the local German officials on the spot; Herr von Wangenheim, the German Ambassador at Constantinople, declared that it was not his *rôle* to interfere; the atrocities were defended by publicists in the German Press; they were first denied and then apologized for by the German Ambassador in the United States. In the German Reichstag on January 11, 1916, Herr von Stumm, chief of the Political Department of the Foreign Office, replied as follows to the urgent enquiries of the courageous Socialist Deputy, Dr. Liebknecht:

> It is known to the Imperial Chancellor that revolutionary demonstrations, organized by our enemies, have taken place in Armenia, and that they have caused the Turkish Government to expel the Armenian population of certain districts and to allot to them new dwelling-places. An exchange of views about the reaction of these measures upon the population is now taking place. Further information cannot be given.

Germany, in fact, signified in the clearest manner that the Young Turks' attempt to exterminate their Armenian subjects was right in German eyes; and, indeed, this Young Turkish policy coincided precisely with German ambitions. One of the chief prizes which Germany hoped to gain from the war was the unbridled power to dominate all the submerged nationalities of the Near East—to blast their hopes of national liberty, to stunt their national growth, to drain their energies to her own advantage, and to rob them of a territory stretching from Belgrade to Aleppo, and from Aleppo, through Baghdad and Damascus, to the Persian Gulf and the Suez Canal.

CHAPTER CXXXIV.

THE IRISH REBELLION OF APRIL, 1916 (I.).

Invasions and Attempted Invasions of Ireland—The Sinn Fein Movement—Its Origin and Development—The Government of Ireland—Mr. Birrell—"Larkinism" and the "Citizen Army"—Ulster Volunteers—National Volunteers—Sinn Fein Volunteers—Casement's Career—His Visit to Germany—Anti-British Propaganda among Irish Prisoners—Casement's "Invasion"—From Wilhelmshaven to the Kerry Coast—Casement's Capture—Preparations in Dublin—The Irish Executive—Rebel Plans—The Events of Easter Monday, 1916—Proclamation of an "Irish Republic"—The Fighting Described—Lord Wimborne's Proclamation—Troops land at Kingstown.

THE danger that a foreign enemy would endeavour to take advantage of the exposed position of Ireland and of England's historic religious and racial difficulties in that island is one that has never been absent from the minds of our statesmen and soldiers in time of war or the threat of war. During the religious troubles of the sixteenth century Italian and Spanish emissaries were constantly at work in the South and West, thereby adding not a little to the burden of Queen Elizabeth's statesmen, and in 1579–1580, eight years before the sailing of the "Invincible Armada," considerable Spanish forces were able to evade the English fleet and effect a landing on the Kerry coast in hopes of creating a diversion in favour of King Philip and the Papacy, the latter then at deadly war with England and specially with Elizabeth. From this sprang the Desmond Rebellion, "the most perilous that hath ever begun in Ireland," as Edward Waterhouse reported to Walsingham at the time, and only the prompt appearance of strong forces by land and sea and the destruction of the Spanish stronghold of Smerwick on the Dingle peninsula prevented the rising from becoming general.

And again, a century later, when King James II. was driven out by his subjects, it was to Ireland that the French king dispatched an army to assist him in his attempt at restoration, and many pitched battles and sieges had to be undertaken before the exiled king was again "sent on his travels" and William of Orange seated securely on the throne. Even more threatening were the attentions bestowed on Ireland by the Directory during the French revolutionary war with Great Britain towards the close of the eighteenth century. Stirred by the example of France and by promises of French assistance, Wolfe Tone and his society of United Irishmen aimed, as the Sinn Feiners did in April, 1916, at an independent Irish Republic, and on no less than four occasions French ships of war were able to reach the Irish coast—at Bantry Bay in the south-west, at Killala Bay in Mayo, and at two points on the Donegal Coast. Mr. Froude and Mr. Lecky have dealt in detail with this danger from the point of view of the historian and the statesman, and just ten years before the rising of 1916 the Military Correspondent of *The Times*, in the course of a careful study of Humbert's landing in Mayo in 1798, emphasized the ever-

LEAVING THE COMMISSIONERS' DEPARTMENT.

Sir Matthew Nathan (on left), Permanent Under-Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant; and Mr. Augustine Birrell (on right), Chief Secretary for Ireland. Circle portrait: Lord Wimborne, Lord Lieutenant of Ireland.

present danger of an exposed coast, a watchful enemy, and such smouldering elements of discontent as might always be found to exist in certain parts of Ireland. At a later date the same writer, discussing the Sinn Fein rising, again pointed out that "the use of Ireland as a blackthorn with which an enemy may belabour us in time of war has for long been a subject of study among soldiers, and the present crisis shows that the theories of the use that may be made of Ireland by an enemy are now in course of application." *

The Sinn Fein rising which has now to be described did not differ materially, whether regarded from the point of view of its origin, its incidents or its result, from those of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries to which allusion has been made.

Only the name of the movement in Ireland was new. Wolfe Tone and the cosmopolitan revolutionaries of 1798 scorned the use of Gaelic and were content to call themselves United Irishmen. The founders and leaders of the modern movement, on the other hand, adopted the Gaelic note as their mark of special distinction, and much of their propaganda was carried on under the shelter of the name of the Gaelic League and through the intermediary of Gaelic Colleges and classes. Needless to say, many members of the Gaelic League and many students of the Gaelic language in Ireland, as in Scotland and elsewhere, were quite innocent of any ulterior and treasonable motives, and were ignorant of the underground propaganda that was carried on in their name. Even the publicly proclaimed aims and objects of the Sinn Fein movement were not necessarily disloyal. The Gaelic words "Sinn Fein" in English mean simply "Ourselves," and the members were pledged to devote themselves to the cultivation and promotion of all that was distinctively Gaelic in language and literature, history, costume, and sport, as opposed to whatever was regarded as of

*"The Story of a Raid," *The Times*, November 8, 1906, and May 2, 1916.

English origin. But, as in the case of the United Irishmen, the revolutionary element soon gained the upper hand.

The German strategists—probably even before the war broke out—saw in Ireland a weak spot in the British defences as did Carnot, Hoche and Bonaparte more than a century earlier, and in each case the foreign enemy found in domestic conspiracy a weapon fitted to his hand. Wolfe Tone's machinations in Ireland, at first ostensibly as a mere political reformer, his journey to America, his visit to the enemy country, and finally his arrival with the French fleet in Bantry Bay and Lough Swilly, all go to constitute a wonderfully close analogy to the movements of Sir Roger Casement in connexion with the Irish rising. And the end was not different. Each sailed for the West Coast of Ireland with something resembling an armed force: in each case part of the expedition went wrong. Each arrived only to find the bulk of the Irish people apathetic and indifferent, and to be faced with speedy arrest and the ignominious collapse of all his plans. In each case there was a rising, although in a totally different part of the country from that in which the landing took place, so that it received little or no direct assistance from the foreign enemy, and in each the rising, although sufficiently alarming and destructive in some of its incidents, was easily suppressed by military force as soon as the slack and dilatory civil authorities had realized the danger and taken the proper steps to put an end to it.

The Sinn Fein movement arose, as has been seen, out of the "language movement," which was in itself harmless and even laudable and found supporters amongst people of all classes. The politicians—the Irish Parliamentary Party founded by Parnell and now led by Mr. Redmond—never looked with much favour on this language movement, being jealous of anything that seemed to infringe on their exclusive right to speak in the name of "the Irish people." Gaelic had long been ignored, or regarded somewhat coldly, at the College of Maynooth where the Irish Roman Catholic priesthood were educated. It had no newspapers or popular

SINN FEINERS

Parading through the streets on St. Patrick's Day, March, 1916.

books. It was not taught in the National Schools, and among the common people themselves it was so little considered that each decennial census showed an increasingly rapid falling off in the number of habitual Gaelic speakers. Attempts had again and again been made to stem this falling off of the ancient language of Ireland. Chairs established at the Universities found few pupils, text-books were neglected, learned Germans and Frenchmen coming to study the literary Gaelic of the manuscripts in their libraries met with little help or sympathy in Ireland. All at once a number of young enthusiasts, suspected of being indifferent to the political and sectarian quarrels by which

SIR ROGER CASEMENT.

the country was divided, threw themselves into the language movement and in a few years produced very remarkable results, amongst their own class at least. Whilst the census figures still showed a continuous decline of Irish speakers in the rural districts, the study of Gaelic soon became something of a fashion in the towns, where, as a spoken language, it had been practically extinct. Evening classes were started for those who had left school, a "Gaelic column" began to appear in some of the daily and weekly newspapers: it was taken up as a "subject" by the Board of National Education, by the Intermediate Board, which had charge of secondary education, and by the Universities. The Gaelic League became fired with the idea of an Irish-speaking Ireland, just as Bohemia and Hungary spoke languages of their own in spite of centuries of Austrian domination.

It was soon seen, however, that little real progress was being made. In the Irish-speaking districts the process of decay went on more rapidly than ever, whilst in the towns those who had learnt from books a smattering of a most difficult language tended to forget it from disuse. It was at this point that there first became manifest a tendency to use Gaelic as a political weapon. It was contended that the Magyars preserved their language because Hungary was practically an independent nation with only a slender link binding it to Austria, and that in consequence Ireland should strive for "Hungarian Home Rule" or practical independence instead of the mild form of Home Rule "subject to the Imperial Parliament" offered by Mr. Gladstone and accepted by the Parliamentary Party. "Hungarianism" became the popular cry with this section until it was discovered that the Magyars were the minority or "ascendancy" party in Hungary, ruling the subject Slavs with a rod of iron and hampering them in every possible way in the use of their language and in the exercise of their political rights. When the movement became strong enough to have a mouthpiece of its own, a weekly newspaper was founded with the title *Sinn Fein*, and that title became the battle cry of the extremist section. As Mr. Birrell, who was Chief Secretary for Ireland during all this period of incubation—he held this office from January, 1907, until May, 1916—put it in his evidence before the Royal Commission which enquired into the causes of the rebellion of April, 1916, "there is always a section of opinion in that country bitterly opposed to the British connexion, and in times of excitement this section can impose its sentiments on largely increased numbers of the people." And again, "the spirit of what to-day is called Sinn Feinism is mainly composed of the old hatred and distrust of the British connexion, always noticeable in all classes and in all places, varying in degree and finding different ways of expression, but always there as the background of Irish politics and character." The "times of excitement" necessary to develop this disloyal spirit were certainly not lacking during the Viceroyalty of Lord Aberdeen and the concurrent Chief Secretaryship of Mr. Birrell, and the evil was intensified by what the Commission called "the reluctance shown by the Irish Government to repress by prosecution written and spoken seditious utterances, and to suppress the drilling and manœuvring of armed forces known to be under the control of men who were openly declaring their hostility to Your Majesty's



SIR ROGER CASEMENT AT LIMBURG PRISON CAMP, GERMANY.

Government and their readiness to welcome and assist Your Majesty's enemies."

Concurrently with the spread of Sinn Fein or rather anterior to it there had been growing up in Ireland a general spirit of lawlessness such as would not have been possible or permitted under capable government. "Cattle driving" and other forcible interferences with the happy settlement of the agrarian question which was going on under the auspices of the Land Commission and the Congested Districts Board were of frequent occurrence. The Arms Act, which placed necessary restrictions on the importation of and traffic in dangerous weapons, whilst in no way prohibiting the legitimate use of sporting guns by peaceable people, was



THE GUN-RUNNER AUD.

allowed to lapse, against the unanimous warning of all competent authorities in Ireland, and rifles and revolvers were shortly being sold over the counter in every village shop. The old Fenian conspiracy, which had been responsible for the rising of 1866 and to some extent for the dynamite conspiracy and the Invincible murders in the 'eighties, again began to show dangerous activity. And while all this was going on the Irish Executive made no sign and took no steps. Mr. Birrell had declared on coming into office that he had "found Ireland in a more peaceful condition than she had been in for the last six hundred years," and he seems to have obstinately clung to the belief that that state of affairs could not change, and to have shut his eyes and his ears to all evidence to the contrary. It was on a review of these circumstances that the Royal Commission found that the Chief Secretary was "primarily responsible for the situation that was allowed to arise and for the outbreak that occurred." "The main cause of the rebellion," they reported, "appears to be that lawlessness was allowed to grow up unchecked, and that Ireland for several years past has been administered on the principle that it was safer and more expedient to leave the law in abeyance if collision with any faction of the Irish people could thereby be avoided." "Such a policy," it was added, "is a negation of the cardinal rule of government which demands that the enforcement of law and the preservation of order should always be independent of political expediency."

Another and an even more flagrant toleration of lawlessness was that in connexion with what is called "Larkinism," which demands special mention as being the origin of the "Citizen Army" that played so sinister a part in the rising. James Larkin, who posed as a labour leader, although he was not recognized or authorized by any reputable or well-established trade union, appeared on the scene in Ireland about 1906 as an organizer of frequent strikes at the seaports. After some turbulent passages at Cork, where he was disowned and prosecuted by the Liverpool Dockers' Union, with which he had formerly been connected, he succeeded in 1907 in bringing about a very formidable strike, accompanied by much disorder, in Belfast. Arrested and committed for trial for a violent assault on a non-striker, Larkin was released at the Assizes, the Crown Prosecutor by direction of Dublin Castle entering a *nolle prosequi*. As the authorities had previously released Larkin from prison after his conviction in Cork, the belief became widespread that no repressive measures against his proceedings were to be looked for, and turmoil and violence spread unchecked. Strong representations were made by Lord Shaftesbury, Lord Mayor of Belfast, and by the magistrates and other local authorities, but nothing was done until a police strike resulted and a general paralysis of law was threatened. The military were then called out, the mob fired on, and lives lost—an apt illustration of the statement made before the Commission by Sir David Harrel, formerly Under-Secretary at Dublin Castle, to the effect that the Irish people "are easily led, and it is therefore the more incumbent on the Government to nip lawlessness and disorder in the

bud." The negleet of this elementary duty, he went on to say, has invariably led to things getting out of hand, with the result that strong repressive measures beeome neeessary, and then the innoeent suffer with the guilty. One eonsequenee was that manufaeturers and merehants in Belfast, finding it impossible, in the absenee of poliee proteetion, to get their goods eonveyed to and from the doeks, armed themselves and their servants, eseorted their earts and lorries to the steamers, and saw their goods safe on board. This was the beginning of the arming in Ulster, and it arose from a profound disbelief in the firmness or justiee of the Dublin Castle authorities. When after the eleetions of 1910 Home Rule was seen to be imminent and threats were uttered of using "the strong hand" to put down the resistanee of the North, the Ulster Volunteers were formed. The politieal and religious objections entertained by the majority in Ulster to the rule of a Dublin Parliament, whose loyalty to England and the Empire they distrusted and in whieh their own representatives must neeessarily be in a permanent minority, were raised to fever heat, espeeially sinee the abolition of the Veto of the House of Lords had left them without any eonstitutional protection against a ehanee majority in the House of Commons. But in addition there was the feeling, foreed on the manufaeturing and mereantile elasses by the bitter expeeienee of 1907, that Dublin Castle under Nationalist direetion and guidanee afforded no guarantee for the peaceful earrying on of the industries by whieh they lived and by which their Province flourished. The result was the public and openly-avowed organization of a body of "Volunteers" under the leadership of Sir Edward Carson and with the sanction and support of the politieal, munieipal, and industrial heads of the Ulster eommunity. Over one hundred thousand men were quiekly enrolled and drilled, arms were proeured, and a solemn Covenant entered into by whieh the signatories, while renewing their pledge of devoted loyalty to King and Empire, bound themselves to stand together, whatever might befall, and to defend by foree of arms if neeessary what they regarded as their birthright of full and undiminished British eitizenship. It was the imitation of this arming and drilling by Larkin's Citizen Army and by other bodies of Volunteers in the South, with other objeets, whieh eontributed so mueh to the rising.

After Belfast Larkin next turned up in Dublin, where, in 1913, he organized a "transport workers" strike, and endeavoured as usual to involve and to paralyse the whole industrial life of the eity. The eonditions of labour and of housing in Dublin were indeed appalling, and would have eondoned almost any effort at redress. Employment was searee and irregular, the rate of wages seandalously low, and deeent house aeeommodation for the working elasses almost impossible to obtain.

GUARDING THE GREAT NORTHERN MAIN LINE, DUBLIN.
Military outpost on the north-east of the city.

EDEN QUAY, DUBLIN.
A view from the O'Connell Monument.

It was a common complaint that the Civic and Poor Law authorities paid too much attention to political speech-making and too little to sanitation and the proper performance of their more prosaic duties. The result was that this great strike assumed rather a Syndicalist and revolutionary character than that of a mere dispute about wages, and all the turbulent and disloyal elements in Dublin and the neighbourhood were swept into it. Larkin was evidently provided from some source with ample funds, and as a sequel to the strike the Citizen Army was formed and partly armed by him during the winter of 1913–1914. An armed body of National Volunteers had also been organized in Dublin in imitation of the Ulster Volunteers, and both bodies held parades and reviews without interference from the authorities until in June, 1914, the Inspector-General of the Royal Irish Constabulary felt compelled to draw the attention of the Chief Secretary to the fact that "each county will soon have a trained army far outnumbering the police, and those who control the Volunteers will be in a position to dictate to what extent the law of the land will be carried into effect." Still nothing was done for the reassertion of the authority of the Government, although, as the Commissioners pointed out in their report, "this lawless display of force should have been a warning against the recent policy of permitting the indiscriminate arming of civilians in Ireland in times of turbulence and faction. In periods of peace it may be desirable in an ordinary community to disregard some seditious utterances as mere vapouring, but when a country is engaged in a serious struggle sedition alters its aspect and becomes treason dangerous to the community, and should promptly be suppressed." It thus came about that the outbreak of the Great War found a considerable portion of Ireland under the control of armed forces led by men "openly declaring their hostility to the British Government, and their readiness to welcome and assist England's enemies." And the Government of Dublin Castle was administered on the principle that it "was safer and more expedient to leave the law in abeyance if collision with any faction of the Irish people could thereby be avoided."

At what precise point the necessary connexion between sedition in Ireland and the German Government was established there is as yet no evidence to show. The original body, the Irish National Volunteers, was not ostensibly disloyal, although some of its leading promoters were afterwards identified with the rebellion, and suffered for it. Large numbers were enrolled, but of these only a minority rendered themselves efficient, and the whole movement was at the outset regarded as something in the nature of a political protest against the formation of the Ulster Volunteers. In June, 1914, a membership of 65,000 was claimed, but by this time Mr. Redmond, the leader of the Irish Parliamentary Party, seems to have become alarmed at the seditious tendency of some of the leaders, and he made an effort to get the movement under his own control. He insisted on nominating a sufficient number of members of the committee to direct its decisions, but this step appears only to have accentuated the disloyalty and discontent of the extremists. Matters came to a head after the outbreak of the war, when Mr. Asquith, the Prime Minister, consented to go to Ireland on the invitation of the Parliamentary Party to address a meeting, at which Mr. Redmond himself delivered a strong and earnest speech in favour of the energetic prosecution of the war and of the promotion of recruiting in Ireland. This led to some disturbances, and culminated in a break-up of the Irish National Volunteers. On September 30 a new body, avowedly hostile to the English connexion, was formed under the name of the "Irish" Volunteers, and generally known as the Sinn Fein Volunteers. These allied themselves with the Citizen Army which had arisen out of Larkin's movement; and as the Royal Commissioners state in their report, "It is clear that the insurrection was caused by two bodies of men allied together for this purpose and known as the Irish Volunteers and the Citizen Army." In their manifesto repudiating Mr. Redmond (signed by six persons, all of whom were afterwards found implicated in the rebellion), the founders of the Irish Volunteers state that they "regret that the absence of Sir Roger Casement in

RUINS TO THE NORTH OF SACKVILLE STREET.
A view from Nelson's Pillar.

America prevents him from being a signatory with us."

This is the first appearance in the story of the name of one who played a sinister part, and was ultimately convicted of treason and sentenced to death. As the evidence at the trial was confined to Casement's activities in Germany, and as he had hardly been heard of before in Irish politics, the details of his original connexion with the rebellious movement are for the most part lacking. He came of a well-known County Antrim family, of English origin, whose members had always, so far as is known, been noted for their unswerving loyalty and devotion to the Crown, his father being an officer in the British Army. Born in 1864, he led a roving life for some time, being engaged in the Oil River trade on the Niger Coast. His knowledge of Africa led to his employment in the British Consular service, and he appears as Consul at Lourenço Marques in 1895. Here he was able to be of much assistance to the Government and the Army during the South African war, and was duly thanked for his services. Later he was appointed Consul to the Congo Free State, where he took a very prominent part in what was known as the "red rubber" agitation, exposing and denouncing the bloodshed and cruelty which, he alleged, were connected with the collection and marketing of rubber by the agents of the late King of the Belgians. At this time it is interesting to recall that he and those associated with him were freely attacked and criticised in the Irish Nationalist and Roman Catholic Press on the ground that his reports were largely based on the narratives of Protestant missionaries, and were not borne out by the Catholic missionaries, who had equal opportunities of observing the facts. Oddly enough, in the first and only issue of the *Irish War News*, the organ of the rebels published during the rising, this Congo agitation was referred to in the bitterest terms. It was called "a war of filth," "subsidized scandal mongering," and "a foul-mouthed British libel" on King Leopold, who was the victim of "hired ink-slingers" the name of Sir Roger Casement, the originator of the whole campaign, being, of course, omitted. In 1906 Casement was transferred to Brazil, acting successively as Consul at Santos and as Consul-General at Rio de Janeiro, where again he took a prominent part in attacking the administration of the rubber companies, especially in the Putumayo district, his "Putumayo Report," officially issued as a Bluebook by the Foreign Office, attracting much attention in both hemispheres. In 1911 he was knighted and received the Coronation medal, retiring invalided from the service in 1913. During all this time it is not recorded that he took much interest in Irish politics of any kind, and at his trial a letter was read in which, in acknowledging the honour of

AT THE CORNER OF ABBEY STREET, DUBLIN.
A tramcar unearthed from the débris.

THE GENERAL POST OFFICE, DUBLIN.
The portico viewed from Nelson's Pillar. Centre picture: After the rebellion—sorting out the American mail. An interior view.

knighthood conferred on him in 1911, he expressed the most courtier-like gratitude and devotion to King George.

In October, 1913, Casement, having retired from the public service, appeared on a Home Rule platform in his native county of Antrim, stating that he had never before stood on a public platform to deliver a political speech. His remarks seem to have been of a quite harmless character and attracted no attention. But a quick change supervened. During the winter of 1913–1914 he suddenly appeared as the strenuous advocate of the Hamburg-Amerika line of transatlantic steamers and of their scheme to establish a port of call at Queenstown, the Irish station for the American mails. As the ex-consul had no connexion with New York or with the trade of Queenstown this might have passed as merely the amusement of an idle hour, but in a letter which he wrote to the American Press in February, 1914, after the project had fallen through, there appears a passage that is significant of much in the light of subsequent events. He urged

all Amerieans to travel by the Hamburg-Amerika line in preference to British lines; and, alluding to the English companies, he went on to say: "They have suceeeded, for a time at any rate, in keeping the friendly foreign company from the shores of Ireland, and they think they have Irish trade inexorably in their grip. . . . I hope that before six months are over we shall have been able to devise means of asserting our right to own our own ports and to open them to whom we will." "Before six months were over" Germany was at war with England, and Casement was in Ameriea eagerly pleading the German cause. In view of the light subsequently shed upon the espionage activities carried on in and from the Hamburg-Amerika offiees in London and New York, the significanee of this movement to gain a foothold in Ireland is suffieiently obvious. With Qucenstown as a base, and with "emigration" ageneies all over the eountry, the plan of a German-made insurreetion in Ireland would have been markedly faeilitated.

Whether Casement was at this stage still a mere windbag and catspaw or a full-blown conspirator and traitor seems open to doubt. His exaet movements at the period were at his trial deelared to be unknown, and he duly drew the instalments of his pension from the British Government up to September 30, 1914, nearly two months after the outbreak of the War. But already, in November, 1913, he had given in his adhesion to the Citizen Army and was also a member of the Committee of the Irish National Volunteers. And that his education with regard to German sea-plans was making progress is apparent from a letter, written in August, 1914, but not made public till later, in which oeeurs the following passage dealing with Mr. Redmond's advoeaey of reeruiting for the British Army in the war: "It is perfectly clear that Ireland will be drawn into any war waged by England. But that we should voluntarily help the wrong side in order to prevent a British defeat is the adviee of traitors or of fools. For the present our attitude may be passive, but it must not remain so. The day when a German fleet dominates the Irish Sea and communieations with England are eut, that day will be the first day of Irish freedom and the first day of

UNSAFE RUINS.

Pulling down walls which were in danger of falling.

RUINED BUILDINGS IN SACKVILLE STREET.

the freedom of the seas." Meantime, it is important to note, the Clan-na-Gael or physical force section of the Irish-American Nationalists, a section who had always been hostile to the Parliamentary Party, had formed a working alliance with the German agencies in the United States, and from this period we hear more and more of Germany's sincere and disinterested love for Ireland. Whether Casement was already in America when war broke out or crossed immediately after we have no means of knowing. But already, on September 16, 1914, he wrote from New York to the Irish papers to check the recruiting movement: "Let Irish men and boys," he said, "stay in Ireland. Their duty is clear before God and man. We, as a people, have no quarrel with the German people. Germany has never wronged Ireland and we owe her more than one debt of gratitude." And at the end of the same month, as has been seen, when the Sinn Fein or treasonable section of the Volunteers broke away from the Redmondite or loyal section, the secretary reported that only Sir Roger Casement's absence in America prevented him from being a signatory to the manifesto.

For the next few weeks nothing is heard of Casement, but towards the end of November we find him in Germany as a self-proclaimed "Irish Ambassador" to the Central European Powers at war with England. He had travelled *via* Scandinavia, and he had taken the opportunity of promulgating a cock-and-bull story about an attempt on the part of the British Minister at Christiania to have him poisoned or otherwise disposed of. Arrived in Berlin, he was favourably received at the German Foreign Office and took occasion to issue a statement in which he declared that "all the Irish at home and abroad would work to assist the victory of the Central Empires, as this would mean the destruction of the British yoke on



BIRD'S EYE VIEW OF DUBLIN LOOKING WESTWARD UP THE RIVER LIFFEY.

Ireland." The German Secretary of State, on his part, issued a corresponding statement to the effect that: "The Imperial Government declares formally that under no circumstances would Germany invade Ireland with a view to its conquest or the overthrow of native institutions. Should the fortune of this great war," it was added, "bring German troops to Ireland they would land there not to pillage or destroy, but as forces of a Government inspired only by goodwill towards Ireland and her people, for whom Germany desires national prosperity and freedom." This sudden appearance of the "Irish Ambassador" appears to have roused high hopes in Berlin, where the *Tageblatt* exultingly declared that in Ireland England had "a spectre in her own house," that Ireland had now formally expressed her sympathy for Germany, and that the declaration of the German Foreign Office "would serve to destroy the last misgivings cherished against us in Ireland and correspondingly to intensify Irish enthusiasm for the German cause."

Having settled the matter of the alliance, Casement's activities were now directed towards the formation of an Irish Brigade, to be equipped in Germany and to land in Ireland, and on this point the evidence given on his trial before the High Court affords a very full narrative. Trials for treason are happily uncommon in England, and Casement's was of special interest to lawyers as being the first in which, under the new Indictments Act, the charge against the prisoner was set out in plain language instead of the cumbersome medieval formulæ in use for so many centuries. The charge was based on the old Treason Act of Edward III., and the indictment recited that at a time when "an open and public war was being prosecuted and carried on by the German Emperor against our Lord the King," Casement "did traitorously adhere to and aid and comfort the said enemies in parts beyond the seas." But for the Irish Brigade idea it would have been a matter of considerable difficulty to establish this charge, for treason must be proved by overt acts at the mouth of two witnesses. Casement, however, had directly and personally approached many Irish soldiers while prisoners of war in a German camp and endeavoured to seduce them from their allegiance for the purpose of joining an Irish Brigade to be equipped in Germany and landed in Ireland. And a recent exchange of prisoners had brought many of these all-important witnesses to England at an opportune moment.

From these it appeared that a gradual process of selection of Irish prisoners from various detention camps went on until some two thousand five hundred from different regiments had been concentrated at Limburg on the Lahn in the Wiesbaden district of Prussia. Here towards the end of December, 1914, Casement arrived with a battery of pamphlets and Irish-American newspapers and harangued the prisoners on the misery of their situation and on the wrongs of Ireland. He stated that he was forming an Irish Brigade and he invited the Irish prisoners of war to join it, in which case, instead of being treated as

JAMES LARKIN.

prisoners, they would be taken to Berlin and become the guests of Germany. England was "nearly beaten," and now was the time for Irishmen to fight and gain Home Rule. In the event of Germany's winning a sea battle he would send the Irish Brigade to Ireland, where they would "fight against England and free Ireland." According to the witnesses Casement had "a poor reception." He was "hissed and booed," and on one occasion "struck and pushed out of the camp," defending himself with his umbrella until the German sentries came to his assistance. This missionary work went on for over a year, lectures on the "history of Ireland" were delivered, and copies of the *Gaelic American* and the *Continental Times* with pamphlets bearing such titles as "Crimes against Ireland, by Sir Roger Casement," and "The King, the Kaiser, and Ireland," were distributed throughout the camp and left in

the huts of the prisoners. Eventually, it was stated, some 52 soldiers out of the 2,500 consented to join the Brigade, including one Bailey, a private of the Royal Irish Rifles, with a good service record, who frankly declared after his arrest in Ireland that his only object was to get away from the camp and secure better treatment elsewhere with a view to ultimately rejoining his regiment and fighting for the King. Not a single Irish officer or non-commissioned officer could be got even to listen to Casement's blandishments, and of all the 52 only one ultimately landed in Ireland, personally conducted by Casement himself.

The speech-making and conversations with the prisoners began about Christmas 1914, when, according to Casement, England was already "nearly beaten," but it was not till long after—the "victorious sea-battle" being still unreasonably delayed—that a definite move was made. Here a somewhat mysterious "Captain Monteith" comes into the story. He had, it appears, been active in organizing the Sinn Fein Volunteers and in opposing recruiting for the British Army, and was accordingly deported from Ireland under the Defence of the Realm Act in November 1914. He too made his way to Germany and was acting in concert with Casement, whom he was able to keep *en rapport* with the movements and intentions of sympathizers in Ireland. According to the statement of Bailey, who had in the meantime been put into uniform and made a sergeant in the Irish Brigade, Casement and Monteith took him to Berlin in March 1916, the party putting up at the Saxonia Hotel, which, even in war time, must have been a welcome change from life in the Limburg camp. The next piece of evidence was a railway ticket, Berlin—Wilhelmshaven, April 12, 1916, which by some oversight the German officials had omitted to collect and which was found in the overcoat pocket of one of the three after their landing on the Kerry coast. At Wilhelmshaven Casement, Monteith and Bailey set out in a submarine on their adventurous journey to Ireland—the only "Irish Brigade" that had materialised after fifteen months' preparation. The actual departure seems to have been on April 14. It is noteworthy that although the promised fleet of cruisers with 40,000 men on board did not, for obvious reasons, accompany Casement to Ireland, yet a fleet of Zeppelins and battle cruisers made their appearance off the East Coast on the

A BARRICADE IN TOWNSEND STREET.
Smaller picture: Remains of a motor-car which was used as a barricade.

ARMOURED CARS IN DUBLIN.

A car passing through the streets near Carlisle Bridge. Smaller picture: An armoured car carrying money to the bank.

night of Easter Monday, a date on which it was hoped the Sinn Fein Rebellion would have been in full swing all over Ireland. But as a help in the Rising a captured Wilson liner, transformed into the appearance of a harmless Norwegian tramp, and christened the Aud, was loaded with rifles, machine guns, ammunition and bombs and dispatched from Wilhelmshaven so as to reach the coast of Kerry at the same time as the submarine. As will be seen, it was intercepted and sunk and the only arms that reached our shores were those produced as evidence against Casement at Bow Street.

We must now return to Ireland, where, thanks to the attitude of the Executive which regarded it as "safer and more expedient to leave the law in abeyance," preparations for the rising were, with German and Irish-American help, being steadily and, indeed, ostentatiously pushed forward. As the Royal Commission reported, and as everyone knew in Ireland, the Irish (or Sinn Fein) Volunteers, the Citizen Army and the old Fenian organization were actively engaged in this work. In the words of the Commissioners, "it is now a matter of common notoriety that the Irish Volunteers have been in communication with the authorities in Germany and were for a long time known to be supplied with money through Irish-American societies." This was so stated in public by Mr. John MacNeill on November 8, 1914. From the date of their secession from the National Volunteers the Sinn Fein Volunteers made rapid progress, and a year later, towards the end of 1915, Sir Matthew Nathan, the Under-Secretary for Ireland, was able to report to Mr. Birrell that they numbered 13,500 and that "each group of these is a centre of revolutionary propaganda." He added that they had 2,500 rifles and "had their eyes on the 10,000 in the hands of the supine National Volunteers." But nothing further was done, and the Commissioners, while commending the Under-Secretary for his vigilance, felt compelled to add: "We consider that he did not sufficiently impress upon the Chief Secretary, during the latter's prolonged absences from Dublin, the necessity for more active measures to remedy the situation in

Ireland which on December 18 last in a letter to the Chief Secretary he described as ' most serious and menacing.' "

Apart from arming and drilling, which went on openly, the most mischievous form of disloyalty practised by the Sinn Feiners was their anti-recruiting propaganda. At first the Irish reservists hastened readily to rejoin the Colours, and were in many cases escorted to the railway stations by a cheering populace with bands and banners. Recruiting also was not unsatisfactory when allowance is made for the circumstances of a population mainly agricultural and with its youth largely depleted by emigration. Over 100,000 recruits enlisted in Ireland, although the country was exempted from the system of registration and conscription that was applied in England and Scotland. This, however, was altogether changed when the Sinn Fein propaganda got to work. "It was owing," say the Commissioners, "to the activities of the leaders of the Sinn Fein movement that the forces of disloyalty gradually and steadily increased and undermined the initial sentiment of patriotism." At this time, too (which coincides with Casement's period of greatest activity among the Irish prisoners in Germany), the "Volunteer" and "Citizen" organizations, which of themselves had no visible or substantial means of subsistence, suddenly found themselves in command of apparently unlimited funds. Assisted by German and Irish-American subsidies, "a flood of seditious literature" was poured over Ireland. Anti-recruiting and treasonable newspapers appeared in rapid succession, and arms and explosives were smuggled into the country. Now and again a newspaper was suppressed or a too active and plain spoken agitator was deported under the Defence of the Realm Act, but no firm or consistent policy was followed, and the men deported were able to make their way to America or in some cases back to Ireland to resume their activity. Sir Morgan O'Connell, a prominent Kerry magistrate and Deputy Lieutenant for his county, told the Commission of his vain attempts to induce the Castle to suppress a seditious anti-recruiting meeting announced to be held in Killarney. The meeting was an "imported" one, he said, speakers, platform, resolutions and audience being brought in by special trains. The Executive refused to interfere, and the result was that recruiting, which had been going rather well in the district, came to a sudden stop. Organizers and speakers for such meetings were sent all over the country amply provided with money and with pamphlets and posters, with the result, as recorded by the Commission, that "by the middle of 1915 it was obvious to the military authorities that their efforts in favour of recruiting were being frustrated by the hostile activities of the Sinn Fein supporters, and they made representations to the authorities to that effect. The general danger of the situation was clearly pointed out to the Irish Government by the military authorities on their own initiative in February last, but the warning fell on unheeding ears."

The winter of 1915–16 was a highly critical period, and continuous warnings poured into Dublin Castle from responsible officials throughout the country. If these had been attended to the rising could even then have been stopped. The "conduct, zeal, and loyalty" of the Royal Irish Constabulary, who were responsible for order in the whole country outside Dublin, had never been put to a severer test, and never was the efficiency of that splendid force more thoroughly proved; that they did not strike in time and so prevent all the bloodshed and destruction that ensued was not their fault. The warning of Sir Neville Chamberlain, Inspector-General of the Royal Irish Constabulary, in which, nearly two years before the outbreak, he pointed out that the police would soon be far outnumbered by an armed and trained force in every county, and that the Volunteers would be in a position to dictate whether or not the law of the land should be carried into effect, has already been quoted, and later in the year 1914, when the war had begun, he reported that the Volunteer organization was disloyal, seditious, and revolutionary. At the same time the Commissioner of the Dublin Metropolitan Police warned the Government that the Volunteers might "attempt some escapade before long." As the Commissioners state, the heads of police were in possession of "full and exact reports as to the nature, progress, and aims of the various armed associations in Ireland. From these sources the Government had abundant material on which they could have acted many months before the leaders themselves contemplated any armed rising."

Lord Wimborne was now Lord-Lieutenant, having succeeded Lord Aberdeen in January, 1915, and he was approached in March, 1916, by Lord Midleton, a resident Irish peer who had

ON THE KINGSTOWN ROAD AT BALLS BRIDGE, DUBLIN.
Soldiers about to open fire on Sinn Feiners, who were sniping from houses two hundred yards away.

held high office in more than one Government, and who saw what was going on in his own county of Cork. The facts were pointed out, but as Lord Midleton stated in his evidence, "I gathered, although he did not say so in words, that he (the Viceroy) was unable to move further owing to the general attitude of the Government towards Ireland, which it was impossible to disturb." On St. Patrick's Day (March 17), however, things reached a stage when it was impossible any longer to ignore the danger. The Admiralty were, it is believed, in receipt of information regarding the preparations for Casement's sailing and for the shipping of 20,000 rifles and other munitions to Ireland that were going on at that moment at Wilhelmshaven, and the Sinn Fein Volunteers themselves indulged in a kind of full-dress rehearsal of the rising fixed for Easter—five weeks later. The Volunteers paraded the principal streets armed and in force, and, it was said, even went through the form of "occupying" the gates of the Castle and other public buildings. Corresponding manifestations were held throughout the country, and on this the Inspector-General of Police reported bluntly that the Irish Volunteers were "a pack of rebels," who would proclaim their independence on the first favourable opportunity. Further warning was contained in a letter intercepted by the Censor, in which the writer boasted of the St. Patrick's Day performance, and added that the Castle was watching the Volunteers closely, but was "afraid to do anything against them." They had marched, "all armed with rifles," through the main streets. They had "saluted" John MacNeill, their leader, "under the nose of the Castle," and had done the same in front of the "foreign college of Trinity" and the old

THE RUINED "LIBERTY HALL"
After it was captured by British troops.

Parliament House. After this one or two feeble and irresolute attempts to seize arms were made, whereupon the Council of the Volunteers issued a haughty manifesto stating that they would not submit to be disarmed, and that "the raiding for arms and the attempted disarming of men" would be met, "in the natural course of things," by resistance and bloodshed. The Chief Commissioner of the Dublin police now reported that "drastic steps" should be taken, as the Sinn Feiners were "gaining in numbers, in equipment, in discipline and in confidence," and that the longer such steps were delayed the more difficult they would be. This report reached the Under-Secretary on April 10. On April 12, the day on which Casement arrived at Wilhelmshaven, it reached the Chief Secretary, who sagely wrote upon it: "Requires careful consideration." And there it rested, the Chief Commissioner receiving no directions or orders. On the 19th, at a meeting of the Dublin Corporation, an Alderman Kelly declared that it was evidently the deliberate intention of the Government to cause bloodshed in Ireland by an attack on the Volunteers, and he protested against such an unprovoked outrage in a city which he declared was, "under God, the most peaceable in Europe." On the 18th, the day before, the Admiralty had received secret information from Germany of the sailing of Casement; the ship was timed to arrive in Ireland on Good Friday, the 21st, and the rising was fixed for the following day—Easter Eve, or Easter Sunday morning.

Even the Irish Executive could not close its ears to this news, and it began to consider the taking of steps that ought to have been considered and taken six months before. The Sinn Feiners and the Citizen Army were also somewhat unprepared and divided in their

councils. Of the former the most noisy and talkative would probably, when the critical moment approached, have been only too glad of some excuse to postpone a rising for which they had, in truth, little stomach. As far back as May, 1915, a resolution in favour of an immediate insurrection had been proposed by one of the fanatical extremists at the Council of the Irish Volunteers, and had been vetoed only by the personal influence of Professor John MacNeill, the chairman. At this last moment also the "intellectuals" showed signs of wishing to hold back, and some confusion in the ranks of the rebels was the result. They would have been only too willing to let the "40,000 Germans," of whom there had been so much talk throughout the country, land and fight their battles; but now when they heard that Casement was coming practically alone, and that the Castle was waking up, it was a different story. The Citizen Army, however, with its central office at Liberty Hall, was of tougher fibre, and was resolved to go on at all costs. This "Liberty Hall" was a ramshackle mansion in a decaying quarter of Dublin, near the docks, and had been the centre of Larkinite activity during the great dock and transport strike of 1913 and had ever since been the headquarters of the Irish Transport and General Workers' Union as well as of the Citizen Army, and the focus of disorder and sedition in Dublin. Funds were never lacking, and a printing press had been established there from which proceeded much of the seditious literature with which the country was permeated. At the last moment, in order to excite the people and to make it impossible to take any backward step, the Liberty Hall Press produced a bogus document purporting to be a circular containing orders for the immediate seizure by the police, at a given word, of all the members of the Sinn Fein National Council, of the Executive of the Irish Volunteers, of the Committee of the National Volunteers, and of the Council of the Gaelic League, together with the occupation by the military of the buildings identified with these bodies. This document was undoubtedly one of the proximate causes of the outbreak which it rendered inevitable, as was obviously the

RUINS IN BRIDGE STREET.
Removing a wrecked barricade.

intention of those who concoeted and circulated it. It was made the text of the speech of Alderman Kelly at the meeting of the Dublin Corporation on April 19, to which allusion has been made, and its wide circulation was intended to create, and did create, the idea that the Government was determined to have bloodshed at any cost and on any pretext.

As a matter of fact this "bloodthirsty" Government was still hesitating and irresolute. In England the politicians were, just at the moment, violently excited about the question of general service in the Army, and a break-up of the Government was declared to be imminent. The Chief Secretary was in London, prepared to admit, indeed, that the scheme for an insurrection in Ireland required "careful consideration," but otherwise taking no steps in the matter, whilst the Lord Lieutenant was completing arrangements for a holiday viceregal tour in Ulster with the usual junketing and speechmaking. The Admiralty alone was on the alert, and sent out from Queenstown a sloop to patrol the Kerry coast and await the arrival of the Aud with its cargo of arms and the German submarine with Sir Roger Casement on board. No doubt the Admiralty had good reason for keeping its own counsel. The Aud was challenged and stopped by the sloop Bluebell, while the submarine was apparently able to reach the coast, to land its passengers, and to get off again. Both the Aud and the submarine kept good time; indeed they appear to have arrived a day too soon. According to the Admiralty warning the landing was to have been on the 21st, and the rising a day or two later. But on the evening of the 20th a labourer named Hussey, while walking on Banna Strand, near Tralee, observed a deep red light out at sea, apparently about half a mile from the shore. This was, no doubt, the signal of the arrival of the boat and its cargo, but alas for the plotters there was nobody there to receive and return the signal, for Hussey was an industrious, honest man and knew nothing of plots or insurrections. If Casement had been able to land then and had been received by a band of volunteers with motor-cars, as was doubtless the arrangement, the arms and ammunition might have been distributed over the south-west of Ireland before morning and the ringleaders on their way to Dublin to take charge of matters there. But everything miscarried. The Aud making for Fenit Harbour, just south of Banna Strand, stood off till morning, when she was hailed by the Bluebell and asked to account for her movements: the submarine had by this time apparently, got rid of its burden and disappeared. The Aud flew Norwegian colours and declared that she was bound from Bergen to a port in Italy; the captain of the Bluebell, not satisfied, ordered her to follow him to Queenstown for further examination, but when just outside the harbour she hoisted the German flag, the crew put off in their boats, and were taken prisoners while the vessel herself blew up and sank. When divers went down the cargo was found, as expected, to consist of arms and ammunition.

Meanwhile events were happening on shore. Another peasant named MacCarthy went out before daylight on Good Friday morning for a walk on Banna Strand, and there he found, half waterlogged and drifting with the waves, a vessel of quite unusual construction—a little tub of a boat without keel or rudder and with four short oars which were also adrift. It was obviously designed so as to be packed and carried securely inside a submarine. It appears from Bailey's narrative that Casement, Monteith and himself had endeavoured to reach land with this craft, but they were not seamen, and as they made no allowance for the Atlantic surf, the boat capsized in shallow water and they had to wade ashore. They had some revolvers and a considerable quantity of ammunition which they concealed as best they could in the sand, and set out apparently to look for the insurrection. The immediate outlook seemed sufficiently hopeless. They were on a bleak exposed shore miles away from any means of communication; no one was there to welcome them; the submarine was gone, leaving them indeed with a boat but a boat which they were unable to handle. If the Aud had succeeded in landing her cargo of arms at Fenit or elsewhere there might still be a chance, as Tralee and the district had been well worked by German spies and agents. Lody, the German spy who was executed in the Tower, had been arrested at Killarney, not many miles off, and doubtless he had left plenty of ground bait behind. It is probable, in fact, that if the boat had arrived a day or two later it might have found a "procession" or "demonstration" in progress that would speedily have resolved itself into an armed force. But the derelicts on Banna Strand knew nothing of what was just then happening



A civilian tries to get through the barricade, but is stopped by a soldier.

Searching a cart for ammunition.

Examining passports. Circle on right: Searching a motor-car.

STREET SCENES IN DUBLIN.

RESCUING VALUABLES FROM SMOKING RUINS.

to the Aud, and they knew as little of the preparations, or lack of preparation, of their friends on shore. Early in the morning they were seen by a servant girl wandering on the sand dunes, and, later on, Monteith and Bailey were met making their way to Tralee, some miles off. Casement, possibly on account of weakness, had been left behind among the sandhills. At this point Monteith disappears from the story, ultimately, according to one account, making his escape to America with a companion whom he had met in Tralee; Bailey returned alone to the Strand, but was unable to find Casement.

Meanwhile the peasant who discovered the boat on the shore has spread the story: neighbours assemble to examine the scene; the revolvers are dug out of the sand and other discoveries suggest that the police should be communicated with. When the constables arrive from Ardfert, the nearest village, further search is made, Casement is found hiding in an old "rath" or earthen fort of prehistoric construction: Bailey also is run down. All are conveyed to Tralee, where a few arrests are made and the insurrection and invasion are at an end so far as the "Kingdom of Kerry" is concerned.

It was afterwards ascertained that here and there in Cork and in Kerry, and even across the estuary of the Shannon in the County of Clare, which lies immediately to the north of Kerry, there had been assemblages of men on the Friday and on the Saturday waiting anxiously for some messengers who did not arrive. They were Volunteers or would-be Volunteers, waiting for the arms that were never to be delivered. Casement was on his way to London to stand his trial for High Treason, and the police, who knew their duty as soon as they were permitted to perform it, had the leading local suspects safely under lock and key. In Tralee police-barracks Casement learnt something of what had been going on. He recognized that the game was up, sent for a priest and asked him to let the people know that he was Roger Casement, that he had failed, that the German arms and ammunition were at the bottom of the sea, that no more foreign aid was to be looked for and that a rising was hopeless. One local incident remains to be referred to before we leave Kerry. On the night of Good Friday a

motor car driving furiously passed through Killorglin, a village lying to the west of Killarney and south of Tralee. Outside Killorglin, on the Tralee road, the car took a wrong turning and plunged with all its occupants into the river Laune, which there begins to widen out into an estuary on its way to Dingle Bay. The three passengers were drowned. Two of the bodies were recovered and the men were found to be wearing Sinn Fein badges. The third body was carried out to sea. Were these men carrying round the fiery cross and calling on the faithful with final instructions to rally to Casement? Was the third man Monteith on his way back to Tralee to take charge of affairs there? It would seem that this dramatic incident with all its influence on the rising in Kerry and elsewhere will remain a mystery to the last.

"MAJOR" MACBRIDE (×).
One of the shot rebels.

We left Dublin in some confusion, the Citizen Army pushing forward for insurrection, the Sinn Feiners uncertain as to their plans and movements, the authorities in the Castle still in the dark but uneasy at the prospect before them. The news of Casement's landing and arrest became known on Saturday and those concerned behaved each after his kind. The Castle deliberated, the "intellectuals" of the Sinn Fein movement decided to postpone action, the Citizen Army decided to go ahead and act more vigorously than ever. At the end of March, as we have seen, the Inspector-General of the Royal Irish Constabulary had reported that the Volunteers throughout the country were "a pack of rebels" only awaiting the opportunity to proclaim their independence. A week later the Chief Commissioner of Police had reported to Dublin that they were gaining in numbers, equipment, discipline, and confidence, and that "drastic action" should be taken, yet nothing had been done in the interval to strengthen the garrison or to protect the Metropolis and the seat of Government and of military authority in the country, the Dublin police being an unarmed force. There were no guns nearer than Athlone, where four field pieces represented the artillery of Ireland, and the garrisons, including that of Dublin, were little more than training depôts. On April 22 the *Irish Volunteer* announced the holding of "a very interesting series of manœuvres" for Easter, a movement which "might well stand as a model for other areas." That evening such authorities as could be got together met in consultation in Dublin Castle. On the following day further consultations were held and it was then finally decided that the proper course was to seize the leaders of the movement. But the question at once arose: How to do it? There were no troops

JOHN MACNEILL.
President of the Sinn Fein Volunteers.

A MACHINE-GUN SECTION IN ACTION.

available for so serious a step, and long ago when Sir Neville Chamberlain, the Inspector-General, had warned the Government that the police would find themselves in every county confronted with superior force, his warning was ignored. Now the Executive realised, too late, that the witness was true. They were helpless with an armed insurrection at their gates, and they decided that they must wait till a sufficient military force was collected. No doubt they were strengthened in their idea that delay was safe by the failure of Casement in Kerry and by the decision of the moderate section to postpone action. This decision had been promulgated in Dublin late on Saturday evening in the following form :—

> Owing to the very critical position all orders given to Irish Volunteers for to-morrow, Easter Sunday, are hereby rescinded, and no parades, marches, or other movements of Irish Volunteers will take place. Each individual volunteer will obey this order strictly in every particular.
>
> EOIN MACNEILL,
> Chief of Staff, Irish Volunteers.

But Professor MacNeill, who was the founder of the Volunteers, had launched a movement which he was unable any longer to control. No "parades, marches or other movements" took place on Easter Sunday, it is true, but excited and angry consultations were held and the proclamation of the "Irish Republic" was drawn up, signed and printed at Liberty Hall and publicly read from the steps of that building by the Countess Markievicz, surrounded by her "staff." After that the boats were burnt and there was no going back. MacNeill's proclamation no doubt gave some of the more timid members the opportunity of stopping at home and taking no public part in the rising, but Liberty Hall, the Citizen Army, the Fenians and all the signatories of the proclamation—seven in number, MacNeill's name being omitted—were committed. The only official comment on MacNeill's countermanding order that saw the light was written five days later by P. H. Pearse, a schoolmaster, who called himself "Commandant General Commanding-in-Chief the Army of the Irish Republic and President of the Provisional Government." It was written when Pearse saw that the movement was hopelessly beaten, and it is additionally interesting as showing how well planned and how widely spread had been the movement for rebellion. After boasting that he and his friends had been "writing with fire and steel the most glorious chapter in the later history of Ireland," he went on to say :—

> I am satisfied that we should have accomplished more, that we should have accomplished the task of

enthroning as well as proclaiming the Irish Republic as a sovereign State, had our arrangements for a simultaneous rising of the whole country, with a combined plan as sound as the Dublin plan has been proved to be, been allowed to go through on Easter Sunday. Of the fatal countermanding order which prevented those plans from being carried out I shall not speak further.

Nor did the "fatal countermanding order" long hold the field. On the Sunday morning an armed body of members of the Citizen Army raided a quarry near Dublin and captured 250 pounds of gelignite which they conveyed in triumph to Liberty Hall and later in the day, as already stated, the Republic was proclaimed from the steps of that building. This, however, seems to have been an unauthorized piece of eccentricity and self-assertion on the part of the Countess Markievicz, as the formal proclamation by the self-elected Provisional Government —of which the Countess was not a member— did not take place till the following day. And so quietly was this first proclamation managed —or such was the state of disorganization in Dublin—that neither the authorities nor the Dublin newspapers appear to have heard of it at the time. A more formal defiance of MacNeill's order, the move which finally launched the rising in Dublin was issued early on Monday morning in the following shape :—

Dublin Brigade Orders, H.Q.
24th April, 1916.

(1) The four city battalions will parade for inspection and route march at 10 a.m. to-day.

(2) Full arms and equipment and one day's rations.

THOMAS MACDONAGH,
Commandant.

Coy. E. 3 will parade at Beresford Place at 10 a.m.

P. H. PEARSE,
Commandant.

Both MacDonagh and Pearse had signed the Manifesto read on the previous day and they and the others had decided that they must make the plunge in spite of their nominal chief.

While all this was going on, the Castle, a few hundred yards away, was still cogitating. On Monday morning it had secured the concurrence of the Chief Secretary to the proposed arrest and internment of the Volunteer leaders. No doubt the country's governors were congratulating themselves on a good day's work. It was holiday time : the Commander-in-Chief had gone to England, and many of his officers had gone off to the Ward Hunt Races at Fairyhouse, when the news suddenly arrived that the City was "up," that the Republic had been proclaimed at Nelson's Pillar, and that a series of commanding positions in the City were already in the hands of the rebels !

The proceedings of this extraordinary Easter Monday—the most calamitous day in the history of Dublin since that "Black Monday" many centuries before when the flower of its citizens, several hundred in number, Easter holiday making in Cullen's Wood, were set upon and

BARRICADE OF BARRELS ON BACHELORS WALK.
Smaller picture : Troops sniping in the streets.

FLOUR AND BREAD FOR THE POOR.

Taking away a supply of flour from a military depôt. Smaller picture: Giving bread to a hungry inhabitant.

massacred by the wild tribesmen from the neighbouring mountains—call for some description in detail. The minimizing statements issued by the Executive and the restrictions of the Censorship, no doubt necessary and inevitable at the time, together with the mendacious reports deliberately circulated by the rebels, combined to produce the impression even in friendly countries that a comparatively harmless street disturbance was ruthlessly suppressed in torrents of blood by a savage and oppressive Government. A more preposterous travesty of history was never concocted. We have already seen the "Commandant General of the Army of the Irish Republic" boasting of a "sound" and "combined" plan for simultaneous insurrection all over the country, and of the fact that he and his friends had been writing "in fire and steel" a new chapter in the history of Ireland; and it is necessary to point out that at the very outset, when the police had been driven off the streets, and before the soldiers were in a position seriously to begin the work of restoring order and authority, murder, pillage, and arson were the order of the day. That some of the leaders attempted to prevent this does not in the least modify or excuse the criminal recklessness of their conduct in letting loose the forces of crime and disorder in a notoriously turbulent city. And the outrage and bloodshed and destruction of a great capital that ensued must for ever lie at their doors, even when due allowance is made for the slackness and incapacity of an Executive which neglected all the duties with which it was entrusted. Unarmed and isolated policemen, soldiers and civilians were murdered at the very outset of the rebellion both in Dublin and in the country districts, and this is at once the explanation and the justification of the severity of the repression.

As we have seen, the four city battalions of the Volunteers were summoned—in defiance of their "Chief of Staff"—to parade at 10 o'clock "with full arms and equipment and one day's rations" at Beresford Place. Beresford Place is the open space in front of Liberty Hall, the headquarters of the Citizen Army, whose members assembled in full force at the same time. And at Liberty Hall the proclamation

of the Irish Republic had already been drawn up, signed and printed, in readiness for general distribution. Dublin is a compactly built city, divided pretty equally into north and south by the river Liffey, whose long lines of quays preserve an open and continuous thoroughfare from west to east. Canals with many bridges form a kind of boundary to the north and south. To the east it is open to the sea, and railways, with four terminal stations, form the connexion with the south, west, and north of the island. The Castle, the nominal Seat of Government of the country, lies in the centre and all the leading buildings, such as the Post Office, the Bank, and the Four Courts, lie within a few minutes' reach. Liberty Hall and the Custom House are a little to the east of Sackville Street, whose main ornament is the Post Office, an imposing porticoed edifice with Nelson's Pillar just opposite. All the main "strategic points" are easily reached, and a determined body of insurgents, with well-laid plans and favoured by a careless executive, can obtain control of the city within half an hour. This is what happened. The "parade" at Beresford Place suddenly resolved itself into an army of insurrection, and before the Castle knew what was going on its sceptre had departed, the unarmed city police had to withdraw quietly, and Dublin was at the mercy of the rebels.

It was about half-past 11 on this Easter Monday when the "army" in Beresford Place began to dissolve into sections which marched off to take up their appointed stations. At a quarter to 12 a motor-car containing the Provisional Government, and followed by a bodyguard of some 200 well-armed men, emerged from Beresford Place into Abbey Street, and marched down the street in the direction of the Post Office, where it had been decided that the Republic should establish its headquarters. The place was not badly chosen, seeing that the Post Office is, or rather was, an isolated, powerfully-constructed stone building, and commands the main street of the city. It also was the meeting place of the wires and cables that control electric communications all over Ireland and to England. A considerable number of the staff also were credited with Sinn Fein principles, so that there need be no difficulty about gaining access and securing control of the whole building before any alarm could be given. Everything went off according to programme. Arrived at the Post Office, the Volunteers entered with a rush, the public were cleared out of the rooms on the ground floor and the loyal employés ordered off at the revolver's point. The lower windows were barricaded, provisions were requisitioned from a hotel across the way, and everything set in order for a prolonged occupation till the "country" would rise and acclaim its new Government In order to leave no doubt as to their status or their intentions the green flag of the Independent Irish Republic was formally hoisted over the portico, while the leaders very solemnly appeared in the street, and from the foot of Nelson's Pillar read the proclamation establishing "The Provisional Government of the

SISTERS OF CHARITY DISTRIBUTING BREAD TO THE POOR
At North William Street after the Rebellion.

Irish Republic." The leading passages of this document are worth republication in order that friendly nations and an enquiring posterity may know and judge of the character of the whole undertaking which ended in such overwhelming and deserved disaster. There was no grievance or misgovernment alleged, no suggestion of Home Rule—simply a cry of unappeasable race hatred and revolutionary mania. England and the English people were a foreign Power that must be expelled from the country with the assistance of the Germans—Ireland's "gallant allies"—and the rebels were invited to stab the Empire in the back while engaged in a life-and-death struggle with the forces of barbarism and savagery in Europe. Here are the words:—

"Having organized and trained her manhood through her secret revolutionary organization, the Irish Republican Brotherhood, and through her open military organizations, the Irish Volunteers and the Irish Citizen Army, having patiently perfected her discipline, having resolutely waited for the right moment to reveal itself, she now seizes that moment, and, supported by her exiled children in America and by gallant allies in Europe, but relying in the first on her own strength, she strikes in full confidence of victory.

"We declare the right of the people of Ireland to the ownership of Ireland and to the unfettered control of Irish destinies to be sovereign and indefeasable. The long usurpation of that right by a foreign people and government has not extinguished the right nor can it ever be extinguished except by the destruction of the Irish people. In every generation the Irish people have asserted their right to national freedom and sovereignty: six times during the past three hundred years they have asserted it in arms. Standing on that fundamental right, and again asserting it in arms in the face of the world, we hereby proclaim the Irish Republic as a Sovereign Independent State, and we pledge our lives and the lives of our comrades in arms to the cause of its freedom, of its welfare, and of its exaltation among the nations. . . . Until our arms have brought the opportune moment . . . for the establishment of a permanent National Government, representative of the whole people of Ireland and elected by the suffrages of all her men and women, the Provisional Government hereby constituted will administer the civil and military affairs of the Republic in trust for the people."

This manifesto did not secure the support or signature of a single elected representative of any section of the Irish people, or of any man who had won influence by public services for Ireland. Its signatories were a convicted dynamiter, a handful of minor poets, journalists and schoolmasters, a junior corporation official, and a Syndicalist leader who had been sent over by Mr. Keir Hardie, and who had more than once been in collision with the law for offences against public order. All were killed in the course of the rising or by verdict of court-martial after it, and so they have passed from human judgment, but can anyone wonder at the hot indignation given expression to by the leader of the Irish Parliamentary party at the "wicked" and "insolent" claim of such men to speak for Ireland, and to drench their country with blood at the instigation of a foreign foe? The movement, wrote Mr. Redmond, was insane and anti-patriotic: "Germany plotted it, Germany organized it, Germany paid for it. So far as Germany's share in it is concerned, it is a German invasion of Ireland, as brutal, as selfish, as cynical as Germany's invasion of Belgium." The dishonest pretext of invoking Germany as the protector of the sovereign rights of nationalities and the heaven-sent redresser of Ireland's historic grievances was put out of court by the Irish leader in a stinging passage:

> What has Ireland suffered in the past that Poland, Alsace, Belgium, or Serbia have not suffered at the hands of Germany, and I may add also that portion of the soil of France, her old friend and ally, which is in the hands of Germany? What has been the record of Germany but the suppression of nationality, of freedom, and of language: in short, the suppression of all the things for which for centuries Ireland has struggled, the victory of which Ireland has achieved?

Mr. Redmond, in composing this passage, might well have had in mind the words in which Robert Emmet more than a century before had in his speech from the dock repudiated the charge of being an emissary of France:

> 'Tis false, I am no emissary. . . . On the contrary it is evident from the introductory paragraph of the address of the Provisional Government that every hazard attending an independent effort was deemed preferable to the more fatal risk of introducing a French army into the country. When the fluctuating spirit of French freedom was not fixed and bound by the chains of a military despot it might have been an

POBLACHT NA H EIREANN.

THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
OF THE
IRISH REPUBLIC
TO THE PEOPLE OF IRELAND.

IRISHMEN AND IRISHWOMEN: In the name of God and of the dead generations from which she receives her old tradition of nationhood, Ireland, through us, summons her children to her flag and strikes for her freedom.

Having organised and trained her manhood through her secret revolutionary organisation, the Irish Republican Brotherhood, and through her open military organisations, the Irish Volunteers and the Irish Citizen Army, having patiently perfected her discipline, having resolutely waited for the right moment to reveal itself, she now seizes that moment, and, supported by her exiled children in America and by gallant allies in Europe, but relying in the first on her own strength, she strikes in full confidence of victory.

We declare the right of the people of Ireland to the ownership of Ireland, and to the unfettered control of Irish destinies, to be sovereign and indefeasible. The long usurpation of that right by a foreign people and government has not extinguished the right, nor can it ever be extinguished except by the destruction of the Irish people. In every generation the Irish people have asserted their right to national freedom and sovereignty; six times during the past three hundred years they have asserted it in arms. Standing on that fundamental right and again asserting it in arms in the face of the world, we hereby proclaim the Irish Republic as a Sovereign Independent State, and we pledge our lives and the lives of our comrades-in-arms to the cause of its freedom, of its welfare, and of its exaltation among the nations.

The Irish Republic is entitled to, and hereby claims, the allegiance of every Irishman and Irishwoman. The Republic guarantees religious and civil liberty, equal rights and equal opportunities to all its citizens, and declares its resolve to pursue the happiness and prosperity of the whole nation and of all its parts, cherishing all the children of the nation equally, and oblivious of the differences carefully fostered by an alien government, which have divided a minority from the majority in the past.

Until our arms have brought the opportune moment for the establishment of a permanent National Government, representative of the whole people of Ireland and elected by the suffrages of all her men and women, the Provisional Government, hereby constituted, will administer the civil and military affairs of the Republic in trust for the people.

We place the cause of the Irish Republic under the protection of the Most High God, Whose blessing we invoke upon our arms, and we pray that no one who serves that cause will dishonour it by cowardice, inhumanity, or rapine. In this supreme hour the Irish nation must, by its valour and discipline and by the readiness of its children to sacrifice themselves for the common good, prove itself worthy of the august destiny to which it is called.

Signed on Behalf of the Provisional Government,

THOMAS J. CLARKE,
SEAN Mac DIARMADA, THOMAS MacDONAGH,
P. H. PEARSE, EAMONN CEANNT,
JAMES CONNOLLY. JOSEPH PLUNKETT.

THE PROCLAMATION OF AN "IRISH REPUBLIC."

excusable policy to have sought the alliance of France as was done in 1798. Then it might not have been so great a hazard to have accepted of French aid under a guaranteeing treaty such as Franklin obtained for America. But in the present day . . . reviewing the conduct of France to other countries, seeing how she has behaved to Switzerland, to Holland and to Italy, could we expect better conduct towards us? Let not then any man attaint my memory by believing that I could have hoped for freedom through the aid of France and betrayed the sacred cause of liberty by committing it to the power of her most determined foe.

The idea of a revolution made and paid for

FIREMEN PLAYING ON THE FLAMES IN SACKVILLE STREET.

in Germany did not appeal to any responsible section of the citizens of Dublin, although, with that timid subserviency to popular clamour and rhetorical fireworks which characterizes them, they did nothing to check or suppress it. The people gazed in mild amazement at the spectacle of a handful of men, most of whom they had never heard of before, declaring themselves the Government of Ireland, and seizing public buildings, looting hotels, and barricading the streets in the name of the Irish Republic. Ireland had been exceptionally prosperous during the war and on account of the war, and Dublin thought of nothing less than of any disturbance of the existing order of things. On this fine Easter Monday the streets were crowded with holiday makers, who took no particular notice of the Sinn Feiners marching and countermarching through their city. It was only when the windows of the Post Office began to be smashed, shots fired, and tramcars stopped and overturned that it dawned on them that serious mischief was afoot. Nor was it long ere the blacker side of the movement was shown. While the Post Office was being provisioned and barricaded as a fortified headquarters, other bodies of the rebels were sent to occupy certain houses and positions, anyone offering resistance being promptly shot. The first victim was a harmless, unarmed policeman at the Upper Castle Gate, who was deliberately murdered when he ventured to challenge the right of an armed mob to enter the Castle yard. It would have been the simplest thing in the world for the rebels, who numbered 30 to one, and amongst whom there were two women armed with revolvers, to push the constable aside and secure him, but they preferred murder. There was not even an adequate military motive for the crime, for no serious attempt was made to seize and occupy the Castle. They simply fired a couple of volleys at the windows across the Castle yard, and then went away on the appearance of a sentry who closed the gate. A very competent witness who watched the strange scene with growing amazement from his window across the street writes :

> The poor constable was a familiar figure at the gate. I often saw him as I looked out, and knew him as a kindly and courteous fellow with a pat on the head for the little children who used to come and gaze in through the railings at the Viceroy's House. The volunteers fired at him at four or five yards range and he died where he fell, a devoted priest kneeling by him while the shots rang round him in the mad attack on the seat of government in Ireland.

It will remain one of the mysteries of the rising why the rebels, having done so much, had not the courage to go further and seize and occupy the Castle. The gate was a very ordinary railing, such as might be seen at the foot of any gentleman's avenue, and could easily have been scaled or broken down. There were a few men in the guard room, but the story goes that they had no ammunition for their rifles ! At any rate, they did not attempt to shoot. Otherwise the place—which is only a

square of ordinary brick buildings—was practically undefended and—the day being a holiday—unoccupied. The Under-Secretary was in his room with a few clerks, and the Vicercgal apartments, turned into a hospital, were occupied by wounded men and nurses. The empty City Hall just by the Castle gate was seized and occupied by the rebels on their retirement from the more serious enterprise, and the *Daily Express* office just across the street was also rushed. This was the end of the greatest fiasco of the rebellion, the insurgents having achieved absolutely nothing and remaining in their new quarters only until they were dislodged by the military on the following day.

By this time things were moving at the Post Office. Aimless firing began from the windows and from the roof, and several passing civilians were shot before they realised what was happening. The first soldiers to fall were some Lancers, who had been out on escort duty that morning, accompanying a train of wagons with munitions to the Magazine in Phœnix Park. On their way back they came, all unsuspecting, down Sackville Street from the north end. As they passed the Post Office they were met with a volley from the roof, which killed four of the men, the rest making their escape. There were also several cases of isolated soldiers shot in the streets on their way back to barracks. Nothing on this first day, however, excited greater horror and indignation than the cold-blooded murder of a number of members of the Veterans' Corps, a body of elderly men such as are to be found in most of our cities who, being unfit for active service, go out at intervals for route marches and parades in order to "keep fit" and to show their sympathy and willingness to help in any way within their power. This corps had arranged a route march for Easter Monday and were returning, with unloaded rifles and without ammunition as usual, to Beggars Bush Barracks in the south of the city, when they were ambushed in Haddington Road and fired on without warning. Five of them were fatally, and about twice as many seriously, wounded before the survivors succeeded in reaching their barracks. Here is the simple story of a lady who saw the tragedy from her own window in Northumberland Road—a street crossing the end of Haddington Road—without any idea at the time of the

REMAINS OF A BUILDING AFTER BOMBARDMENT.
Wreckage in the streets of Dublin.

bloodthirsty work that was afoot in a civilized city :—

About 4.30, as I stand at the drawing-room window, I see a small detachment of the G.R. veterans : the afternoon has been warm, they look hot and tired. A sharp report rings out, a man in the foremost rank falls forward on his face, to all appearances dead, a ghastly stream of blood flowing from his head. His comrades make for cover—the shelter of a tree, the side of a flight of steps. Bullet follows bullet with lightning rapidity. The road is unusually deserted and silent until one of the veterans dashes across it and falls at the feet of a woman who sets up a wail of terror. I cannot bear to look and yet I feel impelled to do so. Of the six men by the tree only one is now standing —they must have lain down—but, no, they have fallen on their backs one over another—they are all wounded ! Oh, the horror of it all—what does it mean ? A wounded man is being borne in the direction of our house—we rush to open the door and offer assistance, but they take him next door. I cannot watch longer—I must go back to my mother, who is sitting quietly by the fire ; she is very old and frail, and must not know of what is passing, so I try to appear as usual. After chatting to her for a short time I return again to the window just in time to see a bareheaded white-coated doctor drive up in a motor car. He disappears into one of the houses, where he tends the wounded, some of whom are carried off to the hospital : the crowd which had gathered at the cross-road gradually melts away.

All this while the systematic occupation of the city and its approaches was being carried out, more or less according to arrangement. That there had been a carefully thought-out programme arranged and communicated to the various districts was proved by a note-book found on one of the Wexford rebels, containing a list of all the places to be seized in Dublin as soon as the rising was declared. Dublin, as has been explained, is well situated for such an operation, the railway stations and canal bridges being all within a compact radius. The military headquarters in Dublin—the Royal Barracks—are situated so as to control the entrance to the Phœnix Park, the Magazine and the King's Bridge Station, which leads to the Curragh Camp, in Kildare, where the bulk of the troops are generally placed. A little to the west, and nearer the Magazine, are the Island-bridge Barracks not far from Kilmainham Hospital, the residence of the Irish Commander-in-Chief. Covering an important bridge on the road leading due south are the Portobello Barracks. Mount Street Bridge and Balls Bridge are on the important Kingstown Road, the nearest barracks being at Beggar's Bush. The rebels no doubt knew the weakness of the Dublin garrison, and that there were scarcely enough troops to hold the buildings, so they were able to lay their plans without fear of serious interruption until reinforcements arrived. The most important position occupied from the point of view of the bloodshed that ensued was Mount Street Bridge, near the junction of the Pembroke and Northumberland Roads. This controlled the main road to the city from Kingstown, by which route troops from England must arrive, the few soldiers at Beggar's Bush being unable at first to render much assistance. Portobello Bridge in the south and Cabra Bridge in the north were also seized, the latter being convenient for the control of the Midland Great Western Railway, whose terminus at Broadstone was also occupied. At the same time the two workhouses, the North Dublin and the South Dublin, Jacob's biscuit factory and Boland's mill and bakery were seized, no doubt for provisioning purposes. The two most showy seizures, St. Stephen's Green and the Four Courts, were also the most useless as they commanded nothing and were in fact mere death traps for those who occupied them.

A SCENE AT THE CORNER OF MERCHANTS QUAY.

Ruins of a military tailor's shop.

Next to their failure at the Castle, the occupation of which would at any rate have constituted a high-sounding moral and diplomatic success, the neglect to seize Trinity College was the greatest mistake of the rebels. Here too they had an open gate before them if they had had the courage to take advantage of it. The College was almost empty but for a handful of men of the Officers Training Corps. When the city fell into the hands of the rebels and the mob, some stray soldiers and policemen found refuge in the College—above all, half a dozen "Anzacs" on leave—who proved invaluable. But at the first it was practically undefended and with its fine group of buildings and commanding situation it would have been of inestimable service. Held as it was for the Crown and with its windows lined by expert sharpshooters, it did perhaps more than any other military post to disorganize and paralyse the plans of the rebels. So long as Trinity was held in this fashion no attempt was possible to seize the Bank—the Old Parliament House on College Green—whose possession would have been, like that of the Castle, a conspicuous advertisement of success for the new Provisional Government. Then the College faces directly up Dame Street, at the head of which are the approaches to the Castle from the Four Courts direction. Finally, from one point or another of the College buildings, it was possible to keep under fire Carlisle Bridge and the lower part of Sackville Street. Even Butt Bridge and Beresford Place could to some extent be brought under fire, so that direct communication to and from the Post Office, the City Hall, Liberty Hall and St. Stephen's Green were rendered dangerous if not impossible. As for St. Stephen's Green itself, its occupation served no purpose whatever, except for the stopping of the Southern tramway service and the shooting or interning of a few unfortunate civilians who did not pay proper respect to the self-constituted authorities of the new Republic. It is surrounded by high buildings all of which can be entered from the back and its unfortunate "garrison" were all the time under fire from the roof and the upper windows of the Shelbourne Hotel, which dominates the whole square. The Countess Markievicz was apparently in charge here and in the College of Surgeons, to which the garrison were glad to escape when the square grew too hot to hold.

Another remarkable example of the utter unpreparedness of the Executive deserves to be mentioned among the incidents of this first day of the outbreak. Although the Viceroy and the Under-Secretary were at the moment considering the grave danger and the steps to be taken to meet it, the Phœnix Park, containing the Viceregal Lodge—the residence of the Lord-Lieutenant—and the Central Magazine, was left open and unguarded. Of course the proximity of the Royal Barracks, of Island Bridge Barracks and of the Headquarters Depôt of the Royal Irish Constabulary might be taken as precluding the idea of a serious occupation, but nothing whatever stood in the way of a raid before the garrisons were alarmed. As a matter of fact this is what occurred. The Magazine was seized by a motor party and it was even reported in Dublin that the Lodge had been raided, and His Excellency the Lord-Lieutenant carried off as a hostage. As for the Magazine it was taken without resistance. Instead of a Commandant and a strong garrison it appears that Commandant Playfair had been sent on service to the front and that Mrs. Playfair and her family had only a few soldiers for their defence and that of the Magazine. The rebels entered and shot the sentry as he endeavoured to make his way to Island Bridge Barracks to give the alarm. Mrs. Playfair was ordered to leave, the telephone was cut and the building set on fire. Mrs. Playfair's young son, who pluckily endeavoured to reach a neighbouring house where there was a telephone, was shot, and died next morning. Fortunately, in that as in other cases, the rebels were clumsy in carrying out their arrangements where explosives were concerned. The fire they kindled was extinguished by soldiers from Island Bridge Barracks before it reached the high explosives, and the rebels decamped, having accomplished nothing but murder.

Up to this time there had been no serious fighting—the insurgents as a rule meeting with little or no resistance—and a large proportion of the inhabitants of Dublin were not aware that anything remarkable was happening. As usual on such occasions the majority of the people in the streets were holiday makers from the country, many of whom spent the day quietly with their friends and only realized the situation when they arrived at the various railway stations in the evening on their way home and found that they could get no farther, most of the buildings being in the hands of the rebels and all trains stopped. Those living at a comparatively short distance from Dublin made the best of it by starting to walk home; many others, however, had to lie about the streets

or crowd into the churches for shelter When dark came on the baser elements of the populace, finding the streets clear of police, began looting such shops as they could break into, stealing whatever they could carry away. Sweet shops were generally attacked first, and after that premises where clothing, boots and hats, or even toys, were to be had. Meanwhile, skirmishing and "sniping" went on all night, many isolated soldiers and civilians being victims. So ended Dublin's first day of "Liberty Restored."

The authorities were still almost helpless for lack of soldiers. Lord Wimborne issued a proclamation notifying the people of the attempt "instigated and designed by the foreign enemies of our King and Country to incite rebellion in Ireland," and warning them that "the sternest measures are being, and will be, taken for the prompt suppression of the existing disturbances and the restoration of order," and that assemblies and crowds in the streets should be avoided. But there were as yet no means at hand for enforcing or even for widely circulating the proclamation. Nor was communication with England easy. Some Northern members of Parliament on their way to attend the important secret session of the House of Commons that had been summoned for Tuesday managed on Monday evening to make their way by road from Amiens Street station, the terminus of the Great Northern Railway, to Kingstown, and so to catch the Holyhead steamer, and they conveyed the news, which had reached none of the newspapers, to Westminster. But they had been anticipated by the Admiral on the station, who had sent a wireless message with such scanty details as could be collected warning the

REBELS BEING MARCHED OFF TO BARRACKS.

Smaller picture: Two of the Plunkett brothers (in uniform) waiting to be marched off, with others, under escort

CONVOY OF MILITARY STORES.
Passing through a danger zone.

Government, through the Admiralty, in London. The Curragh camp sent up such troops as could be spared, and the authorities in Belfast, which remained completely peaceful, were able to send up practically its whole garrison with a considerable contingent of police. But troops from England were urgently needed; those at hand, after all reinforcements, being only sufficient to throw a weak cordon across the city from King's Bridge Terminus to the Castle and thence down Dame Street to Trinity College, and to place sufficient garrisons in these important stations as well as in the Electric Power Station and the Telephone Exchange. These vital points had been overlooked by the rebels, who now found their forces completely cut in two, Liberty Hall and the Post Office being unable to communicate with or to support St. Stephen's Green and the City Hall, and *vice versa*.

Next morning, Tuesday, April 25, with no newspapers, postal delivery, trains or trams, and with the milk and vegetable supply cut off after the week-end holiday, Dublin woke up to the knowledge that something very serious was going on. The wildest rumours were naturally in circulation: German landings, the whole country in arms, the Castle a rebel stronghold, the Lord-Lieutenant a prisoner and a hostage. A few adventurous spirits made their way into the centre of the city to see the sights—of business there was no question—but most peaceable citizens, after being stopped once or twice either by the military cordon or by a rebel sentry, were glad to get home again and await the course of events. It was then, and still is, difficult to obtain a proper chronological account of the facts—one witness positively fixing a certain event on Tuesday, whilst another is equally certain that it took place on Wednesday. Lord Wimborne, reinforced by the approach of troops from England, with a proper supply of artillery, machine guns and armoured cars, opened on Tuesday morning with a much more vigorous and effective proclamation than his "warning" of the previous evening:

WHEREAS in the City of Dublin and the County of Dublin certain evil-disposed persons and associations with the intention of subverting the authority of the Crown in Ireland have committed divers acts of violence, and have with deadly weapons attacked the forces of the Crown, and have resisted by armed force the lawful authority of His Majesty's Police and Military Forces:

AND WHEREAS by reason thereof several of His Majesty's liege subjects have been killed and many others severely injured, and much damage to property has been caused:

AND WHEREAS such armed resistance to His Majesty's Authority still continues:



LETTER FROM SIR ROGER CASEMENT TO JOSEPH

The letter, which is dated February 17, 1914, refers to the arming of Irish (Sinn Fein)

Now We, Ivor Churchill, Baron Wimborne, Lord Licutcnant-General and General Governor of Ireland, by virtue of all the powers thereunto enabling us, do hereby proclaim that from and after the date of this proclamation and for the period of onc month thercafter the City of Dublin and County of Dublin are under and subject to Martial Law, and We do hereby call on all loyal and well-affectcd subjects of the Crown to aid in upholding and maintaining the peace of the Realm, and the supremacy and authority of the Crown.

The proelamation goes on to promulgate the usual warnings against the dangers of the streets and the neeessity for all loyal persons to remain indoors, and eoncludes as follows:

And We do hereby proclaim that all persons found carrying arms without lawful authority are liable to be dealt with by virtue of this proclamation.

Given at Dublin this 25th Day of April 1916.

Wimborne.

By this time such of the insurgents as were eapable of reasoning must have begun to realise their position. Outside their own ranks no one in Dublin had paid any attention to them, and even with the poliee and military in abeyanee they had not been able to advanee an ineh beyond the places they had originally seized. The cordon across the eity was strengthened and held fast, and their seouts brought the disquieting information that a similar military cordon was being pushed north from King's Bridge and along the Cireular Road and down to Amiens Street station, getting into touch with the troops already in oeeupation of Trinity College by Butt's Bridge and the Fire Brigade station. The headquarters at the Post Offiee, Liberty Hall and the Four Courts were now entirely isolated, and their reduetion was only a question of time. In this desperate situation the Provisional


Really I should be glad to
get them. The truce is
going by fast & soon they
will have lost their value abroad
& it was foreign parts I wanted
them. The only things I'm reed were
the two parcels of Coffins in London
— & I'm not sure a Leprecaun Except
one I bought in Dublin.
Will you please ring up those lazy
beggars. Somewhere & see they are sent to
me here. Yours truly
R. Casement

PLUNKETT, ONE OF THE "PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT."
Volunteers. The word "Coffins" is supposed to mean rifles and "Leprecauns" revolvers.

Government saw that its only hope lay in trying to convince the people of Dublin that, as the country was rising and victory could not be long delayed, it was the duty and the interest of the capital to rally to the Republic. Accordingly a proclamation was issued, a few extracts from which will enable readers to judge of its general tenor:

> The country is rising in answer to Dublin's call, and the final achievement of Ireland's freedom is now, with God's help, only a matter of days. The valour, self-sacrifice, and discipline of Irish men and women are about to win for our country a glorious place among the nations.
>
> All citizens of Dublin who believe in the right of their country to be free will give their allegiance and their loyal help to the Irish Republic. Every Irishman and Irish woman worthy of the name will come forward to help their common country in this her supreme hour.
>
> Able-bodied citizens can help by building barricades in the streets to oppose the advance of the British troops. The British troops have been firing on our women and on our Red Cross. On the other hand, Irish regiments in the British Army have refused to act against their fellow countrymen.

This last audacious fabrication was destined to receive its appropriate answer before the ink on it was dry. Cabra Bridge has been mentioned as a northern outwork of the rebel position, and here on this Tuesday afternoon the insurgents were destined to come for the first time into serious contact with the troops—Irish troops, as it happened—and they found the experience much more lively and less satisfactory than the shooting of helpless veterans or isolated sentries or civilians. Strong barricades had been erected both on Park Road and on Cabra Road at the point where the Charleville Road joins, and near Phibsborough Church, and houses overlooking the barricades had been occupied in force by well-armed parties. Visitors endeavouring to get home found themselves stopped here on Monday evening, and the rebels fired on all officers and men in uniform and seized their cars. On Tuesday a body of the Dublin Fusiliers, with the first guns that had arrived, were sent to clear away the obstruction and open a way into the centre of the city. As soon as the soldiers came in sight of the rebel position a shell or two sent the barricades flying and the Fusiliers carried the post by a brisk charge

assisted by fire from a couple of machine guns. So was ended the legend that Irish troops, and the Dublin Fusiliers above all, would not help in clearing their city from the armed mob that had disgraced it and blackened its name in the eyes of the world. An attempt was made to stop the Fusiliers by blowing up the Cabra Bridge and the bridge crossing the Midland Railway, but as elsewhere the explosions failed; some of the rebels surrendered and some made their escape across country in the direction of Glasnevin and Finglas and were heard of no more. The soldiers then made their way down Capel Street and joined their comrades at the Castle, where they were able to take part in the final scenes of the recapture of the City Hall and the *Daily Express* office.

Late on Monday night the troops who had arrived at the Castle from King's Bridge, as part of the cordon stretching on to Trinity College, had begun to make things uncomfortable for the garrison of the City Hall, which was attacked simultaneously in front and rear. A machine gun mounted on the roof of one of the buildings that go to form the Castle yard also did much execution and kept the snipers on the roofs of the City Hall and the *Daily Express* office under salutary control. Another machine gun appeared at the gate of the Castle, where the constable had been murdered earlier in the day, and raked all the windows of the office, thus securing quietness in that quarter for the rest of the night. Tuesday saw the last of both these rebel "forts." The City Hall roof was cleared, 25 prisoners, including some women, being taken. Afterwards the *Express* office was rushed at the point of the bayonet, many dead bodies being found on the roof, and all danger in the Castle quarter was at an end.

Some other incidents of this day, the second in the history of the unhappy "Republic," deserve record. Looting in the streets not occupied by the military was worse than ever, the news of goods to be had for nothing having spread over all parts of the city. The attacks became more determined and more disorderly, wanton destruction being apparently as much an object as plunder. Sackville Street, where the conflagration had not yet started, suffered most, and women and men were seen making their way to the slums with bundles of clothing. A considerable amount of barter went on, boots, sweetmeats and jewellery possessing rapidly fluctuating values according to the state of the exchange. Tall silk hats were a drug in the market, being kicked about the streets freely, whilst small boys exercised their ingenuity in attempting to wear two or three of them at the same time. Expensive mechanical toys and dolls were in much demand, and the papers mentioned the case of a very small urchin who rode gloriously home on a tricycle horse with an air gun over his shoulder. It is on this day and in this connexion that we get the first glimpse of the Sheehy Skeffington episode which was shortly after to have a tragic sequel. Skeffington was an extremist in his way, but also a pacifist, a non-resister and a faddist generally. He adhered to the new "government" without approving of the violence with which its proclamation was accompanied. Above all the sight of the looting disgusted him from more than one point of view, and he made an attempt to stop it. This is the incident as described by an eye-witness in a Dublin publication:

> At 12.45 (on Tuesday) Mr. Sheehy Skeffington walks hastily from the General Post Office to O'Connell Bridge. He is in private attire and wears knickerbockers. In one hand he carries some papers and in the other a brush. He pastes one of the papers on the Smith O'Brien monument, around which a crowd gathers eager to read the proclamation. Here is a copy:
>
> "When there are no regular police on the streets, it becomes the duty of the citizens to police the streets themselves and to prevent such spasmodic looting as has taken place in a few streets. Civilians, men and women, who are willing to co-operate are asked to attend at Westmoreland Chambers at five o'clock this, Tuesday, afternoon. "FRANCIS SHEEHY SKEFFINGTON."

It was while posting this or a similar manifesto that Skeffington later on came into collision with an officer stationed at Portobello Barracks, with fatal consequences that were detailed at a subsequent Court Martial, when the officer was found to be insane.

All this evening troops were being landed at Kingstown ready for the march on Dublin—conveyance by train being at an end for the time—with horse, foot and artillery; worst of all, as the rebels were to find, with naval guns. And from the sea too the iron ring was closing in on the doomed conspirators, for the little gunboat Helga was lying in the mouth of the Liffey ready to sail up the river in the morning and blow Liberty Hall to the four winds with a few well placed shells.

And that a touch of somewhat grim humour may not be lacking, the tale goes that a non-chalant Tommy, ready for whatever fate had in store for him, asked, on landing at Kingstown, whether he was in France, whilst others, having heard of Ireland, asked if they had been brought to fight "Carson's crowd."

CHAPTER CXXXV.

THE IRISH REBELLION OF APRIL, 1916 (II.).

Situation on April 26—The Rebel Positions and Prospects in Dublin—Troops from England—Proclamations—Fighting in South Dublin—Sherwood Foresters Trapped on the Kingstown Road—North Dublin Fighting—The Great Fires in Sackville Street and Abbey Street—General Maxwell's Command—Confusion among the Rebels—The Country Risings—Galway's "Black Belt"—Oranmore—Athenry—Skerries—Donabate—Castle Bellingham Outrages—Ashbourne—Limerick—Kerry and Cork—Enniscorthy—General Maxwell's Grip on Dublin—The Rebels Surrender—Estimate of Casualties—Rebel Leaders Shot—Courts-martial—General Maxwell's Report—The Casement Trial—The Royal Commission of Inquiry—Mr. Asquith Visits Ireland—Proposal for Settlement—Government Bill Postponed.

THE morning of Wednesday, April 26, was a gloomy dawn for the rebels. Dublin, except for the looters and marauders of the underworld, had not moved. Not a single trade society or political society or municipal organization of any kind had declared for the Provisional Government of the Irish Republic. They had failed at the Castle and had been driven from the City Hall and neighbouring buildings at the point of the bayonet. Their attempt to control communications to the west and the south and the north had come to nothing at King's Bridge, at Broadstone, and at Amiens Street, although they strangled the Great Northern line to some extent by their command of the Fairview district, an old Larkinite stronghold, and by the rising at Swords and Donabate. Communications by road and rail to Kingstown they still dominated at Westland Row, and down towards Lansdowne Road station; their positions at Boland's Mill, the Old Distillery, Mount Street Bridge, and at the junction of Pembroke Road, Northumberland Road, and Lansdowne Road, were still unchallenged. All their southern positions, however, including those at St. Stephen's Green and the South Dublin Union, were cut off by the now well-established military cordon from King's Bridge, along Thomas Street (the scene of Emmet's fiasco), past the Castle to Trinity College and on to Butt's Bridge and the Custom House. The northern cordon from the Park to Amiens Street by the North Circular Road was also firmly held, so that the rebel forces were broken in two and completely isolated, although indeed they had rigged up a rather amateurish wireless installation on a roof opposite the Post Office. Inside the military cordon to the north of the river, the Post Office, the Four Courts, the quays and buildings at the foot of Sackville Street, and Liberty Hall, were their main points of support. Pearse in his last manifesto had called on Dublin for "allegiance and loyal help to the Irish Republic," and on the country to rise "in answer to Dublin's call." Town and country alike had made no sign that could reach the rebel headquarters.

General Maxwell's report, written on May 25, when the rising was over and all danger at an end, showed that on the fatal Easter Monday there were only available in the Dublin area

1,465 infantry (Royal Irish Rifles, Royal Irish Regiment, and Dublin Fusiliers) with 76 officers, and 851 cavalry (6th Reserve Cavalry Regiment) with 35 officers. And these, before everything else, had five barracks to garrison, and Dublin Castle, the Viceregal Lodge, the Magazine, the Royal Hospital, and the Bank to protect. There were, in addition, the mobile column (3rd Reserve Cavalry Brigade), under the command of Colonel Portal, at the Curragh, 30 miles off, a battery of four 18-pounders at Athlone, 78 miles off, and some soldiers, who might or might not be spared, at Templemore, 79 miles off, and at Belfast, 113 miles off. If the rebels were to have the slightest chances of even a temporary success, it was therefore necessary for them to secure command of all Dublin before reinforcements began to arrive, and having failed in this, their failure was complete.

And yet, even on Wednesday, it was pretty certain that the Provisional Government had little idea of the real hopelessness of their position. They had plenty of rifles, ammunition, and food, and in the two days' street fighting they had probably inflicted as many casualties—police, civilians, and soldiers—as they had suffered. In their amazing and childlike ignorance of the world in which they lived they imagined, or had persuaded themselves, that the British Army was all engaged in the war, that the police would be surrounded and captured by the rural rebels, and that German submarines could prevent the arrival of reinforcements. They had also evolved a theory—it would be incredible were it not vouched for by good testimony—that if they could hold out for three days they would *ipso facto* become "belligerents," and therefore entitled, whatever happened, to take part in the Peace Conference at the end of the war and discuss terms of settlement as equals. But the worst mistake of all was that they had forgotten the existence of the British fleet, whose smallest fighting vessel could blow their most formidable stronghold into a dust heap in a few hours. At Cork and at Kingstown guns and men had already been landed from the fleet, some were even now in Dublin, and in the early morning Liberty Hall saw its fate in the shape of the Helga, a fisheries patrol vessel, lying off the Custom House, and within point blank range of the Larkinite headquarters, from whose doorstep three days before the first formal defiance of England had been delivered by the Countess Markievicz. At eight o'clock the Helga opened fire, and then, as a local chronicler put it, "Dublin for the first time in her history heard the booming of naval guns in the heart of the city." The Citizen Army did not wait

LANCERS PATROL AT COLLEGE GREEN.

LANCERS IN DUBLIN.
A picket on duty passing through a barricade.

for more. Without firing a shot they bolted like rats from a stack and made their way by back passages and slums to Abbey Street and the comparative safety of Sackville Street. The Helga gunners, as one of them put it, "had the time of their lives." They sent a few dropping shots which without making any great mark on the exterior of the building were so well aimed that they came down through the roof and, exploding, completely demolished the interior. At the same moment, and in order to make a clean job of it, two guns of the Field Artillery just arrived, cantered out of the back gate of Trinity College in Great Brunswick Street, and with some well-placed shots from the quay at the end of Tara Street completed the work. It was nothing more than target practice, but those of the rebels who carried the news to the Post Office, or who saw the scene from "Kelly's Fort," at the corner of Bachelor's Walk, must have seen in it the end of the last of their hopes. It is worth noting at this point, in view of the assertion so freely made that it was the shells from the guns that caused the conflagration in the Sackville Street area later on, that the Beresford Place shelling, thorough and complete as it was, was followed by no sign of fire.

Meanwhile reinforcements from the 59th Division had begun to arrive from England, the bulk of the Dublin work having hitherto fallen on the mobile column from the Curragh. On this day Dublin saw two new proclamations, one from the King and one from General Friend, Commander-in-Chief of the Forces in Ireland. The first Proclamation was of a purely technical and legal character, and dealt with the first section of the Defence of the Realm (Amendment) Act, 1915. This is the section which provides for the trial by Civil Court of British subjects charged with offences under the Act. Sub-section 7 of the same section provides for the suspension by Royal Proclamation of this proviso in case of certain special military emergencies, and the Royal Proclamation, dated from Windsor Castle, simply declared that, such a military emergency having arisen, the operation of the section was accordingly suspended in Ireland "until We see fit to revoke this our proclamation." General Friend's proclamation ordered all loyal citizens in Dublin City and County to remain within doors between the hours of 7.30 p.m. and 5.30 a.m. unless provided with military passes. The military now felt themselves strong enough to throw out tentacles, as it were, from the main cordon with the object of still further isolating the rebel positions. Of course, these buildings could have been blown to pieces by the guns as Liberty Hall had been, but to avoid so far as



SKETCH-MAP OF DUBLIN.

possible all unnecessary destruction of property a more deliberate method was employed. The tightening of the noose round headquarters and the Post Office was the first task, and this was accomplished by three columns directed from the Government strongholds on the south side of the river. The first left the Castle and, crossing by Essex Bridge, moved up Capel Street, which runs parallel to Sackville Street on the west; the other, from Trinity College, crossed Butt Bridge and went up Gardiner Street, lying about the same distance to the east. Reaching Great Britain Street—re-christened Parnell Street—the two bodies joined forces at the head of Sackville Street where the Parnell Statue stands. The third column, from King's Bridge, went up Queen Street into North King Street, through which they were able to pass until they joined hands with the Capel Street column. The Post Office and the Four Courts were now effectively isolated from the rest of the city and from each other. This important movement was carried out by the 5th Leinsters, 2/6 Sherwood Foresters, the 3rd Royal Irish Regiment and the Ulster Composite Battalion, under the command of Colonel Portal.

While these necessary precautions were being taken, some very fierce and costly fighting was taking place on the south side in the same district in which the veterans had been fired on on Easter Monday. This position was remarkably well chosen. It was in close connexion with the position at Ringsend, comprising Boland's Mill, the Distillery and the Gas Works. From this the rebels pushed forward by the canal basin to Clanwilliam Place, which faces and controls Mount Street Bridge and Northumberland Road. At the junction of Northumberland Road and Haddington Road is Clanwilliam House, and lower down, where Pembroke Road, Northumberland Road, and Lansdowne Road meet, is Carisbrooke House. All these had been forcibly occupied by the rebels, the occupiers being treated with little ceremony, and as they completely commanded the approaches to Dublin from Kingstown and were built in the solid, substantial manner characteristic of Dublin architecture, they constituted a very strong position indeed, hardly to be approached or taken without artillery. Up this road, little dreaming of the ambush prepared for them, came on Tuesday afternoon the first contingent of the reinforcements from England, the 7th Battalion Sherwood Foresters (Territorials), all young troops still in the training stage. Fire was first opened from Carisbrooke House and many fell at the very outset, the young soldiers facing the bullets with great courage, but being quite unable to deal effectively with sharpshooters on roofs and behind windows in inaccessible buildings. Beggar's Bush Barracks, which is in the immediate vicinity, and in which the survivors of the Veterans' Corps and various fugitives had taken refuge, was itself besieged and unable to render any effective assistance. The barracks and the barrack yard were continuously "sniped" from Boland's Mill and other buildings in the occupation of the rebels, and many

AFTER THE REBELLION.
Clearing away débris in Liffey Street.

casualties occurred. This continued till Wednesday afternoon, when the garrison was strengthened by a detachment of the Notts and Derby Territorials, who landed at Kingstown and marched to Ballsbridge, whence they reached the barracks by Shelbourne Road, thus avoiding the danger area. If the Sherwoods and the Staffords, who were ahead of them—all alike being strangers to the district and ignorant even of the existence of the barracks—had been warned in time, and guided by the same road, much bloodshed might have been spared.

The lady whose diary has been already quoted, who saw the shooting of the members of the Veterans' Corps from her window in Northumberland Road on Monday, and who had now realized the nature of the insurrection, wrote of these later events as follows :

The morning hours pass quietly, but at noon the sudden report of a rifle breaks the silence. I run to the window. Khaki-clad figures are creeping along both sides of the road, getting what shelter they can from the low stone walls supporting the iron railings. I hastily close all shutters, fearing a repetition of Monday's scenes, but it is the soldiers who have come, and we rejoice. We take up a position on the landing at the top of the kitchen stairs, as being the safest spot, and for more than an hour we listen to the sounds of battle. There seem to be many men engaged : we think some are in our garden or on the steps. The soldiers are attacking the two corner houses, No. 25 opposite and 26 and 28 on our side of Northumberland Road. We fear that they are wavering, for I hear a voice shouting, "You won't give way now, boys!" Almost immediately there is a hurried knock at the side door. We run to open it. "May wounded men be brought in here?" We gladly welcome them, and hurry to give the little help in our power, bring water, towels, cushions to put under their poor heads. The two brought in are, alas very badly wounded—the adjutant of the Sherwood Foresters is unconscious, and the poor young lieutenant is in great pain. The doctor of the regiment and some Red Cross men are with them, but so hurriedly had they been started for Ireland that no medical supplies or comforts had yet arrived, and it was some time before any anæsthetics could be procured.

We lose count of time, and meals are forgotten, except to provide tea and bread for the soldiers, who have had no proper meal since they left their quarters. All day long the battle rages—the noise is terrible ; revolvers, rifles and machine-guns are doing their deadly work. More wounded lie outside, but can only be brought in under cover of darkness. The adjutant still lies unconscious on our dining-room floor : a Red Cross man keeps watch beside him. The doctor advises us to take my mother to another room. We try the drawing-room, but a bullet crashes through the window : the mirror over the mantelpiece is shattered, the floor is strewn with glass, it is too unsafe. I bring my mother back ; the poor adjutant is dead, they carry him to the hall.

Suddenly there is a tremendous crash. A bomb

IN THE RUINED STREETS OF DUBLIN.
Hunting among the wreckage for souvenirs.

has been thrown in order to drive the rebels from a house a few yards distant. The aim is true; a cheer goes up; the glass round our hall door is smashed by the concussion. Upstairs in my mother's bedroom another bullet comes crashing through a window, but does no further damage. About 8.30 p.m. the firing ceases; they tell us that the houses in our vicinity are all now in the possession of the military; the wounded have been removed, and we are left to take what rest we can. All night we hear the sound of marching feet: no word is spoken, only a steady tramp, and every now and then the report of a sniper's rifle. The doctor tells me that a whole division, consisting of more than 15,000 men, have come to help us—Thank God!

27th: Much sound of firing from early morning until about 6 p.m. More houses in the neighbourhood are taken by the military. A naval gun is brought up from Kingstown on a cart, which does great execution, and is brought back amid cheers. Soldiers are posted on the roofs of the houses between us and the bridge over the Canal (Mount Street Bridge). They fire continually towards the railway bridge, which is still a stronghold of the rebels. Our food supplies are becoming short; the milkman cannot reach us, nor yet the baker's van, neither can we venture out to seek for food.

28th: Still more soldiers come! They halt before reaching the cross-road, a volley is fired, and in detachments of 25 or so they take the crossing at a run. Poor weary fellows! I saw them sit down in the ranks while waiting for their turn, yet never a man fell out amongst all those I watched. Next come the ammunition wagons—the finest sight of all as the drivers each whipped up his pair of strong, shaggy-hoofed horses, and in one breathless moment they took the crossing at a gallop.

The terrible noise of firing goes on around us all day and far into the night.

A strange contrast: the troops as they marched citywards met with a varied reception; from the houses which had been seized by the Sinn Feiners a murderous fire from rifles and revolvers was poured upon them; from others, not in the direct firing line, sallied forth ladies and their maids bearing trays with cups of tea and plates of bread and jam to feed the hungry men; it made quite a festive scene under the bright sunshine which marked some of the days of the tragic week.

The fighting in this quarter was prolonged and desperate. The soldiers, hastily assembled and hurried across from England, often with very inadequate equipment, and some of them with but little acquaintance with the service rifle, behaved splendidly in a situation that would have tried veterans to the utmost. Under persistent and well-directed fire they advanced again and again, and towards evening, with the help of grenades, they succeeded in carrying Carisbrooke House and Clanwilliam House in succession. Much hard fighting was necessary before Mount Street Bridge and Clanwilliam Place on the opposite side were carried, and ultimately artillery had to be called in before the whole of the Ringsend area was cleared. Here, as elsewhere, the doctors

and nurses behaved with splendid bravery and devotion. Sir Patrick Dun's Hospital lies just at the back of Clanwilliam Place, and close to Boland's bakery, and therefore almost in the line of fire. People were shot in front of the hospital—in which 142 casualties were treated—the staff venturing out in the thickest fire to pick up and carry in the wounded.

General Maxwell reported on this fighting, which, of course, took place before his arrival, that at the first onset the Adjutant, Captain Dietrichsen, and another officer were killed, and seven officers wounded, and when in the evening the whole column, with bombing parties, advanced in successive waves, four officers were killed and fourteen wounded, and 216 of other ranks were killed and wounded. He also makes special mention of civilian help rendered: "In connexion with this fighting at Mount Street Bridge, where our heaviest casualties occurred, I should like to mention the gallant assistance given by a number of medical men, ladies, nurses, and women servants, who at great risk brought in and tended to the wounded, continuing their efforts even when deliberately fired at by the rebels."

The other outlying position—to the north—also made a hard fight, but the casualties there were much slighter, the situation being a more open one, and the assailants not brought under such close fire. Fairview lies some little distance up the Great Northern Railway and in the Clontarf district—famous for its battle on a Good Friday, nearly a thousand years before, when Brian Boru fought the Danish King of Dublin. The rebels at first occupied the railway bridge on the Clontarf Road and the adjacent embankment, but on Tuesday night they were driven out, although it was not till

BRITISH TROOPS MARCHING ALONG THE QUAYS.

some four days later that all armed resistance in this dangerous quarter was subdued. Although so near Dublin, this suburb was practically cut off for the greater part of the week, and was in danger of starvation, till a relief train was made up in Belfast and arrived with welcome supplies on Saturday morning. Inside the City proper, things continued hopeless for the rebels. Armoured cars, loopholed for sharpshooters, were simply constructed out of engine boilers fitted on motor lorries, and in each of these a dozen men could be conveyed from point to point, and were able to answer the snipers' fire on more equal terms. St. Stephen's Green, the holding of which was the most foolish undertaking of the rebels, was simply surrounded and held until troops were available to dispose of it. The garrison attempted to dig themselves in by some very ineffective trench work, whilst the soldiers with machine guns at the upper windows of the Shelbourne Hotel kept them in very effective check. There was much ornamental water in this beautiful little park, which was well stocked with waterfowl, and the keeper, who remained inside all the time, reported that his charges were well looked after and fed by him, and were very little perturbed by the bullets flying over their heads. Outside the Green, the College of Surgeons was also occupied, and here the insurgents found themselves much better protected from bullet fire than in the square. Jacob's biscuit factory and the South Dublin Union also held out, but these positions were of no real strategic importance. North of the river the Post Office and the Four Courts, together with the two buildings at the foot of Sackville Street—"Kelly's Fort" and Hopkins's at the opposite corner—caused much trouble, although the latter were well covered from the south side of the river—from Trinity College, Westmoreland Street, and D'Olier Street. The guns also were being brought into play, and the Post Office was shelled both from across the river and from the head of Sackville Street.

At this point the fires began, and with the assistance of the report of Captain Purcell, Chief of the Dublin Fire Brigade, we can trace pretty accurately their origin and their spread. As early as Monday night there were two alarms in Sackville Street—both shoe shops that had been looted and set on fire by the mob. These fires were easily extinguished, but were followed by a third outbreak in Earl Street, just off Sackville Street. On

AFTER THE REBELLION.
The ruins in Sackville Street.

AFTER THE REBELLION.

Smoking ruins on the side of the Liffey. Smaller picture: Ruins of a rebel stronghold on the south bank of the Liffey.

Tuesday afternoon a serious fire broke out in Lawrence's well-known photograph, stationery and toy shop, and on Wednesday at noon this was followed by one in a shop in Henry Street, at the back of the Post Office, which was also being looted. In all these cases there was no suggestion of shell fire, and the damage can only have arisen from the carelessness or the malice of the looters. The fire brigade easily extinguished these fires or kept them under control, although two persons were shot while standing beside the engine at the corner of Henry Street, this being the beginning of an experience which ultimately drove the fire brigade off the streets and left Sackville Street and the neighbourhood to its fate. Early on Thursday morning there was a bad fire in Harcourt Street, near St. Stephen's Green, and on the brigade making an entry they found a dead insurgent with a rifle, a bag of ammunition, and two revolvers.

We now come to the great fire, which was not extinguished till some millions' worth of property was destroyed—a conflagration which, if there had been a high wind, might have consumed half the city. The Post Office was at this time being shelled, and it is, of course, possible that the fire may have arisen in this way from a stray shot, but there was no evidence either way. On the one hand, there were many cases during the week of buildings destroyed by shell fire without further consequences; and on the other, there were many fires directly caused by looters. What intensified the evil was that owing to the fire of the snipers the fire brigade was from this time on unable to pay proper attention to the outbreaks as they occurred. The great fire began in Abbey Street at the Sackville Street end. Here there had been a barricade erected by the rebels on the same model as half a dozen others, quite as useless, in other parts of the city. It was composed of old furniture, bicycles, and bales of paper, and is



MAP OF IRELAND.

mentioned here only as it was the means of conveying the fire across Abbey Street, and thus more than doubling its area. The reserve printing office of the *Irish Times* was the scene of the outbreak, the office being unoccupied at the time. The fire was observed from the Central Station shortly after noon, and Captain Purcell reported, "as the area was the scene of terrible rifle firing at the time, I did not allow the brigade to attend." The fire brigade chief speaks of his "anguish of mind" at seeing himself powerless in face of such a conflagration, and later on, when the sniping had somewhat slackened, he and his men made an effort to reach it in the Marlborough Street direction. Here he met with some success, but owing to the sniping that was going on he was unable to do all he hoped. Ultimately, he said, "some of my men's lives were threatened by Sinn Feiners, who told them that if they did not clear off they would shoot them. We had to retire. That was at 9 a.m. on Saturday."

By this time what may be called the "regular" insurgents had made up their minds to surrender, and they cannot be held respensible for this reckless encouragement of incendiarism worthy of the Paris Commune. The "snipers" were probably from the first more or less irresponsible agents, and as affairs approached the crisis they seem to have given

themselves over entirely to their mad lust for the destruction of life and property. Captain Purcell resumed his story thus: "At 3.40 p.m. on Saturday the Commanding Officer of the troops in Dublin sent me a special dispatch to say that they had the leaders of the rebels in their custody: that they would now cease military operations: that matters in the city were getting normal and that I might now make an effort to stop the fires in Sackville Street and Abbey Street. I immediately turned out the whole force of the brigade. . . . We were making excellent progress towards stopping the fire on both sides of Abbey Street when the bullets began to fly amongst us. I had two men up on fire escapes and bullets struck their ladders. Our engines were shot at from the direction of Westmoreland Street and Aston's Quay. Bullets hit the engines, going through the mudguards and through the tires. I abandoned the engines and hose on the streets and rushed the men in batches in motor ambulances home to their stations. Then we saw the fires ripping away in every direction from the west along Abbey Street and along Henry Street." Captain Purcell estimated the approximate value of buildings and stock destroyed at £2,500,000, the number of buildings involved being over 200.

In order to preserve the continuity of the story of the conflagration we have brought that part of the narrative down to Saturday. It is now necessary to go back for some days in order to recount the course of the rebellion in the interval. The Government in London, which at the outset, owing perhaps to defective information arising from the closing of regular communications with Dublin, had shown some inclination to minimize the danger in Ireland, grew more and more alarmed as news of the real extent of the insurrection began to arrive in England. On Tuesday little or nothing was known at Westminster: on Wednesday the Prime Minister admitted that Martial Law had had to be proclaimed in Dublin and added that drastic action was being taken there; but he assured the House that "outside Dublin the country is tranquil; only three minor cases of disturbance being reported." On receipt of further news, however, a Cabinet Council was called, at which it was decided at once to proclaim Martial Law over the whole of Ireland, and to send over General Sir John Maxwell as Commander-in-Chief with plenary powers to enforce it. This was announced to the House of Commons on the following day by the Prime Minister, who added that there were "indications of the spread of the movement, especially in the West." Large additional reinforcements, it was also announced, had arrived from England and were in hand for disposal as required. General Maxwell started at once, and reached Dublin early on the following morning (April 28), when he immediately issued a

IN A DUBLIN STREET.
Workmen pulling down buildings which were a danger to pedestrians.

proclamation, of which the following were the operative clauses :

" Most vigorous measures will be taken by me to stop the loss of life and damage to property which certain misguided persons are causing by their armed resistance to the law. If necessary I shall not hesitate to destroy all buildings within any area occupied by rebels and I warn all persons within the area specified below, and now surrounded by His Majesty's troops, forthwith to leave such areas under the following conditions :

" (*a*) Women and children may leave the area by any of the examining posts set up for the purpose and will be allowed to go away free.

" (*b*) Men may leave by the same examining posts and will be allowed to go away free, provided the examining officer is satisfied they have taken no part whatever in the present disturbances.

" (*c*) All other men who present themselves at the said examining posts must surrender unconditionally, together with any arms and ammunition in their possession."

Naturally a soldier of the experience of Sir John Maxwell did not assume such a command without the fullest assurances regarding his position and powers. In a country where, before the rising, authority was almost non-existent, and where there was still a Viceroy armed in theory with all the powers of the Crown but in practice reduced to the position of an automaton charged with registering the decrees of others, it was necessary, above all, that some one man should be entrusted with complete and undivided authority. The instructions given to Sir John by the Army Council as representing His Majesty's Government were in these terms :

" His Majesty's Government desire that Sir John Maxwell will take all such measures

PART OF THE FOUR COURTS, DUBLIN.
Showing windows with barricade of books. Smaller picture : The mock judgment seat erected by the rebels.

IRISH REBELS IN A DETENTION CAMP IN IRELAND.

as may, in his opinion, be necessary for the prompt suppression of the insurrection in Ireland, and be granted a free hand in regard to all troops now in Ireland or which may be placed under his command hereafter, and also in regard to such measures as may seem to him advisable under the (Royal) proclamation dated April 26 issued under the Defence of the Realm Act (1915)."

It is characteristic of the confusion of powers and the doubts regarding the law in Ireland, that even after all these Royal, Viceregal and military proclamations, it was thought necessary two days later (April 29) to issue a further Viceregal proclamation in the same terms as that of April 25, with the difference that for the word "Dublin" in the first the words "that part of the United Kingdom called Ireland" were substituted in the second. This new proclamation, like the last, was limited to one month, although no such limitation was contained in the Royal proclamation of April 26 or in the plenary powers conferred on Sir John Maxwell as Commander-in-Chief in Ireland on April 27.

It is only fair to say here that, so far as the limited forces at their command permitted, the Irish Commander-in-Chief and his officers, Brigadier-General Lowe, Colonel Kennard and Major H. F. Somerville, had since the beginning of the outbreak acted with promptitude and decision, and that their system of cordons was the proper course to adopt and was most effective in limiting and quelling the rebellion in Dublin as well as preventing its spread to the country districts immediately adjoining the capital. And the Royal Commission of Enquiry in its report expressly exonerated the military authorities from "any responsibility for the rebellion or its results." "As long as Ireland was under civil government," they added, "those authorities had nothing to do with the suppression of sedition. Their duties were confined to securing efficiency in their own ranks and to the promotion of recruiting, and they could only aid in the suppression of disorder when duly called on by the civil power. . . . The general danger of the situation was clearly pointed out to the Irish Government by the military authorities on their own initiative in February last, but the warning fell on unheeding ears." The necessity for Sir John Maxwell's appointment, therefore, arose from a combination of circumstances. There was

"MAJOR" MACBRIDE (×) UNDER ESCORT.

virtually no government in Ireland. The rebellion, although well in hand in Dublin, showed signs of spreading in certain country districts; the Army, the Navy, and the Royal Irish Constabulary were all engaged in the task of suppression, and all, as the Commission reported, took their orders from different authorities. And in addition to these military considerations Sir John Maxwell had to take over a great many of the duties of the civil administration of the country as well. It was essential, therefore, that an officer who had held similar highly responsible positions—as he had done in South Africa and in Egypt—should be in supreme command in Ireland. The choice was an admirable one, and not only in Dublin but throughout the country Sir John's influence at once began to make itself felt.

It is necessary here to pay some attention to the state of affairs in the country since the landing of Casement and the first outbreak in Dublin—a situation which shook the Government out of its complacency and led to the appointment of General Maxwell as Military Dictator. As we have seen, Pearse, the Commander-in-Chief and President of the Provisional Government, in the course of the valedictory proclamation in which he referred to MacNeill's "fatal countermanding order," said:

> I am satisfied that we should have accomplished more, that we should have accomplished the task of enthroning as well as proclaiming the Irish Republic as a Sovereign State had our arrangements for a simultaneous rising of the whole country, with a combined plan as sound as the Dublin plan has proved to be, been allowed to go through on Easter Sunday.

So far as the soundness of the Dublin plan is concerned the preceding narrative speaks for itself. It is related of a previous conspirator that, when he had laid all his plans, had called on his followers to rally to him, and had been promptly arrested, he declared bitterly: "I always said the police were the curse of Ireland!" Similarly, no doubt, the plans of the Provisional Government of the Irish Republic, in decreeing the overthrow by force of arms of the British Government in Ireland, were "sound"—except in so far as they neglected to take into consideration the existence of the British Empire, and of its armed forces on sea and land. The "fatal countermanding order" no doubt gave a good many young men an opportunity of taking advantage of second thoughts and of staying at home in peace and quietness instead of losing life or liberty in the national pursuit of "rainbow-chasing." But if every battalion of the Irish Volunteers had followed the original orders and had paraded on Easter Sunday with "full arms and equip-

A PRISONER
On his way to Dublin Castle.

ment and one day's rations," they would not have averted—they would scarcely even have delayed—the inevitable result. In the first place, even when allowance is made for what Mr. Birrell called "the hatred and distrust of the British connexion always noticeable in all classes and in all places," the country, prosperous and thriving beyond all ancient or modern experience, was in no mood for a rising. Even if the Aud's cargo of arms had been landed on Good Friday the people of Clare, Kerry, and Cork showed that they had as little heart to make use of them at the bidding of a few unknown speechmakers as had the citizens of Dublin to rally to the support of a green flag on the Post Office. And even for this landing of arms the non-existence of the British fleet had to be presupposed. The police alone, if left to themselves instead of having their hands tied and their eyes bandaged by an incompetent Irish executive, would long before have rounded up the peripatetic "organizers" and would have put an end even to the thought of an armed insurrection in the country districts, where the various "risings" had only to be surrounded by superior force and isolated on the Dublin plan to wither away from their own essential weakness and absurdity.

ARREST OF AN ARMED MAN IN SACKVILLE STREET.

A PRISONER SINN FEINER
On his way to headquarters.

Here is an account by an eye-witness of the working of the "plan" in a Northern county (which claimed to have been particularly well organized by Professor MacNeill and his friends), before the news of the "fatal countermanding order" had been received:

This district was the scene of intense excitement on Saturday evening and Sunday in consequence of the advent of large bodies of Sinn Feiners from —— and other centres. A number of them bore arms. At 12.45 on Saturday afternoon the first party of Dublin representatives arrived by the ordinary train and marched to ——, where they were met by the local leaders. The first contingent arrived at 7 p.m., accompanied by pipers, and marched to ——. A further large contingent arrived by the midnight mail train, and having paraded in the market square they, too, marched to ——. During the night signalling operations and field movements were carried out round ——, and on Sunday further contingents continued to arrive. . . . A private conference was held at noon, and at 1.15 p.m. a motor-car arrived from Dublin. The message which its occupants conveyed appeared to have a very depressing effect on the conference, which immediately broke up. It had been intended to camp out during the night and to march to ——, a stronghold of the movement, at daybreak on Monday. On the receipt of the news from Dublin, however, the contingents were paraded and marched to ——, a distance of about eight miles. Here they met with a very cool reception from the other branches of the Nationalist movement, and one of the Sinn Feiners fired revolver shots. He was promptly

GERMAN WAR 'NEWS" IN NO-MAN'S LAND: THE IRISH ANSWER THE ENEMY TAUNTS.

Soon after the trouble in Ireland, the Germans in the trenches opposite the Royal Munster Fusiliers put up on their parapet two placards—one referring to Ireland (reproduced on left), and the other to the fall of Kut-el-Amara, stating that at the latter place the whole of the English Army had been taken pr soners. The Munsters answered the enemy taunts by charging the German trenches and seizing the obnoxious placards, which they bore back in triumph.

arrested, and a serious scrimmage was narrowly averted. The Sinn Feiners proceeded to the station, leaving the delinquent in the hands of the police.

Here, also, as in the case of the Killarney meeting, of which Sir Morgan O'Connell gave evidence before the Royal Commission, the abortive "rising" appears to have been imported by excursion train from the big towns and to have secured little if any genuine local support. Of risings that actually took place and lasted for a few days until news arrived of the collapse in Dublin there were three or four worth mention—two of them, like Liberty Hall, coming to a premature end owing to the unexpected and paralysing appearance of a small unit of the British fleet. Galway County appears to have been first in the field. There is from of old a "black belt" in Galway, well known to the police. "If you were to let off a gun in a crowd in ——," a neighbouring resident once cryptically remarked to the present writer, "you wouldn't miss hittin' the right man." However this may be, there was a rising in the district on the night of Easter Monday. On Tuesday the towns of Craughwell and Athenry were seized and the police barracks surrounded. The railway lines by which relief might have come from Limerick or from Athlone were cut, and one contingent proceeding due west captured Oranmore, and marched to the occupation of the City of Galway four miles distant. No doubt the possession of the capital of Connaught with its fine harbour and stores would have been a great achievement for the Provisional Government, and would have provided an open door for the fleet of Germany—their "gallant ally." But here, again, no allowance had been made for the presence of the British fleet. As has been told already, the Admiralty had received early news of the sailing of Casement and of the Aud, and, in consequence, the coast patrol was more alert than ever. Flushed with their easy victories inland, the insurgents were advancing on Galway by the road which here skirts the shores of Galway Bay when they unexpectedly came under the fire of the guns of a destroyer which had come round from the harbour as soon as the alarm had been received by the authorities there. This was no part of the "sound plan," and the insurgents promptly broke and fled in the utmost confusion.

Galway itself, it was declared, was quite prepared to deal with the invaders. There was a strongly built military barracks there, well placed to control the approach to the town both by road and rail. The police were also armed and ready, and to crown all, the citizens, including the Redmond Volunteers, declared their loyalty and made preparations to deal with all disturbers. Not only did Galway protect itself, it promptly organized a movement of pursuit. The police, under the leadership of their County Inspector, reached Oranmore in time to release the constables who had been detained in their barracks, and to hasten the flight of the rebels along the Athenry road. Even in Athenry, twelve miles off, the Sinn Feiners did not feel themselves safe from the guns. After an attempt to hold the model farm established by the Agricultural Department for the improvement of the district, they continued their retreat and ultimately took up their quarters, some 1,200 strong, at Moyode Castle, between Craughwell and Athenry. Here they held out for a couple of days, commandeering supplies from the neighbourhood. Getting no encouraging news from Dublin and finding few adherents locally, they ultimately dispersed, their discomfiture being emphasized by the arrival at Loughrea and Athenry of small

TAKEN PRISONER BY THE REBELS.
A soldier who was rescued from the ruins of the Coliseum Theatre. He was taken by the rebels on the outbreak of the Rebellion, and held during the week in the Post Office.

bodies of military who had been landed at Galway or dispatched by motor-cars from Limerick. The police were busy for some time afterwards in making arrests of prominent leaders, some being well-placed people in Galway City—the others being of the usual corner-boy conspirator class, who had made the district a by-word for two generations. This little episode—which is reminiscent rather of the fighting days in Texas than of a town within twelve hours of London—attracted little attention even in Dublin, where the newspapers were overfilled with descriptions of the ruin at their doors. The only first-hand account that appeared was that sent by a special correspondent of *The Times*, of which the following are the leading passages:

The village of Athenry, the storm-centre of many a disturbance in the old days of turbulence, where the Fenian "Invincibles" found their last foothold, was bound to play a part in the drama of the last ten days; but I little suspected how strange that part had been. Bandits in a disused castle, highway robbery, a race for life between cyclists and motorists, and a hunt for outlaws among the mountains—these are the leading chapters of a story which, if I had not received it from an unimpeachable source, I should have dismissed as incredible.

The Sinn Feiners spent Easter Monday making bombs. Late on Tuesday night they mustered, about 1,000 strong, outside the Town Hall, armed with rifles, shotguns, pikes, rakes, and four-pronged pitchforks, or "graips," as they are called in these parts. Only the "officers" were in uniform. At their head was a "Captain" Mellowes, who was deported to England a month ago as an organizer of sedition, but somehow escaped. It is said that he returned to the district dressed as a priest.



ON THE ROOF OF THE REBEL HEADQUARTERS.

Men of the Citizen Army drilling on the roof of Liberty Hall, Dublin. Smaller picture: On guard.

IRISH PRISONERS ARRIVING AT KNUTSFORD, CHESHIRE.

From the Town Hall the rebels marched to an experimental farm of about 600 acres, not far from Athenry, carried on by the Department of Agriculture. Here they passed the night; and when they left the next afternoon they took with them horses and carts laden with all the butter, flour, and other foodstuffs they could find, four tons of oats, a quantity of bran, and a few sheep. Without serious opposition from the handful of police in the district they marched to Moyode Castle, three or four miles south-east of the village, and took possession there. The castle, which stands in a park of about 1,000 acres, is a picturesque but rather modern reproduction of a battlemented creeper-clad Tudor residence. It was owned by Lord Ardilaun, who died last year, but for at least 30 years it has been unoccupied except by caretakers. From them I heard that the men were under excellent control. They killed a score of fowls and littered several rooms with hay and rubbish, but otherwise did little damage. A priest, said to be known as Father Feeney, accompanied and confessed them. Four policemen whom they brought with them as prisoners were shut in a room overlooking the courtyard. Sixteen or seventeen girls accompanied the men, cooked their food—including the carcass of a bullock seized from the castle estates and slaughtered in the yard—and slept in the caretaker's rooms.

On their arrival at the castle the rebels sent out scouting parties and placed sentries at the approaches to the park. From time to time the scouts came in to report and receive orders. Foraging parties rounded up a dozen milch cows from neighbouring farms; others took potatoes from the fields; others scoured the roads for travellers. Four motor-cars were commandeered, and travellers were compelled at the point of the gun to hand over anything which the rebels coveted. On Tuesday half a dozen police cyclists came under the fire of the pickets near the park. They dismounted, took cover, and returned the fire. A few moments later they saw three motor-cars coming down the drive. Mounting their bicycles, they rode for their lives towards Athenry. Every few yards of the way were patches of unrolled "metal," and a spill meant capture, alive or dead. The occupants of the pursuing cars fired continually at the fleeing cyclists, but their shots went wide. For the greater part of the three miles into the town the road was slightly down-hill. Aided by the gradient, and goaded by the peril behind, the policemen rode as they had never ridden before. How they managed to dodge the jagged flints and to swing round the corners without accident they cannot tell. All they know is that, thanks to a start of half a mile or so and a large share of good luck, they reached Athenry in safety only just in time, and the rebels turned back empty-handed.

On Friday evening a strong force of the Sherwood Foresters and several hundred policemen arrived in Loughrea, some six miles from Moyode Castle. The news of their coming was conveyed to the castle, it is said, by a priest. That evening the rebels paraded in front of the castle and marched off. A six miles' journey brought them to another deserted mansion, Lime Park, owned by a member of the Persse family. There they halted and decided to disband. By this time desertions had reduced their numbers to about half their original strength. Breaking up into small parties, they tramped off homewards, hoping to escape the penalty of their foolhardiness. Their hopes were falsified. To a man they were known to the police, and with the reinforcements the latter were able to round them up one by one. Their leaders made off to the mountains of Gort, a spur of the Slieve Aughty heights which runs down to Galway Bay about Kinvara.

The other occasion upon which, to the discomfiture of the rebels, the British Navy put in an unexpected appearance was at Skerries, on the coast, some fifteen miles north of Dublin, a favourite watering-place and, since recently, an Admiralty Marconi station. Skerries is in North Dublin County, the constituency represented by Mr. John Clancy, a well known Nationalist of Mr. John Redmond's following, who had been doing excellent service in the cause of recruiting since the outbreak of the war. But although the good folk of Skerries were as loyal and peaceable as could be desired, there was a "bad" district

lying to the south of it and on the direct Dublin road. Swords, Lusk and Donabate were Sinn Fein centres, and here the rising took place on Easter Monday according to programme. At Donabate an attempt was made to blow up the railway bridge, but only a few rails were displaced—the "explosives department" of the army of the Provisional Government being, here as elsewhere, sadly at fault. After this exploit the rebels adopted a waiting attitude for a time, expecting no doubt news and further directions from Dublin, where, as already stated, the railway was also interrupted in the Fairview district. Meanwhile a somewhat amusing contretemps had occurred at Swords, where Mr. Clancy and some friends from Dublin were due to address on Easter Monday a recruiting meeting, or rather a "war demonstration," as it was called, for Skerries had done so well in the war—one hundred recruits from one little fishing village—that all that was left to do was to cheer up the mothers and wives and sweethearts left at home. So Skerries was *en fête* and all the local celebrities, civil and military, were out in their best to welcome the M.P. and the gentlemen from Dublin, and to take part in the presentation of certificates of honour to the representatives of the brave men who were fighting the Empire's battle in France. The meeting was there and the platform and the excited crowd, but instead of the eloquent speakers there only arrived a Job's messenger with the news that the country was up, the railway cut, the rebels in possession of Donabate Station, and the train bearing Mr. Clancy and the speakers held up

AFTER THE REBELLION.

Rifles captured from the rebels. Smaller picture: One of the cartridge cases supplied by Germany to the rebels which was found in the Four Courts.

AFTER THE REBELLION.

Pikes captured from the rebels. Smaller picture: One of the dum-dum bullets supplied by Germany to the rebels.

somewhere on the way. It is satisfactory to add that no one was much the worse: a local K.C. and some retired Army officers stepped into the breach; the meeting was held, the speeches made and the certificates of honour duly presented to the deserving.

Next day, however, things looked more alarming, for communications were broken both to the north and to the south, and of newspapers and letters there were none. Reports, growing as they spread, were to the effect that the rebels were in possession of Dublin and were marching in force on Skerries to capture the town and, above all, the Marconi station. Seven soldiers and a few police were all the armed forces that could be mustered, for most of the able-bodied men were at the front, but Skerries did its duty. Volunteers were organized and given their stations by Captain Battersby, wounded and back from the front: Sergeant Burke, of the Royal Irish Constabulary, held the barracks and saw that his men had their carbines and sword-bayonets in order; the Marconi station was garrisoned. Dr. Healy and some local ladies fitted up the Carnegie library as an emergency Red Cross hospital. The motto of Skerries was "No Surrender"! But just as the tension was at its greatest the watchers on the hill saw a streak of smoke on the horizon, and soon they could make out the white ensign, the funnels, and the deck, crowded with troops, of a destroyer tearing along at full speed to the rescue. Only a bit of bunting and one little vessel, hardly honoured with a name in the Navy List, yet it signified the far-reaching might of a great Empire and reduced into ludicrous insignificance all the boasted power



TAKEN FROM THE SINN FEINERS.
Collection of trophies which includes German belts, cartridges, and trenching tools.

and plans of the Provisional Government. Before the engines had well stopped, the boats were being manned and lowered, and in half an hour two hundred men of the North Staffordshires had rendered the signal station secure. Meanwhile two gunboats had made their appearance and kept watch over Skerries and the coast road from Donabate. The Sinn Feiners thought discretion the better part and did not venture to approach.

The rising in the district north of Dublin was, however, one of the most serious and widespread that took place. At Castle Bellingham, in County Louth, between Drogheda and Dundalk, a party of armed Sinn Feiners arrived in motor-cars and took possession of the village at about seven o'clock on Easter Monday evening. There were only three constables in the place and they were promptly seized. This was on the main road between Belfast and Dublin, and several motor-cars, with peaceful citizens returning north after attending the races at Fairyhouse, were stopped and confiscated, the occupants in most cases being permitted to continue their journey on foot. One, however, who happened to be in uniform, Lieutenant Dunville, was placed against the railings and shot—the wound, although serious, happily not proving fatal. One of the policemen, however, Constable McGee, a Donegal man, was not so fortunate, as he was shot dead. For some reason the rebels here seem to have been flurried, and they did not stay to complete their work. The murderers in this case were identified and dealt with by court-martial after the rising had been quelled. There was not the slightest excuse for the Castle Bellingham outrages, as there had been no resistance and the invaders of the peaceful village had not been interfered with in any way. Farther north still, in County Tyrone, there were symptoms of a rising, but it was promptly checked by a flying column of three hundred men, who arrived from Belfast in motor-cars just in the nick of time. Brigadier-General Hackett-Pain, who had assumed command in Belfast, was thus able not only to send 1,200 men to the relief of Dublin, but to put an effectual stop to any attempt at a rising in the loyal province. The citizens promptly placed 100 motor-cars with drivers at the disposal of the military for use wherever required.

Somewhat nearer to Dublin than Skerries—at a point not far from Ashbourne on the Slane road, just across the border of Meath—there was perpetrated some of the cruellest work of the whole rising. In this case it is believed that a party of Sinn Feiners from North Dublin were the murderers. Ashbourne was entered and the police barracks surrounded, the men gallantly holding out. The alarm

IMPLEMENTS FOUND ON A CAPTURED REBEL.

AFTER THE REBELLION.
Travellers arriving at Kingstown waiting for a pass outside the Town Hall.

having been given, parties of police from Slane, Navan, and Drogheda set out in motor-cars to relieve the barracks. The whole force was under the command of County Inspector Gray and District Inspector Smith. As the constables and the drivers were all strangers in the district they had to trust to local guidance, and there is little doubt that they were steered into a carefully planned ambush. The intention had been to leave the motors outside Ashbourne and march into the village. The police were, however, taken unawares in passing through a small wood at a place called Rathgate. Here a murderous fire was opened on them from both sides of the road as the cars were climbing a hill. Many were hit at the first volley, the others got out of the cars and endeavoured to line the ditches and return the fire, fatally handicapped as they were by the surprise and by superior numbers. The rebels called on them to surrender, but they refused, and the desperate fight was kept up for over four hours till both inspectors were down and the police had fired their last cartridge. The two inspectors, two sergeants, and six constables were dead. Two harmless travellers who arrived in a motor-car while the fighting was going on were also shot dead and fourteen constables were wounded. Flushed with this success the rebels bivouacked in the neighbourhood of Ashbourne till the news of the failure of the rising in Dublin arrived, when they, like their confederates in Lusk and Swords, hastily decamped.

In the West, south of the Athenry and Craughwell district, things pursued a more peaceful course, although there was throughout the week much tension and anxiety. Clare was restless and some expectant assemblages were noticed, but an energetic County Inspector had the district well in hand and nothing dangerous happened. This may be regarded as specially satisfactory, since Clare had received its share of attention from the Germans in the incubation stage of the movement, and it was rumoured that more than one enemy submarine had succeeded in reaching the coast and establishing communication with the local leaders. It will be seen on a glance at the map that two points —Athlone and Limerick—cover the bridges across the Shannon and through them control the whole of Connaught. Athlone was promptly strengthened by the dispatch of a battalion of the Sherwood Foresters, and caused no further anxiety. Limerick has always been regarded as a point of danger, and contains, like its neighbour across the Shannon, a large proportion of the troublesome element. Any attempt at a junction of forces was therefore to be specially guarded against. To a visitor at this time Limerick presented the appearance rather of a town at the front of the fighting line. Both bridges were barricaded with earthworks and barbed wire, whilst every approach was covered by

machine-guns. Detachments from two Irish regiments—the Leinsters and the Royal Irish Rifles—in regular field kit were entrusted with this post of honour and also guarded the railway station, and very fit they looked and ready to give a good account of themselves if called on. But the Clare and South Galway malcontents did not put in an appearance. Limerick City remained quiet, although many scowling looks were to be seen in the streets. The Mayor, on Friday, the 28th, issued a proclamation in which he appealed to the citizens, "with all the force and power which my words can command," to abstain from "anything that may result in exposing the lives and property of the people to danger or destruction": and expressed his confidence that he and his people would pass through "this time of stress and difficulty" with "our reputation for sacrifice and forbearance sustained intact." A critical eye might have looked for an appeal to loyalty rather than to self-interest or to "sacrifice and forbearance," but, after all, nothing happened, and it may be admitted that the Mayor of Limerick sat on the fence with dignity and eloquence.

Kerry and Cork, thanks to the Casement fiasco and the disaster to the Sinn Fein motorists at Killorglin, remained fairly quiet except for the dastardly murders in one or two places of unarmed policemen. At Castlegregory on Tralee Bay a handful of some thirty armed Sinn Feiners turned out on Easter Monday, but after wandering about disconsolately for a little time, and seeing no other sign of the Irish Republic, they went home again, the ringleaders being arrested and their arms seized by the police on the same night. In Cork City the situation was a very peculiar one. There are three main bodies of Nationalists in the Southern capital—O'Brienites, Redmondites, and Sinn Feiners. There is no love lost between them, and in times of excitement only the vigilance of the Royal Irish Constabulary keeps the factions from flying at one another's throats. Under the circumstances the Sinn Feiners, not being very sure of their ground, either with the police or with their fellow Nationalists, were in some difficulty, so they retired to their "armoury" and, behind closed doors, awaited the course of events. They had planned many things, including the seizure of the Post Office and a march on Mallow to join hands with friends from Killarney and Tralee and the wild country lying to the west. But Mallow Junction was strongly occupied by the military and there was a squadron lying in Cork Harbour, and on the whole an attitude of inactivity seemed the safest. The Bishop and the Lord Mayor interviewed them on the doorstep of the armoury and implored them to be reasonable, but this they firmly declined to be under any circumstances—even under the threat of extreme ecclesiastical penalties. Ultimately, as the Republic could not come to them and they could not go to the Republic, they stole off home quietly in the darkness and the police took possession of the armoury and of the

ENNISCORTHY, FROM VINEGAR HILL. [*Valentine.*

arms. "Rebel Cork"—which in all its history has never rebelled—was its own cheerful self again, and the Bells of Shandon once more sounded as grandly as ever on "The pleasant waters of the River Lee."

To the south of Dublin—indeed, all along the line of the South-Eastern Railway from Westland Row to Wexford—there were threatenings of serious trouble, but with the exception of the Ringsend district, already dealt with under Dublin, there was no real danger outside the Gorey-Ferns-Enniscorthy portion of Wexford. It is really a prosperous and industrious district, whose farming and general appearance would be a credit to any country, but it has "patriotic" traditions dating from Vinegar Hill and 1798, and apparently it was thought necessary to make an effort to live up to them. The County of Wexford had been almost completely bought out under the Land Purchase Acts, and the effect was seen in the social and industrial improvement noticeable everywhere. The County Council, manned by moderate Nationalists, was spoken of as a model body, managing its local affairs in practical, business fashion, and none of its members, or of the leading men of the



BOX OF DYNAMITE
Found in the General Post Office, Dublin.



SINN FEIN POSTAGE STAMPS.

county, countenanced the rising in the smallest degree. The trouble was the work of a number of idlers and boys, and the wire-pulling was all done in Dublin. Several of the Redmond Volunteers in Enniscorthy and in country districts were reported as joining the Sinn Fein Volunteers under constraint, and in one district a young priest had a bad influence, but the Volunteer commanding officer for the county not only placed his men in the town of Wexford at the disposal of the authorities for the maintenance of order, but issued a peremptory notice directing the corps in outlying districts to take no part in the "foolishly rebellious movement." And the Mayor of Wexford, at the first meeting of the Corporation, publicly stated that every section of the community—shopkeepers, merchants, and artisans—were "all eager to assist the police and the military authorities to preserve the peace and to protect property." It would, he felt sure, be "the means of further uniting Nationalists and Unionists in their determination to crush any spirit of Germanism in Ireland, or in any part of the Empire." And the New Ross Guardians, another Nationalist Board, unanimously adopted a resolution denouncing the action of the Sinn Feiners as "outrageous, disgraceful, and blackguardly," and added that "we regard their present conduct as an insult to our brave and gallant Irishmen who have sealed the common bond between England and Ireland by shedding their blood on the battlefields of Flanders and elsewhere." Such spontaneous testimonies by popularly elected Boards in one of the most Nationalist corners of Ireland constituted a sufficient answer to the action of a few firebrands whose leaders were strangers to the county, and acting *pour le Roi de Prusse*.

From Enniscorthy and up the railway to Gorey attempts were made to destroy the railway and the bridges, but without any permanent success. Ferns was occupied and

stores commandeered, and between Ferns and Enniscorthy telegraphs were cut, roads broken, and trees cut down and used as barricades. Enniscorthy was occupied in force, and here, in contrast to Wexford, some of the more irresponsible of the townspeople were reported to have given "aid and comfort" to the rebels. But the rising only lasted for four days, and no great damage was done. The police, besieged in their barracks, held out for the whole time, as the County Inspector was able to report to the Royal Commission. As soon as the troops began to arrive at Rosslare and Waterford, they were brought up the line to the scene of trouble and the rising was over. Colonel French, who was in command of the military, had acted throughout with both firmness and tact and thus avoided bloodshed. When he felt strong enough he sent in a message to the rebels, telling them of the failure in Dublin and giving them a fixed period in which to surrender. Some of the leaders were inclined to doubt the facts, and to hope for relief, and, still anxious to avoid the necessity of shelling the town, Colonel French undertook to send an envoy to Dublin by motor-car, to see for himself and to report to his comrades in misfortune. When the messenger returned the rebels, who, as in historical duty bound, had occupied Vinegar Hill, still displayed some hesitation, but a single shell sent over the hill produced a speedy capitulation. The account of the final scene, as sent by a special correspondent of the *Daily Mail*, gave a vivid idea of the final disposition of the troops. Guns had been moved up, and an armoured train had been hastily prepared as a protection against snipers. Writing from the military camp south of Enniscorthy, the correspondent said:

Lafayette] P. H. PEARSE.

The Rebel Commander-in-Chief and President of the Provisional Government. Condemned and shot.

SEAN MACDERMOTT.

One of the signatories to the Rebellion manifesto. Condemned and shot.

It was a home-made fighting machine slung together hurriedly, but very effectively, out of materials to hand. It consisted of an ancient but still serviceable engine in the proud charge of a richly-humorous Hibernian. There were two or three steel trucks shackled to the engine, armoured with hastily-pierced sheets of iron, and the whole amazing contraption was painted slate colour. In the hindermost truck a tackle of scaffold-poles had been erected for the slinging aboard of a couple of quick-firers, and guarding these handy and mobile weapons was an emergency crew of placid Tommies, one of whom was enjoying the sunshine and the rest by reading a tattered copy of that literary masterpiece "The Vanished Bride." It will take me a long time to forget the bewildering effect of this incongruous scene—a khaki-laden armoured train endeavouring to advertise its importance, mingled with priests and peasants, church bells, fishermen, primroses, and speckled trout. Presently a bell tinkled musically in the adjacent signal-box, a huge Irishman with fringed whiskers stuck his head out of the window, called "Right away!" Then another war scene moved into view—two trains, one of artillerymen and horses, and the other with the guns and limbers of a light field battery with cases of ammunition piled on trucks, and the rear brought up by a huge 15-pounder with its grey snout cocked skywards looking for trouble. Upon the truck bearing this monster was scribbled in chalk, so that all could see, the words, "To Enniscorthy."

The rebels surrendered, six of the leaders were arrested and the remainder sent off to their

JAMES CONNOLLY.
The Rebel Commandant-General, Dublin Division. Condemned and shot.

homes. And the official report of Enniscorthy rising ends with the words: "There were no casualties"!

All this time in Dublin General Maxwell had been tightening his grip on the rebels who still held out at the Post Office, the Four Courts, Ringsend, Jacob's biscuit factory, the South Dublin Union, and the College of Surgeons in St. Stephen's Green. The great Sackville Street fire broke out on the afternoon of Thursday, the 27th; Kelly's Fort, at the foot of Sackville Street, had shared the fate of Liberty Hall, and shells were beginning to burst in the Post Office and Boland's Mill. No hope in any quarter. Pearse, as Commander-in-Chief and President, appears to have kept up hope till now, but on the morning of Friday, the 28th, he issued the valedictory bulletin to which reference has already been made—that referring to the "fatal countermanding order." It was an admission of complete defeat. "We are," he said, "busy completing arrangements for the final defence of headquarters, and are determined to hold it while the buildings last." Connolly, on the other hand, the "Commandant-General of the Dublin division," although already wounded, made, on the same day, another desperate attempt, in a bulletin recounting imaginary victories and proclaiming speedy success, to rally the outlying positions to further effort. It was never delivered—O'Rahilly, who endeavoured to carry it through the cordon, being shot down. As the completest account of the rebel positions, and as an illustration of the mentality of the leader of the Citizen Army, as distinct from the more educated Sinn Feiners, the leading passages of this the last utterance before surrender are worth giving:

Headquarters,
April 28, 1916.

To Soldiers:

This is the fifth day of the establishment of the Irish Republic, and the flag of our country still floats over the most important buildings in Dublin, and is gallantly protected by the officers and Irish soldiers in arms throughout the country. Not a day passes without seeing fresh postings of Irish soldiers eager to do battle for tho old cause.

Despite the utmost vigilance of the enemy we have been able to get information telling us how the manhood of Ireland, inspired by our splendid actions, are gathering to offer up their lives, if necessary, in the same holy cause. We are here hemmed in the G.P.O. because the enemy feels that in this building is to be found the heart and inspiration of this great movement.

The British Army, whose exploits we are for ever having dinned into our ears, which boasts of having stormed the Dardanelles and the German lines on the Marne, behind their artillery and machine-guns are afraid to attack or storm any position held by our forces. The slaughter they suffered in the first few days has totally unnerved them, and they dare not again attempt an infantry attack on our positions.

Our Commandants around us are holding their own. Commandant Daly's splendid exploit in capturing Linen Hall Barracks* we all know. You must know

* This was a disused barrack, last occupied by the Army Pay Office, and set on fire by the rebels.

SHEEHY SKEFFINGTON.
Shot at Portobello Barracks, Dublin.

also that the whole population, both clergy and laity, of this district are united in his praise. Commandant MacDonagh is established in an impregnable position reaching from the walls of Dublin Castle to Redmond's Hill and from Bishop Street to Stephen's Green.

In Stephen's Green Commandant Mallin holds the College of Surgeons, one side of the square, a portion of the other side, and dominates the whole Green and all its entrances and exits.

Commandant de Valera stretches in a position from the Gas Works to Westland Row, holding Boland's Bakery, Boland's Mill, Dublin and South-Eastern Railway Works, and dominates Merrion Square.

Commandant Kent holds the South Dublin Union and Guinness's Buildings to Marrowbone Lane, and controls Jameson's Distillery and district. On two occasions the enemy effected a lodgment and were driven out with great loss.

The men of North County Dublin are in the field, have occupied all the police barracks in the district, destroyed all the telegraph system on the Great Northern Railway up to Dundalk, and are operating against the trains of the Midland Great Western.

Dundalk has sent 200 men to march upon Dublin, and in the other parts of the North our forces are active and growing.

In Galway Captain Mellowes, fresh after his escape from an Irish prison, is in the field with us; Wexford and Wicklow are strong, and Cork and Kerry are equally acquitting themselves creditably.

We have every confidence that our allies in Germany and kinsmen in America are straining every nerve to hasten matters on our behalf.

Courage, boys, we are winning, and in the hour of victory let us not forget the splendid women who have everywhere stood by us and cheered us on. Never had a woman a grander cause and never was a cause more grandly served.

JAMES CONNOLLY,
Commandant-General
Dublin Division.

The next day, the Post Office being by this time on fire, Pearse sent out a messenger saying he was ready to surrender. There was naturally some delay in communicating with the authorities and in securing the signed consent of the other rebel leaders at headquarters. Finally, at two p.m., Pearse surrendered unconditionally and was brought before General Maxwell, in whose presence he signed the final capitulation. At seven o'clock a dejected procession of disarmed and worn-out men with a white flag at their head made their appearance in Sackville Street and were taken in charge by an armed escort: they were marched down the ruined and still smouldering street and disappeared along Westmoreland Street in the direction of Trinity College, where, in the courtyards, they were sorted out for imprisonment or deportation.

The terms of the surrender, as signed in the presence of the general commanding, were as follows:

In order to prevent the further slaughter of Dublin citizens and in the hope of saving the lives of our followers now surrounded and hopelessly outnumbered the members of the Provisional Government now present at headquarters have agreed to an unconditional surrender, and the Commandants of the various districts in the City and Country will order their Commands to lay down arms.

P. H. PEARSE,
29th April, 1916,
3.45 p.m.

The above was typewritten on a large sheet of paper. Connolly and MacDonagh wrote their submissions with their own hands lower down on the same sheet.

I agree to these conditions for the men only under my own command in the Moore Street District, and for the men in the Stephen's Green Command.

JAMES CONNOLLY.

On consultation with Commandant Ceannt (Kent) and other officers I have decided to agree to unconditional surrender also.

THOMAS MACDONAGH.

De Valera, who commanded at Boland's Mill (the Ringsend district) and who complained bitterly that "if only the people had come out with knives and forks" they might have won, did not surrender till the next day; and the Four Courts, the South Dublin Union, Jacob's, and the College of Surgeons followed suit. There was still scattered fighting and sniping from roofs for some days afterwards. The district at the back of the Four Courts—a rabbit warren of some of the worst slums in Dublin—was still a source of trouble, and a good deal of blood was shed before complete order was restored. But the rebellion was over. What the deaths and injuries resulting from this mad outbreak amounted to is a point that will probably never be accurately known: the hospitals were overwhelmed: no exact record was possible either there or at the cemeteries, whilst many were probably covered up in the blazing ruins or buried secretly. Of police and soldiers the official casualties were 479—127 killed and 352 wounded. Amongst persons classed as "civilians" there were 1,930 casualties reported—200 being killed. How many of these were rebels in arms, and how many were innocent victims of bullets from either side there is no means of knowing, as proper identification was in many cases not forthcoming. Many civilians, police and soldiers, as we have seen, were shot during the first two days, before the systematic military repression began. The damage to property by fire was estimated by the Fire Brigade at £2,500,000, but that sum naturally only covered premises and stock, and took no account of businesses ruined and of the time that must elapse before a fresh start could be made.

The surrender of the Provisional Government at the General Post Office, involving as it did that of the Macdonagh-Kent Com-

IN THE DOCK AT BOW STREET.
Casement (on right) and Daniel Julian Bailey charged with high treason.

mandos at Jacob's biscuit factory and the South Dublin Union, of de Valera at Ringsend, and of the Four Courts and the College of Surgeons, was the end of the rebellion, and on May 1, exactly a week after the first outbreak, Field-Marshal French, as Commander-in-Chief of the Home Forces, was able to announce that "all the rebels in Dublin have surrendered, and the city is reported to be quiet." "The rebels in the country," it was added, "are surrendering to mobile columns." At that time there were over a thousand prisoners in Dublin alone, of whom about half were promptly sent to Detention Camps in England. On the same day the Irish Command issued the following notice:

Rebels considered suitable for trial are being tried by Field General Courts-Martial under the Defence of the Realm Act. As soon as the sentences have been confirmed the public will be informed as to the results of the trial. Those prisoners whose cases could not be immediately dealt with are being sent to places of confinement in England. Their cases will receive consideration later. The cases of the women taken prisoners are under consideration. The work of dealing with these trials is one of great magnitude and is being proceeded with with despatch.

AT RICHMOND BARRACKS, DUBLIN.
Arrival of a prisoner under escort.

The public were not left long in suspense as to the result of these trials—and here the procedure adopted differed from that of the Young Ireland and the Fenian rebellions, in which instances prolonged public trials with speeches and demonstrations served to keep up a state of unrest for months after the rising had been suppressed. In the course of the week it was announced that all the seven signatories to the rebellion manifesto—Clarke, Macdermott, Macdonagh, P. H. Pearse, E. Kent, Connolly, and J. Plunkett—had been condemned and shot. Seven others who had taken a particularly prominent part in the rebellion or in the outrages which accompanied it—E. Daly, M. O'Hanrahan, W. Pearse, MacBride, Colbert, Mallin, and Heuston—had met with the same fate. Fifty-five others, including the Countess Markievicz, were convicted and sentenced to death, the penalties being commuted to various terms of penal servitude or imprisonment. One other, William Kent, was convicted of the murder of a head constable near Fermoy, in the County of Cork, and shot. Of those reprieved seven received life sentences, forty-seven were sent to penal servitude for shorter periods, and several were sentenced to imprisonment for from one to three years On May 11 General Maxwell issued an official notice stating that "the trials by court-martial of those who took an actual part in the rising in Dublin are practically finished." And he added that:

> In view of the gravity of the rebellion and its connection with German intrigue propaganda, and in view of the great loss of life and destruction of property resulting therefrom, the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief has found it imperative to inflict the most severe sentences on the known organizers of this detestable rising and on those commanders who took an active part in the actual fighting which occurred. It is hoped that these examples will be sufficient to act as a deterrent on intriguers and to bring home to them that the murder of his Majesty's liege subjects or other acts calculated to imperil the safety of the realm will not be tolerated.

An Advisory Committee was appointed to consider the cases of others detained, and, on the ground that very many of those who took part in the rising "believed that they were being called up on Monday for a route march," about a thousand of them were released without further punishment. As the courts-martial were private and no report of the evidence was made public, there was not unnaturally a certain outcry in political circles, and wild

exaggerations about the suppression of the rebellion in "torrents of blood" had been heard in irresponsible quarters. But it was not even suggested that anyone was convicted by court-martial who had not taken part in the rebellion or in the preparations for it. As regards those sentenced to death there was no dispute—the crime was flagrant and avowed.

There were, however, two instances in which serious complaint was made, and where it was recognized that further enquiry should be held. The first was that of Mr. Sheehy Skeffington, whose case has already been alluded to. We have seen that Skeffington, who had been at the Post Office, the seat of the rebel government, left that building on the Tuesday afternoon, posting up on his way notices calling on the citizens to "police the streets" and prevent looting. Whilst engaged on this he was arrested, and with two others conducted to Portobello Barracks, round which there had been severe fighting. The place was held, under circumstances of great stress and strain, by a small garrison of the Royal Irish Rifles. Early next morning the three prisoners were taken from their cells by order of the officer in charge and shot without trial. This officer retained his command for several days, when, some of the circumstances having transpired, he was placed under arrest and ultimately tried by court-martial. There was no denial of the facts, and the unhappy officer—who was back from the front after being wounded, and who had obviously acted under great mental excitement—was found guilty of murder, being insane at the time. He was removed to a criminal lunatic asylum to be detained during His Majesty's pleasure. Later on, in view of further complaints from Mr. Skeffington's friends, the Prime Minister announced that he proposed to set up a Government inquiry into all the circumstances of the case.

In the second instance the military were accused of unnecessary violence and bloodshed whilst forcing their way through the North King Street quarter in order to complete

COURT-MARTIAL AT RICHMOND BARRACKS, DUBLIN.
Maj.-Gen. Lord Cheylesmore, President, and Mr. Kenneth Marshall, Judge-Advocate, arriving at the Court.



HOSPITAL IN DUBLIN CASTLE.

The picture hall which was set aside for wounded soldiers.

Smaller picture: A corner of a ward where wounded Sinn Feiners were tended.

the eordon round the rebel position in the Four Courts. It was alleged that in a certain public-house they had shot men who were not in rebel uniform and had taken no part in the fighting. In this case, complaint having been made in Parliament, the Prime Minister directed a careful investigation, which was held, and the result announced in the House of Commons in the following terms:

> The conelnsion arrived at after a full hearing in all the cases was that the deaths occurred in the course of continuous and desperate street and house-to-house fighting, which lasted for nearly two days, and in which the soldiers were constantly exposed to sniping from the windows and roofs of the houses. There can be little doubt that some men who were not taking an aetual part in the fighting were in the eourse of the struggle killed by both rebels and soldiers. But after careful inquiry it is impossible to bring home responsibility to any particular person or body of persons.

Further pressed, Mr. Asquith added that, having had experience of such matters in the past, he had read the proceedings at these inquiries and did not think that any partiality of any kind was shown. All the persons eoncerned were invited to attend. If he thought truth would be elueidated and responsibility brought home by any further inquiry he would, in the interest not only of the public but also of the Army, direct that it should be held; but ho had eome to the conelusion, after carefully weighing the facts, that a further inquiry would not lead to any different conclusion.

It will be admitted that it could fairly be elaimed by the military authorities that thero was never in history a rebellion so bitter and bloodthirsty suppressed with less violence and punished with less rigour. In his offieial report to Field-Marshal Freneh (May 25, 1916), Sir John Maxwell had the satisfaction of saying: "I am able to report that the conduct of the troops was admirable; their cheerfulness, courage, and good discipline, under the most trying eonditions, was excellent. Although doors and windows of shops and houses had to be broken open, no genuine case of looting has been reported to me, which I consider refleets the greatest eredit on all ranks." And after acknowledging the great assistance he had

received from the clergy of all denominations, medical men, nurses, and telegraph and telephone operators who had continuously performed their duties, often in circumstances of great danger, General Maxwell concluded: "I am glad to be able to record my opinion that the feelings of the bulk of the citizens of Dublin being against the Sinn Feiners materially influenced the collapse of the Rebellion."

In a separate report to the Secretary of State for War General Maxwell said that he thought it desirable to direct attention to the difficult conditions under which the troops had to act:

(1) The rebellion began by Sinn Feiners, presumably acting under orders, shooting in cold blood certain soldiers and policemen: simultaneously they occupied houses along the routes into the City of Dublin which were likely to be used by troops taking up posts.

(2) Most of the rebels were not in any uniform, and by mixing with peaceful citizens made it almost impossible for the troops to distinguish between friend and foe until fire was opened.

(3) In many cases troops having passed along a street seemingly occupied by harmless people were suddenly fired upon from behind from windows and roof tops. Such were the conditions when reinforcements commenced to arrive in Dublin.

(4) Whilst fighting continued under conditions at once so confused and so trying, it is possible that some innocent persons were shot. It must be remembered that the struggle was in many cases of a house-to-house character, that sniping was continuous and very persistent, and that it was often extremely difficult to distinguish between those who were, or had been, firing upon the troops and those who had for various reasons chosen to remain on the scene of the fighting, instead of leaving the houses and passing through the cordons.

(7) There have been numerous incidents of deliberate shooting on ambulances, and those courageous persons who voluntarily came out to attend to the wounded. The City Fire Brigade when it turned out in consequence of incendiary fires were fired on and had to retire.

. . . . . .

(10) Artillery fire was only used to reduce the barricades, or against a particular house known to be strongly held.

. . . . . .

(14) I cannot imagine a more difficult situation than that in which the troops were placed: most of those employed being draft-finding battalions or young Territorials from England who had no knowledge of Dublin.

Under the circumstances I consider the troops as a whole behaved with the greatest restraint and carried out their disagreeable and distasteful duties in a manner which reflects the greatest credit on their discipline.

(19) I wish to emphasize that the responsibility for the loss of life, however it occurred, the destruction of property and other losses rests entirely with those who engineered this revolt, and who, at a time when the Empire is engaged in a gigantic struggle, invited the assistance and cooperation of the Germans.

There still remained one prisoner deeply implicated in the rising who had not been brought before the courts-martial, it being thought better that he should have a more formal and deliberate trial before the High Court in London. On May 15, three weeks after his landing in Kerry, Sir Roger Casement was brought up at Bow Street police court and charged with treason. With him in the



THE PREMIER'S VISIT TO DUBLIN.

Mr. Asquith leaving Richmond Barracks after interviewing rebels.

dock appeared the prisoner Bailey, who had accompanied him from Limburg to Berlin, and from Wilhelmshaven in his submarine journey to the Kerry coast. The evidence produced was of the simplest and most direct kind—proof that Casement was a British subject; that he had approached the Irish prisoners in Limburg Camp and endeavoured to seduce them from their allegiance and to form an "Irish Brigade" to fight against England with German arms and equipment; that in pursuance of this scheme he had landed in Ireland provided with arms, war maps, signalling apparatus and a secret code, and accompanied by a ship loaded with arms and explosives sent by the German Government to provoke and assist an insurrection. In Bailey's case there was put in a signed statement which he had made to a police inspector in Kerry, and in which he admitted the material facts while disclaiming any treasonable intent. Both were committed for trial on the full charge, and in due course came up for trial before a Court composed of the Lord Chief Justice of England, Mr. Justice Avory, and Mr. Justice Horridge. The Crown was represented by the Attorney-General and the Solicitor-General, and the Counsel assigned to Sir Roger Casement were Mr. Serjeant Sullivan, K.C., of the Irish Bar, and Mr. Artemus Jones. In addition, Professor J. H. Morgan, Barrister-at-Law, and Mr. W. F. Doyle, of the Philadelphia Bar, had permission to assist in the defence of the prisoner. In the case of Bailey the Crown accepted his plea that he had acted as an innocent agent; no evidence was called, and he was formally acquitted by the jury.

Casement's case, which came first, occupied the Court for four days, much of the time being occupied by the speeches and the legal arguments, as there was no dispute about the facts and no witnesses were called for the defence. An attempt was made by the defence to quash the indictment on the ground that it disclosed no offence known to the law and triable by that Court. The treason charged was the act of adhering to the King's enemies elsewhere than in the King's realm, and it was argued that in the statute of Edward III., under which the indictment was laid, the words: "If a man be adherent to the King's enemies in his realm, giving him aid and comfort in the realm, or elsewhere," meant that the overt act must be committed within the realm and not elsewhere. The Court, however, unanimously refused the motion to quash, the Lord Chief Justice holding that the Act of Edward III. was a declaratory Act, that it was an offence to adhere to the



AT A REVIEW IN TRINITY COLLEGE PARK.

A group at the saluting base—Left to right: General Maxwell, Lady Wimborne, Mr. Asquith, Miss Grosvenor, Mr. Bonham Carter (Mr. Asquith's private secretary), and General Friend.

GENERAL MAXWELL,
Commanding-in-Chief the Forces in Ireland, inspecting Volunteers.

Smaller picture: Inspecting the Irish Automobile Club Ambulance. General Friend in rear.

King's enemies within the realm or without the realm, and that it was equally "adhering within the realm" to the King's enemies by giving them aid and comfort without the realm. The point, it may be added here, was taken to the Court of Appeal, where it was again argued before a strong Bench, consisting of Mr. Justice Darling with Mr. Justices Bray, A. T. Lawrence, Serutton, and Atkin. Mr. Serjeant Sullivan repeated his argument at length, but the Court did not call on the Attorney-General to reply. Whilst disclaiming any disrespect to Mr. Sullivan, whose argument "had been exceedingly well considered, and was in every way worthy of the greatest traditions of the King's Courts," Mr. Justice Darling for himself and his colleagues held that the point must fail. "We think," he said, "that if a man be adherent to the King's enemies in his realm by giving to them aid and comfort in his realm, or if he be adherent to the King's enemies elsewhere—that is, by giving to them aid and comfort elsewhere—he is equally adherent to the King's enemies, and if he is so adherent to the King's enemies, he commits a treason which the statute defines."

As regards the facts of the case, Casement—who was permitted to address the Court twice, once before his Counsel's address and once after the inevitable verdict of guilty had been delivered and before sentence was passed—contented himself with statements mainly irrelevant. He denied that he had taken "German gold," or that he had advised Irishmen to fight with Germans or for Germans. "An Irishman," he said, "has no right to



THE ROYAL COMMISSION.
Sir Matthew Nathan, Under-Secretary, before the Commission.
Circle portrait: Viscount Hardinge (Chairman).
[*Lafayette*

fight for any land but Ireland." He had touched upon these matters, he said in conclusion, because they were calculated to reflect on his honour and thus to tarnish the cause he held dear. In his second statement the prisoner was more political and more rhetorical. He spoke of "judicial assassination," and declared that the statute of Edward III. had no power over him, because "the kings of England as such had no rights in Ireland up to the time of Henry VIII. This Court," he declared, "is to me, an Irishman, a foreign Court." In Ireland alone, he argued, was loyalty to one's country held to be a crime. And in conclusion he said with much emphasis and earnestness:

> When all your rights become only an accumulated wrong; where men must beg with bated breath for leave to subsist in their own land, to think their own thoughts, to sing their own songs, to garner the fruit of their own labours, and even whilst they beg to see things inexorably withheld from them: then surely it is a braver, a saner, and a truer thing to be a rebel than tamely to accept it as the natural lot of man.

This final outburst provoked a remonstrance from Mr. T. W. Rolleston, a well-known veteran Irish Nationalist, who uttered a public protest against a statement calculated to convey an impression so childishly at variance with elementary truth:

> How amazingly unlike the reality [wrote Mr. Rolleston] is this picture of modern Ireland! Apparently there are Irishmen still utterly unable to realize that they no longer live under the shadow of the Penal Laws. It is the plain, incontrovertible fact that there is nothing on earth to prevent any Irishman from subsisting in his own land and garnering the full reward of his labours. Some classes of Irishmen are better protected in this respect than any of the corresponding classes in Great Britain. . . . As for the Celtic wing of the Irish revival, the Government, as everyone knows, has liberally endowed a National University which has perfect freedom of internal control. It has made the Irish language an obligatory subject for matriculation, and has appointed four professors, one of whom was President of the Irish Volunteers and another the founder and President of the Gaelic League, to promote at handsome salaries the very studies which we are told are banned under English rule. Besides this, the teaching of Gaelic in the National Schools has for many years been subsidized from Imperial funds to the tune of £15,000 to £20,000 a year. There is indeed no limit to the subsidy except in the readiness of parents and school-managers to take advantage of it. . . . Home Rule may do a great deal for Ireland, and I hope and believe it will. But more personal and spiritual freedom Ireland could not possibly have than she enjoys at present. It is conceivable that she may have less.
>
> It has not, I think, been noticed that one of the most unhappy features of the Sinn Fein movement is the blow which it has struck at liberal ideas and the claims of local traditions and local patriotism all over the world. Germany and Russia—at least the old Russia—thinking of their Polish, Danish, and Alsatian policies, might well turn to us and say: "We were right, after all! You have tried up to the hilt the policy of giving free play to the traditional sentiments of the smaller units within your Empire—this is your reward!" Sinn Fein has given to the world a lesson written in fire and blood in which Continental despotism will for many a day read the justification of its worst tyrannies.*

And this might well be the epitaph on a movement which was born and lived in an atmosphere of systematic misrepresentation and falsehood. In this it was worthy of its German or Germanized progenitors. And the same spirit of falsehood accompanied it to the last, some Irish-American ecclesiastics being so misinformed and so misguided as to appeal for funds to relieve "the appalling misery and destitution that exist to-day in Ireland" in consequence of the arrests and other measures

* *Westminster Gazette*, July 3, 1916.

taken for the suppression of the rebellion. In Dublin, it is true, much want was undoubtedly caused by the wholesale destruction of business and of property arising from the acts of the rebels themselves and their hangers-on; and in this case instant and effective measures were taken by the authorities for its relief, the distribution of food and other supplies being undertaken and carried on before the fires were well extinguished. As for the rest of Ireland, it was and continues to be exceptionally prosperous and thriving in all that contributes to material welfare. The "appalling misery and distress" are as imaginary as the "inexorable" wrongs of which Casement complained and which, as Mr. Rolleston pointed out, were only typical of the "fatal obsession of ideas which in Ireland have long ceased to correspond with realities."

On the day after Casement's condemnation as a traitor the necessary sequel appeared in the form of an official notice stating that "The King has been pleased to direct that Sir Roger Casement, Knight, shall cease to be a member of the Most Distinguished Order of St. Michael and St. George, of which Order he was appointed a Companion in 1905, and that his name shall be erased from the Register of the Order."

In response to requests made in Parliament, a Royal Commission—consisting of Lord Hardinge, ex-Viceroy of India, Sir Montague Shearman, a Judge of the High Court, and Sir Mackenzie Chalmers—was appointed "to Enquire into the Causes of the Recent Outbreak of Rebellion in Ireland." After hearing much evidence in London and in Dublin, the Commission unanimously reported in a document from which several extracts have already been published in the course of this narrative. It was held that Mr. Birrell, Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant, "the administrative head of Your Majesty's Government in Ireland," was "primarily responsible for the situation that was allowed to arise and for the outbreak that occurred." Sir Matthew Nathan, the Under-Secretary, it was found, had "carried out with the utmost loyalty" the policy of the Government and of the Chief Secretary, but he was to blame in that "he did not sufficiently impress upon the Chief Secretary, during the latter's prolonged absences from Dublin, the necessity for more active measures to remedy the situation in Ireland." The Lord Lieutenant, who had only been a short time in Ireland, and who, by the conditions of his office, was in no way answerable for the policy of the Government, was exonerated from all blame. The

MEMBERS OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION.
Sir Montague Shearman (left) and Sir Mackenzie Chalmers.

LORD MIDLETON.
After giving evidence before the Royal Commission.

MEMBERS OF THE ROYAL IRISH CONSTABULARY.

Smaller picture: Sir Neville Chamberlain, Inspector-General of the R.I.C., congratulating members of the Constabulary.

real root and origin of the whole evil was found to be, in words already quoted:

> That lawlessness was allowed to grow up unchecked, and that Ireland for several years past has been administered on the principle that it was safer and more expedient to leave law in abeyance if collision with any faction of the Irish people could thereby be avoided. Such a policy is the negation of that cardinal rule of government which demands that the enforcement of law and the preservation of order should always be independent of political expediency.

Such a sweeping condemnation had never before been passed by an impartial and competent tribunal upon a modern Government responsible to Parliament. Those familiar with Ireland, and with the way in which affairs had been neglected and mismanaged for many years, were indeed acquainted with the situation and had made repeated and urgent representations to those in authority, and, as the Commissioners put it, "the warning fell on unheeding ears." But to the British public and to the Empire at large the revelation of the facts came with a shock of surprise and disgust. The Chief Secretary and the Under-Secretary sent in their resignations and the Viceroy followed the same course, the office of Lord Lieutenant being placed in Commission in the hands of five Lords Justices empowered to sign the necessary documents and to execute the routine duties of Government. In General Maxwell's hands, under the Defence of the Realm Act and the Proclamations establishing Military Law, was left the sole directing authority. Constitutional government in Ireland was bankrupt; but, at the same time, it was recognized that it was impossible to contemplate the indefinite continuance of the existing military system.

In the absence of any other civil authority the Prime Minister undertook the task of

personal investigation into the whole difficult situation. He arrived in Dublin on Friday, May 12, at a time when the courts-martial were virtually over, and had personal interviews with Sir John Maxwell and with a considerable number of civil officials, as well as with leading merchants and leaders of industry. He also paid visits to Belfast and to Cork and, as he stated, "had a full and frank discussion as to the present position of affairs." On the 20th he was back in London. In his absence there had been much ill-informed gossip as to his intentions, and it was currently reported that he had drawn up some new scheme of government intended, once for all, to settle the Irish question. In *The Times* of May 17, however, there appeared an article dismissing all these "fantastic schemes," which might please theorists in England, but which had "no relation to Irish realities." It was pointed out that it was still the question of Ulster that blocked the way, and that any attempt at a "practical temporary solution" must take the question up "exactly where it was left two years ago." And on May 22, when the Prime Minister was back in London, the lesson of the whole situation was again enforced in an article pointing out that the difficulty was not merely an Irish one, but had widespread ramifications with bearings on our foreign policy and on the conduct of the war. The difficulty, it was pointed out, was:

to prevent the Irish problem from complicating our relations with neutral countries, and especially with America. Let there be no misunderstanding about the importance of this last piece of work. The executions in Dublin, few as they were by comparison with the ghastly death-roll which the rebels caused, have had the worst possible effect across the seas. Our Washington Correspondent has left no doubt of the impression created even in the minds of those Americans who are best disposed towards this country. A legend is already in existence in Ireland, and is in danger of becoming historical, to the effect that a few harmless idealists, fighting heroically for their ideal, have been butchered in cold blood by an overwhelming and vindictive Army. Nothing in the facts can justify the propagation of this travesty of the truth. But it exists, it is characteristically Irish, and its strength is very largely due to the false perspective with which the Government themselves have distorted the picture. They deliberately and most foolishly minimized a ghastly outbreak in the first instance. In spite of innumerable warnings, they were reluctant to allow the truth to get abroad. Is it surprising that the authentic news of the executions, slowly doled out, was thought a startling contrast to the trumpery affair of which the first official bulletins had spoken? Whatever else he does, Mr. Asquith must lose no time in correcting this blunder. The naked facts, honestly told, should be sufficient to break up the German-Irish connexion everywhere. As things stand at present, we run a serious risk of cementing it by sheer ineptitude.

And, again, it was insisted, the Ulster difficulty had to be faced first if there was to be any settlement at all: "Above all, Ulster wants to be left alone, and, therefore, we repeat that the practical line of advance is to settle first the outstanding geographical dispute between Ulster and the rest of Ireland. A prompt agreement on this point between Mr. Redmond and Sir Edward Carson would help the solution of many other difficulties." The reference to the hitch of "two years ago" in *The Times* article pointed, of course, to the break-up of the Buckingham Palace Conference immediately before the outbreak of war. On July 21, 1914, the King, knowing of the peril that then threatened the Empire, made a personal attempt to bring about some agreement between parties in Ireland. He summoned the leaders to Buckingham Palace, where, for four days, the question was threshed out in all its aspects. Mr. Redmond, it was understood, was willing to concede four Ulster counties which should be excluded from the scheme of Home Rule under a Dublin Parliament, Sir Edward Carson claiming a "clean cut" for the whole of Ulster. Ultimately the Conference broke up on July 24 having arrived at "no agreement either in principle or in detail." Twelve days later we were at war, and, although the Home Rule Bill was put on the Statute Book in September, it was subject to a definite pledge that it was not to come into operation till after the war and till some scheme had been adopted for the settlement by consent of the

ARMED CIVIL GUARD.
A guard, fully armed, established in Dublin to accompany the police on their round of duty.

Ulster difficulty. This is where the matter was "left two years ago," and it was here that it was now taken up. Mr. Lloyd George was entrusted by the Cabinet with the conduct of the negotiations, and in a few days it was announced that Mr. Redmond and Mr. Devlin on the one hand, and Sir Edward Carson and Colonel Craig on the other, had arrived at an understanding which they felt justified in submitting to their followers for ratification. The Ulster Unionist Council was summoned by Sir Edward Carson to meet in Belfast on June 6, and Mr. Redmond, on his part, arranged for a meeting of the Irish Parliamentary Party in Dublin on the 10th. It soon became known that the basis of settlement arrived at was the speedy coming into operation of the Home Rule Act, subject to an Amending Act that would provide for the exclusion from its operation of the six Ulster counties of Down, Antrim, Derry, Armagh, Tyrone and Fermanagh, with the cities of Belfast, Londonderry, and Newry. The Ulster Council accepted the scheme on the understanding that it was to be a "definite" settlement: the Irish Parliamentary Party, whose meeting was followed by a "Conference" in Belfast of Nationalists from the six excluded Ulster counties, accepted it on the understanding that the settlement was only for the duration of the war, which was to be followed by an Imperial Conference to consider and decide the whole question of the relationship of the constituent parts of the Empire to each other. There was some wrangling over these differences of opinion or of expression, and the misunderstanding involved a ministerial crisis and the resignation of Lord Selborne. Some sections of the Irish Nationalists also took exception to Mr. Redmond's "surrender" of Ulster, whilst some Southern Unionists protested warmly against their "abandonment." But, on the whole, the leaders kept their followers together, and on July 19 the Prime Minister announced that a Bill on the lines of the Redmond-Carson agreement had been drafted and would be laid before the House of Commons.

Then, however, in circumstances which must here be left for subsequent discussion, the difficulties again became serious. On July 24 the Prime Minister stated in the House of Commons that the Bill must be postponed, since the Government did not see its way to proceed with any Bill "in regard to which there does not appear beforehand to be a prospect of substantial agreement between all the principal parties concerned." Mr. Asquith expressed the hope that the disagreement would be only temporary, and he renewed the appeal "that we should heart and soul on all sides endeavour to bring about an arrangement which will redound, we believe, to the good of Ireland and to the strength and safety of the Empire."



INSIDE THE FOUR COURTS, DUBLIN.
A barricaded door as left by the rebels.

CHAPTER CXXXVI.

THE WESTERN FRONT DURING THE BATTLE OF VERDUN.

Strategy of the Allies—Causes of British Inactivity—Sir Douglas Haig's Despatch of May 19, 1916—Position of the German Armies from the Sea to the Somme—Extension of British Front—Analysis of the Fighting from February to April—New Weapons and Protective Devices—Steel Helmets—Wonderful Work in the Air—A Russian Contingent in France.

IN Chapter CXVI. we brought the narrative of the fighting on the Western Front down to the Battle of Verdun, the opening phases of which to the end of April have been described in Chapters CXXIII and CXXV. The Battle of Verdun to some extent made onlookers forget that to west, north-west and south of it, from Switzerland to the sea, the heavy and field artillery were seldom, if ever, silent for any long interval, while bombing and mining operations and flights and duels of airmen were the rule and not the exception. The daily casualty lists, if not very numerous, showed at any rate that there were continuous encounters with the Germans, although none of these was of any magnitude. Between February 21 and the end of April, 1916, however, the Germans did not venture to take the offensive on a large scale, except in the Verdun region, and the Allies, who had learnt from the Battles of the Champagne Pouilleuse and Loos not to attack seriously until they were provided with an adequate supply of ammunition and troops in sufficient numbers, were content to parry the Crown Prince's efforts against Verdun and the not very serious thrusts against the French positions in the Champagne.

Time was on the side of the Allies. Their national resources in men and material would eventually be far greater than those of the Central Powers, and there was no military reason why they should be drawn into a premature offensive, which, if unsuccessful, might lower their prestige among neutrals and cause disappointment in the British, French and Italian nations. It was their best plan for the moment to play a waiting game. Owing to the immensely increased efficiency of the British and French heavy artillery, the defender was not, indeed, so favourably placed as he had been in the comparatively recent past, but the offensive is generally a more costly operation than the defensive, and thus the obvious policy of Joffre was to let the Germans exhaust themselves by continuing their mad-bull-like rushes, which since they had been repulsed at the Battle of the Marne had always ended unfortunately for Germany. Every hour increased the gap of time between the days when the Teutonic hordes, buoyed up by the memories of Gravelotte and Sedan, had reached the outskirts of Paris. Psychologically the Kaiser's troops were weakening and the pressure of the Allied fleets was gradually but inevitably diminishing the physical strength and the material resources of the armies and peoples of the German and Austro-Hungarian Emperors.

Accordingly, no incident of great importance occurred on the Western Front during the last days of February and in March and April, 1916,

THE BRITISH AND GERMAN STEEL HELMETS. [*Official Photograph.*

except at Verdun, where the outcome of the German attacks was small and completely insignificant considering the price paid for them. This absence of spectacular incidents produced a false impression, especially in France, where a rumour, which probably originated in Germany, began to circulate that the British Army was not doing its fair share. Sir Douglas Haig, in his dispatch of May 19, 1916, sufficiently dealt with this rumour.

"The only offensive effort [he said] made by the enemy on a great scale was directed against our French Allies near Verdun. The fighting in that area has been prolonged and severe. The results have been worthy of the high traditions of the French Army and of great service to the cause of the Allies. The efforts made by the enemy have cost him heavy losses both in men and in prestige, and he has made these sacrifices without gaining any advantage to counterbalance them.

"During this struggle my troops have been in readiness to cooperate as they might be needed, but the only assistance asked for by our Allies was of an indirect nature—viz., the relief of the French troops on a portion of their defensive front. This relief I was glad to be able to afford.

"Its execution on a considerable front, everywhere in close touch with the enemy, was a somewhat delicate operation, but it was carried out with complete success, thanks to the cordial cooperation and goodwill of all ranks concerned and to the lack of enterprise shown by the enemy during the relief."

While the Battle of Verdun proceeded the British, who had already replaced the French from a point north of Hébuterne, through Albert to the heights north of the Somme, took over the Arras salient, and occupied Loos, the plateau of Notre Dame de Lorette, Souchez, the Labyrinth, Arras itself and the trenches south of it to the environs of Hébuterne. In March, 1916, the Armies commanded by Sir Douglas Haig extended from the Yperlee Canal north of Ypres to the banks of the Somme. That the French troops thus released from the Arras salient had a material influence on the Battle of Verdun is shown by General Joffre's reply to Sir Douglas Haig's telegram of congratulations. "The French Army," said Joffre, 'is confident that it will obtain results [at Verdun] from which all the Allies will reap an advantage. It remembers also that its recent call on the comradeship of the British Army met with an immediate and complete response." The "Ordre de Bataille" of the German Armies north of the Somme, published by *The Times* on April 17, 1916, a copy of which is reproduced at p. 476, broadly indicates the share taken by the British in the campaign at that date.

From the Somme to the North Sea the

German Higher Command had disposed, in addition to over 3,000 guns, 40 German divisions (excluding the cavalry), numbering in all probability not far short of 500,000 infantry, and altogether some 800,000 soldiers. *The Times* Military Correspondent, in an article accompanying the map, pointed out that facing the French and Belgian troops on the left were only the Naval Corps with two and a half Landwehr and Ersatz divisions. All the rest of the available German forces in this part of the theatre of war was in front of us, while the one cavalry and eight infantry divisions kept in reserve could be rapidly moved up to any point of the German front, whether for attack or defence. It was also significant that, with the exception of one Landwehr division, the remainder of the Germans, including the divisions in reserve, opposing the British were "good Active and Reserve formations"—troops, in *The Times* Military Correspondent's opinion, "at least as good as those assailing Verdun, and better than any other in West or East." To hold fast this huge army—in numbers considerably larger than the whole of the army led by Napoleon into Russia in 1812 and infinitely better equipped than that historic host—was no light task. In general terms Sir Douglas Haig described the nature of the struggle:

"On the British front no action on a great scale, such as that of Verdun, has been fought during the past five months, nevertheless our troops have been far from idle or inactive. Although the struggle, in a general sense, has not been intense, it has been everywhere continuous, and there have been many sharp local actions.

"The maintenance and repair of our defences alone, especially in winter, entail constant heavy work. Bad weather and the enemy combine to flood and destroy trenches, dug-outs, and communications; all such damages must be repaired promptly, under fire, and almost entirely by night.

"Artillery and snipers are practically never silent, patrols are out in front of the lines every night, and heavy bombardments by the artillery of one or both sides take place daily in various parts of the line. Below ground there are continual mining and counter-mining, which, by the ever-present threat of sudden explosion and the uncertainty as to when and where it will take place, causes perhaps a more constant strain than any other form of warfare. In the air there is seldom a day, however bad the weather, when aircraft are not busy reconnoitring, photographing, and observing fire. All this is taking place constantly at any hour of the day or night, and in any part of the line.

[*Official Photograph.*

BRITISH TROOPS IN A WOOD BEHIND THE TRENCHES DURING A GERMAN BOMBARDMENT.



THE GERMAN ARMIES FROM THE SEA TO THE SOMME IN APRIL, 1916

"In short, although there has been no great incident of historic importance to record on the British front during the period under review, a steady and continuous fight has gone on, day and night, above ground and below it. The comparative monotony of this struggle has been relieved at short intervals by sharp local actions, some of which, although individually almost insignificant in a war on such an immense scale, would have been thought worthy of a separate dispatch under different conditions, while their cumulative effect, though difficult to appraise at its true value now, will doubtless prove hereafter to have been considerable.

"One form of minor activity deserves special mention—namely, the raids or 'cutting-out parties' which are made at least twice or three times a week against the enemy's line. They consist of a brief attack, with some special object, on a section of the opposing trenches, usually carried out at night by a small body of men. The character of these operations—the preparation of a road through our own and the enemy's wire—the crossing of the open ground unseen—the penetration of the enemy's trenches—the hand-to-hand fighting in the darkness and the uncertainty as to the strength of the opposing force—give peculiar scope to the gallantry, dash and quickness of decision of the troops engaged; and much skill and daring are frequently displayed in these operations.

"The initiative in these minor operations was taken, and on the whole has been held, by us; but the Germans have recently attempted some bold and well-conceived raids against our lines, many of which have been driven back, although some have succeeded in penetrating, as has been reported by me from time to time.

"The work of the Tunnelling Companies calls for special mention. Increased mining activity on the part of the enemy has invariably been answered with enterprise combined with untiring energy on the part of our miners, who in carrying out duties always full of danger have shown that they possess in the highest degree the qualities of courage, perseverance and self-sacrifice. Their importance in the present phase of warfare is very great."

An extract from a letter written by an officer, who for his gallantry obtained the Military Cross, will bring home to the reader who has had no experience of modern warfare what our men are doing and suffering:

"The first night we were ferociously hated at 7 p.m., but last night we got a fearful



BRITISH TROOPS WITH BOMBS.
In a German crater after a mine explosion.

drubbing from 2.10 a.m. to 2.30 of rapid of all sizes. The place simply rained metal. The first shell woke me up, and I spent this time alone in utter darkness prone on the ground and trusting to sandbags, a plank and my steel cap to stop direct hits from six-inchers and crump shrapnel. When at last it was over, I heard whistles and shouts and shots, turned out the rest of my platoon and rushed out to find my screen, which I happen to have put 100 yards in front of the wood, retreating through the wood in disorder. The Huns had shelled the wood wickedly, and the moment the barrage was lifted on to the causeway, while my unfortunate screen was still playing tiger-rugs as the shells screamed over, the Huns rushed on in three parties—160 men in all—and some even got to the woods before my screen could get in. The latter were ordered to fall back on the wood if attacked, but they were so overwhelmed that they had to come right back before we knew where we were. I met them at the bridge they had to cross, and though they were in disorder and straggling over one by one while the wood crashed with bombs, I managed to rally them, and we lay down on our side of the first stream and soon had a vigorous rifle and machine-gun fire raking the woods. Many had to fight their way back hand to hand, and several were

British troops filling sand-bags.

AFTER DARK BEHIND THE

wounded. As the Huns eharged, they made the most hellish sereaming row I ever heard, and I shall never forget it. Imagine 160 men almost mad with fright and breathless trying to shout 'Vaterland' through the dark night, and then the sereams and groans and erashes of bombs in the wood just aeross the brook. We bagged seven prisoners, who fought like tigers by all reports, and rushed about the wood like maniaes, jabbering Hunnish and eraekling the reeds and bushes. It was 160 to 30, but we made a rush and withdrew over the bridge, whieh we pulled back, and then I made the fellows stop there whatever happened. We tried to 'phone S.O.S., but the wires had been eut by shells. Two of my maehine guns eroeked and only one was in working order; this one and our rifle-fire held the Huns up and gave them a nasty raking, although we were heavily shelled as we lay in the open, and a barrage of erashing 5·9 shrapnel swept the eauseway. We sratehed ourselves a few odd scraps of eover or erept into shell-holes, hanging on while I tried to get more maehine guns and guns to strafe the woods and preparo my counter-attaek, for I was determined to retake it at all eosts. Captain —— eame up with two sections of another platoon and these fresh men were very weleome. The slightly wounded stuek it splendidly. At this point he took over for fivo minutes while I went baek to report. . . . I managed to eollar two maehine guns, but nothing more. When I eame baek we managed to put the bridge across again, and I sent a patrol over to reeonnoitre. They jolly soon got bombs about their ears and eame baek reporting the obvious faet that the wood was full. We let everything rip for a minute or two, rallied the men, and streamed over the plank bridge, while the heavy shrapnel with its deafening erash, blaek smoke and pattering bits of iron, made the plaee a hell. By now it was dawn, and as our bayonets gleamed in the faint light and what looked like a erowd of shadowy devils streamed over the brook under the enemy fire, most of the Fritzes got eold feet and earried their wounded away. One wounded fellow (whose button I sent you) pluekily went on firing and bombing as he lay by the bridge-head. We bayoneted him, chased several others out of the bushes, and lined the opposite bank. I then took forward a small party and found a dying Hun, made one or two sympathetie remarks in bad German and got out of him that most of the others had gone home, and then he na-poohed. We advaneed ovor the marsh, in plaees waist deep in mud, and the Huns eleared out. During this advanee we were badly shelled and a six-ineh Jaek Johnson landed within six yards of me, blowing a huge hole in the marsh just by, and making me bite my eheek. About this time my platoon ser-

A ration-party caught in the open by an enemy star-shell.

BRITISH FIRE TRENCHES.

geant—a splendid fellow—got a shrapnel in the back, a few others were hit, but we went through. My party then scoured the place for our missing and found a cap with the badge torn out but with name of the man, so we skirted round the outside of the wood and joined the centre party. The shelling now ceased, and we went back to the marshes to hunt for stage property.

"As I was searching the dead for documents, I heard a weird noise on my right, shouting and doubling and high jinks as though a hare was running through our camp. I found a wretched Hun yelling out all kinds of rot. When I went up with my revolver his face was khaki and his hands trembled violently as he held them up. And then there occurred a little comedy. Striving to remember der, die, das, I advised him to behave quietly (most unnecessary) and then took his arm and began to stroll back while I held my revolver at his chest with the other. I never knew the funny pictures were so true before. He was tall and thin and squinted wickedly, and with his two hands up—if only I were an artist, I could make you laugh for a month. As the poor wretch was so frightened, I put my revolver back and tried to talk to him, but he was too frightened to say anything coherent. He managed, however, to stutter out 'nong' when I asked him if he sprach Französich. I soon handed him over to someone else, and searched the wood again for wounded, prisoners and material. We found eight Mauser rifles, three excellent wire-cutters, two dead Huns, three large land mines and about thirty bombs besides other trifles. The prisoner has since told us that there were 100 of his crowd, and two sections of ordinary infantry. This party had come to blow up our causeway with these mines, an ambitious scheme that fell through rather badly. I have no doubt they'll try again and probably in even larger numbers. Our losses were 17, only one of whom was killed outright.

"Going under shrapnel fire in the open is very strange—one's chief worry is the absurd size of one's legs, and I'll swear that I subconsciously tried to tuck them away under my steel helmet, needless to say, without success."

We will now record the main events between February 21 and April 30 on the front from the North Sea to the Somme, then from the Somme to the eastern skirts of the Argonne Forest, and finally from the south of Verdun to the Swiss frontier.

On the Franco-Belgian front, which extended from the sea, near Nieuport, to a point on the Yperlee Canal, just north of Ypres, there was comparative calm. The Germans were not inclined to repeat their error of trying to reach Calais by an advance through Nieuport, Furnes,



BRITISH MONITORS OFF THE COAST OF FLANDERS.

or Dixmude, and the policy of the Allies, for the moment, was to remain on the defensive in this area. The fighting, therefore, resolved itself chiefly into artillery duels, some of which, as those on March 1, March 18, and April 23, were very intense. On Monday, April 24, an allied squadron, composed, according to the German account, of monitors, destroyers, and large and small steamers, which were apparently searching for mines and laying out buoys preparatory to a bombardment, appeared off the coast of Flanders. The buoys were used to mark off Dutch territorial waters. Zeebrugge was bombarded, with what result is uncertain. If the German report is to be believed, three German torpedo-boats attacked our ships and returned to port undamaged, while a British destroyer was injured and a trawler sunk, the crew being captured and taken to Zeebrugge.

On the British front, from the point where it joined on to the Franco-Belgian forces, down to the heights above the Somme, the situation in the last week of February and during March and April was very different. The Ypres salient was, as ever, both a vast shell-trap and the theatre of numerous combats which in our colonial wars would have been designated battles. On Sunday, February 27, a German attack on the trenches north of the Ypres-Comines Canal was repulsed. A few days later, on Thursday, March 2, it was our turn to take the offensive.

The reader will remember that on February 14 the Germans had captured part of a narrow ridge thirty to forty feet high, covered with trees, on the northern bank of the Canal, running outward into the German area. Our trenches passed over the eastern part of this, which was known as "The Bluff." The enemy on the 14th secured some 650 yards of our front-line trenches. Two of these trenches were at once regained, but the others in spite of several counter-attacks, remained in the possession of the Germans, who, anticipating a renewal of our offensive, dug themselves in with peculiar thoroughness. A large number of guns were collected in the vicinity to deluge our troops with shrapnel and high-explosive shells if they advanced. A similar concentration of guns took place behind the British line, and for several days the garrison of the dug-outs and trenches on "The Bluff" was heavily bombarded. On March 1, between 5 and 6 p.m., our bombardment became, literally, terrific. It was accompanied by a hail of bombs thrown by hand. The enemy, expecting an attack, appeared to have been ordered to deliver one themselves, but the men could not be induced to leave their refuges. During the night British machine-guns played ceaselessly. From a distance the position of "The Bluff," veiled in mist and darkness, was indicated by abrupt and continuous flashes of orange light. A red sun rose over a clump of trees on the horizon, and by its light high above the frosty fields the enemy aeroplanes were seen vanishing upwards to avoid the bursting of the shells ascending from the anti-aircraft guns. Our men, with their heads protected by the new

AT SOUCHEZ.
A French soldier crossing a narrow part of the river.

steel helmets, which were now being tested for the first time on a large scale, waited the word of command.

The attack had been organized with minute attention to the most trivial details. Each hour, on four occasions, bursts of fire from the guns and mortars had kept the Germans in a state of nervous excitement expecting the charge. At 4.29 a.m., on March 2, the assault was delivered. Sir Douglas Haig states that it "was a complete surprise." The enemy were found with their bayonets unfixed, and many of them without rifles or equipment. About fifty Germans scuttled into a crater at the eastern end of "The Bluff." They put up a brief resistance and then disappeared into some

tunnels, where they were captured at leisure. The attackers on the right carried "The Bluff" with little opposition. In the centre our troops seized the German third line, and held it while the captured trenches in the rear were being consolidated. On the left our men at first failed to reach the German position, but a Lewis gun was brought to bear on the defenders by the troops in the centre, and the enemy, being enfiladed, was forced to retreat.

The German trenches were found full of dead, the result of the bombardment; five officers and 250 men were captured. So stunned was the enemy by this blow, that it was not till midday that he made any attempt to recover the lost ground; then 51 batteries opened fire. At 3 p.m. a column of Germans advanced to the attack, but, instead of closing with our troops, they hurled their bombs beyond the British trenches and rushed forward with their hands up. As on previous occasions, the German artillery sent a storm of shells among their own men, many of whom were killed, the remainder surrendering. Not all the Germans, however, behaved in this fashion. Like wild beasts at bay, with bombs and rifles many defended to the last their deep dug-outs.

The British steel helmet had more than fulfilled expectations. It was painted grey, and resembled an inverted bowl. It was not so light as the French headpiece, and the wide, downward sloping brim—designed to protect the side and back of the neck, the temples and upper part of the face as well as the top and sides of the head—made it look shallower. The top was smooth and round, whereas the crown of the French helmet presented a prominent ridge tapering backwards. Our helmet did not fit close to the head, standing away about a third of an inch all round, the weight being borne by a padded leather band fixed to the inner side by a series of indiarubber buffers, each about the thickness



IN THE TRENCHES

Firing a trench mortar. Smaller picture: A trench mortar and its shell.

of a lead pencil, and an inch long. The buffers diffused and neutralised the force of a blow. The steel had been carefully tested, and was really bullet proof. The account of an eye-witness shows how important was this new defensive armour.

I was this morning shown a batch of casques from wounded men which have been collected from the field. In all cases the men who were wearing these were either unscathed or suffering from slight concussion or mere scalp wounds. It is believed that had they not been wearing these helmets they would either have been all killed or dangerously wounded. One of the casques bears an indentation from a heavy blow with the butt-end of a German rifle. The man thus struck bayoneted his assailant and was none the worse for the assault.

Another casque bears distinct evidence of a direct hit with the business-end of a shell. Several of them are rent by fragments of shrapnel casing, manifestly with a force which against a cloth cap would have been quite sufficient to cause fracture of the bone. Others are pitted by shrapnel bullets. Most of the men who wore these state that except for a rattling like a hail-storm sweeping over a galvanized roof, and a sudden compression around the rim of the helmet, they were unaware that they were being struck.

The Germans had special kinds of helmets for sentries or snipers, and for men working in the saps. One found by the French in a German trench near Chaulnes was three-eighths of an inch thick, and weighed slightly under fourteen pounds. It was described as follows in *The Times*:—

As will be seen by the front section (see sketch 1) it is shaped on the lower part of the right side in order that a man wearing it can use a rifle. In shape it resembles half of the headpiece of a suit of armour of the twelfth or thirteenth centuries. Although the eye-holes are only two very narrow slits, about five-eighths of an inch long and one-sixteenth of an inch wide, the wearer can see sufficiently to secure the range of the object to sight the rifle.

The wearer puts the helmet on like a fencing mask, and is able to secure it firmly to the neck by the means of straps (see sketch 2). The steel is shaped at various angles so as to deflect rifle and small machine-gun bullets. Tests which have been made upon the headpiece with bullets of small calibre show that the design is effective.

Our success on March 2 was succeeded by a violent artillery duel. Five days later the enemy sprang a mine near the Ypres-Comines railway, but no serious damage was inflicted by the explosion. In the vicinity of the Ypres-Roulers railway, south of Verlorenhoek, the British on March 14 carried out a small raid with good results. Near Boesinghe, on the Yperlee Canal, there was some hard fighting. After a heavy bombardment the enemy rushed a bombing post, which, however, was at once recaptured (March 19–20).

Boesinghe was approximately the spot where the salient commenced on the north, St. Eloi, where it ended on the south. At St. Eloi mines were exploded by the British (March 27) and detachments of the Northumberland Fusiliers and Royal Fusiliers carried the enemy's first and second line trenches on a front of some 600 yards. The Germans suffered severely, and two officers and 168 men were captured. The enemy Staff at first characteristically admitted that 100 yards of trenches had been blown up, but forgot to mention the attack which followed. Later (March 29) they stated, apparently in error, that one of the mine craters occupied by the British "had been recovered." By March 28 the total of prisoners taken had been increased to five officers and 195 men, and the efforts of the Germans, seconded by a powerful artillery, to regain the lost ground had failed. On March 30, however, a mine crater was, in fact, carried by them

SKETCH 1.

SKETCH 2.

AT ST. ELOI: AWAITING THE SIGNAL TO CHARGE, MARCH 27, 1916, AFTER THE EXPLOSION OF A MINE.
British infantry preparing to make a dash on the enemy's trenches.

Two days afterwards (April 1) another German officer and four men were made prisoners and early in the morning of April 3 the above-mentioned crater with four more officers and 80 men passed into the possession of the British. On April 6 one of the five main craters, now garrisoned by Canadians, was lost. It was recovered on the night of April 9. During the night of the next day grenade fighting continued with varying fortune. "We hold," said the British *communiqué* of the 11th, "three of the craters, but not the other two at present."

On the 11th the enemy turned his attention to the northern end of the salient. Three successive attacks west of the Ypres-Pilkem road, which runs parallel with the Yperlee Canal, were delivered. The Germans for a moment established themselves in the first-line trench, but were promptly expelled and they left behind them 25 dead and 3 prisoners.

When perusing the accounts of these minor engagements the reader must never forget that they were preceded, or succeeded, by gun-fire such as in past wars had been wont to accompany only pitched battles, and that between the infantry actions there were innumerable artillery duels along the whole of the vast front.

For example, Sir Douglas Haig telegraphed on April 17: "Heavy shelling to-day about Voormezeele and Dickabusch, and in the area between St. Eloi and the Ypres-Comines canal." An eye-witness translated this laconic message into more picturesque terms:

> It was from a hill in the middle of this delectable region that we, who were not combatants, were allowed to watch the shelling which the *communiqué* so tersely described.
>
> Heavy German guns from somewhere behind the Messines ridge on our right were firing right across to Hooge and Ypres on our further left. We would hear the roar of the gun dominating all the clamour of the smaller pieces, and, as the great shells hurtled across our front they made so much noise that it seemed absurd that one could not see them. Then with eyes fixed on Ypres or Hooge, we waited for the explosion. The flight of these shells was crossed at right angles by the fire of certain heavy guns of our own, which devoted their attention to some place out beyond St. Eloi. As the din increased it was impossible to tell what shells came from where or who was aiming at what. It was just din, din, seemingly objectless and infernal. After a time the further objects all became blotted out by the smoke of explosions. Ypres retired behind a veil. Hooge was quite lost to sight. Everywhere over each definite objective hung banks of smoke. Once well behind the enemy's lines, over towards Hollebeke, in the direction of Menin, it seemed that we had found a magazine or ammunition store of some sort, for a dense column rose slowly into the air, much too big for even the largest shell, and for several minutes went on unfolding wreath on wreath of thick grey fumes.
>
> Overhead, meanwhile, the "aerial activity" of which

the *communiqué* spoke continued, and aeroplanes passed and repassed, chased by little puffs of shrapnel smoke. But prettiest of all was the sight of the German trenches where they ran in plain view by Wytschaete and Messines. The *communiqué* says that "we shelled the enemy's trenches effectively." It certainly looked effective. Just where the yellow-brown line of the trenches ran, visible to the naked eye, a small white puff of smoke rose from the ground, seemingly exactly from the trench itself. A minute later another similar puff appeared 50 yards to the left, still, apparently, directly over the line. Then, farther to the left, a third and then a fourth, and so on until it looked as if someone had planted little silvery shrubs all along the German parapets, each shrub slowly growing taller and thinning out to make way for a later comer. It was, of course, impossible to tell to 20 yards or so whether the shells were actually dropping on the trench itself, but they were most unpleasantly near. And on our hilltop we returned thanks that we were not behind the German sandbags in the front line.

It all ended, as those daily "strafes" do, for no visible reason; it just languished and tapered off into nothing. The same thing is happening somewhere along this front at almost every moment. From no apparent cause, except that they think that perhaps they have left us alone too long, the enemy begin, first with a single gun and then gradually increasing until a full-blown "strafe" is at its height. Sometimes we begin And presumably we always have at least as good a reason as they. It is conjectured that, on one side and the other, there may be one life lost for each two tons of ammunition fired away. And next day you may read in the *communiqué* that there has been heavy shelling in the neighbourhood of Blank, or that there was artillery activity at Dash. It is an extraordinary war.

The fighting in the St. Eloi region and at other points on the salient continued during the last fortnight of April. On the 19th, after heavy artillery preparation, the enemy's infantry carried two of our craters and the same day assaulted "The Bluff," and our positions north of Ypres at Wieltje and on the Ypres-Langemarck road. They claimed to have occupied 700 yards of our line on the road and to have captured during the day 1 officer, 108 men and 2 machine guns.

The King's Shropshire Light Infantry were ordered to recover the lost position, which the enemy had been busy consolidating with feverish haste. New communication trenches had been cut; machine guns ensconced; and loopholes protected by steel plates.

On Good Friday (April 21) the sky became overclouded, and an hour after sunset the rain fell in torrents, flooding trenches, turning craters into ponds and the ground into a quagmire.

"You've got to help consolidate this trench," observed an officer to one of our men. "Consolidate what? . . This porridge!" was the rejoinder.

The mud was never less than knee, in places thigh or even arm-pit, deep; the water in the craters was sufficient to drown the tallest. The only method of advancing was either to crawl frog-wise, pushing one's rifle before one, or else to wade with rifle carried above the head.

Through the inky darkness, drenched by the never-ceasing rain, the Shropshires slowly moved forward. A splash and a gurgling cry revealed that some soldier had fallen into a crater and was drowning. Bursting shells spouted geysers of mud over the prone or wading men. The wounded had to be slowly extricated from the swamp. One unwounded man stuck in the mud lay helpless and undiscovered until the morning of April 25.

[*Official Photograph.*

AFTER A BRITISH ATTACK.
Wounded on their way to a dressing station.

The attack was delivered in three columns, and the difficulties may be imagined from the fact that one of the columns took hours to cover 200 yards. The column on the right did not reach the enemy's trenches till 1.30 a.m. on April 22. They took possession of them in spite of heavy rifle, grenade and machine-gun fire. Later, cheering was heard to their left. The centre column had reached its objective. At 5 a.m. the enemy massed near a ruined cottage for a counter-attack. It was repulsed. By this time the left column had straggled up. Another counter-attack failed and our line was completely re-established.

During the action the French artillery to the left vigorously bombarded the sector east of

THE CHARGE OF THE NORTHUMBERLAND AND ROYAL FUSILIERS AT ST. ELOI.

Dashing through the enemy's barbed-wire entanglements when they took the German first and second line trenches.

the Ypres-Pilkem road. Of individual deeds of gallantry a few may be recounted.

A lance-corporal spent 6½ hours, from 4 a.m. to 10.30, getting a wounded man back a distance of 600 yards. He carried him at first, till wounded in the shoulder; then he dragged and pushed him through the mud, being, after daylight, all the time under heavy fire, and when he got him in was himself in a state of complete exhaustion. A private, after being wounded in the knee, managed to crawl into the German trench and refused to leave because we had insufficient strength, as he thought, to hold it. He stayed there, helping to repulse two counter-attacks, for 36 hours; and then he had to be carried out on a stretcher. Another private held a sap successfully against a counter-attack single-handed. One officer went on directing the attack with one arm literally hanging by a shred. A sergeant spent two hours on the following day digging a wounded man out of the mud in daylight, being sniped at the whole time. A private in the R.A.M.C. attended to between 30 and 40 wounded men in the open, being himself wounded in the head while he was doing it. He went on, and afterwards organized parties for bringing in isolated wounded left in the mud.

"We have been compelled," ran the German official report, "to evacuate our newly won trenches on the Langemarck-Ypres road on account of high floods, which made consolidation impossible." Probably British bombs, rifles and bayonets also contributed, in no small measure, to the rearward movement!

On the front from St. Eloi to Arras there was no cessation of the fighting and cannonading. In the sector Loos—Arras there were violent engagements during the last week of February. On the 22nd the Germans who the night before had broken the first line of trenches at the Givenchy Wood were dislodged. The seven battalions of the enemy had suffered severely from curtain, rifle and machine-gun fire. On the same day the Germans south-east of Roclincourt exploded a mine, but were unable to take possession of the crater. In their turn, the Allies, on the 26th, exploded mines in two galleries in the vicinity of Vimy, and east of the road from Neuville St. Vaast to La Folie; on March 2 they blew up a mine under an old crater which the enemy was occupying and they captured the new crater thus formed.

The same day the Hohenzollern Redoubt, which, it will be remembered, had checked the advance of the British left at the Battle of Loos, was again and for several days afterwards the scene of a sanguinary struggle. At 5.45 a.m. five mines which had been placed by the British under the German front-line trenches were exploded on a frontage which was roughly that of the National Gallery in Trafalgar Square. Down the slight rise in the ground came a fearful avalanche of clods, sand-bags and mangled bodies. A few minutes later Irish troops threaded their way through the débris to occupy the newly formed craters and to bomb the Germans escaping into their communication trenches. The craters were taken with a loss of only 60 men.

The Irish were not left for long in undisturbed possession. A deluge of shells of all calibres and kinds was poured on this narrow spot by the German guns in the background. The rallied and reinforced German infantry rushed out of the communication trenches to recover the lost ground. Grenades thrown by hand or fired from rifles burst among the Irish. The German snipers were busily engaged in picking off any man whose body was visible, but with grenades and bayonet our gallant soldiers maintained their position. During the next few days the enemy constantly counter-attacked and endeavoured by mines to expel their assailants. In the course of the action numerous feats of daring were performed. For example, a lance-corporal, not content with throwing one bomb at a time, filled two sand-bags with some 40 grenades and hurled the bags at a party of advancing Germans, the survivors of whom fled. On March 18, however, the Germans by exploding mines captured three of the craters at the Hohenzollern Redoubt.

On the 23rd we raided successfully a trench near the Béthune - La Bassée road, and the enemy exploded mines north of the La Bassée canal and others north-east of Neuve Chapelle, while he delivered an unsuccessful grenade attack north of Arras. The next day great activity was shown by both sides in the sector between the La Bassée canal and Arras. On the 26th, near the Hohenzollern Redoubt, there was crater fighting in which our men were victorious; opposite Hulluch the Germans exploded mines, but the British established themselves in the craters; and there were fierce encounters south of Neuville St. Vaast. At the beginning of April, both sides exploded mines at the Hohenzollern Redoubt and near the Hulluch quarries.

North-west of Lens, on April 13, a small party raided the German front-line trenches and killed some of the occupants. The German Headquarters Staff, three days later, reported that "on both sides of the La Bassée canal, there was artillery activity and increased violence in mine fighting," and that "in the region of Vermelles, a British position over 60 yards in extent was destroyed by mine explosions." This untoward incident appears to have occurred in the neighbourhood of the Hulluch quarries. The next day—Sunday, the 16th—our troops successfully raided the enemy trenches south of the Béthune-La Bassée road. On the 19th there was grenade fighting round the Hulluch quarries, and mining activity there and south of Givenchy-en-Gohelle. On the 26th and 27th we raided the enemy trenches south of the La Bassée canal, and there was an encounter with the Germans south of Souchez. The day before the enemy had made four unsuccessful attacks between the La Bassée canal and the Ypres salient near Armentières.

Coinciding with the abortive rising at Dublin, the Germans on the morning of the 27th gassed the Inniskillings and Dublin Fusiliers defending the "Chalk-pit salient" south of Hulluch. This point was doubtless selected by the Crown Prince of Bavaria for special attention because the troops garrisoning the salient were countrymen of Casement. If they had not stood firm, German wireless would have informed the Americans and other neutrals that the Allies could no longer count on the Irish troops. If these were the calculations of the German commanders, they were woefully disappointed. All through the previous day and night the enemy's artillery had been bombarding the area on which the British had established themselves during the Battle of Loos. The Hohenzollern Redoubt trenches were

AFTER THE BATTLE OF ST. ELOI. [*Official Photographs.*

German prisoners captured by the Northumberland Fusiliers and the Royal Fusiliers. Smaller picture: Men of the "Fighting Fifth" returning to the trenches.

[After War Office Official Film.

MEN OF THE CONNAUGHT RANGERS WAITING IN A TRENCH.

attacked. Between the Redoubt and Hullueh a mine was exploded. Other mines were sprung north-east of Vermelles and north-east of the Double Crassier. Great scarlet glares showed the expectant troops in the vicinity where these events were happening.

The morning of the 27th broke clear and fair. There was a faint breeze blowing from the north-east. Suddenly, at 5.10 a.m., the Germans diseharged their poisonous gas, directing the nozzles of the cylinders towards the "Chalk-pit Salient." Simultaneously a barrage of lachrymatory shells was laid down on our support and reserve lines to prevent reinforcements being sent to the assistance of the garrison.

Out of the little satchels slung across their shoulders the Irishmen pulled their gas helmets which they has ily donned. In the midst of th gas, which slowly drifted over and between them, they awaited the coming onset. The Germans, who pose as expert psychologists, delayed the attack. Perhaps they calculated that the Irish, as Celts, would not bear the delay with that stolid equanimity which is characteristic of the English and Scotch. At 7.30 a.m. a second gas cloud was discharged, and the salient was so furiously bombarded that the parapet, at its angle, was in places completely blown away. A few minutes later the infantry attack was launched. If the Germans expected to find panic-stricken or friendly opponents, they were utterly mistaken. As at Le Cateau, and at the second Battle of Ypres, the Inniskillings and the Dublin Fusiliers proved to the Germans that the Celts of our islands were as fine fighting material as the deseendants of the Angles, Saxons, Danes, and Normans.

The barbed wire protecting the southern side of the salient had not been destroyed by the bombardment. There the enemy were mowed down by the rapid fire of the Dublin Fusiliers. Forty dead bodies, including the eorpse of an officer, remained hanging in the midst of the wire entanglement, and wounded crawling back and terrified fugitives told that the attack had failed. The assault on the angle and northern face of the salient was momentarily successful With fierce yells the Germans entered the trenches; but they remained in them only for a few minutes, for the Inniskillings in reserve hurled themselves on the foe, and at the point of the bayonet drove them helter-skelter back. As they fled a machine gun, skilfully posted, cut lanes through the flying enemy, very few of whom escaped to tell their comrades that, as in the critical days of July and August, 1914, the Kaiser's advisers had sadly blundered when they supposed that the Irish soldiers were anxious to abandon the British cause.

The last days of April witnessed considerable

IRISH TROOPS BOMBING

activity on both sides. On the 28th we raided German front-line trenches near the Double Crassier, and early the next morning, after heavy bombardment and under cover of gas, the enemy made two small attacks opposite Hulluch. But their gas was driven back owing to the wind shifting and the ground behind the enemy's line was coloured by it over a front of about 1,000 yards to a depth of about 3,000 yards. The Germans suffered a considerable number of casualties from it and our artillery fire; for many of them had run back through the British barrage of shells. Contemporaneously the Germans liberated gas north of the Messines-Wulverghem road at the southern extremity of the Ypres salient. The gas was followed by infantry, who were driven back by artillery fire and by British bombs and bayonets.

In the meanwhile, from Arras to the northern banks of the Somme, nothing occurred to indicate that the Allies proposed, as in fact was the case, seriously to attack the German line in this region. On February 27 a small German attack south-east of Albert was repulsed. On the 29th, north of the Somme, the British infantry and machine guns dispersed a party of the enemy who attempted to advance from their trenches under cover of a bombardment. We raided enemy trenches near Gommecourt on March 23. Four days later the enemy, after an intense bombardment, attempted to carry the front line position of the Allies between the Somme and the Avre in the neighbourhood of Maucourt. According to the German report, about the same time some weak English detachments took the offensive near La Boisselle, which, north-east of Albert, was soon to be the scene of desperate fighting. On April 7, after very heavy bombardment, German raiders captured one of our trenches north of the Angre, but were quickly expelled. Perhaps because they were apprehensive of our intentions at that point, the Germans, on April 11, again attacked near La Boisselle and took 29 prisoners and a machine-gun, their advance being preceded by flights of lachrymatory shells. Before the action ended they were in full retreat. The next day, April 12, the British trenches north-east of Carnoy were vainly assaulted by the enemy, but we lost some men of a party working on the front wire. Near Mametz, on April 19, a hostile raid was repulsed. We in our turn on the 22nd raided trenches south-west of Thiepval. It will be recollected that after the Battle of the Marne the German right wing had been extended to the plateau of Thiepval, north of Albert, and that the race for the sea had commenced when Joffre discovered that the Germans were slipping northwards from the plateau. On the occasion of the raid of April 22, 13 Germans were captured, and our men, by bombing, killed a large number of the enemy who had

AN ENEMY TRENCH. [After War Office Official Films.

taken refuge in their dug-outs. During the last days of April there was some desultory fighting near Fricourt, and on the 27th details of the Bedfordshire Regiment, with a loss of eight wounded, rushed enemy trenches near Carnoy, and by fierce hand-to-hand fighting drove the remainder of the garrison into their dug-outs, where they were bombed.

Between the Somme and the junction of the Oise and Aisne at Compiègne activity on neither side was pronounced. At the beginning of March an enemy work in the region of Beuvrainges was destroyed by the concentrated fire of several French batteries. On March 29 the Germans, after a violent bombardment, penetrated into an advanced portion of the French line west of Vermandovillers, north of Chaulnes. They were promptly expelled by a counter-attack, but, according to the German account, they took a captain and 57 men prisoners. On the 31st small posts in the region of Dompierre were ineffectually assaulted by the enemy. On April 10 a German reconnaissance in the district of Roye was dispersed by French rifle fire before the enemy reached the wire entanglements north of Andéchy. On the last day of the month the French positions in the region south of Lassigny between Attichy and Le Hamel were attacked: but although the Germans temporarily obtained a footing in one portion of the line, they made no permanent headway, a counter-attack expelling them.

North of the Aisne, and from the Aisne to the eastern environs of Rheims, matters were on the whole livelier from February 22 to the end of April. The French artillery on February 27 destroyed German fortifications in front of Venizel and east of Troyon, and on March 2 the enemy works to the east of Neuville and south of Berry-au-Bac were severely damaged by shell fire, while a strong German patrol which had attacked one of the French posts north of the Aisne was repulsed with considerable los the same day. On March 10 a vigorous effort was made by Saxon regiments to pierce the French line between Troyon and Berry-au-Bac. The attack was preceded by a violent bombardment, which lasted several hours. The point selected was the salient formed by the French trenches at the Bois des Buttes. From the meagre reports which were published, it appears that the Saxons fought their way into the western portion of the wood, and, if the German *communiqué* is to be believed, captured 737 unwounded prisoners, including 12 officers, and a revolving gun, 5 machine guns and 13 bomb mortars. The French, however, stated that the enemy were finally driven out of the position which they had taken. According to the Germans, it was 1,500 yards long and 1,100 yards deep.

Some days later, March 13 or 14, the enemy made three more attempts to carry the trenches on the north-west fringe of the Bois des Buttes

and on the 17th an attaek was directed against a small post to the south-east of the wood. It was repulsed after hand-grenade fighting. The Freneh artillery the same day bombarded the enemy positions in the regions of Ville-au-Bois and Craonne. The activity of the Germans at this point was probably intended to draw the Allied reserves away from the Battle of Verdun. The position of the French north of the Aisne, fighting as they were with a river at their back, had always been precarious, and a powerful German threat here was calculated to alarm them. Fortunately Joffre and de Castelnau were not Bazaine and MacMahon, and their wills were not to be shaken by mere demonstrations, and it was the French who during April took the offensive north of the Aisne. On the 11th of that month their artillery caught a strong German column marching on the road Des Dames and inflicted serious loss on it, and from the German *communiqué* of April 13 it would seem that our Allies delivered a gas attaek in the vieinity of Puisaleine, north-west of Compiègne. A German reeonnaissance which on the 24th sought to penetrate the French lines on the plateau of Paissy was repulsed with loss, and the next day, after artillery preparation, the Freneh earried a small wood to the south of the Bois-des-Buttes, taking 158 unwounded prisoners, including four officers, two maehine guns and a treneh mortar.

The area lying between Rheims and the Argonne had been the scene of the offensive of the Allies and the counter-offensive of the Germans in the late autumn and winter of 1915. While the Battle of Verdun progressed there was no rest in this part of the battle line, although the fighting had not the intensity which characterized the struggle round the great French fortress.

On the morning of February 25 the French attacked and captured an enemy salient to the south of St. Marie-à-Py, taking 300 prisoners,

BRITISH TROOPS IN A COMMUNICATION TRENCH, *Official Photographs.*
Taking up iron posts for wire entanglements. Smaller picture: Using a periscope.

[*After War Office Official Film.*

WITH AN IRISH DIVISION AT THE FRONT.
In a recently blown up trench.

including 5 officers and 16 non-commissioned officers. The next day the Germans endeavoured vainly to retake the salient. Four more of their officers and 20 more non-commissioned officers fell into the hands of the French, whose artillery at the same time bombarded the works of the enemy north of Ville-sur-Tourbe and in the region of Mont Têtu. On the 29th the batteries of our Ally wrecked the German organizations on or about Hill 193, and, west of Maisons-de-Champagne, the enemy exploded a mine, the crater of which was, however, occupied by the French. At the end of the first week of March the Germans strove to break through the French lines between Mont Têtu and Maisons-de-Champagne. Their flammenwerfer were lavishly employed, but, met by a barrage of shells, the attack did not materialize except on the left, where, in the vicinity of the latter point, a small advanced work, with —according to the German *communiqué*—2 officers and 150 men, fell into the hands of the enemy. The next day it was recovered by the French, who captured 85 prisoners, including 3 officers and a machine gun. The German counter-attack which followed was repulsed. On the 15th the French south of St. Soupplet carried a trench west of the Somme-Py-Souain road and took some prisoners. This achievement was denied by the German Staff, who asserted that the operation was unsuccessful and that the French had lost 2 officers, 150 unwounded prisoners and 2 machine guns.

Such were some of the incidents which occurred in Champagne. Nor was the hilly forest of the Argonne, which bounded on the left the battlefield of Verdun, neglected by either of the opponents in that gigantic and prolonged contest. On March 2 and earlier the French guns concentrated their fire on the woods of Cheppy and the German trenches and works north of La Harazée. The next day they also paid attention to the enemy's position at the Fille Morte, while a counter-mine was successfully exploded by the French engineers at St. Hubert. In the Bolonte Wood (north-east of Lachalade) a French attack was, according to the Germans, easily repulsed.

March 6 was signalised by mutual offensives. In the region of Courtes Chaussées a German post was destroyed by a mine which created an enormous crater. The French promptly organized its southern lip. The Germans, on the other hand, exploded two mines between the Haute Chevauchée and Hill 235, and their infantry soon after gained a footing at points in the French front-line trenches. They were, however, ejected, and the enemy were unable to occupy the craters. On March 8, it having been reported that German motor transport

BRITISH TROOPS ATTACKING THE ENEMY UNDER COVER OF SMOKE BOMBS. [L.E.A.

was using the roads in the region of Montfaucon, those roads received particular attention from the French gunners, who, on March 14 bombarded the Four-de-Paris sector, blowing up an ammunition depôt and injuring the enemy railways, roads, and organizations in the region of Montfaucon-Avocourt. Two days later the French *communiqué* ran: "In the Argonne we carried out concentrated fire on the German organization to the north-west of the Varennes Road, and against the batteries in action in the environs of Montfaucon."

On the 18th there was mine fighting to the advantage of the French in the sector of the Courtes Chaussées. A few days afterwards (March 20) German trenches to the north-east of the Four-de-Paris were wrecked by artillery fire, and at La Haute Chevauchée the bursting of French shells was followed by a discharge of sulphurous vapours from the subterranean reservoirs in which German chemists had stored the cylinders containing poisonous fumes. The next day there was grenade fighting at this point, and the French artillery poured a destructive fire on German works near the road from Vienne-le-Château to Binarville. On March 25 a German trench at the Courtes Chaussées was captured. A bombing post and shelter and an enemy work north of the Four-de-Paris were destroyed by a mine on March 29, similar damage being inflicted on the 30th at the Fille Morte and Hill 285. The next day enemy troops marching in the direction of Varennes were caught by the French artillery. The western spur of the Avocourt Wood was bombarded on April 3, a blockhouse destroyed and an enemy ammunition depôt blown up. On April 7 the German *communiqué*, after mentioning that French mine explosions to the north of Four-de-Paris had been followed by short encounters, announced that the French had employed flammenwerfer. Whether that was so or not, the Kaiser's troops had no legitimate ground for complaint. By introducing these inhuman and rarely effective weapons into warfare, they had laid themselves open to retaliation in kind. On the 12th four *camouflets* * were exploded by the French at the Fille Morte, the Haute-Chevauchée, and at Vauquois. After a grenade action, the southern lips of two craters in the sector of the Courtes Chaussées were occupied by our Allies. At Vauquois, on the 17th, an enemy post with its occupants was blown up by a mine. More mine fighting occurred on the 24th, when the French heavy guns also destroyed a German post and wrecked fifty yards of trench in the sector of the Four-de-Paris. On the 29th the French, by a *coup de main*, cleared out a German trench north of the Four-de-Paris and secured some prisoners.

What was happening east of the wooded barrier of the Argonne on both sides of the Meuse round Verdun has been already related in Chapters CXXIII and CXXV. South of Verdun, along the heights of the Meuse, round the west of the German salient of St. Mihiel, across the forest-clad region between the Meuse and the Moselle at Pont-à-Mousson, the gunners, infantrymen and miners of the opposing forces garrisoning or protecting the long labyrinth of trenches, redoubts, and dug-outs seldom had rest. On February 26 the French heavy artillery north-east of St. Mihiel bombarded sheds and depôts near Vigneulles. On March 2 the station of Vigneulles was shelled. Two fires broke out, several trains were struck and a locomotive destroyed. On the 4th the Germans sprung a mine near Les Eparges, the hill fortress captured with such heroism by the French the year before, but were unable to occupy the crater.

A week or so later (March 10) the Germans at St. Mihiel placed floating mines in the Meuse, which it was hoped would be carried down stream by the current. Fortunately they were fished up before they caused any damage. Important enemy hutments in the Heudicourt Wood, north of St. Mihiel, were bombarded on the 14th, and the station and store-houses of Lamarche were set on fire by the French artillery, which at this epoch paid special attention to the villages at the foot of the heights of the Meuse. East of the Forest of Apremont a German trench and numerous prisoners were captured on March 16. The next day a salient of the enemy's line in the Bois de Mortmare, west of Pont-à-Mousson, was carried by our Allies. On the 30th more floating mines were placed in the Meuse north of St. Mihiel by the Germans, but they did no damage. The next day the enemy cantonments at Varvinay, in the Forest of Apremont, were bombarded, and several ammunition wagons were exploded.

On April 5 the Germans north of St. Mihiel once more threw mines into the Meuse. They

* A *camouflet* is a small mine intended to break the enemy's mining galleries without disturbing the surface of the ground.



ON THE LOOK-OUT FOR ENEMY AIRCRAFT. [*Official Photograph.*

On the left two French soldiers using a range finder. On the right is a telescope for observation.

floated down and exploded on the French barrage without causing any damage. A week later (April 12) a train standing north of the station of Heudicourt, north-east of St. Mihiel, was successfully shelled by French long-range guns. These powerful pieces were constantly interfering with the German communications. For example, on April 14 they dropped shells on the station of Novéant-sur-Moselle and on the bridge of Corny, north of Pont-à-Mousson. Towards the end of April, on the 20th, which was the 59th day of the Battle of Verdun, three attacks were delivered in the morning against the French positions at Les Eparges. The first two were completely repulsed; in the course of the third the Germans carried 220 yards of trench, but were immediately afterwards driven out. This engagement was converted by the pens of the German General Staff into a trifling but, on the part of the Germans, successful skirmish. "German patrols," said these artists, "advanced on the Combres Height into an enemy position and brought back one officer and 76 men prisoners." During the remaining days of April the artillery of the French was particularly busy; thus on the 29th it was effectively replying to the German trench mortars in the Forest of Apremont.

In Lorraine and Alsace there was a plentiful expenditure of ammunition and a considerable number of minor engagements, which, like those between Arras and the Somme, might or might not be the prelude to a great offensive in the near future. On February 27th there was another of the interminable artillery duels at the Hartmannsweilerkopf. The same day an enemy detachment in the region of Senones was shelled and dispersed. The night before the Germans had delivered on a front of a mile and a quarter to the south-east of Celles in the valley of the Plaine, a strong attack which had completely failed. On March 1 the French artillery opened on the enemy's communication line in the valley of the Thur. The next day strong German patrols attacking the French posts in the valley of the Lauch were repulsed with grenades. East of Seppois several German trenches on the right bank of the Great Largus were captured on the 3rd: this was denied, however, by the Germans. In the middle of March there was great activity on the part of the opposing artilleries in the sector of La Chapelotte and in the valley of the Thur, and the French raided successfully the enemy trenches of Stossweier and Carspach. On the 16th the Germans attacked south of the Thur

French positions near Burnhaupt, but, checked by a barrage of shells projected by the French artillery, they made no progress. At 7 p.m. on March 18 one of the heavy guns of the enemy which had been detailed to alarm the civilians of Belfort fired shells into that town. North-east of Badonweiller at Thiaville, in Lorraine, there was some severe fighting during March. The Germans admitted that they had been driven from the "Shooting-box" position on April 4, but they claim to have recovered it on the 18th. The French did not admit this reverse; according to them some enemy elements who had penetrated into the French trenches were driven out by a counter-attack. On April 23 the French carried a small enemy post in the direction of the Col du Bonhomme. On the 24th, south-east of Badonweiller, the Germans, after an intense bombardment, tried to capture a French salient at La Chapelotte; some of the enemy gained a footing in the north-east part of the salient, but were promptly dislodged. A similar fate attended another German attack north of Senones. The enemy losses in the La Chapelotte engagement alone were estimated at 1,000, about the total losses of the British at the decisive battle of Paardeberg in the Boer War. On the 26th the Germans, if they are to be believed, carried the first and second French line upon and opposite Hill 542 north-east of Celles, some small detachments entering the third line of trenches and blowing up numerous shelters. On the 29th they attempted, according to the French *communiqué*, three *coups-de-main* during the night; one was directed against the French trenches in the Ban-de-Sapt, another at the Tête-de-Faux, and the third, south of Largitzen: all three were repulsed with heavy losses.

While the struggle above ground and under its surface went on uninterruptedly, but with varying violence, the air was also embraced in the area of conflict. Observation balloons ascended, and airships and aeroplanes crossed and recrossed the immense front of battle. The war in the air cannot be fully dealt with here, but a few incidents may be related so that the reader may be vividly reminded of the new arm, which had had so much influence on both strategy and tactics.

On February 26 nine of the French bombarding aeroplanes travelled behind the German lines and dropped 144 bombs on the Metz-Sablons station, and on the same day another of

THE FRENCH AIR SERVICE. [*Official Photograph.*
At work at a balloon inflation station.



A FRENCH DOUBLE-ENGINED AEROPLANE

Fitted with an aircraft mitrailleuse.

the French aerial squadrons inflicted similar damage on the enemy establishments at Chambley, north-west of Pont-à-Mousson. In the former raid an aeroplane was shot down by anti-aircraft guns and two officers captured. On the last day of February a French military transport train was held up by a German aeroplane between Besançon and Jussey, and it was claimed that the crew of the aeroplane had successfully attacked with their machine-gun a convoy train. A day or so later French air-squadrons wrecked the stations at Chambley and Bensdorf and injured the German works at Avricourt, north-east of Lunéville. On March 7 sixteen French aeroplanes were again above the Metz-Sablons station, dealing out destruction on the trains below them. Attacked by a German aerial squadron the French aviators returned with the loss of one aeroplane, the engine of which had failed. On the 14th a squadron of eleven French aeroplanes bombed the station at Brieulles. A group of seventeen on the 17th were again over the Metz-Sablons and also over the Conflans station, while another squadron dropped five bombs on the station at Arneville and ten on the aerodrome of Dieuze. The aviation-ground of Habsheim and the goods station at Mülhausen were the objectives of twenty-eight French machines on the 18th. The Germans assert that they brought down four of the raiders. On the 30th the stations of Metz-Sablons and Pagny-sur-Moselle were attacked, and on April 1 and 2 the station of Etain, the German bivouacs in the neighbourhood of Nantillois, and the village of Azennes and Brieulles-sur-Meuse. As "a reprisal for the bombardment of Dunkirk by a Zeppelin," on the 2nd, thirty-one Allied machines dropped eighty-three bombs of heavy calibre on the enemy cantonments of Keyem, Eessen, Terrest and Houthulst. During the night of April 10–11 a French squadron bombed the stations of Nantillois and Brieulles. Although somewhat hampered by an intense mist, another squadron in the small hours of the 15th–16th discharged twelve bombs on the Conflans and eight on the Arneville stations, sixteen on the Rombach factories, and eleven on the railroads at Pagny and Ars-sur-Meurthe. The stations at Nantillois and Brieulles, the village of Etain, the bivouacs in the Forest of Spincourt, the cantonments of Viéville and Thillot were treated in like fashion. On the night of the 23rd–24th forty-eight bombs of heavy calibre were released over the station of Vyfwege, east of the Forest of Houthulst, in the environs of Ypres, and places on German lines of communication in the Verdun region received attention, twenty-one shells and eight incendiary bombs being dropped on the station of Longuyon, five shells on that of Stenay,

AERIAL DREADNOUGHT.

A quick-firing gun on a French aeroplane.

twelve on the camps to the east of Dun and thirty-two shells on German establishments in the Montfaucon region, and on the station of Nantillois. After sunset on April 26 squadrons of Freneh aeroplanes loosed thirty-seven bombs of 120 mm. on different stations in the valley of the Aire, twenty-five bombs of this calibre on bivouaes in the valley of the Orne, six similar bombs and two ineendiary bombs on the station at Thionville and eight bombs of 120 mm. on the Conflans station. On Thursday, April 27, a Freneh squadron bombed the station of Lamarche, in the Woevre, and on the night of April 27–8 the stations of Audun-le-Romans, Grandpré and Challeranges, and also hutments near Spincourt. The ensuing night a faetory in full operation at Hayange in German Lorraine and bivouaes to the east of Azannes were, in spite of very violent wind, bombarded by a Freneh squadron engaged on its hundredth raid.

An analysis of the French, British and German *communiqués* reveals that, so far as raiding squadrons were concerned, the balance of aetivity was heavily on the side of the Allies. Nevertheless, oeeasionally a German squadron crossed the Allied lines. For instanee, on April 27 the Germans reported that the barraeks and station of St. Ménéhould had been bombed and the railway line in the Noblette Valley, south of Suippes, had been liberally shelled by their aviators.

Several of the French raids above mentioned, aimed at strategie points on the enemy's eommunieations, were, it will be notieed, noeturnal. The Allied squadrons during the night were able to evade the German aerial patrols. In the daytime that was not so easily aeeomplished, and duels and miniature battles in the air were of frequent oeeurrenee. Thus, on February 27, Adjutant Navarre, on a monoplane in the Verdun region, brought down by machine-gun fire two German aeroplanes. He had previously aeeounted for three of the enemy maehines. On the 29th the British aviators had twenty encounters in the air and Sir Douglas Haig reported that an Albatross was brought down south of Merville and that another burst into flames and fell near La Bassée. Our loss was only one maehine.

About this date Flight Sub-Lieut. Simms, R.N.A.S., attaeked and shot down a hostile aeroplane, whieh fell in flames elose to the Belgian treneh es. On Mareh 2, near Douaumont, the Freneh aviator Navarre wrecked an

ADJUTANT NAVARRE (on right),
Who brought down by machine-gun fire two German aeroplanes in the Verdun region.

Albatross. Six days later fifteen German machines were put to flight by the French, and two were brought down in Champagne, three near Verdun. On the other hand, the German airman, Lieut. Leffers, shot down a British biplane, north of Bapaume, on Mareh 15, and over Haumont (north of Verdun) a large French battle-plane was put out of action. About the same time Lieut. Guynemer further distinguished himself near Verdun. The lieutenant was a notable destroyer of German airmen

Starting on his daily hunt, piloting a new and smaller aeroplane than usual, but a much swifter machine, he notieed two German aircraft sailing above him and placed himself behind one of these. When he judged the range suitable he riddled the German with bullets. The German maehine turned over and crashed to the ground.

After this first vietory Guynemer swooped down on the seeond German aeroplane, but



THE ARRIVAL OF RUSSIAN TROOPS IN FRANCE.

Parading for disembarcation
Smaller picture: The General Commandant welcomes a Russian officer.

misjudging his speed, through unfamiliarity with his machine, he forged ahead of the German after firing some seven or eight shots, which went wide. The enemy, who thus had the advantage, opened fire on the Frenchman and riddled his engine casing with bullets. Splinters struck Guynemer in the face, cutting somewhat deeply into his cheek and nose, while two bullets went through his left arm.

Guynemer let himself drop like a stone for about 1,000 feet, so as to give his opponent the impression that he had brought him down. The German, thinking the battle won, proceeded on his way. Meanwhile Guynemer recovered himself, and steering his machine with one hand, succeeded in landing within the French lines.*

On March 18 Navarre scored his seventh German aeroplane. The same day an aerial engagement between British and German airmen took place near Ypres and La Bassée, and a German machine was brought down near Radinghem. On March 30 there was another encounter, when we, in our turn, lost three machines. In Champagne, on the 30th, the French airman, Doutrien, brought down a Fokker, and the brave and chivalrous German, Lieut. Immelmann, east of Bapaume, got the

* This incident was reported by the *Matin*.

better of a British biplane, capturing its two occupants. From the German *communiqué* of March 31 he appears to have accounted for another—his 13th. The same day, near Belfort, an Aviatik was destroyed by a French air pilot. On April 1 and 2 there were numerous oncounters. A British biplane was forced to descend near Hollebeke in the German lines; a German machine was shot down in the region of Lens, and one of our airmen drove off five hostile machines. The next day, south of Souchez, a German aeroplane was brought to the ground.

On April 5 the German Staff published an untruthful table of the results of the aerial fighting in March. As this table is valuable evidence of the straits to which the German authorities were reduced in their efforts to conceal from the German and Austro-Hungarian peoples the facts of the position, we reproduce it.

[*Official Photograph.*

LIEUT. GUYNEMER.

The French airman carrying the colours presented to the French Air Service.

FLIGHT SUB-LIEUT. SIMMS, R.N.A.S.

Attacked and shot down an enemy aeroplane, which fell in flames close to the Belgian trenches.

"The following are the losses of the aerial battles on the Western Front during March:

How lost.	German.	French and British.
In aerial battles	7	38
Shot down from the earth ...	3	4
Missing	4	—
Involuntary descent in German lines	—	2
Totals	14	44

"Twenty-five of these enemy aeroplanes fell into our hands. The descent of the other nineteen machines has been observed without leaving any doubt."

The French in their *communiqué* of March 30 stated that on this one day alone they had brought down six German aeroplanes and that two more were shot down by anti-aircraft guns!

In the early part of the month a good specimen of a Fokker machine was captured by the British under the following amusing circumstances:

A strapping soldier, an ex-Guardsman now belonging to a signal company of the Royal Engineers, was trundling along on his bicycle, when he suddenly came upon the scene of the landing. He beheld an aeroplane which was clearly not of British pattern, and a well-

swathed figure standing by it. The idea that it was likely to prove an enemy machine never entered the soldier's head. He frankly admits that he took it to be a French aeroplane which had been forced to alight. Having dismounted, he went up to the Boche with his hand extended and a genial smile. The German shook it silently and sadly. The well-meaning Tommy then began to flounder into pigeon-French. The Boche murmured and slowly wagged his head.

The soldier then moved towards the machine with the idea of investigating the trouble which had brought it to earth. It was just at this juncture a party of Fusiliers came around a bend of the road. Taking in the situation —a black cross aeroplane on the ground and what was evidently one of its occupants trying to get the engine to work again—they came on at the double, unslinging their rifles as they came.

The Sapper's presence of mind seems to have gone by the board. He suspected some trick and took to his heels. This was nearly his undoing. The Fusiliers, concluding that he was a Boche trying to make away with papers or photographs, paused and let fly. Happily the aim was too hurried to be good. The soldier took a flying leap into the roadside ditch and there awaited capture.

When he learned that he had missed the chance of making this fine capture himself single-handed his language was quite unrepeatable.

The last straw was the guttural chortling of the German airman, who had never moved throughout and was not therefore fired at.*

On the 8th a Fokker was brought down near Esnes, and another on the 9th in Champagne. The Germans assert that on one of these days the French lost two aeroplanes, and that a, presumably, British aeroplane was "seen to crash to earth in the village of Loos," while a fourth Allied machine fell into the Caillette Forest. The next day, near Badonweiller, a German aeroplane met a summary fate at the hands of a French pilot. The two passengers were killed. On the 11th the British fought eight duels and without loss brought down one machine.

Lieut. Berthold killed the pilot and wounded the observer of a British biplane north-west of Péronne on the 16th. In an aerial fight east of Arras another British biplane was reported on the 24th by the German Staff to have been brought down. This statement seems to, and doubtless does, conflict with Sir Douglas Haig's dispatch of April 25. "Yesterday," he telegraphed, "there was considerable aerial activity. Twenty-nine combats took place. One of our reconnaissances was persistently attacked. All the attacks were driven off and two hostile machines were seen to fall to the ground in the German lines. *All our machines returned safely.*" †

The French *communiqué* of the same day contained still more satisfactory news as to what happened in the air the day before:

Near Vauquois an enemy aeroplane was forced to land in his lines after a fight, and was destroyed by our gun-fire.

In the region of Verdun one of our chasing aeroplanes brought down a German aeroplane, which fell on Poivre Hill, 50 yards from our trenches.

A third machine, brought down by one of our pilots, fell in the Forges Wood.

Finally, a Fokker, riddled with machine-gun fire at point-blank range by one of our airmen, dived vertically in the region of Hattonchattel.

During the night of April 24-25 one of our dirigible airships threw ten shells of 155mm. and six shells of 220mm. on the station of Conflans.

On the 26th there were nineteen combats on the British front. A German two-seater aeroplane was three times attacked by a single-seater British machine at a great height. The enemy pilot was shot through the heart and the observer through the body. The German machine crashed to the earth, with the engine full on, from a height of 14,000 feet. One of our reconnaissances was attacked by eight hostile aeroplanes, one of which was brought down. Two of our machines were damaged, but all returned to their base.

The next day (Thursday, April 27) the French airmen scored four times in duels, and a Fokker, fired on by the machine gun of a Nieuport, fell vertically into the German lines in the region of Nesles-Chaulnes. Against these successes must be set (if they really occurred) three German victories in the air—two west of the Meuse, and the third east of St. Dié in the Vosges.

At the end of April an Aviatik pursued by French "chaser-planes" was obliged to descend in the Argonne and pilot and observer were captured. In the region of Roye one Fokker was destroyed and another forced to earth, and a third near Les Eparges and a fourth near Douaumont were brought down, as were two more of the enemy aircraft south of Verdun, while the British accounted for a couple the same day. The claim of the Germans was that Lieut. Boelcke had "shot down, south of Vaux, his 14th enemy aeroplane," and that another French machine had been put out of action near Verdun. On the last day of the month Sir Douglas Haig reported that "there were seven combats in the air, in the course of which one hostile machine was driven down in the German lines, and a second got out of control and fell on the roofs of Bapaume."

During the same period airships were not inactive. On April 3 one of them dropped thirty-four bombs on the station at Audun-le-Romain; on the 26th, at 12.30 a.m., a German airship came over the Franco-Belgian coast,

* This occurred on April 8.

† The italics are ours.

[*Official Photographs.*

RUSSIAN TROOPS IN FRANCE

Preparing communication trenches.

but did no damage. On the following night (April 26–7) three French dirigibles dropped numerous heavy projectiles on the stations of Etain and Bensdorf and on the Arneville Railway.

A growing feature in the war was the multiplication of captive balloons. The life of those who occupied their cars was precarious. Not only were they targets for artillery and rifles, but they were frequently attacked by aeroplanes. On March 15 a German balloon was forced by a British aeroplane to descend; and on April 2 (Saturday) a "Drache," set fire to by a French aeroplane, was brought down. On other occasions we hear of captive balloons becoming unmoored and drifting aimlessly above and beyond their own lines.

Nor were the aerodromes and hangars—the ports, as it were, of the aerial fleets—unmolested. Thus, on March 31, the German aircraft bombed the French flying-ground at Rosnay, west of Reims.

The counter to aircraft was the anti-aircraft gun. During this period these weapons, the quality of which was being very rapidly improved, frequently registered hits. On March 30 the French "special guns" successfully shelled a German machine, which fell in flames in the enemy's lines, east of Tahure; on or about April 2 a German "Archibald" by a direct hit brought down an Allied aeroplane in flames south-west of Lens. In the middle of the month, near Pervyse, an Allied aeroplane was similarly shot down and was subsequently destroyed by German gun-fire. On April 24 near the celebrated wood of Ploegstreet the British anti-aircraft guns got home on a German aeroplane, the pilot and observer being killed. It was obvious that the improvement of the machines and the consequent increase of safety for the pilots and observers in them was being counterbalanced by the growth in numbers and power of the "Archibalds" and by the enhanced skill of the anti-aircraft gunners.

Among the other memorable events which occurred in France between February 22 and May 1, 1916, must be mentioned the destruction of one of the towers of the Loos "Tower Bridge," and the arrival in France of a Russian

contingent, of more units of the New Army, of Anzacs, South Africans, and detachments from the British forces in the East.

On April 17 a *Times* Special Correspondent wrote :

The disappearance of another landmark of the war zone has to be recorded. Three days ago I was in the Loos region, and of the notorious "twin towers" one had disappeared. The solitary remaining tower looks peculiarly grotesque and lopsided. Presumably its days also are numbered.

Three days after that was penned the first contingent of Russian troops landed at Marseilles. They had been transported across Siberia, and had travelled thence by sea-transport from Dalny to the Mediterranean, *via* the Suez Canal. General Joffre, on behalf of the French Army, welcomed them in the following Order of the Day :—

Our faithful Ally, Russia, whose armies are already fighting so valiantly against Germany, Austria, and Turkey, has wished to give further proof of her friendship to France, and even more signal proof of her devotion to the common cause.

Russian soldiers, selected from among the bravest and led by the best-known officers, are coming to fight in our ranks.

You will welcome them as brothers. You will show them how warm is the feeling you have for those who have left their country to fight at our side.

On behalf of the French Army I welcome the officers, non-commissioned officers, and men who have landed in France. I bow before their colours, upon which will soon be inscribed the glorious names of common victories.

The Russians were received with rapturous enthusiasm in what was probably the oldest city of France, which had been founded by the pioneers of European civilization, the ancient Greeks, centuries before the Birth of Christ and at an epoch when the ancestors of the Germans had scarcely emerged from the Stone Age. The newcomers had volunteered to come over to the Western Front in order to demonstrate to their French and British comrades Russia's sympathy. Among them was a boy of 13, Ivan by name. When they learned on landing of the taking of Trebizond by the Army of the Grand Duke Nicholas, their joy broke all bounds, and they shouted with one accord "Vive la France!"

Most of the Russians proceeded to the trenches in Champagne; a few of them travelled to England. There, on April 28, in the Quadrangle of the War Office, Lord Kitchener reviewed a party of them, among whom were a number of men sent to England in connexion with munition work.

END OF VOLUME EIGHT.

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

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